constantine/include/constantine_ethereum_bls_signatures.h

/** Constantine
 *  Copyright (c) 2018-2019    Status Research & Development GmbH
 *  Copyright (c) 2020-Present Mamy André-Ratsimbazafy
 *  Licensed and distributed under either of
 *    * MIT license (license terms in the root directory or at http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT).
 *    * Apache v2 license (license terms in the root directory or at http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0).
 *  at your option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms.
 */
#ifndef __CTT_H_ETHEREUM_BLS_SIGNATURES__
#define __CTT_H_ETHEREUM_BLS_SIGNATURES__

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif

// Basic Types
// ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

#if defined(__SIZE_TYPE__) && defined(__PTRDIFF_TYPE__)
typedef __SIZE_TYPE__    size_t;
typedef __PTRDIFF_TYPE__ ptrdiff_t;
#else
#include <stddef.h>
#endif

#if defined(__UINT8_TYPE__) && defined(__UINT32_TYPE__) && defined(__UINT64_TYPE__)
typedef __UINT8_TYPE__   uint8_t;
typedef __UINT32_TYPE__  uint32_t;
typedef __UINT64_TYPE__  uint64_t;
#else
#include <stdint.h>
#endif

// https://github.com/nim-lang/Nim/blob/v1.6.12/lib/nimbase.h#L318
#if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__>=199901
# define bool _Bool
#else
# define bool unsigned char
#endif

typedef uint8_t          byte;

// Attributes
// ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#  define ctt_pure __declspec(noalias)
#elif defined(__GNUC__)
#  define ctt_pure __attribute__((pure))
#else
#  define ctt_pure
#endif

#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#  define align(x)  __declspec(align(x))
#else
#  define align(x)  __attribute__((aligned(x)))
#endif

// BLS signature types
// ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

#define FIELD_BITS 381
#define ORDER_BITS 255
#define BYTES(bits) ((int) ((bits) + 8 - 1) / 8)

struct ctt_eth_bls_fp { byte raw[BYTES(FIELD_BITS)]; };
struct ctt_eth_bls_fp2 { struct ctt_eth_bls_fp coords[2]; };

typedef struct { byte raw[BYTES(ORDER_BITS)]; } ctt_eth_bls_seckey;
typedef struct { struct ctt_eth_bls_fp  x, y; } ctt_eth_bls_pubkey;
typedef struct { struct ctt_eth_bls_fp2 x, y; } ctt_eth_bls_signature;

typedef enum __attribute__((__packed__)) {
    cttBLS_Success,
    cttBLS_VerificationFailure,
    cttBLS_PointAtInfinity,
    cttBLS_ZeroLengthAggregation,
    cttBLS_InconsistentLengthsOfInputs,
} ctt_eth_bls_status;

static const char* ctt_eth_bls_status_to_string(ctt_eth_bls_status status) {
  static const char* const statuses[] = {
    "cttBLS_Success",
    "cttBLS_VerificationFailure",
    "cttBLS_PointAtInfinity",
    "cttBLS_ZeroLengthAggregation",
    "cttBLS_InconsistentLengthsOfInputs",
  };
  size_t length = sizeof statuses / sizeof *statuses;
  if (0 <= status && status < length) {
    return statuses[status];
  }
  return "cttBLS_InvalidStatusCode";
}

typedef enum __attribute__((__packed__)) {
    cttCodecScalar_Success,
    cttCodecScalar_Zero,
    cttCodecScalar_ScalarLargerThanCurveOrder,
} ctt_codec_scalar_status;

static const char* ctt_codec_scalar_status_to_string(ctt_codec_scalar_status status) {
  static const char* const statuses[] = {
    "cttCodecScalar_Success",
    "cttCodecScalar_Zero",
    "cttCodecScalar_ScalarLargerThanCurveOrder",
  };
  size_t length = sizeof statuses / sizeof *statuses;
  if (0 <= status && status < length) {
    return statuses[status];
  }
  return "cttCodecScalar_InvalidStatusCode";
}

