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add fetch script and populate content

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3
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# Codex RFCs
Codex specifications related to a decentralised data storage platform.

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---
sidebar_position: 1
title: Vac RFCs
description: Codex is building a decentralised durability storage engine
---
# How to Use Codex
> The Codex project aims to create a decentralised durability engine that allows persisting data in p2p networks. In other words, it allows storing files and data with predictable durability guarantees for later retrieval.
- [Status](/status)
> WARNING: This project is under active development and is considered pre-alpha.
- [Vac](/vac)
[![License: Apache](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-Apache%202.0-blue.svg)](https://opensource.org/licenses/Apache-2.0)
[![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-blue.svg)](https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT)
[![Stability: experimental](https://img.shields.io/badge/stability-experimental-orange.svg)](#stability)
[![CI](https://github.com/status-im/nim-codex/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg?branch=main)](https://github.com/status-im/nim-codex/actions?query=workflow%3ACI+branch%3Amain)
[![Codecov](https://codecov.io/gh/status-im/nim-codex/branch/main/graph/badge.svg?token=XFmCyPSNzW)](https://codecov.io/gh/status-im/nim-codex)
[![Discord](https://img.shields.io/discord/895609329053474826)](https://discord.gg/CaJTh24ddQ)
- [Waku](/waku)
## Build and run
For detailed instructions on preparing to build nim-codex see [*Building Codex*](BUILDING.md).
To build the project, clone it, and run:
```bash
make update && make exec
```
The executable will be placed under the `build` directory under the project root.
Run the client with:
```bash
build/codex
```
### CLI options
```
build/codex --help
Usage:
codex [OPTIONS]... command
The following options are available:
--log-level Sets the log level [=LogLevel.INFO].
--metrics Enable the metrics server [=false].
--metrics-address Listening address of the metrics server [=127.0.0.1].
--metrics-port Listening HTTP port of the metrics server [=8008].
-d, --data-dir The directory where codex will store configuration and data..
-l, --listen-port Specifies one or more listening ports for the node to listen on. [=0].
-i, --listen-ip The public IP [=0.0.0.0].
--udp-port Specify the discovery (UDP) port [=8090].
--net-privkey Source of network (secp256k1) private key file (random|<path>) [=random].
-b, --bootstrap-node Specifies one or more bootstrap nodes to use when connecting to the network..
--max-peers The maximum number of peers to connect to [=160].
--agent-string Node agent string which is used as identifier in network [=Codex].
-p, --api-port The REST Api port [=8080].
-c, --cache-size The size in MiB of the block cache, 0 disables the cache [=100].
--persistence Enables persistence mechanism, requires an Ethereum node [=false].
--eth-provider The URL of the JSON-RPC API of the Ethereum node [=ws://localhost:8545].
--eth-account The Ethereum account that is used for storage contracts [=EthAddress.none].
--eth-deployment The json file describing the contract deployment [=string.none].
Available sub-commands:
codex initNode
```
### Example: Running two Codex clients
```bash
build/codex --data-dir="$(pwd)/Codex1" -i=127.0.0.1
```
This will start Codex with a data directory pointing to `Codex1` under the current execution directory and announce itself on the DHT under `127.0.0.1`.
To run a second client that automatically discovers nodes on the network, we need to get the Signed Peer Record (SPR) of first client, Client1. We can do this by querying the `/info` endpoint of the node's REST API.
