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https://github.com/logos-blockchain/lez-programs.git
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test(privacy): add privacy-preserving test coverage for token and ata programs
Validates the Q2 privacy features (shield/deshield, private-to-private transfers, existing-account crediting, group-owned accounts, and private PDAs) against the token and ata program flows, which previously ran almost entirely in public context. Adds the key_protocol dependency for GMS-based group-account tests and introduces a docs/privacy-test-matrix.md tracker mapping each program/instruction/ privacy-dimension combination to pass, fail, or not-expressible, with root-cause findings for each gap (notably that private PDAs are structurally unsupported by any program currently deriving addresses via for_public_pda). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
co-authored by
Claude Sonnet 5
parent
5b82a52c6b
commit
bbc8079391
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ workspace = true
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nssa = { workspace = true }
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nssa_core = { workspace = true, features = ["host", "test_utils"] }
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clock_core = { git = "https://github.com/logos-blockchain/logos-execution-zone.git", tag = "v0.2.0-rc6" }
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key_protocol = { git = "https://github.com/logos-blockchain/logos-execution-zone.git", tag = "v0.2.0-rc6" }
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amm_core = { workspace = true }
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token_core = { workspace = true }
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ata_core = { workspace = true }
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@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
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use std::collections::HashMap;
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use ata_core::{compute_ata_seed, get_associated_token_account_id};
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use key_protocol::key_management::{
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group_key_holder::{GroupKeyHolder, SealingPublicKey},
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secret_holders::SecretSpendingKey,
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};
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use nssa::{
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execute_and_prove,
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privacy_preserving_transaction::{
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@@ -13,7 +17,7 @@ use nssa::{
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use nssa_core::{
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account::{Account, AccountId, AccountWithMetadata, Data, Nonce},
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encryption::{EphemeralPublicKey, ViewingPublicKey},
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EncryptedAccountData, InputAccountIdentity, NullifierPublicKey, NullifierSecretKey,
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Commitment, EncryptedAccountData, InputAccountIdentity, NullifierPublicKey, NullifierSecretKey,
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};
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use token_core::{TokenDefinition, TokenHolding};
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@@ -592,3 +596,537 @@ fn ata_create_from_private_owner() {
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}
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);
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}
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// Marvin-todo
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/// Documents a confirmed protocol gap (`PDA` Q2 dimension): the ATA holding can never be made
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/// a private account as ATA is currently coded. `Create`'s `ChainedCall.pda_seeds` authorizes
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/// Token to mutate `for_public_pda(ata_program_id, seed)` — a *public*-form PDA match. Per
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/// `resolve_authorization_and_record_bindings` in `lee_core`'s `execution_state.rs`, a
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/// caller-seed match only gets recorded in `private_pda_bound_positions` when it matches under
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/// `for_private_pda` (`is_private_form == true`); a public-form match authorizes the account
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/// but never binds it as a private PDA. Since `PrivatePdaInit`/`PrivatePdaUpdate` require their
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/// position to appear in that binding map (`execution_state.rs:211`), and ATA's own
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/// `verify_ata_and_get_seed` independently requires the account id to equal
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/// `for_public_pda(ata_program_id, seed)` (never `for_private_pda`'s output, by construction),
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/// these two requirements can never both hold for the same account_id. This is not
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/// program-specific friction — it's structural: fixing it would require `ata_core` (and
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/// equally amm_core / stablecoin_core) to derive their PDAs via `for_private_pda` instead,
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/// which is a source change to the program, not a test workaround.
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#[test]
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fn ata_create_private_ata_holding_is_not_expressible() {
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let mut state = V03State::new();
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deploy_programs(&mut state);
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state.force_insert_account(Ids::token_definition(), Accounts::token_definition_init());
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let owner_id = Ids::owner();
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let owner_account = state.get_account_by_id(owner_id);
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// Fresh personal npk/vpk for the ATA holding's privacy identity — distinct from the
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// owner's plain public keypair, which only supplies the seed input.
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let ata_nsk: NullifierSecretKey = [21u8; 32];
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let ata_npk = NullifierPublicKey::from(&ata_nsk);
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let ata_vpk = ViewingPublicKey::from_seed(&[41u8; 32], &[42u8; 32]);
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// Address stays the *standard* public-PDA formula ATA always uses — only its state
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// privacy is under test, not its address derivation.
