diff --git a/Cargo.lock b/Cargo.lock
index 4fd6116e..125e57e2 100644
--- a/Cargo.lock
+++ b/Cargo.lock
@@ -3600,7 +3600,6 @@ dependencies = [
  "sequencer_service_rpc",
  "serde_json",
  "tempfile",
- "test_program_methods",
  "testcontainers",
  "testnet_initial_state",
  "token_core",
diff --git a/artifacts/test_program_methods/group_pda_router.bin b/artifacts/test_program_methods/group_pda_router.bin
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ad33d724
Binary files /dev/null and b/artifacts/test_program_methods/group_pda_router.bin differ
diff --git a/artifacts/test_program_methods/group_pda_spender.bin b/artifacts/test_program_methods/group_pda_spender.bin
index 55820394..16efb8a4 100644
Binary files a/artifacts/test_program_methods/group_pda_spender.bin and b/artifacts/test_program_methods/group_pda_spender.bin differ
diff --git a/integration_tests/Cargo.toml b/integration_tests/Cargo.toml
index feedf24b..cb5277d2 100644
--- a/integration_tests/Cargo.toml
+++ b/integration_tests/Cargo.toml
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ ata_core.workspace = true
 indexer_service_rpc.workspace = true
 sequencer_service_rpc = { workspace = true, features = ["client"] }
 wallet-ffi.workspace = true
-test_program_methods.workspace = true
 testnet_initial_state.workspace = true
 
 url.workspace = true
diff --git a/integration_tests/tests/group_pda.rs b/integration_tests/tests/group_pda.rs
deleted file mode 100644
index fba54a16..00000000
--- a/integration_tests/tests/group_pda.rs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
-#![expect(
-    clippy::tests_outside_test_module,
-    reason = "Integration test file, not inside a #[cfg(test)] module"
-)]
-
-//! Group-owned private PDA lifecycle integration test.
-//!
-//! Demonstrates:
-//! 1. GMS creation and sealed distribution between controllers.
-//! 2. Key agreement: both controllers derive identical keys from the shared GMS.
-//! 3. Forward secrecy: ratcheting the GMS produces different keys, locking out removed members.
-
-use anyhow::{Context as _, Result};
-use integration_tests::TestContext;
-use key_protocol::key_management::group_key_holder::GroupKeyHolder;
-use log::info;
-use nssa::{AccountId, program::Program};
-use nssa_core::program::PdaSeed;
-use tokio::test;
-
-/// Group PDA lifecycle: create group, distribute GMS, verify key agreement, revoke.
-#[test]
-async fn group_pda_lifecycle() -> Result<()> {
-    let ctx = TestContext::new().await?;
-
-    let alice_holder = GroupKeyHolder::new();
-    assert_eq!(alice_holder.epoch(), 0);
-    let pda_seed = PdaSeed::new([42_u8; 32]);
-    let group_pda_spender =
-        Program::new(test_program_methods::GROUP_PDA_SPENDER_ELF.to_vec()).unwrap();
-
-    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
-    // Act 1: GMS creation and sealed distribution
-    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-    info!("Act 1: creating group and distributing GMS");
-
-    let alice_npk = alice_holder
-        .derive_keys_for_pda(&pda_seed)
-        .generate_nullifier_public_key();
-
-    let bob_private_account = ctx.existing_private_accounts()[1];
-    let (bob_keychain, _) = ctx
-        .wallet()
-        .storage()
-        .user_data
-        .get_private_account(bob_private_account)
-        .cloned()
-        .context("Bob's private account not found")?;
-
-    // Alice seals GMS for Bob, Bob unseals
-    let sealed = alice_holder.seal_for(&bob_keychain.viewing_public_key);
-    let bob_holder =
-        GroupKeyHolder::unseal(&sealed, &bob_keychain.private_key_holder.viewing_secret_key)
-            .expect("Bob should unseal the GMS");
-
-    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
-    // Act 2: Key agreement
-    //
-    // Both controllers independently derive identical keys for the same PDA
-    // seed. Neither communicated any per-PDA keys — they derived them from
-    // the shared GMS.
-    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-    info!("Act 2: verifying key agreement");
-
-    let bob_npk = bob_holder
-        .derive_keys_for_pda(&pda_seed)
-        .generate_nullifier_public_key();
-    assert_eq!(
-        alice_npk, bob_npk,
-        "Key agreement: identical NPK from shared GMS"
-    );
-
-    let group_account_id =
-        AccountId::for_private_pda(&group_pda_spender.id(), &pda_seed, &alice_npk);
-    info!("Group PDA AccountId: {group_account_id}");
-
-    // Both derive the same AccountId independently
-    let bob_account_id = AccountId::for_private_pda(&group_pda_spender.id(), &pda_seed, &bob_npk);
-    assert_eq!(group_account_id, bob_account_id);
-
-    info!("Act 2 complete: key agreement verified");
-
-    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
-    // Act 3: Revocation and forward secrecy
-    //
-    // Alice ratchets the GMS to exclude Bob. The new keys produce a different
-    // NPK and therefore a different AccountId. Bob's frozen holder can no
-    // longer derive the new keys.
