mirror of
https://github.com/logos-blockchain/lez-programs.git
synced 2026-08-25 06:01:11 +00:00
Lift the inverse constant-product SwapExactOutput math out of the guest's exact_output_swap_logic into amm_core::swap_exact_out_amounts(amount_out, reserve_in, reserve_out, fee_bps) -> Option<(effective_in, required_in)>: ceil(reserve_in * amount_out / (reserve_out - amount_out)) lifted through the fee via mul_div_ceil. exact_output_swap_logic now calls it and keeps its nonzero/exceeds-reserve asserts. Behavior-preserving (the panic-message tests still pass); None (out >= reserve or zero fee multiplier) surfaces as the existing expect. Makes the on-chain exact-output pricing one reusable function so the off-chain quote can produce byte-identical required-input figures instead of re-deriving the inverse formula. Mirrors swap_exact_in_amounts.
568 lines
21 KiB
Rust
568 lines
21 KiB
Rust
use amm_core::{
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assert_supported_fee_tier, compute_config_pda, compute_pool_pda_seed,
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read_vault_fungible_balances, spot_price_q64_64, swap_exact_in_amounts, swap_exact_out_amounts,
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AmmConfig, MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY,
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};
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pub use amm_core::{compute_liquidity_token_pda_seed, compute_vault_pda_seed, PoolDefinition};
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use clock_core::CLOCK_01_PROGRAM_ACCOUNT_ID;
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use nssa_core::{
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account::{AccountId, AccountWithMetadata, Data},
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program::{AccountPostState, ChainedCall, ProgramId},
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};
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use twap_oracle_core::compute_current_tick_account_pda;
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/// Validates swap setup: checks pool liquidity is ready, vaults match, and reserves are sufficient.
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fn validate_swap_setup(
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pool: &AccountWithMetadata,
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vault_a: &AccountWithMetadata,
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vault_b: &AccountWithMetadata,
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) -> PoolDefinition {
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let pool_def_data = PoolDefinition::try_from(&pool.account.data)
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.expect("AMM Program expects a valid Pool Definition Account");
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assert_supported_fee_tier(pool_def_data.fees);
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assert!(
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pool_def_data.liquidity_pool_supply >= MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY,
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"Pool liquidity supply is below minimum liquidity"
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);
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assert_eq!(
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vault_a.account_id, pool_def_data.vault_a_id,
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"Vault A was not provided"
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);
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assert_eq!(
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vault_b.account_id, pool_def_data.vault_b_id,
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"Vault B was not provided"
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);
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let (vault_a_balance, vault_b_balance) =
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read_vault_fungible_balances("Validate swap setup", vault_a, vault_b);
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assert!(
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vault_a_balance >= pool_def_data.reserve_a,
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"Reserve for Token A exceeds vault balance"
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);
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assert!(
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vault_b_balance >= pool_def_data.reserve_b,
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"Reserve for Token B exceeds vault balance"
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);
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pool_def_data
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}
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/// Assembles the swap post-states (including the echoed current-tick and clock accounts) and the
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/// chained call that refreshes the pool's TWAP current tick from the post-swap spot price.
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#[expect(
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clippy::too_many_arguments,
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reason = "post-state assembly keeps pool, vault, user, oracle, and delta state explicit"
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)]
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#[expect(
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clippy::needless_pass_by_value,
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reason = "consistent with codebase style"
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)]
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fn finalize_swap(
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config: AccountWithMetadata,
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pool: AccountWithMetadata,
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pool_def_data: PoolDefinition,
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vault_a: AccountWithMetadata,
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vault_b: AccountWithMetadata,
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// Echoed back at the input/output slot positions the guest declared, so the framework matches
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// each post-state to the correct account regardless of swap direction.
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user_holding_input: AccountWithMetadata,
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user_holding_output: AccountWithMetadata,
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current_tick_account: AccountWithMetadata,
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clock: AccountWithMetadata,
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deposit_a: u128,
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withdraw_a: u128,
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deposit_b: u128,
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withdraw_b: u128,
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twap_oracle_program_id: ProgramId,
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) -> (Vec<AccountPostState>, ChainedCall) {
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let pool_post_definition = PoolDefinition {
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reserve_a: pool_def_data
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.reserve_a
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.checked_add(deposit_a)
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.expect("reserve_a + deposit_a overflows u128")
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.checked_sub(withdraw_a)
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.expect("reserve_a + deposit_a - withdraw_a underflows"),
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reserve_b: pool_def_data
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.reserve_b
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.checked_add(deposit_b)
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.expect("reserve_b + deposit_b overflows u128")
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.checked_sub(withdraw_b)
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.expect("reserve_b + deposit_b - withdraw_b underflows"),
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..pool_def_data
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};
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let mut pool_post = pool.account.clone();
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pool_post.data = Data::from(&pool_post_definition);
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// Refresh the pool's TWAP current tick from the post-swap spot price. The pool is already owned
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// by this program, so it is passed (in its post-swap state) as the authorized price source.
