diff --git a/blend/generate_inputs_for_poq.py b/blend/generate_inputs_for_poq.py
index dee86ea..4d94a2a 100644
--- a/blend/generate_inputs_for_poq.py
+++ b/blend/generate_inputs_for_poq.py
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ if not core_or_leader in [0,1]:
 # 1) Core‐node registry Merkle‐proof
 # pick a random core_sk and derive its public key
 core_sk   = F(randrange(0,p,1))
-pk_core   = Compression([ F(1296193216988918402894), core_sk ])
+pk_core   = Compression([ F(4605003), core_sk ])
 core_selectors = randrange(0,2**20,1)
 core_selectors = format(int(core_selectors),'020b')
 core_nodes = [F(randrange(0,p,1)) for i in range(20)]
@@ -247,30 +247,18 @@ t1 = F(p- (int(t1_constant) // total_stake**2))
 
 value =  F(total_stake / 100)
 threshold = (t0 + t1 * value) * value
-starting_slot = randrange(max(0,slot_number-2**25+1),slot_number,1)
-
-slot_secret = F(randrange(0,p,1))
-slot_secret_indexes = format(int(slot_number - starting_slot),'025b')
 
+sk = F(randrange(0,p,1))
 tx_hash = F(randrange(0,p,1))
 output_number = F(randrange(0,50,1))
 
+pk = Compression([F(4605003),sk])
 
-slot_secret_path = [F(randrange(0,p,1)) for i in range(25)]
-secret_root = slot_secret
-for i in range(25):
-    if int(slot_secret_indexes[24-i]) == 0:
-        secret_root = Compression([secret_root,slot_secret_path[i]])
-    else:
-        secret_root = Compression([slot_secret_path[i],secret_root])
-sk = poseidon2_hash([F(256174383281726064679014503048630094),starting_slot,secret_root])
-pk = Compression([F(1296193216988918402894),sk])
-
-note_id = poseidon2_hash([F(65580641562429851895355409762135920462),tx_hash,output_number,value,pk])
+note_id = poseidon2_hash([F(232989242343357190262606),tx_hash,output_number,value,pk])
 ticket = poseidon2_hash([F(13887241025832268),F(epoch_nonce),F(slot_number),note_id,sk])
 while(ticket > threshold):
     output_number += 1
-    note_id = poseidon2_hash([F(65580641562429851895355409762135920462),tx_hash,output_number,value,pk])
+    note_id = poseidon2_hash([F(232989242343357190262606),tx_hash,output_number,value,pk])
     ticket = poseidon2_hash([F(13887241025832268),F(epoch_nonce),F(slot_number),note_id,sk])
  
 aged_nodes = [F(randrange(0,p,1)) for i in range(32)]
@@ -308,13 +296,11 @@ inp = {
   "pol_epoch_nonce":      str(epoch_nonce),
   "pol_t0":               str(t0),
   "pol_t1":               str(t1),
-  "pol_slot_secret":      str(slot_secret),
-  "pol_slot_secret_path": [str(x) for x in slot_secret_path],
+  "pol_secret_key":       str(sk),
   "pol_noteid_path":       [str(x) for x in aged_nodes],
   "pol_noteid_path_selectors":   [str(x) for x in aged_selectors],
   "pol_note_tx_hash": str(tx_hash),
   "pol_note_output_number":    str(output_number),
-  "pol_sk_starting_slot":    str(starting_slot),
   "pol_note_value":            str(value)
 }
 
diff --git a/blend/poq.circom b/blend/poq.circom
index 67a90d2..d95e038 100644
--- a/blend/poq.circom
+++ b/blend/poq.circom
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 pragma circom 2.1.9;
 
 include "../hash_bn/poseidon2_hash.circom";
-include "../misc/constants.circom";         // defines NOMOS_KDF, SELECTION_RANDOMNESS, PROOF_NULLIFIER
+include "../misc/constants.circom";         // defines KDF, SELECTION_RANDOMNESS, PROOF_NULLIFIER
 include "../misc/comparator.circom";        
 include "../circomlib/circuits/bitify.circom";
 include "../mantle/pol_lib.circom";      // defines proof_of_leadership
@@ -48,15 +48,13 @@ template ProofOfQuota(nLevelsPK, nLevelsPol, bitsQuota) {
     signal input pol_epoch_nonce;
     signal input pol_t0;
     signal input pol_t1;
-    signal input pol_slot_secret;
-    signal input pol_slot_secret_path[nLevelsPol];
 
     signal input pol_noteid_path[32];
     signal input pol_noteid_path_selectors[32];
+    signal input pol_secret_key;
     signal input pol_note_tx_hash;
     signal input pol_note_output_number;
 