`curl http://127.0.0.1:8080/api/codex/v1/info`
This should output information about Client1, including its PeerID, TCP/UDP addresses, data directory, and SPR:
```json
{
"id": "16Uiu2HAm92LGXYTuhtLaZzkFnsCx6FFJsNmswK6o9oPXFbSKHQEa",
"addrs": [
"/ip4/0.0.0.0/udp/8090",
"/ip4/0.0.0.0/tcp/49336"
],
"repo": "/repos/status-im/nim-codex/Codex1",
"spr": "spr:CiUIAhIhAmqg5fVU2yxPStLdUOWgwrkWZMHW2MHf6i6l8IjA4tssEgIDARpICicAJQgCEiECaqDl9VTbLE9K0t1Q5aDCuRZkwdbYwd_qLqXwiMDi2ywQ5v2VlAYaCwoJBH8AAAGRAh-aGgoKCAR_AAABBts3KkcwRQIhAPOKl38CviplVbMVnA_9q3N1K_nk5oGuNp7DWeOqiJzzAiATQ2acPyQvPxLU9YS-TiVo4RUXndRcwMFMX2Yjhw8k3A"
}
```
Now, let's start a second client, Client2. Because we're already using the default ports TCP (:8080) and UDP (:8090) for the first client, we have to specify new ports to avoid a collision. Additionally, we can specify the SPR from Client1 as the bootstrap node for discovery purposes, allowing Client2 to determine where content is located in the network.
```bash
build/codex --data-dir="$(pwd)/Codex2" -i=127.0.0.1 --api-port=8081 --udp-port=8091 --bootstrap-node=spr:CiUIAhIhAmqg5fVU2yxPStLdUOWgwrkWZMHW2MHf6i6l8IjA4tssEgIDARpICicAJQgCEiECaqDl9VTbLE9K0t1Q5aDCuRZkwdbYwd_qLqXwiMDi2ywQ5v2VlAYaCwoJBH8AAAGRAh-aGgoKCAR_AAABBts3KkcwRQIhAPOKl38CviplVbMVnA_9q3N1K_nk5oGuNp7DWeOqiJzzAiATQ2acPyQvPxLU9YS-TiVo4RUXndRcwMFMX2Yjhw8k3A
```
There are now two clients running. We could upload a file to Client1 and download that file (given its CID) using Client2, by using the clients' REST API.
## Interacting with the client
The client exposes a REST API that can be used to interact with the clients. These commands could be invoked with any HTTP client, however the following endpoints assume the use of the `curl` command.
### `/api/codex/v1/connect/{peerId}`
Connect to a peer identified by its peer id. Takes an optional `addrs` parameter with a list of valid [multiaddresses](https://multiformats.io/multiaddr/). If `addrs` is absent, the peer will be discovered over the DHT.
Example:
```bash
curl "127.0.0.1:8080/api/codex/v1/connect/<peer id>?addrs=<multiaddress>"
```
### `/api/codex/v1/download/{id}`
Download data identified by a `Cid`.
Example:
```bash
curl -vvv "127.0.0.1:8080/api/codex/v1/download/<Cid of the content>" --output <name of output file>
```
### `/api/codex/v1/upload`
Upload a file, upon success returns the `Cid` of the uploaded file.
Example:
```bash
curl -vvv -H "content-type: application/octet-stream" -H Expect: -T "<path to file>" "127.0.0.1:8080/api/codex/v1/upload" -X POST
```
### `/api/codex/v1/info`
Get useful node info such as its peer id, address, and SPR.