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let new_price = spot_price_q64_64(
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pool_post_definition.reserve_a,
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pool_post_definition.reserve_b,
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);
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let pool_price_source = AccountWithMetadata {
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account: pool_post.clone(),
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is_authorized: true,
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account_id: pool.account_id,
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};
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let update_tick_call = ChainedCall::new(
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twap_oracle_program_id,
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vec![
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current_tick_account.clone(),
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pool_price_source,
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clock.clone(),
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],
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&twap_oracle_core::Instruction::UpdateCurrentTick { price: new_price },
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)
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.with_pda_seeds(vec![compute_pool_pda_seed(
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pool_def_data.definition_token_a_id,
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pool_def_data.definition_token_b_id,
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)]);
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let post_states = vec![
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AccountPostState::new(config.account),
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AccountPostState::new(pool_post),
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AccountPostState::new(vault_a.account),
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AccountPostState::new(vault_b.account),
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AccountPostState::new(user_holding_input.account),
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AccountPostState::new(user_holding_output.account),
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AccountPostState::new(current_tick_account.account),
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AccountPostState::new(clock.account),
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];
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(post_states, update_tick_call)
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}
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#[expect(
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clippy::too_many_arguments,
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reason = "instruction surface passes explicit pool, vault, and user accounts"
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)]
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#[must_use]
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pub fn swap_exact_input(
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config: AccountWithMetadata,
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pool: AccountWithMetadata,
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vault_a: AccountWithMetadata,
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vault_b: AccountWithMetadata,
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user_input_holding: AccountWithMetadata,
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user_output_holding: AccountWithMetadata,
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current_tick_account: AccountWithMetadata,
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clock: AccountWithMetadata,
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swap_amount_in: u128,
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min_amount_out: u128,
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amm_program_id: ProgramId,
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) -> (Vec<AccountPostState>, Vec<ChainedCall>) {
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let pool_def_data = validate_swap_setup(&pool, &vault_a, &vault_b);
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// The program IDs are taken from the config account, not trusted from a caller-supplied
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// account. Validating the config PDA is also the Program's initialization gate.
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assert_eq!(
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config.account_id,
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compute_config_pda(amm_program_id),
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"Swap exact input: AMM config Account ID does not match PDA"
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);
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let config_data = AmmConfig::try_from(&config.account.data)
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.expect("Swap exact input: AMM Program must be initialized before use");
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let token_program_id = config_data.token_program_id;
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let twap_oracle_program_id = config_data.twap_oracle_program_id;
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assert_eq!(
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vault_a.account.program_owner, token_program_id,
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"Vault A must be owned by the configured Token Program"
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);
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assert_eq!(
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vault_b.account.program_owner, token_program_id,
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"Vault B must be owned by the configured Token Program"
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);
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// Swap direction is taken from the (signed) input holding's own token definition, then the
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// role-based holdings are mapped back to the pool's stored A/B order so the rest of the
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// routine — reserve bookkeeping and finalize — stays keyed to token A/B.
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let token_in_id = token_core::TokenHolding::try_from(&user_input_holding.account.data)
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.expect("Swap exact input: input holding must be a valid token holding")
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.definition_id();
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let (user_holding_a, user_holding_b) = if token_in_id == pool_def_data.definition_token_a_id {
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(user_input_holding, user_output_holding)
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} else if token_in_id == pool_def_data.definition_token_b_id {
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(user_output_holding, user_input_holding)
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} else {
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panic!("Swap exact input: input holding token is not part of the pool");
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};
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assert_eq!(
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user_holding_a.account.program_owner, token_program_id,
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"User Token A holding must be owned by the configured Token Program"
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);
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assert_eq!(
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user_holding_b.account.program_owner, token_program_id,
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"User Token B holding must be owned by the configured Token Program"
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);
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// The current tick is refreshed by a chained call to the oracle; validate its PDA and the
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// clock here so the swap is rejected early with an AMM-level error.