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let seed = compute_ata_seed(Ids::token_program(), owner_id, Ids::token_definition());
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let ata_id = get_associated_token_account_id(&Ids::ata_program(), &seed);
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let owner_pre = AccountWithMetadata::new(owner_account, true, owner_id);
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let def_pre = AccountWithMetadata::new(
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Accounts::token_definition_init(),
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false,
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Ids::token_definition(),
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);
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let ata_pre = AccountWithMetadata::new(Account::default(), false, ata_id);
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let instruction = ata_core::Instruction::Create {
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token_program_id: Ids::token_program(),
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};
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let instruction_data = Program::serialize_instruction(instruction).unwrap();
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let shared_secret = SharedSecretKey::encapsulate_deterministic(&ata_vpk, &[0u8; 32], 0).0;
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let ata_program = Program::new(ata_methods::ATA_ELF.to_vec().into()).unwrap();
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let token_program = Program::new(token_methods::TOKEN_ELF.to_vec().into()).unwrap();
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let program_with_deps = ProgramWithDependencies::new(
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ata_program,
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HashMap::from([(Ids::token_program(), token_program)]),
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);
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let result = execute_and_prove(
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vec![owner_pre, def_pre, ata_pre],
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instruction_data,
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vec![
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InputAccountIdentity::Public,
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InputAccountIdentity::Public,
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InputAccountIdentity::PrivatePdaInit {
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epk: EphemeralPublicKey(Vec::new()),
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view_tag: EncryptedAccountData::compute_view_tag(&ata_npk, &ata_vpk),
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npk: ata_npk,
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ssk: shared_secret,
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identifier: 0,
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seed: None,
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},
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],
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&program_with_deps,
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);
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let err = result.expect_err(
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"a private-PDA ATA holding must be rejected: its account id can never satisfy both \
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ATA's own for_public_pda address check and PrivatePdaInit's for_private_pda binding \
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requirement simultaneously",
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);
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let message = format!("{err:?}");
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assert!(
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message.contains("has no proven (seed, npk) binding via Claim::Pda or caller pda_seeds"),
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"expected the private-PDA binding rejection, got a different error: {message}"
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);
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}
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// Marvin-todo
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/// Credits an *already-existing* private holding through ATA's chained call to Token, and
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/// documents a structural finding along the way:
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/// `ata_program::transfer::transfer_from_associated_token_account` hard-asserts `recipient.account
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/// != Account::default()` ("Recipient token holding must be initialized"), so a *fresh* private
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/// recipient (shield-style, `PrivateUnauthorized`) can never be created through `ATA::Transfer` —
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/// only an existing account can be credited. That collapses what would otherwise be separate `BASE`
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/// and `EXIST` tests into one: this test necessarily exercises both "private account through a
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/// chained call" (`CHAIN`) and "sending to an existing private account" (`EXIST`, requiring the
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/// recipient's cooperation via `PrivateAuthorizedUpdate`, per the finding already confirmed in
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/// `token.rs`).
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///
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/// The private holding is funded beforehand via a direct (non-ATA) `Token::Transfer` shield
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/// from a throwaway public holder, since neither `ATA::Transfer` (blocked by the assert above)
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/// nor `Token::Mint` (this test fixture's definition has `authority: None`, fixed supply) can
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/// create it.
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#[test]
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fn ata_transfer_to_existing_private_recipient() {
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let mut state = state_for_ata_tests();
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// A throwaway public holder to shield from directly via Token — bypassing ATA entirely,
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// since ATA::Transfer cannot originate a fresh private recipient (see doc comment above).
