541 lines
16 KiB
Nim
541 lines
16 KiB
Nim
## Nim-LibP2P
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## Copyright (c) 2020 Status Research & Development GmbH
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## Licensed under either of
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## * Apache License, version 2.0, ([LICENSE-APACHE](LICENSE-APACHE))
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## * MIT license ([LICENSE-MIT](LICENSE-MIT))
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## at your option.
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## This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed except according to
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## those terms.
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import chronos
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import chronicles
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import stew/[endians2, byteutils]
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import nimcrypto/[utils, sysrand, sha2, hmac]
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import ../../connection
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import ../../peer
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import ../../peerinfo
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import ../../protobuf/minprotobuf
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import ../../utility
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import ../../stream/lpstream
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import secure,
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../../crypto/[crypto, chacha20poly1305, curve25519, hkdf],
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../../stream/bufferstream
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logScope:
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topic = "Noise"
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const
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# https://godoc.org/github.com/libp2p/go-libp2p-noise#pkg-constants
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NoiseCodec* = "/noise"
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PayloadString = "noise-libp2p-static-key:"
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ProtocolXXName = "Noise_XX_25519_ChaChaPoly_SHA256"
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# Empty is a special value which indicates k has not yet been initialized.
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EmptyKey: ChaChaPolyKey = [0.byte, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
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NonceMax = uint64.high - 1 # max is reserved
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NoiseSize = 32
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MaxPlainSize = int(uint16.high - NoiseSize - ChaChaPolyTag.len)
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type
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KeyPair = object
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privateKey: Curve25519Key
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publicKey: Curve25519Key
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# https://noiseprotocol.org/noise.html#the-cipherstate-object
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CipherState = object
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k: ChaChaPolyKey
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n: uint64
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# https://noiseprotocol.org/noise.html#the-symmetricstate-object
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SymmetricState = object
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cs: CipherState
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ck: ChaChaPolyKey
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h: MDigest[256]
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# https://noiseprotocol.org/noise.html#the-handshakestate-object
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HandshakeState = object
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ss: SymmetricState
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s: KeyPair
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e: KeyPair
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rs: Curve25519Key
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re: Curve25519Key
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HandshakeResult = object
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cs1: CipherState
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cs2: CipherState
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remoteP2psecret: seq[byte]
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rs: Curve25519Key
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Noise* = ref object of Secure
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localPrivateKey: PrivateKey
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localPublicKey: PublicKey
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noisePrivateKey: Curve25519Key
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noisePublicKey: Curve25519Key
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commonPrologue: seq[byte]
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outgoing: bool
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NoiseConnection* = ref object of SecureConn
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readCs: CipherState
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writeCs: CipherState
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NoiseHandshakeError* = object of CatchableError
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NoiseDecryptTagError* = object of CatchableError
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NoiseOversizedPayloadError* = object of CatchableError
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NoiseNonceMaxError* = object of CatchableError # drop connection on purpose
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# Utility
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proc genKeyPair(): KeyPair =
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result.privateKey = Curve25519Key.random()
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result.publicKey = result.privateKey.public()
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proc hashProtocol(name: string): MDigest[256] =
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# If protocol_name is less than or equal to HASHLEN bytes in length,
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# sets h equal to protocol_name with zero bytes appended to make HASHLEN bytes.
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# Otherwise sets h = HASH(protocol_name).
