#![no_main]

use arbitrary::{Arbitrary, Unstructured};
use fuzz_props::generators::{arb_fuzz_native_transfer, arbitrary_fuzz_state, arbitrary_transaction};
use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
use nssa::V03State;

fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
    let mut u = Unstructured::new(data);

    // Generate a fuzz-driven initial state instead of always using the fixed
    // testnet genesis.  This exposes state-dependent bugs that only manifest
    // with specific account shapes (e.g. zero balance, u128::MAX balance, or a
    // nonce at the wrap-around boundary).
    let fuzz_accs = match arbitrary_fuzz_state(&mut u) {
        Ok(accs) => accs,
        Err(_) => return,
    };
    let init_accs: Vec<(nssa::AccountId, u128)> = fuzz_accs
        .iter()
        .map(|a| (a.account_id, a.balance))
        .collect();

    // Construct the initial state
    let mut state = V03State::new_with_genesis_accounts(&init_accs, vec![], 0);

    // Generate up to 8 transactions and apply them
    let n_txs: u8 = u8::arbitrary(&mut u).unwrap_or(0) % 8;
    for i in 0..n_txs {
        // Mix correlated transactions (referencing known fuzz accounts and
        // correctly signed) with random ones.  Correlated transactions give
        // the fuzzer a direct path to successful state transitions; random ones
        // exercise the rejection and isolation paths.
        let tx_result = if bool::arbitrary(&mut u).unwrap_or(false) {
            arb_fuzz_native_transfer(&mut u, &fuzz_accs)
        } else {
            arbitrary_transaction(&mut u)
        };
        let Ok(tx) = tx_result else {
            break;
        };

        // Stateless gate: only attempt state transitions that pass stateless check
        let Ok(tx) = tx.transaction_stateless_check() else {
            continue;
        };

        // Clone state before to detect state leakage on failure
        let state_snapshot = state.clone();

        // Advance block_id and timestamp each iteration so the state machine
        // sees a realistic monotonically-increasing context.  Using the same
        // block_id=1 / timestamp=0 for every tx hides bugs that only manifest
        // when the block context changes across a multi-transaction sequence.
        let block_id: u64 = 1 + u64::from(i);
        let timestamp: u64 = u64::from(i);
        let result = tx.execute_check_on_state(&mut state, block_id, timestamp);

        match result {
            Err(_) => {
                // INVARIANT: StateIsolationOnFailure — a rejected tx must leave
                // public account balances unchanged.
                for &(acc_id, _) in &init_accs {
                    let bal_before = state_snapshot.get_account_by_id(acc_id).balance;
                    let bal_after = state.get_account_by_id(acc_id).balance;
                    assert_eq!(
                        bal_before, bal_after,
                        "INVARIANT VIOLATION [StateIsolationOnFailure]: balance changed \
                         despite tx rejection for account {:?}",
                        acc_id
                    );
                }
            }
            Ok(applied_tx) => {
                // INVARIANT: BalanceConservation — total balance of known accounts
                // must be conserved on success.  Catches double-credit and
                // token-inflation bugs — two transfer paths that each credit the
                // recipient without debiting the sender would inflate the total, but
                // neither the rejection check nor any other per-account check catches
                // it unless we compare the aggregate.
                let total_before: u128 = init_accs
                    .iter()
                    .map(|&(acc_id, _)| state_snapshot.get_account_by_id(acc_id).balance)
                    .fold(0u128, u128::saturating_add);
                let total_after: u128 = init_accs
                    .iter()
                    .map(|&(acc_id, _)| state.get_account_by_id(acc_id).balance)
                    .fold(0u128, u128::saturating_add);
                assert_eq!(
                    total_before,
                    total_after,
                    "INVARIANT VIOLATION [BalanceConservation]: total balance of genesis \
                     accounts changed after successful transaction (double-credit / \
                     token-inflation bug)",
                );

                // INVARIANT: ReplayRejection — the nonce is consumed on first
                // acceptance; replaying the identical transaction in the very next
                // block must be rejected.
                // `execute_check_on_state` returns the `ValidatedTransaction` on
                // success, so we can feed it back without re-validating.
                let replay_result =
                    applied_tx.execute_check_on_state(&mut state, block_id + 1, timestamp + 1);
                assert!(
                    replay_result.is_err(),
                    "INVARIANT VIOLATION [ReplayRejection]: transaction accepted twice — \
                     nonce replay not prevented (first block_id={block_id}, replay \
                     block_id={})",
                    block_id + 1,
                );
            }
        }
    }
});