typedef enum __attribute__((__packed__)) {
    cttCodecEcc_Success,
    cttCodecEcc_InvalidEncoding,
    cttCodecEcc_CoordinateGreaterThanOrEqualModulus,
    cttCodecEcc_PointNotOnCurve,
    cttCodecEcc_PointNotInSubgroup,
    cttCodecEcc_PointAtInfinity,
} ctt_codec_ecc_status;

static const char* ctt_codec_ecc_status_to_string(ctt_eth_bls_status status) {
  static const char* const statuses[] = {
    "cttCodecEcc_Success",
    "cttCodecEcc_InvalidEncoding",
    "cttCodecEcc_CoordinateGreaterThanOrEqualModulus",
    "cttCodecEcc_PointNotOnCurve",
    "cttCodecEcc_PointNotInSubgroup",
    "cttCodecEcc_PointAtInfinity",
  };
  size_t length = sizeof statuses / sizeof *statuses;
  if (0 <= status && status < length) {
    return statuses[status];
  }
  return "cttCodecEcc_InvalidStatusCode";
}

// Initialization
// ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

/** Initializes the library:
 *  - detect CPU features like ADX instructions support (MULX, ADCX, ADOX)
 */
void ctt_eth_bls_init_NimMain(void);

// SHA-256
// ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

typedef struct {
  align(64) uint32_t message_schedule[16];
  align(64) byte     buf[64];
            uint64_t msgLen;
} ctt_eth_bls_sha256_context;

/** Initialize or reinitialize a Sha256 context.
 */
void ctt_eth_bls_sha256_init(ctt_eth_bls_sha256_context* ctx);

/** Append a message to a SHA256 context
 *  for incremental SHA256 computation
 *
 *  Security note: the tail of your message might be stored
 *  in an internal buffer.
 *  if sensitive content is used, ensure that
 *  `ctx.finish(...)` and `ctx.clear()` are called as soon as possible.
 *  Additionally ensure that the message(s) passed were stored
 *  in memory considered secure for your threat model.
 *
 *  For passwords and secret keys, you MUST NOT use raw SHA-256
 *  use a Key Derivation Function instead (KDF)
 */
void ctt_eth_bls_sha256_update(ctt_eth_bls_sha256_context* ctx, const byte* message, ptrdiff_t message_len);

/** Finalize a SHA256 computation and output the
 *  message digest to the `digest` buffer.
 *
 *  Security note: this does not clear the internal buffer.
 *  if sensitive content is used, use "ctx.clear()"
 *  and also make sure that the message(s) passed were stored
 *  in memory considered secure for your threat model.
 *
 *  For passwords and secret keys, you MUST NOT use raw SHA-256
 *  use a Key Derivation Function instead (KDF)
 */
void ctt_eth_bls_sha256_finish(ctt_eth_bls_sha256_context* ctx, byte digest[32]);

/** Clear the context internal buffers
 *  Security note:
 *  For passwords and secret keys, you MUST NOT use raw SHA-256
 *  use a Key Derivation Function instead (KDF)
 */
void ctt_eth_bls_sha256_clear(ctt_eth_bls_sha256_context* ctx);

/** Compute the SHA-256 hash of message
 *  and store the result in digest.
 *  Optionally, clear the memory buffer used.
 */
void ctt_eth_bls_sha256_hash(byte digest[32], const byte* message, ptrdiff_t message_len, bool clear_memory);

