fix: repo pinning

- minor invariant changes
- missing target in CI added
- docs
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Roman 2026-06-22 10:17:30 +08:00
parent 119c867b89
commit 56162a66a3
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14 changed files with 239 additions and 21 deletions

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@ -4,6 +4,18 @@ description: >
symlinks it to the expected sibling path (../logos-execution-zone) so that
Cargo path dependencies resolve correctly.
inputs:
ref:
description: >
Git ref (SHA, tag, or branch) of logos-execution-zone to check out.
Defaults to the pinned, reviewed revision below — this single line is the
source of truth for the LEZ version every PR-gating workflow builds against.
To bump it: update ../logos-execution-zone to a tested commit, run
`just update-lez`, replace this SHA, and open a PR. The scheduled
lez-compat workflow overrides this with `main` to detect upstream drift.
required: false
default: dac429a94af932b0c827544fff8b9de85b83e6f3
runs:
using: composite
steps:
@ -11,8 +23,16 @@ runs:
uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
repository: logos-blockchain/logos-execution-zone
ref: ${{ inputs.ref }}
path: logos-execution-zone
- name: Symlink logos-execution-zone to sibling directory
run: ln -s "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/logos-execution-zone" "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/../logos-execution-zone"
shell: bash
- name: Report pinned LEZ revision
run: |
echo "LEZ ref: ${{ inputs.ref }}"
echo "LEZ SHA: $(git -C "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/logos-execution-zone" rev-parse HEAD)" \
| tee -a "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
shell: bash

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@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ jobs:
fuzz_privacy_preserving_witness
fuzz_encoding_privacy_preserving
fuzz_nullifier_set_roundtrip
fuzz_privacy_preserving_state_transition
EOF
)
echo "targets=$targets" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"

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@ -12,6 +12,14 @@ env:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
jobs:
# ── Target-inventory gate: fail if any workflow/script/doc omits a target ────
target-inventory:
name: Target inventory in sync
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- run: python3 scripts/check_target_inventory.py
# ── Smoke fuzz: 60 s per target ─────────────────────────────────────────────
smoke-fuzz:
name: Smoke fuzz (${{ matrix.target }})
@ -40,6 +48,7 @@ jobs:
- fuzz_privacy_preserving_witness
- fuzz_encoding_privacy_preserving
- fuzz_nullifier_set_roundtrip
- fuzz_privacy_preserving_state_transition
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
@ -228,6 +237,7 @@ jobs:
- fuzz_privacy_preserving_witness
- fuzz_encoding_privacy_preserving
- fuzz_nullifier_set_roundtrip
- fuzz_privacy_preserving_state_transition
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Checkout logos-execution-zone
@ -300,7 +310,8 @@ jobs:
fuzz_transaction_properties \
fuzz_privacy_preserving_witness \
fuzz_encoding_privacy_preserving \
fuzz_nullifier_set_roundtrip; do
fuzz_nullifier_set_roundtrip \
fuzz_privacy_preserving_state_transition; do
echo "=== $target ===" | tee -a perf_baseline.txt
cargo fuzz run "$target" -- -max_total_time=30 2>&1 \
| grep -E "exec/s|execs_per_sec" | tail -1 | tee -a perf_baseline.txt

53
.github/workflows/lez-compat.yml vendored Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
name: LEZ upstream compatibility
# Detects drift between this fuzzing repo and the *latest* logos-execution-zone
# main, independently of PR gating (which builds against the pinned SHA in
# .github/actions/checkout-lez). A failure here means upstream main moved in a
# way that breaks the harness — bump the pinned ref once the break is resolved.
on:
schedule:
- cron: "0 4 * * *"
push:
branches: [ test-privacy-features ]
workflow_dispatch:
env:
RISC0_DEV_MODE: "1"
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
jobs:
build-against-upstream-main:
name: Build + test against LEZ main
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Checkout logos-execution-zone (main, not the pinned SHA)
uses: ./.github/actions/checkout-lez
with:
ref: main
- name: Install Rust nightly
uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@nightly
with:
components: llvm-tools-preview
- name: Cache cargo registry
uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: |
~/.cargo/registry
~/.cargo/git
target
key: lez-compat-${{ runner.os }}-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
- name: Install logos-blockchain-circuits
uses: ./logos-execution-zone/.github/actions/install-logos-blockchain-circuits
with:
github-token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- name: Build shared fuzz harness against upstream main
run: cargo build -p fuzz_props --release
- name: Run fuzz_props tests against upstream main
run: cargo test -p fuzz_props --release