Example:
```bash
curl -vvv "127.0.0.1:8080/api/codex/v1/info"
```
- [Codex](/codex)
- [Nomos](/nomos)

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docusaurus.config.js
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@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ require('dotenv').config()
/** @type {import('@docusaurus/types').Config} */
const config = {
title: 'Codex',
url: 'https://docs.codex.storage/',
title: 'Vac',
url: 'https://rfc.vac.dev/',
baseUrl: '/',
customFields: {},
@ -22,12 +22,55 @@ const config = {
locales: ['en'],
},
plugins: [
[
'@docusaurus/plugin-content-docs',
{
id: 'codex',
path: 'codex',
routeBasePath: 'codex',
},
],
[
'@docusaurus/plugin-content-docs',
{
id: 'nomos',
path: 'nomos',
routeBasePath: 'nomos',
},
],
[
'@docusaurus/plugin-content-docs',
{
id: 'status',
path: 'status',
routeBasePath: 'status',
},
],
[
'@docusaurus/plugin-content-docs',
{
id: 'vac',
path: 'vac',
routeBasePath: 'vac',
},
],
[
'@docusaurus/plugin-content-docs',
{
id: 'waku',
path: 'waku',
routeBasePath: 'waku',
},
],
],
presets: [
[
'@acid-info/logos-docusaurus-preset',
/** @type {import('@acid-info/logos-docusaurus-preset').PluginOptions} */
({
businessUnit: 'Codex',
businessUnit: 'VacResearch',
theme: {
name: 'default',
options: {

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const https = require('https')
const fs = require('fs')
const path = require('path')
// NOTE: Replace YOUR_GITHUB_TOKEN with your GitHub token
async function fetchFromGitHub(url, callback) {
https
.get(
url,
{
headers: {
'User-Agent': 'Node.js',
Authorization: `token {YOUR_GITHUB_TOKEN}`,
},
},
res => {
let data = ''
res.on('data', chunk => {
data += chunk
})
res.on('end', () => {
const parsedData = JSON.parse(data)
console.log('parsedData:', parsedData)
callback(null, parsedData)
})
},
)
.on('error', err => {
callback(err, null)
})
}
async function fetchDirectoryContents(dirUrl, basePath, prefixToRemove) {
fetchFromGitHub(dirUrl, async (err, files) => {
if (err) {
console.error('Error fetching files:', err.message)
return
}
if (!files) {
console.log('No files found', files)
return
}
for (const file of files) {
const relativePath = file.path.replace(
new RegExp(`^${prefixToRemove}`),
'',
)
const filePath = path.join(basePath, relativePath)
if (file.type === 'file') {
await downloadAndSaveFile(file.download_url, filePath)
} else if (file.type === 'dir') {
await fetchDirectoryContents(file.url, basePath, prefixToRemove)
}
}
})
}
function parseSlugFromFrontmatter(content) {
const frontmatterMatch = content.match(/---\s*\n([\s\S]*?)\n---/)
if (frontmatterMatch) {
const frontmatterContent = frontmatterMatch[1]
const slugMatch = frontmatterContent.match(/^slug:\s*(\d+)/m)
if (slugMatch) {
return parseInt(slugMatch[1], 10)
}
}
return 1 // Return null if not found
}
async function downloadAndSaveFile(url, filePath) {
https
.get(url, res => {
let content = ''
res.on('data', chunk => {
content += chunk
})
res.on('end', () => {
const fullFilePath = path.join(__dirname, filePath)
const directory = path.dirname(fullFilePath)
fs.mkdirSync(directory, { recursive: true })
const fileExtension = path.extname(filePath)
if (fileExtension === '.md' || fileExtension === '.mdx') {
// Remove 'tags' line from frontmatter because the format is wrong
content = content.replace(/tags:.*\n?/, '')
// Replace <br> with <br/>
content = content.replace(/<br>/g, '<br/>')
// Escape < and > with \< and \>, respectively
// Be cautious with this replacement; adjust as needed based on your context
content = content.replace(/</g, '\\<').replace(/>/g, '\\>')
// NEW: Remove 'slug' line from frontmatter
content = content.replace(/^slug:.*\n?/m, '')
// Replace empty Markdown links with placeholder URL
content = content.replace(/\[([^\]]+)\]\(\)/g, '[$1](#)')
// // parse sidebarPosition from the slug in the frontmatter
const sidebarPosition = parseSlugFromFrontmatter(content) || 1
// Insert sidebar_position at the end of frontmatter if it doesn't exist
if (
/^---\s*[\s\S]+?---/.test(content) &&
!/sidebar_position: \d+/.test(content)
) {
content = content.replace(
/^---\s*([\s\S]+?)---/,
`---\n$1sidebar_position: ${sidebarPosition}\n---`,
)
}
}
fs.writeFile(fullFilePath, content, err => {
if (err) {
console.error('Error saving file:', err.message)
return
}
console.log('Downloaded and saved:', filePath)
})
})
})
.on('error', err => {
console.error('Error downloading file:', err.message)
})
}
const directoriesToSync = ['codex', 'nomos', 'status', 'vac', 'waku']
directoriesToSync.forEach(dirName => {
const baseUrl = `https://api.github.com/repos/vacp2p/rfc-index/contents/${dirName}`
const baseSavePath = `./${dirName}/`
const prefixToRemove = dirName + '/'
fetchDirectoryContents(baseUrl, baseSavePath, prefixToRemove).then(() => {
console.log(`Synced ${dirName}`)
})
})

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---
title: 38/CONSENSUS-CLARO
name: Claro Consensus Protocol
status: raw
category: Standards Track
editor: Corey Petty \<corey@status.im\>
created: 01-JUL-2022
revised: \<2022-08-26 Fri 13:11Z\>
uri: \<https://rdf.logos.co/protocol/Claro/1/0/0#\<2022-08-26%20Fri$2013:11Z\>
contributors:
- Álvaro Castro-Castilla
- Mark Evenson
sidebar_position: 1
---
## Abstract
This document specifies Claro: a Byzantine, fault-tolerant, binary decision
agreement algorithm that utilizes bounded memory for its execution.