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if name.len <= 32:
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result.data[0..name.high] = name.toBytes
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else:
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result = sha256.digest(name)
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proc dh(priv: Curve25519Key, pub: Curve25519Key): Curve25519Key =
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Curve25519.mul(result, pub, priv)
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# Cipherstate
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proc hasKey(cs: CipherState): bool =
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cs.k != EmptyKey
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proc encryptWithAd(state: var CipherState, ad, data: openarray[byte]): seq[byte] =
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var
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tag: ChaChaPolyTag
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nonce: ChaChaPolyNonce
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np = cast[ptr uint64](addr nonce[4])
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np[] = state.n
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result = @data
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ChaChaPoly.encrypt(state.k, nonce, tag, result, ad)
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inc state.n
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if state.n > NonceMax:
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raise newException(NoiseNonceMaxError, "Noise max nonce value reached")
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result &= tag
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trace "encryptWithAd", tag = byteutils.toHex(tag), data = result.shortLog, nonce = state.n - 1
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proc decryptWithAd(state: var CipherState, ad, data: openarray[byte]): seq[byte] =
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var
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tagIn = data[^ChaChaPolyTag.len..data.high].intoChaChaPolyTag
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tagOut = tagIn
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nonce: ChaChaPolyNonce
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np = cast[ptr uint64](addr nonce[4])
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np[] = state.n
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result = data[0..(data.high - ChaChaPolyTag.len)]
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ChaChaPoly.decrypt(state.k, nonce, tagOut, result, ad)
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trace "decryptWithAd", tagIn = tagIn.shortLog, tagOut = tagOut.shortLog, nonce = state.n
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if tagIn != tagOut:
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error "decryptWithAd failed", data = byteutils.toHex(data)
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raise newException(NoiseDecryptTagError, "decryptWithAd failed tag authentication.")
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inc state.n
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if state.n > NonceMax:
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raise newException(NoiseNonceMaxError, "Noise max nonce value reached")
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# Symmetricstate
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proc init(_: type[SymmetricState]): SymmetricState =
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result.h = ProtocolXXName.hashProtocol
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result.ck = result.h.data.intoChaChaPolyKey
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result.cs = CipherState(k: EmptyKey)
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proc mixKey(ss: var SymmetricState, ikm: ChaChaPolyKey) =
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var
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temp_keys: array[2, ChaChaPolyKey]
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sha256.hkdf(ss.ck, ikm, [], temp_keys)
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ss.ck = temp_keys[0]
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ss.cs = CipherState(k: temp_keys[1])
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trace "mixKey", key = ss.cs.k.shortLog
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proc mixHash(ss: var SymmetricState; data: openarray[byte]) =
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var ctx: sha256
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ctx.init()
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ctx.update(ss.h.data)
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ctx.update(data)
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ss.h = ctx.finish()
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trace "mixHash", hash = ss.h.data.shortLog
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# We might use this for other handshake patterns/tokens
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proc mixKeyAndHash(ss: var SymmetricState; ikm: openarray[byte]) {.used.} =
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var
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temp_keys: array[3, ChaChaPolyKey]
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sha256.hkdf(ss.ck, ikm, [], temp_keys)
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ss.ck = temp_keys[0]
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ss.mixHash(temp_keys[1])
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ss.cs = CipherState(k: temp_keys[2])
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proc encryptAndHash(ss: var SymmetricState, data: openarray[byte]): seq[byte] =
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# according to spec if key is empty leave plaintext
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if ss.cs.hasKey:
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result = ss.cs.encryptWithAd(ss.h.data, data)
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else:
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result = @data
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ss.mixHash(result)
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proc decryptAndHash(ss: var SymmetricState, data: openarray[byte]): seq[byte] =
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# according to spec if key is empty leave plaintext
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if ss.cs.hasKey:
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result = ss.cs.decryptWithAd(ss.h.data, data)
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else:
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result = @data
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ss.mixHash(data)
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proc split(ss: var SymmetricState): tuple[cs1, cs2: CipherState] =
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var
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temp_keys: array[2, ChaChaPolyKey]
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sha256.hkdf(ss.ck, [], [], temp_keys)
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return (CipherState(k: temp_keys[0]), CipherState(k: temp_keys[1]))
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proc init(_: type[HandshakeState]): HandshakeState =
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result.ss = SymmetricState.init()
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template write_e: untyped =
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trace "noise write e"
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# Sets e (which must be empty) to GENERATE_KEYPAIR(). Appends e.public_key to the buffer. Calls MixHash(e.public_key).
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hs.e = genKeyPair()
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msg &= hs.e.publicKey
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hs.ss.mixHash(hs.e.publicKey)
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template write_s: untyped =
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trace "noise write s"
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# Appends EncryptAndHash(s.public_key) to the buffer.
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msg &= hs.ss.encryptAndHash(hs.s.publicKey)
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template dh_ee: untyped =
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trace "noise dh ee"
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# Calls MixKey(DH(e, re)).