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@ -164,7 +164,8 @@ jobs:
fuzz_apply_state_diff_split_path fuzz_multi_block_state_sequence \
fuzz_sequencer_vs_replayer fuzz_merkle_tree \
fuzz_transaction_properties fuzz_privacy_preserving_witness \
fuzz_encoding_privacy_preserving fuzz_nullifier_set_roundtrip; do
fuzz_encoding_privacy_preserving fuzz_nullifier_set_roundtrip \
fuzz_privacy_preserving_state_transition; do
cargo fuzz build "${target}"
done

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@ -299,7 +299,9 @@ fuzz-afl TARGET="" TIME="30":
echo "Binary not found — building $t first…"
just afl-build-target "$t"
fi
timeout "$TIME" afl-fuzz -i "$CORPUS" -o "$OUTPUT" -- "$BINARY" || true
# Use afl-fuzz's own -V (run for N seconds then exit) instead of GNU
# `timeout`, which is not installed by default on macOS.
afl-fuzz -V "$TIME" -i "$CORPUS" -o "$OUTPUT" -- "$BINARY" || true
}
for t in "${TARGETS[@]}"; do
echo "=== afl++ $t for ${TIME}s ==="
@ -427,7 +429,9 @@ fuzz-afl-parallel TIME="30" JOBS="4":
echo "Binary not found — building $t first…"
just afl-build-target "$t"
fi
timeout {{TIME}} afl-fuzz -i "$CORPUS" -o "$OUTPUT" -- "$BINARY" || true
# Use afl-fuzz's own -V (run for N seconds then exit) instead of GNU
# `timeout`, which is not installed by default on macOS.
afl-fuzz -V {{TIME}} -i "$CORPUS" -o "$OUTPUT" -- "$BINARY" || true
}
echo "Targets: ${#TARGETS[@]} | max parallel: {{JOBS}} | time per target: {{TIME}}s"
for t in "${TARGETS[@]}"; do
@ -462,7 +466,8 @@ afl-corpus-sync:
[ -d "$QUEUE" ] || continue
for f in "$QUEUE"/id:*; do
[ -f "$f" ] || continue
HASH=$(sha1sum "$f" | cut -d' ' -f1)
# sha1sum (GNU/Linux) is absent on stock macOS; fall back to shasum.
HASH=$( { sha1sum "$f" 2>/dev/null || shasum -a 1 "$f"; } | cut -d' ' -f1)
DEST_FILE="${DEST}/${HASH}"
if [ ! -f "$DEST_FILE" ]; then
cp "$f" "$DEST_FILE"