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assert_eq!(
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clock.account_id, CLOCK_01_PROGRAM_ACCOUNT_ID,
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"Swap exact input: clock account must be the canonical 1-block LEZ clock account"
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);
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assert_eq!(
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current_tick_account.account_id,
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compute_current_tick_account_pda(twap_oracle_program_id, pool.account_id),
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"Swap exact input: current tick Account ID does not match PDA"
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);
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let (chained_calls, [deposit_a, withdraw_a], [deposit_b, withdraw_b]) =
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if token_in_id == pool_def_data.definition_token_a_id {
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let (chained_calls, deposit_a, withdraw_b) = swap_logic(
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user_holding_a.clone(),
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vault_a.clone(),
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vault_b.clone(),
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user_holding_b.clone(),
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swap_amount_in,
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min_amount_out,
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pool_def_data.fees,
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pool_def_data.reserve_a,
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pool_def_data.reserve_b,
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pool.account_id,
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);
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(chained_calls, [deposit_a, 0], [0, withdraw_b])
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} else if token_in_id == pool_def_data.definition_token_b_id {
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let (chained_calls, deposit_b, withdraw_a) = swap_logic(
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user_holding_b.clone(),
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vault_b.clone(),
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vault_a.clone(),
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user_holding_a.clone(),
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swap_amount_in,
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min_amount_out,
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pool_def_data.fees,
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pool_def_data.reserve_b,
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pool_def_data.reserve_a,
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pool.account_id,
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);
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(chained_calls, [0, withdraw_a], [deposit_b, 0])
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} else {
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panic!("AccountId is not a token type for the pool");
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};
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// Echo the two user holdings in the guest's declared slot order (input, then output) so the
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// framework matches each post-state to the right account. The a/b mapping above only drives the
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// reserve/vault bookkeeping; post-states are matched to accounts positionally.
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let (user_holding_input, user_holding_output) =
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if token_in_id == pool_def_data.definition_token_a_id {
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(user_holding_a, user_holding_b)
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} else {
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(user_holding_b, user_holding_a)
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};
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let (post_states, update_tick_call) = finalize_swap(
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config,
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pool,
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pool_def_data,
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vault_a,
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vault_b,
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user_holding_input,
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user_holding_output,
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current_tick_account,
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clock,
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deposit_a,
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withdraw_a,
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deposit_b,
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withdraw_b,
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twap_oracle_program_id,
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);
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let mut chained_calls = chained_calls;
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chained_calls.push(update_tick_call);
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(post_states, chained_calls)
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}
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#[expect(
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clippy::too_many_arguments,
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reason = "swap calculation keeps account context and pricing parameters explicit"
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)]
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fn swap_logic(
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user_deposit: AccountWithMetadata,
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vault_deposit: AccountWithMetadata,
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vault_withdraw: AccountWithMetadata,
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user_withdraw: AccountWithMetadata,
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swap_amount_in: u128,
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min_amount_out: u128,
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fee_bps: u128,
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reserve_deposit_vault_amount: u128,
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reserve_withdraw_vault_amount: u128,
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pool_id: AccountId,
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) -> (Vec<ChainedCall>, u128, u128) {
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// Fee-adjust the input and price via constant product. Shared with the
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// off-chain swap quote (`amm_core::swap_exact_in_amounts`) so the preview and
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// the executed trade agree exactly. The recorded pool reserves are updated
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// later with the full `swap_amount_in`, so LP fees accrue inside `reserve_*`
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// via invariant growth rather than as a vault-balance surplus over `reserve_*`.