Claro is a novel variant of the Snow family providing a probabilistic
leaderless BFT consensus algorithm that achieves metastablity via
network sub-sampling. We present an application context of the use of
Claro in an efficient, leaderless, probabilistic permission-less
consensus mechanism. We outline a simple taxonomy of Byzantine
adversaries, leaving explicit explorations of to subsequent
publication.
NOTE: We have renamed this variant to `Claro` from `Glacier` in order to disambiguate from a previously released research endeavor by [Amores-Sesar, Cachin, and Tedeschi](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2210.03423.pdf). Their naming was coincidentally named the same as our work but is sufficiently differentiated from how ours works.
## Motivation
This work is a part of a larger research endeavor to explore highly scalable Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) consensus protocols. Consensus lies at the heart of many decentralized protocols, and thus its characteristics and properties are inherited by applications built on top. Thus, we seek to improve upon the current state of the art in two main directions: base-layer scalability and censorship resistance.
Avalanche has shown to exibit the former in a production environment in a way that is differentiated from Nakamoto consensus and other Proof of Stake (PoS) protocols based in practical Byzantine Fault Tolerant (pBFT) methodologies. We aim to understand its limitations and improve upon them.
## Background
Our starting point is Avalanche’s Binary Byzantine Agreement algorithm, called Snowball. As long as modifications allow a DAG to be constructed later on, this simplifies the design significantly. The DAG stays the same in principle: it supports confidence, but the core algorithm can be modeled without.
The concept of the Snowball algorithm is relatively simple. Following is a simplified description (lacking some details, but giving an overview). For further details, please refer to the [Avalanche paper](https://assets.website-files.com/5d80307810123f5ffbb34d6e/6009805681b416f34dcae012_Avalanche%20Consensus%20Whitepaper.pdf).
1. The objective is to vote yes/no on a decision (this decision could be a single bit, or, in our DAG use case, whether a vertex should be included or not).
2. Every node has an eventually-consistent complete view of the network. It will select at random k nodes, and will ask their opinion on the decision (yes/no).
3. After this sampling is finished, if there is a vote that has more than an `alpha` threshold, it accumulates one count for this opinion, as well as changes its opinion to this one. But, if a different opinion is received, the counter is reset to 1. If no threshold `alpha` is reached, the counter is reset to 0 instead.
4. After several iterations of this algorithm, we will reach a threshold `beta`, and decide on that as final.
Next, we will proceed to describe our new algorithm, based on Snowball.
We have identified a shortcoming of the Snowball algorithm that was a perfect starting point for devising improvements. The scenario is as follows:
- There is a powerful adversary in the network, that controls a large percentage of the node population: 10% to ~50%.
- This adversary follows a strategy that allows them to rapidly change the decision bit (possibly even in a coordinated way) so as to maximally confuse the honest nodes.
- Under normal conditions, honest nodes will accumulate supermajorities soon enough, and reach the `beta` threshold. However, when an honest node performs a query and does not reach the threshold `alpha` of responses, the counter will be set to 0.
