diff --git a/lee/key_protocol/src/key_management/group_key_holder.rs b/lee/key_protocol/src/key_management/group_key_holder.rs
index 4f324ba2..2fc6b5fb 100644
--- a/lee/key_protocol/src/key_management/group_key_holder.rs
+++ b/lee/key_protocol/src/key_management/group_key_holder.rs
@@ -186,7 +186,8 @@ impl GroupKeyHolder {
     /// Returns `Err` if the ciphertext is too short or the AES-GCM authentication tag
     /// doesn't verify (wrong key or tampered data).
     pub fn unseal(sealed: &[u8], own_key: &SealingSecretKey) -> Result<Self, SealError> {
-        // kem_ciphertext (ML_KEM_768_CIPHERTEXT_LEN) + nonce (12) = header, then AES-GCM tag (16) minimum.
+        // kem_ciphertext (ML_KEM_768_CIPHERTEXT_LEN) + nonce (12) = header, then AES-GCM tag (16)
+        // minimum.
         const HEADER_LEN: usize = ML_KEM_768_CIPHERTEXT_LEN + 12;
         const MIN_LEN: usize = HEADER_LEN + 16;
 
diff --git a/lee/state_machine/core/src/encryption/shared_key_derivation.rs b/lee/state_machine/core/src/encryption/shared_key_derivation.rs
index d87e4107..4b46165a 100644
--- a/lee/state_machine/core/src/encryption/shared_key_derivation.rs
+++ b/lee/state_machine/core/src/encryption/shared_key_derivation.rs
@@ -118,8 +118,9 @@ impl SharedSecretKey {
 
     /// Receiver: decapsulate the shared secret from a KEM ciphertext.
     ///
-    /// Returns `None` if the `EphemeralPublicKey` is not exactly [`ML_KEM_768_CIPHERTEXT_LEN`] bytes — callers on
-    /// the wallet scan path should skip the output rather than panic on malformed chain data.
+    /// Returns `None` if the `EphemeralPublicKey` is not exactly [`ML_KEM_768_CIPHERTEXT_LEN`]
+    /// bytes — callers on the wallet scan path should skip the output rather than panic on
+    /// malformed chain data.
     ///
     /// `d` and `z` are the two 32-byte halves of the FIPS 203 `ViewingSecretKey` seed.
     #[must_use]