-    signal input pol_sk_starting_slot;
     signal input pol_note_value;
 
 
@@ -96,10 +94,6 @@ template ProofOfQuota(nLevelsPK, nLevelsPol, bitsQuota) {
     would_win.epoch_nonce         <== pol_epoch_nonce;
     would_win.t0                  <== pol_t0;
     would_win.t1                  <== pol_t1;
-    would_win.slot_secret         <== pol_slot_secret;
-    for (var i = 0; i < nLevelsPol; i++) {
-        would_win.slot_secret_path[i] <== pol_slot_secret_path[i];
-    }
     for (var i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
         would_win.aged_nodes[i]      <== pol_noteid_path[i];
         would_win.aged_selectors[i]  <== pol_noteid_path_selectors[i];
@@ -107,7 +101,7 @@ template ProofOfQuota(nLevelsPK, nLevelsPol, bitsQuota) {
     would_win.aged_root      <== pol_ledger_aged;
     would_win.transaction_hash <== pol_note_tx_hash;
     would_win.output_number    <== pol_note_output_number;
-    would_win.starting_slot  <== pol_sk_starting_slot;
+    would_win.secret_key     <== pol_secret_key;
     would_win.value          <== pol_note_value;
 
     // Enforce the selected role is correct
diff --git a/ledger/notes.circom b/ledger/notes.circom
index 589c19e..d3b4c59 100644
--- a/ledger/notes.circom
+++ b/ledger/notes.circom
@@ -5,26 +5,12 @@ include "../hash_bn/poseidon2_hash.circom";
 include "../hash_bn/poseidon2_perm.circom";
 include "../misc/constants.circom";
 
-template derive_secret_key(){
-    signal input starting_slot;
-    signal input secrets_root;
-    signal output out;
-
-    component hash = Poseidon2_hash(3);
-    component dst = NOMOS_POL_SK_V1();
-    hash.inp[0] <== dst.out;
-    hash.inp[1] <== starting_slot;
-    hash.inp[2] <== secrets_root;
-
-    out <== hash.out;
-}
-
 template derive_public_key(){
     signal input secret_key;
     signal output out;
 
     component hash = Compression();
-    component dst = NOMOS_KDF();
+    component dst = KDF();
     hash.inp[0] <== dst.out;
     hash.inp[1] <== secret_key;
     out <== hash.out;
diff --git a/mantle/generate_inputs_for_pol.py b/mantle/generate_inputs_for_pol.py
index db65f56..34a8f88 100755
--- a/mantle/generate_inputs_for_pol.py
+++ b/mantle/generate_inputs_for_pol.py
@@ -228,30 +228,17 @@ t1 = F(p- (int(t1_constant) // total_stake**2))
 
 value = F(total_stake / 100)
 threshold = (t0 + t1 * value) * value
-starting_slot = randrange(max(0,slot_number-2**25+1),slot_number,1)
-
-slot_secret = F(randrange(0,p,1))
-slot_secret_indexes = format(int(slot_number - starting_slot),'025b')
 
+sk = F(randrange(0,p,1))
 tx_hash = F(randrange(0,p,1))
 output_number = F(randrange(0,50,1))
+pk = Compression([F(4605003),sk])
 
-
-slot_secret_path = [F(randrange(0,p,1)) for i in range(25)]
-secret_root = slot_secret
-for i in range(25):
-    if int(slot_secret_indexes[24-i]) == 0:
-        secret_root = Compression([secret_root,slot_secret_path[i]])
-    else:
-        secret_root = Compression([slot_secret_path[i],secret_root])
-sk = poseidon2_hash([F(256174383281726064679014503048630094),starting_slot,secret_root])
-pk = Compression([F(1296193216988918402894),sk])
-
-note_id = poseidon2_hash([F(65580641562429851895355409762135920462),tx_hash,output_number,value,pk])
+note_id = poseidon2_hash([F(232989242343357190262606),tx_hash,output_number,value,pk])
 ticket = poseidon2_hash([F(13887241025832268),F(epoch_nonce),F(slot_number),note_id,sk])
 while(ticket > threshold):
     output_number += 1
-    note_id = poseidon2_hash([F(65580641562429851895355409762135920462),tx_hash,output_number,value,pk])
+    note_id = poseidon2_hash([F(232989242343357190262606),tx_hash,output_number,value,pk])
     ticket = poseidon2_hash([F(13887241025832268),F(epoch_nonce),F(slot_number),note_id,sk])
  