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@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
[Logos Execution Zone (LEZ)](https://github.com/logos-blockchain/logos-execution-zone) protocol.**
[![Rust](https://img.shields.io/badge/rust-nightly-orange?logo=rust)](rust-toolchain.toml)
[![Fuzzing](https://img.shields.io/badge/libFuzzer%20%C2%B7%20AFL%2B%2B-20%20targets-blue)](#-fuzz-targets)
[![Fuzzing](https://img.shields.io/badge/libFuzzer%20%C2%B7%20AFL%2B%2B-21%20targets-blue)](#-fuzz-targets)
[![Mutation testing](https://img.shields.io/badge/cargo--mutants-enabled-green)](.github/workflows/mutants.yml)
[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-lightgrey)](LICENSE-MIT)
@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ lez-fuzzing/
│ └── generators.rs # Arbitrary / proptest strategies
├── fuzz/ # cargo-fuzz crate (own [workspace] sentinel)
│ ├── Cargo.toml
│ ├── fuzz_targets/ # 20 targets total — see table below
│ ├── fuzz_targets/ # 21 targets total — see table below
│ │ ├── _template.rs # Template for `just new-target`
│ │ └── fuzz_*.rs
│ └── corpus/ # Curated seed inputs (one dir per target)
@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ just fuzz-props
| 18 | `fuzz_privacy_preserving_witness` | `privacy_preserving_transaction::WitnessSet`: CorrectVerification (witness for msg A passes `signatures_are_valid_for(A)`) + MessageIsolation + SignerIdsMatchWitnessKeys |
| 19 | `fuzz_encoding_privacy_preserving` | Privacy-preserving encoding: MessageEncodingRoundtrip + TxEncodingDeterministic/NonEmpty |
| 20 | `fuzz_nullifier_set_roundtrip` | `NullifierSet` Borsh serialisation: NullifierSetRoundtrip (decode→encode identity for the hand-written impl) |
| 21 | `fuzz_privacy_preserving_state_transition` | Path B — `NSSATransaction::PrivacyPreserving` through `execute_check_on_state` with a dev-mode passing proof: reaches commitment/nullifier checks 56 + `apply_state_diff`. Asserts no-panic, StateIsolationOnFailure, PrivateStateIsolationOnFailure, CommitmentInsertion, NonceIncrementCorrectness, PostStateApplied, ReplayRejection (balance conservation intentionally not asserted — the fake proof bypasses the circuit guarantee) |
Each target lives at `fuzz/fuzz_targets/<name>.rs`.