- The highest threat to Snowball is an adversary that keeps it from reaching the `beta` threshold, managing to continuously reset the counter, and steering Snowball away from making a decision.
This document only outlines the specification to Claro. Subsequent analysis work on Claro (both on its performance and how it differentiates with Snowball) will be published shortly and this document will be updated.
## Claro Algorithm Specification
The Claro consensus algorithm computes a boolean decision on a
proposition via a set of distributed computational nodes. Claro is
a leaderless, probabilistic, binary consensus algorithm with fast
finality that provides good reliability for network and Byzantine
fault tolerance.
### Algorithmic concept
Claro is an evolution of the Snowball Byzantine Binary Agreement (BBA) algorithm, in which we tackle specifically the perceived weakness described above. The main focus is going to be the counter and the triggering of the reset. Following, we elaborate the different modifications and features that have been added to the reference algorithm:
1. Instead of allowing the latest evidence to change the opinion completely, we take into account all accumulated evidence, to reduce the impact of high variability when there is already a large amount of evidence collected.
2. Eliminate the counter and threshold scheme, and introduce instead two regimes of operation:
- One focused on grabbing opinions and reacting as soon as possible. This part is somewhat closer conceptually to the reference algorithm.
- Another one focused on interpreting the accumulated data instead of reacting to the latest information gathered.
3. Finally, combine those two phases via a transition function. This avoids the creation of a step function, or a sudden change in behavior that could complicate analysis and understanding of the dynamics. Instead, we can have a single algorithm that transfers weight from one operation to the other as more evidence is gathered.
4. Additionally, we introduce a function for weighted sampling. This will allow the combination of different forms of weighting:
- Staking
- Heuristic reputation
- Manual reputation.
It’s worth delving a bit into the way the data is interpreted in order to reach a decision. Our approach is based conceptually on the paper [Confidence as Higher-Order Uncertainty](https://cis.temple.edu/~pwang/Publication/confidence.pdf), which describes a frequentist approach to decision certainty. The first-order certainty, measured by frequency, is caused by known positive evidence, and the higher-order certainty is caused by potential positive evidence. Because confidence is a relative measurement defined on evidence, it naturally follows comparing the amount of evidence the system knows with the amount that it will know in the near future (defining “near” as a constant).
Intuitively, we are looking for a function of evidence, **`w`**, call it **`c`** for confidence, that satisfies the following conditions:
1. Confidence `c` is a continuous and monotonically increasing function of `w`. (More evidence, higher confidence.)
2. When `w = 0`, `c = 0`. (Without any evidence, confidence is minimum.)
3. When `w` goes to infinity, `c` converges to 1. (With infinite evidence, confidence is maximum.)
The paper describes also a set of operations for the evidence/confidence pairs, so that different sources of knowledge could be combined. However, we leave here the suggestion of a possible research line in the future combining an algebra of evidence/confidence pairs with swarm-propagation algorithm like the one described in [this paper](http://replicated.cc/files/schmebulock.pdf).
### Initial opinion
A proposal is formulated to which consensus of truth or falsity is
desired. Each node that participates starts the protocol with an
opinion on the proposal, represented in the sequel as `NO`, `NONE`,
and `YES`.
A new proposition is discovered either by local creation or in
response to a query, a node checks its local opinion. If the node can
compute a justification of the proposal, it sets its opinion to one of
`YES` or `NO`. If it cannot form an opinion, it leaves its opinion as
`NONE`.
For now, we will ignore the proposal dissemination process and assume all nodes participating have an initial opinion to respond to within a given request. Further research will relax this assumption and analyze timing attacks on proposal propagation through the network.
The node then participates in a number of query rounds in which it
solicits other node's opinion in query rounds. Given a set of `N`
leaderless computational nodes, a gossip-based protocol is presumed to
exist which allows members to discover, join, and leave a weakly
transitory maximally connected graph. Joining this graph allows each
node to view a possibly incomplete node membership list of all other
nodes. This view may change as the protocol advances, as nodes join
and leave. Under generalized Internet conditions, the membership of
the graph would experience a churn rate varying across different
time-scales, as the protocol rounds progress. As such, a given node
may not have a view on the complete members participating in the
consensus on a proposal in a given round.
