diff --git a/circom_circuits/Blend/generate_inputs_for_poq.py b/circom_circuits/Blend/generate_inputs_for_poq.py
index 3761771..9134667 100644
--- a/circom_circuits/Blend/generate_inputs_for_poq.py
+++ b/circom_circuits/Blend/generate_inputs_for_poq.py
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ if not core_or_leader in [0,1]:
 # 1) Core‐node registry Merkle‐proof
 # pick a random core_sk and derive its public key
 core_sk   = F(randrange(0,p,1))
-pk_core   = Compression([ F(1296193216988918402894), core_sk ])
+pk_core   = poseidon2_hash([ F(1296193216988918402894), core_sk ])
 core_selectors = randrange(0,2**20,1)
 core_selectors = format(int(core_selectors),'020b')
 core_nodes = [F(randrange(0,p,1)) for i in range(20)]
@@ -260,11 +260,11 @@ slot_secret_path = [F(randrange(0,p,1)) for i in range(25)]
 secret_root = slot_secret
 for i in range(25):
     if int(slot_secret_indexes[24-i]) == 0:
-        secret_root = poseidon2_hash([secret_root,slot_secret_path[i]])
+        secret_root = Compression([secret_root,slot_secret_path[i]])
     else:
         secret_root = Compression([slot_secret_path[i],secret_root])
 sk = poseidon2_hash([F(256174383281726064679014503048630094),starting_slot,secret_root])
-pk = Compression([F(1296193216988918402894),sk])
+pk = poseidon2_hash([F(1296193216988918402894),sk])
 
 note_id = poseidon2_hash([F(65580641562429851895355409762135920462),tx_hash,output_number,value,pk])
 ticket = poseidon2_hash([F(13887241025832268),F(epoch_nonce),F(slot_number),note_id,sk])
diff --git a/circom_circuits/Blend/poq.circom b/circom_circuits/Blend/poq.circom
index 20ee738..e122fc6 100644
--- a/circom_circuits/Blend/poq.circom
+++ b/circom_circuits/Blend/poq.circom
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ template ProofOfQuota(nLevelsPK, nLevelsPol, bitsQuota) {
 
 
     // Derive key_nullifier
-    component nf = Compression();
+    component nf = Poseidon2_hash(2);
     component dstNF = KEY_NULLIFIER_V1();
     nf.inp[0] <== dstNF.out;
     nf.inp[1] <== selection_randomness.out;
diff --git a/circom_circuits/Mantle/generate_inputs_for_proof_of_claim.py b/circom_circuits/Mantle/generate_inputs_for_proof_of_claim.py
index d607373..cf2318b 100755
--- a/circom_circuits/Mantle/generate_inputs_for_proof_of_claim.py
+++ b/circom_circuits/Mantle/generate_inputs_for_proof_of_claim.py
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ def PoseidonSponge(data, capacity, output_len):
 
 
 secret_voucher = F(randrange(0,p,1))
-reward_voucher = Compression([F(1668646695034522932676805048878418),secret_voucher])
+reward_voucher = poseidon2_hash([F(1668646695034522932676805048878418),secret_voucher])
 
 merkle_nodes = [F(randrange(0,p,1)) for i in range(32)]
 selectors = randrange(0,2**32,1)
diff --git a/circom_circuits/Mantle/poc.circom b/circom_circuits/Mantle/poc.circom
index 42a5caf..5a79e2f 100644
--- a/circom_circuits/Mantle/poc.circom
+++ b/circom_circuits/Mantle/poc.circom
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 //test
 pragma circom 2.1.9;
 
-include "../hash_bn/poseidon2_perm.circom";
+include "../hash_bn/poseidon2_hash.circom";
 include "../hash_bn/merkle.circom";
 include "../misc/constants.circom";
 
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ template derive_voucher_nullifier(){
     signal input secret_voucher;
     signal output out;
 
-    component hash = Compression();
+    component hash = Poseidon2_hash(2);
     component dst = VOUCHER_NF();
     hash.inp[0] <== dst.out;
     hash.inp[1] <== secret_voucher;
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ template derive_reward_voucher(){
     signal input secret_voucher;
     signal output out;
 
-    component hash = Compression();
+    component hash = Poseidon2_hash(2);
     component dst = REWARD_VOUCHER();
     hash.inp[0] <== dst.out;
     hash.inp[1] <== secret_voucher;