diff --git a/fuzz/fuzz_targets/fuzz_state_diff_computation.rs b/fuzz/fuzz_targets/fuzz_state_diff_computation.rs
index dbe06a0..410afb3 100644
--- a/fuzz/fuzz_targets/fuzz_state_diff_computation.rs
+++ b/fuzz/fuzz_targets/fuzz_state_diff_computation.rs
@@ -1,17 +1,25 @@
 #![no_main]
-//! Fuzz target: state diff isolation.
+//! Fuzz target: state diff isolation — bidirectional.
 //!
-//! Invariant: `ValidatedStateDiff::from_public_transaction` must only produce
-//! account changes for accounts that appear in `tx.affected_public_account_ids()`.
+//! Invariants:
 //!
-//! A diff that modifies an account outside that set would allow a transaction
-//! to silently corrupt unrelated accounts' balances.
+//! 1. **Forward containment** — `ValidatedStateDiff::from_public_transaction` must
+//!    only produce account changes for accounts that appear in
+//!    `tx.affected_public_account_ids()`.  A diff that modifies an undeclared
+//!    account would allow a transaction to silently corrupt unrelated balances.
+//!
+//! 2. **Reverse completeness (under-reporting)** — every account declared in
+//!    `tx.affected_public_account_ids()` that `execute_check_on_state` actually
+//!    modifies must appear in the diff.  A diff that silently omits a balance
+//!    change passes invariant 1 but leaves callers with a stale view of the state,
+//!    potentially enabling double-spend and consistency bugs.
 //!
 //! The initial state is generated from the fuzz input (rather than a fixed
 //! testnet genesis) so that state-dependent diff bugs — those triggered only by
 //! specific account shapes such as zero balance or `u128::MAX` — are reachable.
 
 use arbitrary::{Arbitrary, Unstructured};
+use common::transaction::NSSATransaction;
 use fuzz_props::arbitrary_types::ArbPublicTransaction;
 use fuzz_props::generators::arbitrary_fuzz_state;
 use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
@@ -37,13 +45,18 @@ fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
         Err(_) => return,
     };
 
-    // Collect the set of accounts the transaction claims to touch.
+    // Collect the set of accounts the transaction declares it will touch.
+    // `affected_public_account_ids()` returns owned data so `pub_tx` remains
+    // available for both `from_public_transaction` (borrow) and the later move
+    // into `NSSATransaction::Public`.
     let affected = pub_tx.affected_public_account_ids();
 
     match ValidatedStateDiff::from_public_transaction(&pub_tx, &state, 1, 0) {
         Ok(diff) => {
-            // INVARIANT: every key in the public diff must be in `affected`.
             let public_diff = diff.public_diff();
+
+            // INVARIANT 1 (forward containment): every key in the diff must be
+            // in `affected`.  Protects against a diff touching undeclared accounts.
             for changed_id in public_diff.keys() {
                 assert!(
                     affected.contains(changed_id),
@@ -53,6 +66,37 @@ fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
                     affected
                 );
             }
+
+            // INVARIANT 2 (reverse completeness): every account in `affected`
+            // that `execute_check_on_state` actually modifies must appear in the
+            // diff.  A "silent under-report" — where execution changes an account
+            // that `affected` declared but `ValidatedStateDiff` omits — passes
+            // invariant 1 above but leaves the protocol with a stale state view.
+            //
+            // We execute the same transaction on a cloned state and compare each
+            // account in `affected` before and after.  The stateless gate ensures
+            // we do not panic on a structurally malformed transaction.
+            let mut exec_state = state.clone();
+            // `pub_tx` is moved here; it is no longer borrowed after this point.
+            let tx_for_exec = NSSATransaction::Public(pub_tx);
+            if let Ok(checked_tx) = tx_for_exec.transaction_stateless_check() {
+                if checked_tx.execute_check_on_state(&mut exec_state, 1, 0).is_ok() {
+                    for acc_id in &affected {
+                        let before = state.get_account_by_id(*acc_id);
+                        let after = exec_state.get_account_by_id(*acc_id);
+                        if before != after {
+                            assert!(
+                                public_diff.contains_key(acc_id),
+                                "INVARIANT VIOLATION: account {:?} is declared in \
+                                 affected_public_account_ids() and was modified by \
+                                 execute_check_on_state but is absent from \
+                                 ValidatedStateDiff (silent under-report)",
+                                acc_id
+                            );
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+            }
         }
         Err(_) => {
             // Validation failure is expected for structurally or semantically invalid inputs.