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let shield_source_key = PrivateKey::try_new([77u8; 32]).expect("valid private key");
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let shield_source_id = AccountId::from(&PublicKey::new_from_private_key(&shield_source_key));
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state.force_insert_account(
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shield_source_id,
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Account {
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program_owner: Ids::token_program(),
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balance: 0_u128,
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data: Data::from(&TokenHolding::Fungible {
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definition_id: Ids::token_definition(),
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balance: 1_000_000_u128,
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}),
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nonce: Nonce(0),
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},
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);
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let recipient_nsk: NullifierSecretKey = [51u8; 32];
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let recipient_npk = NullifierPublicKey::from(&recipient_nsk);
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let recipient_vpk = ViewingPublicKey::from_seed(&[61u8; 32], &[62u8; 32]);
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let recipient_id = AccountId::for_regular_private_account(&recipient_npk, 0);
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let shield_amount = 500_000_u128;
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let source_pre = AccountWithMetadata::new(
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state.get_account_by_id(shield_source_id),
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true,
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shield_source_id,
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);
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let fresh_recipient_pre = AccountWithMetadata::new(Account::default(), false, recipient_id);
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let shield_secret = SharedSecretKey::encapsulate_deterministic(&recipient_vpk, &[0u8; 32], 0).0;
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let token_program_for_shield = Program::new(token_methods::TOKEN_ELF.to_vec().into())
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.expect("valid token ELF")
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.into();
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let (shield_output, shield_proof) = execute_and_prove(
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vec![source_pre, fresh_recipient_pre],
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Program::serialize_instruction(token_core::Instruction::Transfer {
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amount_to_transfer: shield_amount,
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})
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.unwrap(),
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vec![
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InputAccountIdentity::Public,
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InputAccountIdentity::PrivateUnauthorized {
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epk: EphemeralPublicKey(Vec::new()),
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view_tag: EncryptedAccountData::compute_view_tag(&recipient_npk, &recipient_vpk),
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npk: recipient_npk,
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ssk: shield_secret,
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identifier: 0,
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},
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],
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&token_program_for_shield,
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)
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.unwrap();
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let shield_message =
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Message::try_from_circuit_output(vec![shield_source_id], vec![Nonce(0)], shield_output)
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.unwrap();
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let shield_witness =
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WitnessSet::for_message(&shield_message, shield_proof, &[&shield_source_key]);
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state
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.transition_from_privacy_preserving_transaction(
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&PrivacyPreservingTransaction::new(shield_message, shield_witness),
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0,
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0,
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)
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.unwrap();
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let recipient_after_shield = Account {
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program_owner: Ids::token_program(),
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balance: 0_u128,
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data: Data::from(&TokenHolding::Fungible {
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definition_id: Ids::token_definition(),
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balance: shield_amount,
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}),
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nonce: Nonce::private_account_nonce_init(&recipient_id),
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};
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assert!(
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state
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.get_proof_for_commitment(&Commitment::new(&recipient_id, &recipient_after_shield))
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.is_some(),
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"shield setup must land before the ATA transfer under test"
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);
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// Now the actual test: owner's ATA sends more into that now-existing private recipient.
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let owner_id = Ids::owner();
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let owner_account = state.get_account_by_id(owner_id);
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let sender_ata_id = Ids::owner_ata();
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let sender_ata_account = state.get_account_by_id(sender_ata_id);
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let membership_proof = state
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.get_proof_for_commitment(&Commitment::new(&recipient_id, &recipient_after_shield))
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.expect("recipient's commitment must be in the set");
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let transfer_secret =
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SharedSecretKey::encapsulate_deterministic(&recipient_vpk, &[0u8; 32], 0).0;
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let owner_pre = AccountWithMetadata::new(owner_account, true, owner_id);
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let sender_ata_pre = AccountWithMetadata::new(sender_ata_account, false, sender_ata_id);
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let recipient_pre =
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AccountWithMetadata::new(recipient_after_shield.clone(), true, recipient_id);