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let (effective_amount_in, withdraw_amount) = swap_exact_in_amounts(
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swap_amount_in,
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reserve_deposit_vault_amount,
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reserve_withdraw_vault_amount,
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fee_bps,
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);
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assert!(
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effective_amount_in != 0,
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"Effective swap amount should be nonzero"
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);
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// Slippage check
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assert!(
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min_amount_out <= withdraw_amount,
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"Withdraw amount is less than minimal amount out"
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);
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assert!(withdraw_amount != 0, "Withdraw amount should be nonzero");
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let token_program_id = user_deposit.account.program_owner;
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let mut chained_calls = Vec::new();
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chained_calls.push(ChainedCall::new(
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token_program_id,
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vec![user_deposit, vault_deposit],
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&token_core::Instruction::Transfer {
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amount_to_transfer: swap_amount_in,
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},
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));
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let mut vault_withdraw = vault_withdraw.clone();
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vault_withdraw.is_authorized = true;
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let pda_seed = compute_vault_pda_seed(
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pool_id,
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token_core::TokenHolding::try_from(&vault_withdraw.account.data)
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.expect("Swap Logic: AMM Program expects valid token data")
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.definition_id(),
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);
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chained_calls.push(
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ChainedCall::new(
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token_program_id,
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vec![vault_withdraw, user_withdraw],
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&token_core::Instruction::Transfer {
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amount_to_transfer: withdraw_amount,
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},
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)
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.with_pda_seeds(vec![pda_seed]),
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);
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(chained_calls, swap_amount_in, withdraw_amount)
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}
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#[expect(
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clippy::too_many_arguments,
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reason = "instruction surface passes explicit pool, vault, and user accounts"
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)]
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#[must_use]
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pub fn swap_exact_output(
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config: AccountWithMetadata,
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pool: AccountWithMetadata,
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vault_a: AccountWithMetadata,
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vault_b: AccountWithMetadata,
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user_input_holding: AccountWithMetadata,
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user_output_holding: AccountWithMetadata,
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current_tick_account: AccountWithMetadata,
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clock: AccountWithMetadata,
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exact_amount_out: u128,
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max_amount_in: u128,
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amm_program_id: ProgramId,
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) -> (Vec<AccountPostState>, Vec<ChainedCall>) {
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let pool_def_data = validate_swap_setup(&pool, &vault_a, &vault_b);
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// The program IDs are taken from the config account, not trusted from a caller-supplied
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// account. Validating the config PDA is also the Program's initialization gate.
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assert_eq!(
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config.account_id,
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compute_config_pda(amm_program_id),
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"Swap exact output: AMM config Account ID does not match PDA"
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);
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let config_data = AmmConfig::try_from(&config.account.data)
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.expect("Swap exact output: AMM Program must be initialized before use");
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let token_program_id = config_data.token_program_id;
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let twap_oracle_program_id = config_data.twap_oracle_program_id;
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assert_eq!(
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vault_a.account.program_owner, token_program_id,
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"Vault A must be owned by the configured Token Program"
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);
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assert_eq!(
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vault_b.account.program_owner, token_program_id,
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"Vault B must be owned by the configured Token Program"
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);
|
|
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// Swap direction is taken from the (signed) input holding's own token definition, then the
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// role-based holdings are mapped back to the pool's stored A/B order so the rest of the
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// routine — reserve bookkeeping and finalize — stays keyed to token A/B.
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let token_in_id = token_core::TokenHolding::try_from(&user_input_holding.account.data)
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.expect("Swap exact output: input holding must be a valid token holding")
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.definition_id();
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let (user_holding_a, user_holding_b) = if token_in_id == pool_def_data.definition_token_a_id {
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(user_input_holding, user_output_holding)
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} else if token_in_id == pool_def_data.definition_token_b_id {
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(user_output_holding, user_input_holding)
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} else {
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panic!("Swap exact output: input holding token is not part of the pool");
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};
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assert_eq!(
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user_holding_a.account.program_owner, token_program_id,
|
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"User Token A holding must be owned by the configured Token Program"
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);
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assert_eq!(
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user_holding_b.account.program_owner, token_program_id,
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"User Token B holding must be owned by the configured Token Program"
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);
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// The current tick is refreshed by a chained call to the oracle; validate its PDA and the
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// clock here so the swap is rejected early with an AMM-level error.
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assert_eq!(
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clock.account_id, CLOCK_01_PROGRAM_ACCOUNT_ID,
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|
"Swap exact output: clock account must be the canonical 1-block LEZ clock account"
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);
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assert_eq!(
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current_tick_account.account_id,
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compute_current_tick_account_pda(twap_oracle_program_id, pool.account_id),
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"Swap exact output: current tick Account ID does not match PDA"
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);
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let (chained_calls, [deposit_a, withdraw_a], [deposit_b, withdraw_b]) =
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if token_in_id == pool_def_data.definition_token_a_id {
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let (chained_calls, deposit_a, withdraw_b) = exact_output_swap_logic(
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user_holding_a.clone(),
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vault_a.clone(),
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vault_b.clone(),
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user_holding_b.clone(),
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exact_amount_out,
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max_amount_in,
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pool_def_data.reserve_a,
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pool_def_data.reserve_b,
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pool_def_data.fees,
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pool.account_id,
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);
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(chained_calls, [deposit_a, 0], [0, withdraw_b])
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} else if token_in_id == pool_def_data.definition_token_b_id {
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let (chained_calls, deposit_b, withdraw_a) = exact_output_swap_logic(
|
|
user_holding_b.clone(),
|
|
vault_b.clone(),
|
|
vault_a.clone(),
|
|
user_holding_a.clone(),
|
|
exact_amount_out,
|
|
max_amount_in,
|
|
pool_def_data.reserve_b,
|
|
pool_def_data.reserve_a,
|
|
pool_def_data.fees,
|
|
pool.account_id,
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
(chained_calls, [0, withdraw_a], [deposit_b, 0])
|
|
} else {
|
|
panic!("AccountId is not a token type for the pool");
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// Echo the two user holdings in the guest's declared slot order (input, then output) so the
|
|
// framework matches each post-state to the right account. The a/b mapping above only drives the
|
|
// reserve/vault bookkeeping; post-states are matched to accounts positionally.