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@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ just fuzz-regression
| `fuzz_privacy_preserving_witness` | `privacy_preserving_transaction::WitnessSet`: **CorrectVerification** (witness for message A passes `signatures_are_valid_for(A)`), **MessageIsolation**, **SignerIdsMatchWitnessKeys** | `fuzz/fuzz_targets/fuzz_privacy_preserving_witness.rs` |
| `fuzz_encoding_privacy_preserving` | Privacy-preserving encoding: **MessageEncodingRoundtrip**, **TxEncodingDeterministic** / **NonEmpty** | `fuzz/fuzz_targets/fuzz_encoding_privacy_preserving.rs` |
| `fuzz_nullifier_set_roundtrip` | `NullifierSet` Borsh serialisation: **NullifierSetRoundtrip** (decode→encode identity for the hand-written impl) | `fuzz/fuzz_targets/fuzz_nullifier_set_roundtrip.rs` |
| `fuzz_privacy_preserving_state_transition` | Path B — `NSSATransaction::PrivacyPreserving` through `execute_check_on_state` with a dev-mode passing proof, reaching checks 56 (`check_commitments_are_new` / `check_nullifiers_are_valid`) and `apply_state_diff`: **No panic**, **StateIsolationOnFailure**, **PrivateStateIsolationOnFailure**, **CommitmentInsertion**, **NonceIncrementCorrectness**, **PostStateApplied**, **ReplayRejection**. Balance conservation is intentionally *not* asserted — the synthesised fake receipt bypasses the circuit guarantee. Requires `RISC0_DEV_MODE=1` | `fuzz/fuzz_targets/fuzz_privacy_preserving_state_transition.rs` |
---
@ -376,8 +377,8 @@ The nightly AFL++ CI workflow has two jobs:
| Job | Triggers | Matrix |
|-----|----------|--------|
| `afl-smoke` | nightly + `workflow_dispatch` | all 20 targets, 60 s each |
| `afl-coverage-aggregate` | nightly, `needs: afl-smoke` | all 20 targets merged into one LLVM HTML report |
| `afl-smoke` | nightly + `workflow_dispatch` | all 21 targets, 60 s each |
| `afl-coverage-aggregate` | nightly, `needs: afl-smoke` | all 21 targets merged into one LLVM HTML report |
The smoke job (one matrix leg per target, on `ubuntu-latest`):
1. Builds AFL++ from source, then builds the target with `cargo afl build --no-default-features --features fuzzer-afl`
@ -387,7 +388,7 @@ The smoke job (one matrix leg per target, on `ubuntu-latest`):
The coverage-aggregate job:
1. Downloads every smoke leg's findings
2. Rebuilds all 20 targets with `RUSTFLAGS="-C instrument-coverage"`
2. Rebuilds all 21 targets with `RUSTFLAGS="-C instrument-coverage"`
3. Runs all checked-in corpus + AFL queue inputs through each binary
4. Merges every `.profraw` → one `.profdata` → a single combined HTML report via `llvm-cov show`
@ -620,6 +621,7 @@ Measured on a 4-core x86_64 Linux runner with `RISC0_DEV_MODE=1`:
| `fuzz_privacy_preserving_witness` | ~15 000 exec/sec *(estimate)* |
| `fuzz_encoding_privacy_preserving` | ~50 000 exec/sec *(estimate)* |
| `fuzz_nullifier_set_roundtrip` | ~100 000 exec/sec *(estimate)* |
| `fuzz_privacy_preserving_state_transition` | slow — dev-mode proof synthesis + verification per exec dominates runtime *(estimate)* |
> [!NOTE]
> Throughput figures for the five new targets are rough estimates; run `just perf-baseline`
@ -691,6 +693,7 @@ from `data`; if a check doesn't depend on the input, write it as a unit test in
| Item | Notes |
|------|-------|
| `PrivacyPreservingTransaction` coverage | Excluded from `fuzz_encoding_roundtrip` because its ZK receipt cannot be reconstructed in a fuzzing loop. A dedicated slow target with `RISC0_DEV_MODE=1` and `proptest` should be added after the current targets are stable |
| `PrivacyPreservingTransaction` encoding | Still excluded from `fuzz_encoding_roundtrip` because a real ZK receipt cannot be reconstructed in a fast fuzzing loop. Encoding is instead covered by the dedicated `fuzz_encoding_privacy_preserving` target |
| `PrivacyPreservingTransaction` state transition (fake-receipt caveat) | Covered by `fuzz_privacy_preserving_state_transition`, which drives `execute_check_on_state` under `RISC0_DEV_MODE=1` using a synthesised *passing* proof (a dev-mode fake receipt). Because the proof is forced to pass, the circuit's balance-conservation guarantee is bypassed, so this target intentionally does **not** assert balance conservation — see `fuzz_props::privacy::synthesize_passing_proof` for the binding caveat |
| `fuzz_validate_execute_consistency` new-account detection | If `execute_check_on_state` creates a brand-new account absent from both the genesis set and the diff, that state-widening will not be detected — full detection requires iterating all accounts in `V03State`, which the API does not currently expose |
| LEZ version tracking | There is no submodule pin — `lez-fuzzing` reads `../logos-execution-zone` as checked out. Update that repo to a release tag or a tested commit, then run `just update-lez` (which does `git pull --ff-only`) and open a PR to bump it |
| LEZ version tracking | CI pins the upstream revision in a single place — the `ref` input default of `.github/actions/checkout-lez`. PR-gating workflows build against that pinned SHA for reproducibility; the scheduled `lez-compat.yml` workflow overrides it with `main` to flag upstream drift. Locally, `lez-fuzzing` still reads `../logos-execution-zone` as checked out. To bump: update that repo to a tested commit, run `just update-lez` (which does `git pull --ff-only`), replace the SHA in the action, and open a PR |