 aged_nodes = [F(randrange(0,p,1)) for i in range(32)]
@@ -284,10 +271,9 @@ inp = {
   "epoch_nonce":                str(epoch_nonce),
   "t0":                         str(t0),
   "t1":                         str(t1),
-  "slot_secret":                str(slot_secret),
+  "secret_key":                 str(sk),
   "P_lead_part_one":            str(F(123456)),
   "P_lead_part_two":            str(F(654321)),
-  "slot_secret_path":           [str(x) for x in slot_secret_path],
   "noteid_aged_path":           [str(x) for x in aged_nodes],
   "noteid_aged_selectors":      [str(x) for x in aged_selectors],
   "ledger_aged":                str(aged_root),
@@ -296,7 +282,6 @@ inp = {
   "noteid_latest_path":         [str(x) for x in unspent_nodes],
   "noteid_latest_selectors":    [str(x) for x in unspent_selectors],
   "ledger_latest":              str(latest_root),
-  "starting_slot":              str(starting_slot),
   "v":                          str(value)
 }
 
diff --git a/mantle/pol_lib.circom b/mantle/pol_lib.circom
index 58f5279..cfe8fc8 100644
--- a/mantle/pol_lib.circom
+++ b/mantle/pol_lib.circom
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ template derive_entropy(){
     signal output out;
 
     component hash = Poseidon2_hash(4);
-    component dst = NOMOS_NONCE_CONTRIB_V1();
+    component dst = NONCE_CONTRIB_V1();
     hash.inp[0] <== dst.out;
     hash.inp[1] <== slot;
     hash.inp[2] <== note_id;
@@ -48,8 +48,6 @@ template would_win_leadership(secret_depth){
     signal input epoch_nonce;
     signal input t0;
     signal input t1;
-    signal input slot_secret;
-    signal input slot_secret_path[secret_depth];
 
     //Part of the note id proof of membership to prove aged
     signal input aged_nodes[32];
@@ -59,51 +57,23 @@ template would_win_leadership(secret_depth){
     //Used to derive the note identifier
     signal input transaction_hash;
     signal input output_number;
-
-    //Part of the secret key
-    signal input starting_slot;
+    signal input secret_key;
 
     // The winning note value
     signal input value;
 
     signal output out;
     signal output note_identifier;
-    signal output secret_key;
-
-
-    // Derivation of the secrets root from the slot secret at position slot - starting_slot
-            // Verify that the substraction wont underflow (starting_slot < slot)
-    component checker = SafeFullLessThan();
-    checker.a <== starting_slot;
-    checker.b <== slot;
-
-            // Compute the positions related to slot - starting_slot and make sure slot - starting_slot is a 25 bits number
-    component bits = Num2Bits(secret_depth);
-    bits.in <== slot - starting_slot;
-
-            // Derive the secrets root
-    component secrets_root = compute_merkle_root(secret_depth);
-    for(var i=0; i<secret_depth; i++){
-        secrets_root.nodes[i] <== slot_secret_path[i];
-        secrets_root.selector[i] <== bits.out[secret_depth-1-i];
-    }
-    secrets_root.leaf <== slot_secret;
-
-
-    // Derive the secret key
-    component sk = derive_secret_key();
-    sk.starting_slot <== starting_slot;
-    sk.secrets_root <== secrets_root.root;
 
 
     // Derive the public key from the secret key
     component pk = derive_public_key();
-    pk.secret_key <== sk.out;
+    pk.secret_key <== secret_key;
 
 
     // Derive the note id
     component note_id = Poseidon2_hash(5);
-    component dst_note_id = NOMOS_NOTE_ID_V1();
+    component dst_note_id = NOTE_ID_V1();
     note_id.inp[0] <== dst_note_id.out;
     note_id.inp[1] <== transaction_hash;
     note_id.inp[2] <== output_number;
@@ -131,7 +101,7 @@ template would_win_leadership(secret_depth){
     ticket.epoch_nonce <== epoch_nonce;
     ticket.slot <== slot;
     ticket.note_id <== note_id.out;
-    ticket.secret_key <== sk.out;
+    ticket.secret_key <== secret_key;
 
 
     // Compute the lottery threshold
@@ -147,12 +117,9 @@ template would_win_leadership(secret_depth){
     winning.b <== threshold;
 
