lez-fuzzing/fuzz/fuzz_targets/fuzz_state_transition.rs

93 lines
4.0 KiB
Rust

#![no_main]
use arbitrary::{Arbitrary, Unstructured};
use fuzz_props::generators::{arb_fuzz_native_transfer, arbitrary_fuzz_state, arbitrary_transaction};
use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
use nssa::V03State;
fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
let mut u = Unstructured::new(data);
// Generate a fuzz-driven initial state instead of always using the fixed
// testnet genesis. This exposes state-dependent bugs that only manifest
// with specific account shapes (e.g. zero balance, u128::MAX balance, or a
// nonce at the wrap-around boundary).
let fuzz_accs = match arbitrary_fuzz_state(&mut u) {
Ok(accs) => accs,
Err(_) => return,
};
let init_accs: Vec<(nssa::AccountId, u128)> = fuzz_accs
.iter()
.map(|a| (a.account_id, a.balance))
.collect();
// Construct the initial state
let mut state = V03State::new_with_genesis_accounts(&init_accs, vec![], 0);
// Generate up to 8 transactions and apply them
let n_txs: u8 = u8::arbitrary(&mut u).unwrap_or(0) % 8;
for i in 0..n_txs {
// Mix correlated transactions (referencing known fuzz accounts and
// correctly signed) with random ones. Correlated transactions give
// the fuzzer a direct path to successful state transitions; random ones
// exercise the rejection and isolation paths.
let tx_result = if bool::arbitrary(&mut u).unwrap_or(false) {
arb_fuzz_native_transfer(&mut u, &fuzz_accs)
} else {
arbitrary_transaction(&mut u)
};
let Ok(tx) = tx_result else {
break;
};
// Stateless gate: only attempt state transitions that pass stateless check
let Ok(tx) = tx.transaction_stateless_check() else {
continue;
};
// Clone state before to detect state leakage on failure
let state_snapshot = state.clone();
// Advance block_id and timestamp each iteration so the state machine
// sees a realistic monotonically-increasing context. Using the same
// block_id=1 / timestamp=0 for every tx hides bugs that only manifest
// when the block context changes across a multi-transaction sequence.
let block_id: u64 = 1 + u64::from(i);
let timestamp: u64 = u64::from(i);
let result = tx.execute_check_on_state(&mut state, block_id, timestamp);
if result.is_err() {
// INVARIANT: a rejected tx must leave public account balances unchanged
for &(acc_id, _) in &init_accs {
let bal_before = state_snapshot.get_account_by_id(acc_id).balance;
let bal_after = state.get_account_by_id(acc_id).balance;
assert_eq!(
bal_before, bal_after,
"INVARIANT VIOLATION: balance changed despite tx rejection for account {:?}",
acc_id
);
}
} else {
// INVARIANT: total balance of known accounts must be conserved on success.
// Catches double-credit and token-inflation bugs — two transfer paths that
// each credit the recipient without debiting the sender would inflate the
// total, but neither the rejection check nor any other per-account check
// catches it unless we compare the aggregate.
let total_before: u128 = init_accs
.iter()
.map(|&(acc_id, _)| state_snapshot.get_account_by_id(acc_id).balance)
.fold(0u128, u128::saturating_add);
let total_after: u128 = init_accs
.iter()
.map(|&(acc_id, _)| state.get_account_by_id(acc_id).balance)
.fold(0u128, u128::saturating_add);
assert_eq!(
total_before,
total_after,
"INVARIANT VIOLATION: total balance of genesis accounts changed after successful \
transaction (possible double-credit or token-inflation bug)",
);
}
}
});