// Comparisons
// ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ctt_pure bool ctt_eth_bls_pubkey_is_zero(const ctt_eth_bls_pubkey* pubkey) __attribute__((warn_unused_result));
ctt_pure bool ctt_eth_bls_signature_is_zero(const ctt_eth_bls_signature* sig) __attribute__((warn_unused_result));

ctt_pure bool ctt_eth_bls_pubkeys_are_equal(const ctt_eth_bls_pubkey* a,
                                            const ctt_eth_bls_pubkey* b) __attribute__((warn_unused_result));
ctt_pure bool ctt_eth_bls_signatures_are_equal(const ctt_eth_bls_signature* a,
                                               const ctt_eth_bls_signature* b) __attribute__((warn_unused_result));

// Input validation
// ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

/** Validate the secret key.
 *
 *  Regarding timing attacks, this will leak timing information only if the key is invalid.
 *  Namely, the secret key is 0 or the secret key is too large.
 */
ctt_pure ctt_codec_scalar_status ctt_eth_bls_validate_seckey(const ctt_eth_bls_seckey* seckey) __attribute__((warn_unused_result));

/** Validate the public key.
 *
 *  This is an expensive operation that can be cached.
 */
ctt_pure ctt_codec_ecc_status ctt_eth_bls_validate_pubkey(const ctt_eth_bls_pubkey* pubkey) __attribute__((warn_unused_result));

/** Validate the signature.
 *
 *  This is an expensive operation that can be cached.
 */
ctt_pure ctt_codec_ecc_status ctt_eth_bls_validate_signature(const ctt_eth_bls_signature* pubkey) __attribute__((warn_unused_result));

// Codecs
// ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Serialize a secret key
 *
 *  Returns cttCodecScalar_Success if successful
 */
ctt_codec_scalar_status ctt_eth_bls_serialize_seckey(byte dst[32], const ctt_eth_bls_seckey* seckey) __attribute__((warn_unused_result));

/** Serialize a public key in compressed (Zcash) format
 *
 *  Returns cttCodecEcc_Success if successful
 */
ctt_codec_ecc_status ctt_eth_bls_serialize_pubkey_compressed(byte dst[48], const ctt_eth_bls_pubkey* pubkey) __attribute__((warn_unused_result));

/** Serialize a signature in compressed (Zcash) format
 *
 *  Returns cttCodecEcc_Success if successful
 */
ctt_codec_ecc_status ctt_eth_bls_serialize_signature_compressed(byte dst[96], const ctt_eth_bls_signature* sig) __attribute__((warn_unused_result));

/** Deserialize a secret key
 *  This also validates the secret key.
 *
 *  This is protected against side-channel unless your key is invalid.
 *  In that case it will like whether it's all zeros or larger than the curve order.
 */
ctt_codec_scalar_status ctt_eth_bls_deserialize_seckey(ctt_eth_bls_seckey* seckey, const byte src[32]) __attribute__((warn_unused_result));

/** Deserialize a public key in compressed (Zcash) format.
 *  This does not validate the public key.
 *  It is intended for cases where public keys are stored in a trusted location
 *  and validation can be cached.
 *
 *  Warning ⚠:
 *    This procedure skips the very expensive subgroup checks.
 *    Not checking subgroup exposes a protocol to small subgroup attacks.
 *
 *  Returns cttCodecEcc_Success if successful
 */
ctt_codec_ecc_status ctt_eth_bls_deserialize_pubkey_compressed_unchecked(ctt_eth_bls_pubkey* pubkey, const byte src[48]) __attribute__((warn_unused_result));

/** Deserialize a public_key in compressed (Zcash) format.
 *  This also validates the public key.
 *
 *  Returns cttCodecEcc_Success if successful
 */
ctt_codec_ecc_status ctt_eth_bls_deserialize_pubkey_compressed(ctt_eth_bls_pubkey* pubkey, const byte src[48]) __attribute__((warn_unused_result));

/** Deserialize a signature in compressed (Zcash) format.
 *  This does not validate the signature.
 *  It is intended for cases where public keys are stored in a trusted location
 *  and validation can be cached.
 *
 *  Warning ⚠:
 *    This procedure skips the very expensive subgroup checks.
 *    Not checking subgroup exposes a protocol to small subgroup attacks.
 *
 *  Returns cttCodecEcc_Success if successful
 */
ctt_codec_ecc_status ctt_eth_bls_deserialize_signature_compressed_unchecked(ctt_eth_bls_signature* sig, const byte src[96]) __attribute__((warn_unused_result));