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hs.ss.mixKey(dh(hs.e.privateKey, hs.re))
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template dh_es: untyped =
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trace "noise dh es"
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# Calls MixKey(DH(e, rs)) if initiator, MixKey(DH(s, re)) if responder.
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when initiator:
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hs.ss.mixKey(dh(hs.e.privateKey, hs.rs))
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else:
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hs.ss.mixKey(dh(hs.s.privateKey, hs.re))
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template dh_se: untyped =
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trace "noise dh se"
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# Calls MixKey(DH(s, re)) if initiator, MixKey(DH(e, rs)) if responder.
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when initiator:
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hs.ss.mixKey(dh(hs.s.privateKey, hs.re))
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else:
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hs.ss.mixKey(dh(hs.e.privateKey, hs.rs))
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# might be used for other token/handshakes
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template dh_ss: untyped {.used.} =
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trace "noise dh ss"
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# Calls MixKey(DH(s, rs)).
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hs.ss.mixKey(dh(hs.s.privateKey, hs.rs))
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template read_e: untyped =
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trace "noise read e", size = msg.len
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if msg.len < Curve25519Key.len:
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raise newException(NoiseHandshakeError, "Noise E, expected more data")
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# Sets re (which must be empty) to the next DHLEN bytes from the message. Calls MixHash(re.public_key).
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hs.re[0..Curve25519Key.high] = msg[0..Curve25519Key.high]
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msg = msg[Curve25519Key.len..msg.high]
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hs.ss.mixHash(hs.re)
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template read_s: untyped =
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trace "noise read s", size = msg.len
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# Sets temp to the next DHLEN + 16 bytes of the message if HasKey() == True, or to the next DHLEN bytes otherwise.
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# Sets rs (which must be empty) to DecryptAndHash(temp).
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let
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temp =
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if hs.ss.cs.hasKey:
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if msg.len < Curve25519Key.len + ChaChaPolyTag.len:
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raise newException(NoiseHandshakeError, "Noise S, expected more data")
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msg[0..Curve25519Key.high + ChaChaPolyTag.len]
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else:
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if msg.len < Curve25519Key.len:
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raise newException(NoiseHandshakeError, "Noise S, expected more data")
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msg[0..Curve25519Key.high]
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msg = msg[temp.len..msg.high]
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let plain = hs.ss.decryptAndHash(temp)
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hs.rs[0..Curve25519Key.high] = plain
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proc receiveHSMessage(sconn: Connection): Future[seq[byte]] {.async.} =
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var besize: array[2, byte]
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await sconn.readExactly(addr besize[0], 2)
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let size = uint16.fromBytesBE(besize).int
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trace "receiveHSMessage", size
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var buffer = newSeq[byte](size)
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await sconn.readExactly(addr buffer[0], size)
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return buffer
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proc sendHSMessage(sconn: Connection; buf: seq[byte]) {.async.} =
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var
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lesize = buf.len.uint16
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besize = lesize.toBytesBE
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outbuf = newSeqOfCap[byte](besize.len + buf.len)
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trace "sendHSMessage", size = lesize
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outbuf &= besize
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outbuf &= buf
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await sconn.write(outbuf)
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proc packNoisePayload(payload: openarray[byte]): seq[byte] =
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var
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ns: uint32
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if randomBytes(addr ns, 4) != 4:
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raise newException(NoiseHandshakeError, "Failed to generate randomBytes")
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let
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noiselen = int((ns mod (NoiseSize - 2)) + 1)
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plen = payload.len.uint16
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var
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noise = newSeq[byte](noiselen)
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if randomBytes(noise) != noiselen:
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raise newException(NoiseHandshakeError, "Failed to generate randomBytes")
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result &= plen.toBytesBE
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result &= payload
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result &= noise
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if result.len > uint16.high.int:
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raise newException(NoiseOversizedPayloadError, "Trying to send an unsupported oversized payload over Noise")
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trace "packed noise payload", inSize = payload.len, outSize = result.len
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proc unpackNoisePayload(payload: var seq[byte]) =
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let
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besize = payload[0..1]
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size = uint16.fromBytesBE(besize).int
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if size > (payload.len - 2):
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raise newException(NoiseOversizedPayloadError, "Received a wrong payload size")
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payload = payload[2..^((payload.len - size) - 1)]
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trace "unpacked noise payload", size = payload.len
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proc handshakeXXOutbound(p: Noise, conn: Connection, p2pProof: ProtoBuffer): Future[HandshakeResult] {.async.} =
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const initiator = true
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var
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hs = HandshakeState.init()
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p2psecret = p2pProof.buffer
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hs.ss.mixHash(p.commonPrologue)
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hs.s.privateKey = p.noisePrivateKey
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hs.s.publicKey = p.noisePublicKey
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# -> e
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var msg: seq[byte]
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write_e()
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# IK might use this btw!
