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feat(lee): bind epk/view tag verifier side

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This commit is contained in:
agureev 2026-06-10 22:11:05 +04:00
parent 3e7bfa32a9
commit 94157ead38
2 changed files with 16 additions and 63 deletions
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56
lee/state_machine/src/privacy_preserving_transaction/message.rs
View File

@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
use borsh::{BorshDeserialize, BorshSerialize};
use lee_core::{
Commitment, CommitmentSetDigest, Nullifier, NullifierPublicKey, PrivacyPreservingCircuitOutput,
Commitment, CommitmentSetDigest, Nullifier, PrivacyPreservingCircuitOutput,
account::{Account, Nonce},
encryption::{Ciphertext, EphemeralPublicKey, ViewingPublicKey},
program::{BlockValidityWindow, TimestampValidityWindow},
};
use sha2::{Digest as _, Sha256};
@ -11,41 +10,7 @@ use crate::{AccountId, error::LeeError};
const PREFIX: &[u8; 32] = b"/LEE/v0.3/Message/Privacy/\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00";
pub type ViewTag = u8;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, BorshSerialize, BorshDeserialize)]
pub struct EncryptedAccountData {
pub ciphertext: Ciphertext,
pub epk: EphemeralPublicKey,
pub view_tag: ViewTag,
}
impl EncryptedAccountData {
fn new(
ciphertext: Ciphertext,
npk: &NullifierPublicKey,
vpk: &ViewingPublicKey,
epk: EphemeralPublicKey,
) -> Self {
let view_tag = Self::compute_view_tag(npk, vpk);
Self {
ciphertext,
epk,
view_tag,
}
}
/// Computes the tag as the first byte of SHA256("/LEE/v0.3/ViewTag/" || Npk || vpk).
#[must_use]
pub fn compute_view_tag(npk: &NullifierPublicKey, vpk: &ViewingPublicKey) -> ViewTag {
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
hasher.update(b"/LEE/v0.3/ViewTag/");
hasher.update(npk.to_byte_array());
hasher.update(vpk.to_bytes());
let digest: [u8; 32] = hasher.finalize().into();
digest[0]
}
}
pub use lee_core::{EncryptedAccountData, ViewTag};
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, BorshSerialize, BorshDeserialize)]
pub struct Message {
@ -92,28 +57,13 @@ impl Message {
pub fn try_from_circuit_output(
public_account_ids: Vec<AccountId>,
nonces: Vec<Nonce>,
public_keys: Vec<(NullifierPublicKey, ViewingPublicKey, EphemeralPublicKey)>,
output: PrivacyPreservingCircuitOutput,
) -> Result<Self, LeeError> {
if public_keys.len() != output.ciphertexts.len() {
return Err(LeeError::InvalidInput(
"Ephemeral public keys and ciphertexts length mismatch".into(),
));
}
let encrypted_private_post_states = output
.ciphertexts
.into_iter()
.zip(public_keys)
.map(|(ciphertext, (npk, vpk, epk))| {
EncryptedAccountData::new(ciphertext, &npk, &vpk, epk)
})
.collect();
Ok(Self {
public_account_ids,
nonces,
public_post_states: output.public_post_states,
encrypted_private_post_states,
encrypted_private_post_states: output.encrypted_private_post_states,
new_commitments: output.new_commitments,
new_nullifiers: output.new_nullifiers,
block_validity_window: output.block_validity_window,

23
lee/state_machine/src/validated_state_diff.rs
View File

@ -492,12 +492,7 @@ fn check_privacy_preserving_circuit_proof_is_valid(
let output = PrivacyPreservingCircuitOutput {
public_pre_states: public_pre_states.to_vec(),
public_post_states: message.public_post_states.clone(),
ciphertexts: message
.encrypted_private_post_states
.iter()
.cloned()
.map(|value| value.ciphertext)
.collect(),
encrypted_private_post_states: message.encrypted_private_post_states.clone(),
new_commitments: message.new_commitments.clone(),
new_nullifiers: message.new_nullifiers.clone(),
block_validity_window: message.block_validity_window,
@ -542,7 +537,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn privacy_malicious_programs_cannot_drain_public_victim() {
use lee_core::{
Commitment, InputAccountIdentity, SharedSecretKey,
Commitment, EncryptedAccountData, InputAccountIdentity, SharedSecretKey,
account::{Account, AccountWithMetadata},
};
@ -626,6 +621,11 @@ mod tests {
// [2] recipient — first seen in authenticated_transfer's program_output.pre_states
let account_identities = vec![
InputAccountIdentity::PrivateAuthorizedUpdate {
epk: attacker_epk,
view_tag: EncryptedAccountData::compute_view_tag(
&attacker_keys.npk(),
&attacker_keys.vpk(),
),
ssk: attacker_ssk,
nsk: attacker_keys.nsk,
membership_proof,
@ -650,7 +650,6 @@ mod tests {
let message = Message::try_from_circuit_output(
vec![victim_id, recipient_id],
vec![], // no public signers, no nonces
vec![(attacker_keys.npk(), attacker_keys.vpk(), attacker_epk)],
circuit_output,
)
.unwrap();
@ -690,7 +689,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn privacy_malicious_programs_cannot_drain_private_victim() {
use lee_core::{
Commitment, InputAccountIdentity, SharedSecretKey,
Commitment, EncryptedAccountData, InputAccountIdentity, SharedSecretKey,
account::{Account, AccountWithMetadata},
};
@ -782,6 +781,11 @@ mod tests {
// so PrivateAuthorizedUpdate is not an option.
let account_identities = vec![
InputAccountIdentity::PrivateAuthorizedUpdate {
epk: attacker_epk,
view_tag: EncryptedAccountData::compute_view_tag(
&attacker_keys.npk(),
&attacker_keys.vpk(),
),
ssk: attacker_ssk,
nsk: attacker_keys.nsk,
membership_proof,
@ -807,7 +811,6 @@ mod tests {
let message = Message::try_from_circuit_output(
vec![victim_id, recipient_id],
vec![], // no public signers, no nonces
vec![(attacker_keys.npk(), attacker_keys.vpk(), attacker_epk)],
circuit_output,
)
.unwrap();