/** Deserialize a signature in compressed (Zcash) format.
 *  This also validates the signature.
 *
 *  Returns cttCodecEcc_Success if successful
 */
ctt_codec_ecc_status ctt_eth_bls_deserialize_signature_compressed(ctt_eth_bls_signature* sig, const byte src[96]) __attribute__((warn_unused_result));

// BLS signatures
// ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

/** Derive the public key matching with a secret key
 *
 *  Secret protection:
 *  - A valid secret key will only leak that it is valid.
 *  - An invalid secret key will leak whether it's all zero or larger than the curve order.
 */
void ctt_eth_bls_derive_pubkey(ctt_eth_bls_pubkey* pubkey, const ctt_eth_bls_seckey* seckey);

/** Produce a signature for the message under the specified secret key
 *  Signature is on BLS12-381 G2 (and public key on G1)
 *
 *  For message domain separation purpose, the tag is `BLS_SIG_BLS12381G2_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_POP_`
 *
 *  Input:
 *  - A secret key
 *  - A message
 *
 *  Output:
 *  - `signature` is overwritten with `message` signed with `secretKey`
 *    with the scheme
 *  - A status code indicating success or if the secret key is invalid.
 *
 *  Secret protection:
 *  - A valid secret key will only leak that it is valid.
 *  - An invalid secret key will leak whether it's all zero or larger than the curve order.
 */
void ctt_eth_bls_sign(ctt_eth_bls_signature* sig,
                      const ctt_eth_bls_seckey* seckey,
                      const byte* message, ptrdiff_t message_len);

/** Check that a signature is valid for a message
 *  under the provided public key.
 *  returns `true` if the signature is valid, `false` otherwise.
 *
 *  For message domain separation purpose, the tag is `BLS_SIG_BLS12381G2_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_POP_`
 *
 *  Input:
 *  - A public key initialized by one of the key derivation or deserialization procedure.
 *    Or validated via validate_pubkey
 *  - A message
 *  - A signature initialized by one of the key derivation or deserialization procedure.
 *    Or validated via validate_signature
 *
 *  Output:
 *  - a status code with verification success if signature is valid
 *    or indicating verification failure
 *
 *  In particular, the public key and signature are assumed to be on curve and subgroup-checked.
 */
ctt_pure ctt_eth_bls_status ctt_eth_bls_verify(const ctt_eth_bls_pubkey* pubkey,
                                               const byte* message, ptrdiff_t message_len,
                                               const ctt_eth_bls_signature* sig) __attribute__((warn_unused_result));

// TODO: API for pubkeys and signature aggregation. Return a bool or a status code or nothing?

/** Check that a signature is valid for a message
 *  under the aggregate of provided public keys.
 *  returns `true` if the signature is valid, `false` otherwise.
 *
 *  For message domain separation purpose, the tag is `BLS_SIG_BLS12381G2_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_POP_`
 *
 *  Input:
 *  - Public keys initialized by one of the key derivation or deserialization procedure.
 *    Or validated via validate_pubkey
 *  - A message
 *  - A signature initialized by one of the key derivation or deserialization procedure.
 *    Or validated via validate_signature
 *
 *  In particular, the public keys and signature are assumed to be on curve subgroup checked.
 */
ctt_pure ctt_eth_bls_status ctt_eth_bls_fast_aggregate_verify(const ctt_eth_bls_pubkey pubkeys[], ptrdiff_t pubkeys_len,
                                                              const byte* message, ptrdiff_t message_len,
                                                              const ctt_eth_bls_signature* aggregate_sig) __attribute__((warn_unused_result));

#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

#endif