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let ata_transfer_amount = 200_000_u128;
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let instruction = ata_core::Instruction::Transfer {
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token_program_id: Ids::token_program(),
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amount: ata_transfer_amount,
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};
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let ata_program = Program::new(ata_methods::ATA_ELF.to_vec().into()).unwrap();
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let token_program = Program::new(token_methods::TOKEN_ELF.to_vec().into()).unwrap();
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let program_with_deps = ProgramWithDependencies::new(
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ata_program,
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HashMap::from([(Ids::token_program(), token_program)]),
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);
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let (output, proof) = execute_and_prove(
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vec![owner_pre, sender_ata_pre, recipient_pre],
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Program::serialize_instruction(instruction).unwrap(),
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vec![
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InputAccountIdentity::Public,
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InputAccountIdentity::Public,
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InputAccountIdentity::PrivateAuthorizedUpdate {
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epk: EphemeralPublicKey(Vec::new()),
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view_tag: EncryptedAccountData::compute_view_tag(&recipient_npk, &recipient_vpk),
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ssk: transfer_secret,
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nsk: recipient_nsk,
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membership_proof,
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identifier: 0,
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},
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],
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&program_with_deps,
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)
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.unwrap();
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let message =
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Message::try_from_circuit_output(vec![owner_id, sender_ata_id], vec![Nonce(0)], output)
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.unwrap();
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let witness_set = WitnessSet::for_message(&message, proof, &[&Keys::owner_key()]);
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state
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.transition_from_privacy_preserving_transaction(
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&PrivacyPreservingTransaction::new(message, witness_set),
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0,
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0,
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)
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.unwrap();
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assert_eq!(
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state.get_account_by_id(sender_ata_id),
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Account {
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program_owner: Ids::token_program(),
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balance: 0_u128,
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data: Data::from(&TokenHolding::Fungible {
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definition_id: Ids::token_definition(),
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balance: 1_000_000_u128 - ata_transfer_amount,
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}),
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nonce: Nonce(0),
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}
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);
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let recipient_nonce_after = Nonce::private_account_nonce_init(&recipient_id)
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.private_account_nonce_increment(&recipient_nsk);
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let recipient_after_ata_transfer = Account {
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program_owner: Ids::token_program(),
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balance: 0_u128,
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data: Data::from(&TokenHolding::Fungible {
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definition_id: Ids::token_definition(),
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balance: shield_amount + ata_transfer_amount,
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}),
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nonce: recipient_nonce_after,
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};
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assert!(state
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.get_proof_for_commitment(&Commitment::new(
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&recipient_id,
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&recipient_after_ata_transfer
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))
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.is_some());
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}
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// Marvin-todo
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/// Tests a previously-untried combination: `Burn`'s guest requires `owner` to be a *signer*
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/// (`#[account(signer)]`) — every existing private-owner test so far
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/// (`ata_create_from_private_owner`) only used owner as a passive `PrivateUnauthorized` recipient
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/// in `Create`, which doesn't need signer authorization at all. Here, owner self-initializes *and*
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/// signs in the same transaction via `PrivateAuthorizedInit` (proving control by supplying their
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/// own nsk directly) — the ATA holding itself stays public, per the confirmed `PDA` finding above;
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/// only the signing identity is private.
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#[test]
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fn ata_burn_with_private_owner_signing() {
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let mut state = V03State::new();
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deploy_programs(&mut state);
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state.force_insert_account(Ids::token_definition(), Accounts::token_definition_init());
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let owner_nsk: NullifierSecretKey = [91u8; 32];
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let owner_npk = NullifierPublicKey::from(&owner_nsk);
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let owner_vpk = ViewingPublicKey::from_seed(&[93u8; 32], &[94u8; 32]);
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let owner_id = AccountId::for_regular_private_account(&owner_npk, 0);
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// The ATA holding must stay public (per the confirmed PDA finding), so it's seeded
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// directly rather than via a real `Create` transaction.