The algorithm is divided into 4 phases:
1. Querying
2. Computing `confidence`, `evidence`, and `accumulated evidence`
3. Transition function
4. Opinion and Decision
\<!-- NOTE from CP: not sure this fits, commenting for now --\>
\<!-- ### Proposal Identification
The node has a semantics and serialization of the proposal, of which
it sets an initial opinion:
opinion
\<-- initial opinion on truth of the proposal
as one of: {NO, NONE, YES}
The proposal proceeds in asynchronous rounds, in which each node
queries `k` randomly sampled nodes for their opinions until a decision
about local finality is achieved. The liveness of the algorithm is
severely constrained in the absence of timeouts for a round to
proceed. When a given node has finalized its decision on the
proposal, it enters a quiescent state in which it optionally discards
all information gathered during the query process retaining only the
final opinion on the truth of the proposal. --\>
### Setup Parameters
The node initializes the following integer ratios as constants:
```
# The following values are constants chosen with justification from experiments
# performed with the adversarial models
#
confidence_threshold
\<-- 1
# constant look ahead for number of rounds we expect to finalize a
# decision. Could be set dependent on number of nodes
# visible in the current gossip graph.
look_ahead
\<-- 19
# the confidence weighting parameter (aka alpha_1)
certainty
\<-- 4 / 5
doubt ;; the lack of confidence weighting parameter (aka alpha_2)
\<-- 2 / 5
k_multiplier ;; neighbor threshold multiplier
\<-- 2
;;; maximal threshold multiplier, i.e. we will never exceed
;;; questioning k_initial * k_multiplier ^ max_k_multiplier_power peers
max_k_multiplier_power
\<-- 4
;;; Initial number of nodes queried in a round
k_initial
\<-- 7
;;; maximum query rounds before termination
max_rounds ;; placeholder for simulation work, no justification yet
\<-- 100
```
The following variables are needed to keep the state of Claro:
```
;; current number of nodes to attempt to query in a round
k
\<-- k_original
;; total number of votes examined over all rounds
total_votes
\<-- 0
;; total number of YES (i.e. positive) votes for the truth of the proposal
total_positive
\<-- 0
;; the current query round, an integer starting from zero
round
\<-- 0
```
### Phase One: Query
A node selects `k` nodes randomly from the complete pool of peers in the
network. This query is can optionally be weighted, so the probability
of selecting nodes is proportional to their
Node Weighting
$$
P(i) = \frac{w_i}{\sum_{j=0}^{j=N} w_j}
$$
where `w` is evidence. The list of nodes is maintained by a separate protocol (the network
layer), and eventual consistency of this knowledge in the network
suffices. Even if there are slight divergences in the network view
from different nodes, the algorithm is resilient to those.
A query is sent to each neighbor with the node's current `opinion` of
the proposal.
Each node replies with their current opinion on the proposal.
See [the wire protocol Interoperability section](#wire-protocol) for
details on the semantics and syntax of the "on the wire"
representation of this query.
**Adaptive querying**. An additional optimization in the query
consists of adaptively growing the *`k`* constant in the event of
**high confusion**. We define high confusion as the situation in
which neither opinion is strongly held in a query (*i.e.* a
threshold is not reached for either yes or no). For this, we will
use the *`alpha`* threshold defined below. This adaptive growth of
the query size is done as follows:
Every time the threshold is not reached, we multiply *`k`* by a
constant. In our experiments, we found that a constant of 2 works
well, but what really matters is that it stays within that order of
magnitude.
The growth is capped at 4 times the initial *`k`* value. Again, this
is an experimental value, and could potentially be increased. This
depends mainly on complex factors such as the size of the query
messages, which could saturate the node bandwidth if the number of
nodes queried is too high.