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@ -84,6 +84,9 @@ pub fn arbitrary_fuzz_state(u: &mut Unstructured<'_>) -> arbitrary::Result<Vec<F
///
/// Self-transfers (`from_idx == to_idx`) are allowed since they are a useful
/// edge case (balance should remain unchanged).
///
/// The `nonce`/`amount` draw is biased toward valid inputs so the success path
/// is actually reached, with a minority branch for the rejection paths.
pub fn arb_fuzz_native_transfer(
u: &mut Unstructured<'_>,
accounts: &[FuzzAccount],
@ -93,12 +96,20 @@ pub fn arb_fuzz_native_transfer(
}
let from_idx = (u8::arbitrary(u)? as usize) % accounts.len();
let to_idx = (u8::arbitrary(u)? as usize) % accounts.len();
let nonce = u128::arbitrary(u)?;
let amount = u128::arbitrary(u)?;
let from = &accounts[from_idx];
let to = &accounts[to_idx];
let (nonce, amount) = if bool::arbitrary(u)? {
// Biased valid: nonce near the genesis value, amount within balance.
let nonce = u128::from(u8::arbitrary(u)?) % 4; // 0..=3
let amount = u128::arbitrary(u)? % from.balance.saturating_add(1); // 0..=balance
(nonce, amount)
} else {
// Adversarial: full range drives the rejection paths.
(u128::arbitrary(u)?, u128::arbitrary(u)?)
};
Ok(
common::test_utils::create_transaction_native_token_transfer(
from.account_id,

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@ -241,8 +241,10 @@ pub fn arb_privacy_preserving_tx(
}
}
// ── public_post_states (length varied to exercise the apply/zip-truncation path) ──
let n_post = (u8::arbitrary(u)? as usize) % (public_account_ids.len() + 1);
// ── public_post_states ──
// Range 0..=len+3 so lengths can exceed the public-account count, exercising
// both the truncation path and the oversized/length-mismatch path.
let n_post = (u8::arbitrary(u)? as usize) % (public_account_ids.len() + 4);
let public_post_states = std::iter::repeat_with(|| arb_account(u))
.take(n_post)
.collect::<ArbResult<Vec<_>>>()?;

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@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ fn arb_privacy_preserving_tx_generator_invariants() {
let mut max_commitments = 0_usize;
let mut max_nullifiers = 0_usize;
let mut saw_empty_comm_nonempty_null = false;
let mut saw_oversize_post_states = false;
let mut garbage = 0_usize;
let mut saw_garbage = false;
@ -308,14 +309,16 @@ fn arb_privacy_preserving_tx_generator_invariants() {
// The signer count is drawn modulo `max_signers + 1`, so it can never exceed
// the cap of 3 distinct signers.
assert!(n_signers <= 3, "n_signers {n_signers} exceeds the cap of 3");
// Post-states are drawn modulo `public_account_ids.len() + 1`, so there is
// never a post-state without a corresponding public account.
// Post-states are drawn modulo `public_account_ids.len() + 4` (0..=len+3).
assert!(
msg.public_post_states.len() <= msg.public_account_ids.len(),
"public_post_states {} exceeds public_account_ids {}",
msg.public_post_states.len() <= msg.public_account_ids.len() + 3,
"public_post_states {} exceeds public_account_ids + 3 ({})",
msg.public_post_states.len(),
msg.public_account_ids.len()
msg.public_account_ids.len() + 3
);
if msg.public_post_states.len() > msg.public_account_ids.len() {
saw_oversize_post_states = true;
}
// At most 3 signers plus at most 3 extra ids (both deduplicated).
assert!(
msg.public_account_ids.len() <= 6,
@ -406,6 +409,11 @@ fn arb_privacy_preserving_tx_generator_invariants() {
saw_empty_comm_nonempty_null,
"the generator never produced empty commitments with non-empty nullifiers"
);
// The oversized shape (more post-states than public account ids) must be reachable.
assert!(
saw_oversize_post_states,
"the generator never produced more post-states than public account ids"
);
// The garbage-proof branch (~1 in 8) must be reachable at all.
assert!(saw_garbage, "the generator never produced a garbage proof");
// The garbage-proof rate must sit near the intended 1/8. Integer bands avoid float