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let seed = compute_ata_seed(Ids::token_program(), owner_id, Ids::token_definition());
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let ata_id = get_associated_token_account_id(&Ids::ata_program(), &seed);
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let ata_account = Account {
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program_owner: Ids::token_program(),
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balance: 0_u128,
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data: Data::from(&TokenHolding::Fungible {
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definition_id: Ids::token_definition(),
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balance: 1_000_000_u128,
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}),
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nonce: Nonce(0),
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};
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state.force_insert_account(ata_id, ata_account.clone());
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let owner_pre = AccountWithMetadata::new(Account::default(), true, owner_id);
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let ata_pre = AccountWithMetadata::new(ata_account, false, ata_id);
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let def_pre = AccountWithMetadata::new(
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state.get_account_by_id(Ids::token_definition()),
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false,
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Ids::token_definition(),
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);
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let burn_amount = 300_000_u128;
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let instruction = ata_core::Instruction::Burn {
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token_program_id: Ids::token_program(),
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amount: burn_amount,
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};
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let shared_secret = SharedSecretKey::encapsulate_deterministic(&owner_vpk, &[0u8; 32], 0).0;
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let ata_program = Program::new(ata_methods::ATA_ELF.to_vec().into()).unwrap();
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let token_program = Program::new(token_methods::TOKEN_ELF.to_vec().into()).unwrap();
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let program_with_deps = ProgramWithDependencies::new(
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ata_program,
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HashMap::from([(Ids::token_program(), token_program)]),
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);
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let (output, proof) = execute_and_prove(
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vec![owner_pre, ata_pre, def_pre],
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Program::serialize_instruction(instruction).unwrap(),
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vec![
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InputAccountIdentity::PrivateAuthorizedInit {
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epk: EphemeralPublicKey(Vec::new()),
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view_tag: EncryptedAccountData::compute_view_tag(&owner_npk, &owner_vpk),
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ssk: shared_secret,
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nsk: owner_nsk,
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identifier: 0,
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},
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InputAccountIdentity::Public,
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InputAccountIdentity::Public,
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],
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&program_with_deps,
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)
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.unwrap();
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let message =
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Message::try_from_circuit_output(vec![ata_id, Ids::token_definition()], vec![], output)
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.unwrap();
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let witness_set = WitnessSet::for_message(&message, proof, &[]);
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state
|
||||
.transition_from_privacy_preserving_transaction(
|
||||
&PrivacyPreservingTransaction::new(message, witness_set),
|
||||
0,
|
||||
0,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
state.get_account_by_id(ata_id),
|
||||
Account {
|
||||
program_owner: Ids::token_program(),
|
||||
balance: 0_u128,
|
||||
data: Data::from(&TokenHolding::Fungible {
|
||||
definition_id: Ids::token_definition(),
|
||||
balance: 1_000_000_u128 - burn_amount,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
nonce: Nonce(0),
|
||||
}
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
state.get_account_by_id(Ids::token_definition()),
|
||||
Account {
|
||||
program_owner: Ids::token_program(),
|
||||
balance: 0_u128,
|
||||
data: Data::from(&TokenDefinition::Fungible {
|
||||
name: String::from("Gold"),
|
||||
total_supply: 1_000_000_u128 - burn_amount,
|
||||
metadata_id: None,
|
||||
authority: None,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
nonce: Nonce(0),
|
||||
}
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
let owner_expected = Account {
|
||||
nonce: Nonce::private_account_nonce_init(&owner_id),
|
||||
..Account::default()
|
||||
};
|
||||
assert!(state
|
||||
.get_proof_for_commitment(&Commitment::new(&owner_id, &owner_expected))
|
||||
.is_some());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Marvin-todo
|
||||
/// Composes the `GROUP` dimension with the signer-authorization finding just proven above: a
|
||||
/// group-owned owner (GMS distributed through the real seal/unseal handshake, exactly as in
|
||||
/// `token_group_owned_holding_shared_control`) signs an `ATA::Burn` via `PrivateAuthorizedInit`.
|
||||
/// "Bob" — who only ever receives the sealed GMS, never Alice's `GroupKeyHolder` object —
|
||||
/// independently re-derives the identical nsk/npk and successfully signs for the shared ATA
|
||||
/// owner identity.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn ata_group_owned_owner_signing() {
|
||||
let mut state = V03State::new();
|
||||
deploy_programs(&mut state);
|
||||
state.force_insert_account(Ids::token_definition(), Accounts::token_definition_init());
|
||||
|
||||
// Alice creates the group and derives the shared owner identity's keys.
|
||||
let alice_holder = GroupKeyHolder::new();
|
||||
let derivation_seed = [13_u8; 32];
|
||||
let alice_keys = alice_holder.derive_keys_for_shared_account(&derivation_seed);
|
||||
let owner_npk = alice_keys.generate_nullifier_public_key();
|
||||
let owner_id = AccountId::for_regular_private_account(&owner_npk, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
// Alice distributes the GMS to Bob via the real seal/unseal handshake.
|
||||
let bob_sealing_keys = SecretSpendingKey([17_u8; 32]).produce_private_key_holder(None);
|
||||
let bob_sealing_vpk = bob_sealing_keys.generate_viewing_public_key();
|
||||
let bob_sealing_vsk = bob_sealing_keys.viewing_secret_key;
|
||||
let sealed_gms = alice_holder.seal_for(&SealingPublicKey::from_bytes(
|
||||
bob_sealing_vpk.to_bytes().to_vec(),
|
||||
));
|
||||
let bob_holder =
|
||||
GroupKeyHolder::unseal(&sealed_gms, &bob_sealing_vsk).expect("Bob must unseal the GMS");
|
||||
|
||||
// Bob independently re-derives the same shared owner keys and is the one who signs below.