When the query finishes, the node now initializes the following two
values:
new_votes
\<-- |total vote replies received in this round to the current query|
positive_votes
\<-- |YES votes received from the query|
### Phase Two: Computation
When the query returns, three ratios are used later on to compute the
transition function and the opinion forming. Confidence encapsulates
the notion of how much we know (as a node) in relation to how much we
will know in the near future (this being encoded in the look-ahead
parameter *`l`*.) Evidence accumulated keeps the ratio of total positive
votes vs the total votes received (positive and negative), whereas the
evidence per round stores the ratio of the current round only.
Parameters
$$
\begin{array}{lc}
\text{Look-ahead parameter} & l = 20 \newline
\text{First evidence parameter} & \alpha_1 = 0.8 \newline
\text{Second evidence parameter} & \alpha_2 = 0.5 \newline
\end{array}
$$
Computation
$$
\begin{array}{lc}
\text{Confidence} & c_{accum} \impliedby \frac{total\ votes}{total\ votes + l} \newline
\text{Total accumulated evidence}& e_{accum} \impliedby \frac{total\ positive\ votes}{total\ votes} \newline
\text{Evidence per round} & e_{round} \impliedby \frac{round\ positive\ votes}{round\ votes} \newline
\end{array}
$$
The node runs the `new_votes` and `positive_votes` parameters received
in the query round through the following algorithm:
total_votes
+== new_votes
total_positive
+== positive_votes
confidence
\<-- total_votes / (total_votes + look_ahead)
total_evidence
\<-- total_positive / total_votes
new_evidence
\<-- positive_votes / new_votes
evidence
\<-- new_evidence * ( 1 - confidence ) + total_evidence * confidence
alpha
\<-- doubt * ( 1 - confidence ) + certainty * confidence
### Phase Three: Computation
In order to eliminate the need for a step function (a conditional in
the code), we introduce a transition function from one regime to the
other. Our interest in removing the step function is twofold:
1. Simplify the algorithm. With this change the number of branches is
reduced, and everything is expressed as a set of equations.
2. The transition function makes the regime switch smooth,
making it harder to potentially exploit the sudden regime change in
some unforeseen manner. Such a swift change in operation mode could
potentially result in a more complex behavior than initially
understood, opening the door to elaborated attacks. The transition
function proposed is linear with respect to the confidence.
Transition Function
$$
\begin{array}{cl}
evidence & \impliedby e_{round} (1 - c_{accum}) + e_{accum} c_{accum} \newline
\alpha & \impliedby \alpha_1 (1 - c_{accum}) + \alpha_2 c_{accum} \newline
\end{array}
$$
Since the confidence is modeled as a ratio that depends on the
constant *`l`*, we can visualize the transition function at
different values of *`l`*. Recall that this constant encapsulates
the idea of “near future” in the frequentist certainty model: the
higher it is, the more distant in time we consider the next
valuable input of evidence to happen.
We have observed via experiment that for a transition function to be
useful, we need establish two requirements:
1. The change has to be balanced and smooth, giving an
opportunity to the first regime to operate and not jump directly
to the second regime.
2. The convergence to 1.0 (fully operating in the second regime)
should happen within a reasonable time-frame. We’ve set this
time-frame experimentally at 1000 votes, which is in the order of
~100 queries given a *`k`* of 9.
[[ Note: Avalanche uses k = 20, as an experimental result from their
deployment. Due to the fundamental similarities between the
algorithms, it’s a good start for us. ]]
The node updates its local opinion on the consensus proposal by
examining the relationship between the evidence accumulated for a
proposal with the confidence encoded in the `alpha` parameter:
IF
evidence \> alpha
THEN
opinion \<-- YES
ELSE IF
evidence \< 1 - alpha
THEN
opinion \<-- NO
If the opinion of the node is `NONE` after evaluating the relation
between `evidence` and `alpha`, adjust the number of uniform randomly
queried nodes by multiplying the neighbors `k` by the `k_multiplier`
up to the limit of `k_max_multiplier_power` query size increases.