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@ -196,6 +196,15 @@ def main() -> None:
print()
print(" 4. Run with libFuzzer: just fuzz-one", target)
print(" Run with AFL++: just fuzz-afl", target)
print()
print(" 5. This script only edits .github/workflows/fuzz.yml. Add the")
print(" target to the other enumeration sites too, then verify with:")
print(" python3 scripts/check_target_inventory.py")
print(" (the same check runs in CI and will fail the build on drift):")
print(" .github/workflows/fuzz-afl.yml")
print(" .github/workflows/mutants.yml")
print(" scripts/mutants-corpus-test.sh")
print(" README.md, docs/fuzzing.md")
if __name__ == "__main__":

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@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Fail if any fuzz target registered in fuzz/Cargo.toml is missing from a
workflow / script / doc that enumerates the target list.
`fuzz/Cargo.toml` is the single source of truth: every `[[bin]] name = "fuzz_*"`
must be mentioned by name in each of the consumer files below. This guards
against the drift that `scripts/add_fuzz_target.py` cannot prevent on its own
(it only edits `.github/workflows/fuzz.yml`).
Usage:
python3 scripts/check_target_inventory.py
Exit code 0 = all consumers list every target; 1 = drift detected (prints the
missing target/file pairs). Run from anywhere; paths are resolved relative to
the repository root.
"""
import re
import sys
from pathlib import Path
# Files that enumerate the full target list and must stay in sync with Cargo.toml.
# Paths are relative to the repository root.
CONSUMERS = [
".github/workflows/fuzz.yml",
".github/workflows/fuzz-afl.yml",
".github/workflows/mutants.yml",
"scripts/mutants-corpus-test.sh",
"README.md",
"docs/fuzzing.md",
]
_BIN_NAME_RE = re.compile(r'name\s*=\s*"(fuzz_[a-z0-9_]+)"')
def registered_targets(cargo_toml: Path) -> list[str]:
"""Every `[[bin]] name = "fuzz_*"` in fuzz/Cargo.toml, in file order."""
names = _BIN_NAME_RE.findall(cargo_toml.read_text())
# Preserve order, drop duplicates defensively.
seen: set[str] = set()
ordered: list[str] = []
for n in names:
if n not in seen:
seen.add(n)
ordered.append(n)
return ordered
def main() -> None:
root = Path(__file__).parent.parent # repository root
cargo_toml = root / "fuzz" / "Cargo.toml"
if not cargo_toml.exists():
print(f"ERROR: {cargo_toml} not found", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
targets = registered_targets(cargo_toml)
if not targets:
print(f"ERROR: no [[bin]] targets found in {cargo_toml}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
missing: list[tuple[str, str]] = []
for rel in CONSUMERS:
path = root / rel
if not path.exists():
print(f"ERROR: consumer file not found: {rel}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
text = path.read_text()
for target in targets:
if target not in text:
missing.append((rel, target))
if missing:
print(
f"Target-inventory drift: {len(targets)} targets registered in "
f"fuzz/Cargo.toml, but some consumers are missing entries:\n",
file=sys.stderr,
)
for rel, target in missing:
print(f" MISSING {rel} -> {target}", file=sys.stderr)
print(
"\nAdd the target(s) above to each listed file "
"(see scripts/add_fuzz_target.py for the canonical insertion points).",
file=sys.stderr,
)
sys.exit(1)
print(f"OK: all {len(CONSUMERS)} consumers list every one of the "
f"{len(targets)} registered targets.")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()

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@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ targets=(
fuzz_privacy_preserving_witness
fuzz_encoding_privacy_preserving
fuzz_nullifier_set_roundtrip
fuzz_privacy_preserving_state_transition
)
# cargo-fuzz requires the nightly toolchain (-Zsanitizer=address etc.).