     // Check that every constraint holds
-    signal intermediate_out;
-    intermediate_out <== aged_membership.out * winning.out;
-    out <==  intermediate_out * checker.out;
+    out <== aged_membership.out * winning.out;
 
     note_identifier <== note_id.out;
-    secret_key <== sk.out;
 } 
 
 
@@ -161,8 +128,6 @@ template proof_of_leadership(secret_depth){
     signal input epoch_nonce;  // the epoch nonce eta
     signal input t0;
     signal input t1;
-    signal input slot_secret;  // This is r_sl
-    signal input slot_secret_path[secret_depth];
 
     //Part of the note id proof of membership to prove aged
     signal input noteid_aged_path[32];
@@ -170,6 +135,7 @@ template proof_of_leadership(secret_depth){
     signal input ledger_aged;
 
     //Used to derive the note identifier
+    signal input secret_key;
     signal input note_tx_hash;
     signal input note_output_number;
     
@@ -178,10 +144,7 @@ template proof_of_leadership(secret_depth){
     signal input noteid_latest_selectors[32];         // must be bits
     signal input ledger_latest;
 
-    //Part of the secret key
-    signal input starting_slot;
-
-    // The winning note. The unit is supposed to be NMO and the ZoneID is MANTLE
+    // The winning note.
     signal input v;  // value of the note
 
 
@@ -191,10 +154,6 @@ template proof_of_leadership(secret_depth){
     lottery_checker.epoch_nonce <== epoch_nonce;
     lottery_checker.t0 <== t0;
     lottery_checker.t1 <== t1;
-    lottery_checker.slot_secret <== slot_secret;
-    for(var i = 0; i < secret_depth; i++){
-        lottery_checker.slot_secret_path[i] <== slot_secret_path[i];
-    }
     for(var i = 0; i < 32; i++){
         lottery_checker.aged_nodes[i] <== noteid_aged_path[i];
         lottery_checker.aged_selectors[i] <== noteid_aged_selectors[i];
@@ -202,7 +161,7 @@ template proof_of_leadership(secret_depth){
     lottery_checker.aged_root <== ledger_aged;
     lottery_checker.transaction_hash <== note_tx_hash;
     lottery_checker.output_number <== note_output_number;
-    lottery_checker.starting_slot <== starting_slot;
+    lottery_checker.secret_key <== secret_key;
     lottery_checker.value <== v;
 
 
@@ -241,7 +200,7 @@ template proof_of_leadership(secret_depth){
     component entropy = derive_entropy();
     entropy.slot <== sl;
     entropy.note_id <== lottery_checker.note_identifier;
-    entropy.secret_key <== lottery_checker.secret_key;
+    entropy.secret_key <== secret_key;
 
     entropy_contribution <== entropy.out;
 }
diff --git a/misc/constants.circom b/misc/constants.circom
index 728d49c..f18d9b3 100644
--- a/misc/constants.circom
+++ b/misc/constants.circom
@@ -11,31 +11,24 @@ template LEAD_V1(){
 }
 
 
-// int.from_bytes(b"NOMOS_POL_SK_V1", byteorder="little") = 256174383281726064679014503048630094
-template NOMOS_POL_SK_V1(){
+// int.from_bytes(b"NONCE_CONTRIB_V1", byteorder="little") = 65580641403957881555985426713123114830
+template NONCE_CONTRIB_V1(){
     signal output out;
-    out <== 256174383281726064679014503048630094;
+    out <== 65580641403957881555985426713123114830;
 }
 
 
-// int.from_bytes(b"NOMOS_NONCE_CONTRIB_V1", byteorder="little") = 18459309511848927313552932915476467038165525790019406
-template NOMOS_NONCE_CONTRIB_V1(){
+// int.from_bytes(b"KDF", byteorder="little") = 4605003
+template KDF(){
     signal output out;
-    out <== 18459309511848927313552932915476467038165525790019406;
+    out <== 4605003;
 }
 
 
-// int.from_bytes(b"NOMOS_KDF", byteorder="little") = 1296193216988918402894
-template NOMOS_KDF(){
+// int.from_bytes(b"NOTE_ID_V1", byteorder="little") = 232989242343357190262606
+template NOTE_ID_V1(){
     signal output out;
-    out <== 1296193216988918402894;
-}
-
-
-// int.from_bytes(b"NOMOS_NOTE_ID_V1", byteorder="little") = 65580641562429851895355409762135920462
-template NOMOS_NOTE_ID_V1(){
-    signal output out;
-    out <== 65580641562429851895355409762135920462;
+    out <== 232989242343357190262606;
 }