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msg &= hs.ss.encryptAndHash(@[])
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await conn.sendHSMessage(msg)
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# <- e, ee, s, es
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msg = await conn.receiveHSMessage()
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read_e()
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dh_ee()
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read_s()
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dh_es()
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var remoteP2psecret = hs.ss.decryptAndHash(msg)
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unpackNoisePayload(remoteP2psecret)
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# -> s, se
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msg.setLen(0)
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write_s()
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dh_se()
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# last payload must follow the ecrypted way of sending
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var packed = packNoisePayload(p2psecret)
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msg &= hs.ss.encryptAndHash(packed)
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await conn.sendHSMessage(msg)
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let (cs1, cs2) = hs.ss.split()
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return HandshakeResult(cs1: cs1, cs2: cs2, remoteP2psecret: remoteP2psecret, rs: hs.rs)
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proc handshakeXXInbound(p: Noise, conn: Connection, p2pProof: ProtoBuffer): Future[HandshakeResult] {.async.} =
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const initiator = false
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var
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hs = HandshakeState.init()
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p2psecret = p2pProof.buffer
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hs.ss.mixHash(p.commonPrologue)
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hs.s.privateKey = p.noisePrivateKey
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hs.s.publicKey = p.noisePublicKey
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# -> e
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var msg = await conn.receiveHSMessage()
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read_e()
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# we might use this early data one day, keeping it here for clarity
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let earlyData {.used.} = hs.ss.decryptAndHash(msg)
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# <- e, ee, s, es
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msg.setLen(0)
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write_e()
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dh_ee()
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write_s()
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dh_es()
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var packedSecret = packNoisePayload(p2psecret)
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msg &= hs.ss.encryptAndHash(packedSecret)
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await conn.sendHSMessage(msg)
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# -> s, se
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msg = await conn.receiveHSMessage()
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read_s()
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dh_se()
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var remoteP2psecret = hs.ss.decryptAndHash(msg)
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unpackNoisePayload(remoteP2psecret)
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let (cs1, cs2) = hs.ss.split()
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return HandshakeResult(cs1: cs1, cs2: cs2, remoteP2psecret: remoteP2psecret, rs: hs.rs)
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method readMessage(sconn: NoiseConnection): Future[seq[byte]] {.async.} =
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try:
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var besize: array[2, byte]
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await sconn.readExactly(addr besize[0], 2)
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let size = uint16.fromBytesBE(besize).int
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trace "receiveEncryptedMessage", size, peer = $sconn.peerInfo
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if size == 0:
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return @[]
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var buffer = newSeq[byte](size)
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await sconn.readExactly(addr buffer[0], size)
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var plain = sconn.readCs.decryptWithAd([], buffer)
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unpackNoisePayload(plain)
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return plain
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except LPStreamIncompleteError:
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trace "Connection dropped while reading"
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except LPStreamReadError:
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trace "Error reading from connection"
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method writeMessage(sconn: NoiseConnection, message: seq[byte]): Future[void] {.async.} =
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try:
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var
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left = message.len
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offset = 0
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while left > 0:
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let
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chunkSize = if left > MaxPlainSize: MaxPlainSize else: left
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packed = packNoisePayload(message.toOpenArray(offset, offset + chunkSize - 1))
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cipher = sconn.writeCs.encryptWithAd([], packed)
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left = left - chunkSize
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offset = offset + chunkSize
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var
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lesize = cipher.len.uint16
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besize = lesize.toBytesBE
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outbuf = newSeqOfCap[byte](cipher.len + 2)
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trace "sendEncryptedMessage", size = lesize, peer = $sconn.peerInfo, left, offset
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outbuf &= besize
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outbuf &= cipher
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await sconn.write(outbuf)
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except AsyncStreamWriteError:
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trace "Could not write to connection"
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method handshake*(p: Noise, conn: Connection, initiator: bool = false): Future[SecureConn] {.async.} =
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trace "Starting Noise handshake", initiator
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# https://github.com/libp2p/specs/tree/master/noise#libp2p-data-in-handshake-messages
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let
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signedPayload = p.localPrivateKey.sign(PayloadString.toBytes & p.noisePublicKey.getBytes)
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var
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libp2pProof = initProtoBuffer()
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libp2pProof.write(initProtoField(1, p.localPublicKey))
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libp2pProof.write(initProtoField(2, signedPayload))
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# data field also there but not used!