-    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-    info!("Act 3: ratchet and forward secrecy");
-
-    let mut ratcheted_holder = alice_holder;
-    ratcheted_holder.ratchet([99_u8; 32]);
-    assert_eq!(ratcheted_holder.epoch(), 1);
-
-    let ratcheted_npk = ratcheted_holder
-        .derive_keys_for_pda(&pda_seed)
-        .generate_nullifier_public_key();
-
-    let bob_stale_npk = bob_holder
-        .derive_keys_for_pda(&pda_seed)
-        .generate_nullifier_public_key();
-
-    // Forward secrecy: ratcheted keys differ from Bob's stale keys
-    assert_ne!(ratcheted_npk, bob_stale_npk);
-    assert_ne!(ratcheted_npk, alice_npk);
-
-    // Different AccountId after ratchet
-    let new_account_id =
-        AccountId::for_private_pda(&group_pda_spender.id(), &pda_seed, &ratcheted_npk);
-    assert_ne!(group_account_id, new_account_id);
-
-    // Bob's stale keys still point to the old address
-    let bob_stale_account_id =
-        AccountId::for_private_pda(&group_pda_spender.id(), &pda_seed, &bob_stale_npk);
-    assert_eq!(bob_stale_account_id, group_account_id);
-    assert_ne!(bob_stale_account_id, new_account_id);
-
-    // Sealed round-trip of ratcheted GMS
-    let (alice_kc, _) = ctx
-        .wallet()
-        .storage()
-        .user_data
-        .get_private_account(ctx.existing_private_accounts()[0])
-        .cloned()
-        .context("Alice's keys not found")?;
-    let sealed_ratcheted = ratcheted_holder.seal_for(&alice_kc.viewing_public_key);
-    let restored = GroupKeyHolder::unseal(
-        &sealed_ratcheted,
-        &alice_kc.private_key_holder.viewing_secret_key,
-    )
-    .expect("Should unseal ratcheted GMS");
-    assert_eq!(
-        restored.dangerous_raw_gms(),
-        ratcheted_holder.dangerous_raw_gms()
-    );
-    assert_eq!(restored.epoch(), 1);
-
-    info!("Act 3 complete: forward secrecy verified");
-    info!("Group PDA lifecycle test complete");
-    Ok(())
-}
diff --git a/key_protocol/src/key_management/group_key_holder.rs b/key_protocol/src/key_management/group_key_holder.rs
index 965f36a3..34b68922 100644
--- a/key_protocol/src/key_management/group_key_holder.rs
+++ b/key_protocol/src/key_management/group_key_holder.rs
@@ -598,4 +598,73 @@ mod tests {
             }
         }
     }
+
+    /// Full lifecycle: create group, distribute GMS via seal/unseal, verify key
+    /// agreement, ratchet for forward secrecy.
+    #[test]
+    fn group_pda_lifecycle() {
+        use nssa_core::account::AccountId;
+
+        let alice_holder = GroupKeyHolder::new();
+        assert_eq!(alice_holder.epoch(), 0);
+        let pda_seed = PdaSeed::new([42_u8; 32]);
+        let program_id: nssa_core::program::ProgramId = [1; 8];
+
+        // Derive Alice's keys
+        let alice_keys = alice_holder.derive_keys_for_pda(&pda_seed);
+        let alice_npk = alice_keys.generate_nullifier_public_key();
+
+        // Seal GMS for Bob using Bob's viewing key, Bob unseals
+        let bob_ssk = SecretSpendingKey([77_u8; 32]);
+        let bob_keys = bob_ssk.produce_private_key_holder(None);
+        let bob_vpk = bob_keys.generate_viewing_public_key();
+        let bob_vsk = bob_keys.viewing_secret_key;
+
+        let sealed = alice_holder.seal_for(&bob_vpk);
+        let bob_holder =
+            GroupKeyHolder::unseal(&sealed, &bob_vsk).expect("Bob should unseal the GMS");
+
+        // Key agreement: both derive identical NPK and AccountId
+        let bob_npk = bob_holder
+            .derive_keys_for_pda(&pda_seed)
+            .generate_nullifier_public_key();
+        assert_eq!(alice_npk, bob_npk);
+
+        let alice_account_id = AccountId::for_private_pda(&program_id, &pda_seed, &alice_npk);
+        let bob_account_id = AccountId::for_private_pda(&program_id, &pda_seed, &bob_npk);
+        assert_eq!(alice_account_id, bob_account_id);
+
+        // Ratchet: forward secrecy
+        let mut ratcheted_holder = alice_holder;
+        ratcheted_holder.ratchet([99_u8; 32]);
+        assert_eq!(ratcheted_holder.epoch(), 1);
+
+        let ratcheted_npk = ratcheted_holder
+            .derive_keys_for_pda(&pda_seed)
+            .generate_nullifier_public_key();
+        let bob_stale_npk = bob_holder
+            .derive_keys_for_pda(&pda_seed)
+            .generate_nullifier_public_key();
+
+        assert_ne!(ratcheted_npk, bob_stale_npk);
+        assert_ne!(ratcheted_npk, alice_npk);
+
+        let new_account_id = AccountId::for_private_pda(&program_id, &pda_seed, &ratcheted_npk);
+        assert_ne!(alice_account_id, new_account_id);
+
+        // Bob's stale keys point to old address
+        let bob_stale_id = AccountId::for_private_pda(&program_id, &pda_seed, &bob_stale_npk);
+        assert_eq!(bob_stale_id, alice_account_id);
+        assert_ne!(bob_stale_id, new_account_id);
+
+        // Sealed round-trip of ratcheted GMS
+        let sealed_ratcheted = ratcheted_holder.seal_for(&bob_vpk);
+        let restored = GroupKeyHolder::unseal(&sealed_ratcheted, &bob_vsk)
+            .expect("Should unseal ratcheted GMS");
+        assert_eq!(
+            restored.dangerous_raw_gms(),
+            ratcheted_holder.dangerous_raw_gms()
+        );
+        assert_eq!(restored.epoch(), 1);
+    }
 }