|
|
let (user_holding_input, user_holding_output) =
|
|
if token_in_id == pool_def_data.definition_token_a_id {
|
|
(user_holding_a, user_holding_b)
|
|
} else {
|
|
(user_holding_b, user_holding_a)
|
|
};
|
|
let (post_states, update_tick_call) = finalize_swap(
|
|
config,
|
|
pool,
|
|
pool_def_data,
|
|
vault_a,
|
|
vault_b,
|
|
user_holding_input,
|
|
user_holding_output,
|
|
current_tick_account,
|
|
clock,
|
|
deposit_a,
|
|
withdraw_a,
|
|
deposit_b,
|
|
withdraw_b,
|
|
twap_oracle_program_id,
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
let mut chained_calls = chained_calls;
|
|
chained_calls.push(update_tick_call);
|
|
|
|
(post_states, chained_calls)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[expect(
|
|
clippy::too_many_arguments,
|
|
reason = "swap calculation keeps account context and pricing parameters explicit"
|
|
)]
|
|
fn exact_output_swap_logic(
|
|
user_deposit: AccountWithMetadata,
|
|
vault_deposit: AccountWithMetadata,
|
|
vault_withdraw: AccountWithMetadata,
|
|
user_withdraw: AccountWithMetadata,
|
|
exact_amount_out: u128,
|
|
max_amount_in: u128,
|
|
reserve_deposit_vault_amount: u128,
|
|
reserve_withdraw_vault_amount: u128,
|
|
fee_bps: u128,
|
|
pool_id: AccountId,
|
|
) -> (Vec<ChainedCall>, u128, u128) {
|
|
// Guard: exact_amount_out must be nonzero
|
|
assert_ne!(exact_amount_out, 0, "Exact amount out must be nonzero");
|
|
|
|
// Guard: exact_amount_out must be less than reserve_withdraw_vault_amount
|
|
assert!(
|
|
exact_amount_out < reserve_withdraw_vault_amount,
|
|
"Exact amount out exceeds reserve"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
// Required gross input via the shared amm_core::swap_exact_out_amounts (same
|
|
// pricing as the off-chain exact-output quote). The `amount_out < reserve`
|
|
// guard above means it always resolves.
|
|
let (_, deposit_amount) = swap_exact_out_amounts(
|
|
exact_amount_out,
|
|
reserve_deposit_vault_amount,
|
|
reserve_withdraw_vault_amount,
|
|
fee_bps,
|
|
)
|
|
.expect("swap exact output: reserves and fee must yield a valid input");
|
|
|
|
// Slippage check
|
|
assert!(
|
|
deposit_amount <= max_amount_in,
|
|
"Required input exceeds maximum amount in"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
let token_program_id = user_deposit.account.program_owner;
|
|
|
|
let mut chained_calls = Vec::new();
|
|
chained_calls.push(ChainedCall::new(
|
|
token_program_id,
|
|
vec![user_deposit, vault_deposit],
|
|
&token_core::Instruction::Transfer {
|
|
amount_to_transfer: deposit_amount,
|
|
},
|
|
));
|
|
|
|
let mut vault_withdraw = vault_withdraw;
|
|
vault_withdraw.is_authorized = true;
|
|
|
|
let pda_seed = compute_vault_pda_seed(
|
|
pool_id,
|
|
token_core::TokenHolding::try_from(&vault_withdraw.account.data)
|
|
.expect("Exact Output Swap Logic: AMM Program expects valid token data")
|
|
.definition_id(),
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
chained_calls.push(
|
|
ChainedCall::new(
|
|
token_program_id,
|
|
vec![vault_withdraw, user_withdraw],
|
|
&token_core::Instruction::Transfer {
|
|
amount_to_transfer: exact_amount_out,
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
.with_pda_seeds(vec![pda_seed]),
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
(chained_calls, deposit_amount, exact_amount_out)
|
|
}
|