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libp2pProof.finish()
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let handshakeRes =
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if initiator:
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await handshakeXXOutbound(p, conn, libp2pProof)
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else:
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await handshakeXXInbound(p, conn, libp2pProof)
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var
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remoteProof = initProtoBuffer(handshakeRes.remoteP2psecret)
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remotePubKey: PublicKey
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remoteSig: Signature
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if remoteProof.getValue(1, remotePubKey) <= 0:
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raise newException(NoiseHandshakeError, "Failed to deserialize remote public key.")
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if remoteProof.getValue(2, remoteSig) <= 0:
|
|
raise newException(NoiseHandshakeError, "Failed to deserialize remote public key.")
|
|
|
|
let verifyPayload = PayloadString.toBytes & handshakeRes.rs.getBytes
|
|
if not remoteSig.verify(verifyPayload, remotePubKey):
|
|
raise newException(NoiseHandshakeError, "Noise handshake signature verify failed.")
|
|
else:
|
|
trace "Remote signature verified"
|
|
|
|
if initiator and not isNil(conn.peerInfo):
|
|
let pid = PeerID.init(remotePubKey)
|
|
if not conn.peerInfo.peerId.validate():
|
|
raise newException(NoiseHandshakeError, "Failed to validate peerId.")
|
|
if pid != conn.peerInfo.peerId:
|
|
raise newException(NoiseHandshakeError, "Noise handshake, peer infos don't match! " & $pid & " != " & $conn.peerInfo.peerId)
|
|
|
|
var secure = new NoiseConnection
|
|
inc getConnectionTracker().opened
|
|
secure.stream = conn
|
|
secure.closeEvent = newAsyncEvent()
|
|
secure.peerInfo = PeerInfo.init(remotePubKey)
|
|
if initiator:
|
|
secure.readCs = handshakeRes.cs2
|
|
secure.writeCs = handshakeRes.cs1
|
|
else:
|
|
secure.readCs = handshakeRes.cs1
|
|
secure.writeCs = handshakeRes.cs2
|
|
|
|
trace "Noise handshake completed!"
|
|
|
|
return secure
|
|
|
|
method init*(p: Noise) {.gcsafe.} =
|
|
procCall Secure(p).init()
|
|
p.codec = NoiseCodec
|
|
|
|
proc secure*(p: Noise, conn: Connection): Future[Connection] {.async, gcsafe.} =
|
|
trace "Noise.secure called", initiator=p.outgoing
|
|
try:
|
|
result = await p.handleConn(conn, p.outgoing)
|
|
except CatchableError as exc:
|
|
warn "securing connection failed", msg = exc.msg
|
|
if not conn.closed():
|
|
await conn.close()
|
|
|
|
proc newNoise*(privateKey: PrivateKey; outgoing: bool = true; commonPrologue: seq[byte] = @[]): Noise =
|
|
new result
|
|
result.outgoing = outgoing
|
|
result.localPrivateKey = privateKey
|
|
result.localPublicKey = privateKey.getKey()
|
|
discard randomBytes(result.noisePrivateKey)
|
|
result.noisePublicKey = result.noisePrivateKey.public()
|
|
result.commonPrologue = commonPrologue
|
|
result.init()
|