|
||||
let bob_keys = bob_holder.derive_keys_for_shared_account(&derivation_seed);
|
||||
let bob_nsk = bob_keys.nullifier_secret_key;
|
||||
let bob_vpk = bob_keys.generate_viewing_public_key();
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
bob_keys.generate_nullifier_public_key(),
|
||||
owner_npk,
|
||||
"Bob must derive the identical npk as Alice from the shared GMS"
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// The ATA holding must stay public (per the confirmed PDA finding), so it's seeded
|
||||
// directly rather than via a real `Create` transaction.
|
||||
let seed = compute_ata_seed(Ids::token_program(), owner_id, Ids::token_definition());
|
||||
let ata_id = get_associated_token_account_id(&Ids::ata_program(), &seed);
|
||||
let ata_account = Account {
|
||||
program_owner: Ids::token_program(),
|
||||
balance: 0_u128,
|
||||
data: Data::from(&TokenHolding::Fungible {
|
||||
definition_id: Ids::token_definition(),
|
||||
balance: 1_000_000_u128,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
nonce: Nonce(0),
|
||||
};
|
||||
state.force_insert_account(ata_id, ata_account.clone());
|
||||
|
||||
let owner_pre = AccountWithMetadata::new(Account::default(), true, owner_id);
|
||||
let ata_pre = AccountWithMetadata::new(ata_account, false, ata_id);
|
||||
let def_pre = AccountWithMetadata::new(
|
||||
state.get_account_by_id(Ids::token_definition()),
|
||||
false,
|
||||
Ids::token_definition(),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
let burn_amount = 300_000_u128;
|
||||
let instruction = ata_core::Instruction::Burn {
|
||||
token_program_id: Ids::token_program(),
|
||||
amount: burn_amount,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let shared_secret = SharedSecretKey::encapsulate_deterministic(&bob_vpk, &[0u8; 32], 0).0;
|
||||
|
||||
let ata_program = Program::new(ata_methods::ATA_ELF.to_vec().into()).unwrap();
|
||||
let token_program = Program::new(token_methods::TOKEN_ELF.to_vec().into()).unwrap();
|
||||
let program_with_deps = ProgramWithDependencies::new(
|
||||
ata_program,
|
||||
HashMap::from([(Ids::token_program(), token_program)]),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
let (output, proof) = execute_and_prove(
|
||||
vec![owner_pre, ata_pre, def_pre],
|
||||
Program::serialize_instruction(instruction).unwrap(),
|
||||
vec![
|
||||
InputAccountIdentity::PrivateAuthorizedInit {
|
||||
epk: EphemeralPublicKey(Vec::new()),
|
||||
view_tag: EncryptedAccountData::compute_view_tag(&owner_npk, &bob_vpk),
|
||||
ssk: shared_secret,
|
||||
nsk: bob_nsk,
|
||||
identifier: 0,
|
||||
},
|
||||
InputAccountIdentity::Public,
|
||||
InputAccountIdentity::Public,
|
||||
],
|
||||
&program_with_deps,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let message =
|
||||
Message::try_from_circuit_output(vec![ata_id, Ids::token_definition()], vec![], output)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let witness_set = WitnessSet::for_message(&message, proof, &[]);
|
||||
state
|
||||
.transition_from_privacy_preserving_transaction(
|
||||
&PrivacyPreservingTransaction::new(message, witness_set),
|
||||
0,
|
||||
0,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
state.get_account_by_id(ata_id),
|
||||
Account {
|
||||
program_owner: Ids::token_program(),
|
||||
balance: 0_u128,
|
||||
data: Data::from(&TokenHolding::Fungible {
|
||||
definition_id: Ids::token_definition(),
|
||||
balance: 1_000_000_u128 - burn_amount,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
nonce: Nonce(0),
|
||||
}
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
let owner_expected = Account {
|
||||
nonce: Nonce::private_account_nonce_init(&owner_id),
|
||||
..Account::default()
|
||||
};
|
||||
assert!(state
|
||||
.get_proof_for_commitment(&Commitment::new(&owner_id, &owner_expected))
|
||||
.is_some());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
Reference in New Issue
Block a user