;; possibly increase number nodes to uniformly randomly query in next round
WHEN
opinion is NONE
AND
k \< k_original * k_multiplier ^ max_k_multiplier_power
THEN
k \<-- k * k_multiplier
### Decision
The next step is a simple one: change our opinion if the threshold
*`alpha`* is reached. This needs to be done separately for the `YES/NO`
decision, checking both boundaries. The last step is then to *`decide`*
on the current opinion. For that, a confidence threshold is
employed. This threshold is derived from the network size, and is
directly related to the number of total votes received.
Decision
$$
\begin{array}{cl}
evidence \> \alpha & \implies \text{opinion YES} \newline
evidence \< 1 - \alpha & \implies \text{opinion NO} \newline
if\ \text{confidence} \> c_{target} & THEN \ \text{finalize decision} \newline
\end{array}
$$
After the `OPINION` phase is executed, the current value of `confidence`
is considered: if `confidence` exceeds a threshold derived from the
network size and directly related to the total votes received, an
honest node marks the decision as final, and always returns this
opinion is response to further queries from other nodes on the
network.
IF
confidence \> confidence_threshold
OR
round \> max_rounds
THEN
finalized \<-- T
QUERY LOOP TERMINATES
ELSE
round +== 1
QUERY LOOP CONTINUES
Thus, after the decision phase, either a decision has been finalized
and the local node becomes quiescent never initiating a new query, or
it initiates a [new query](#query).
### Termination
A local round of Claro terminates in one of the following
execution model considerations:
1. No queries are received for any newly initiated round for temporal
periods observed via a locally computed passage of time. See [the
following point on local time](#clock).
2. The `confidence` on the proposal exceeds our threshold for
finalization.
3. The number of `rounds` executed would be greater than
`max_rounds`.
#### Quiescence
After a local node has finalized an `opinion` into a `decision`, it enters a quiescent
state whereby it never solicits new votes on the proposal. The local
node MUST reply with the currently finalized `decision`.
#### Clock
The algorithm only requires that nodes have computed the drift of
observation of the passage of local time, not that that they have
coordinated an absolute time with their peers. For an implementation
of a phase locked-loop feedback to measure local clock drift see
[NTP](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5905.html).
## Further points
### Node receives information during round
In the query step, the node is envisioned as packing information into
the query to cut down on the communication overhead a query to each of
this `k` nodes containing the node's own current opinion on the
proposal (`YES`, `NO`, or `NONE`). The algorithm does not currently
specify how a given node utilizes this incoming information. A
possible use may be to count unsolicited votes towards a currently
active round, and discard the information if the node is in a
quiescent state.
#### Problems with Weighting Node Value of Opinions
If the view of other nodes is incomplete, then the sum of the optional
weighting will not be a probability distribution normalized to 1.
The current algorithm doesn't describe how the initial opinions are formed.
## Implementation status
The following implementations have been created for various testing and simulation purposes:
- [Rust](https://github.com/logos-co/consensus-research)
- [Python](#) - FILL THIS IN WITH NEWLY CREATED REPO
- [Common Lisp](#) - FILL THIS IN WITH NEWLY CREATED REPO
## Wire Protocol
For interoperability we present a wire protocol semantics by requiring
the validity of the following statements expressed in Notation3 (aka
`n3`) about any query performed by a query node:
```n3
@prefix rdf: \<http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#\> .
@prefix rdfs: \<http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#\> .
@prefix xsd: \<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#\> .
@prefix Claro \<https://rdf.logos.co/protocol/Claro#\> .
Claro:query
:holds (
:_0 [ rdfs:label "round";
a xsd:postitiveInteger; ],
rdfs:comment """
The current round of this query
A value of zero corresponds to the initial round.
""" ;
:_1 [ rdfs:label "uri";
rdfs:comment """
A unique URI for the proposal.
It MAY be possible to examine the proposal by resolving this resource,
and its associated URIs.
""" ;
a xsd:anyURI ],
:_2 [ rdfs:label "opinion";
rdfs:comment """
The opinion on the proposal
One of the strings "YES" "NO" or "NONE".
""" ;
# TODO constrain as an enumeration on three values efficiently
a xsd:string ]
) .
```
Nodes are advised to use Waku messages to include their own
metadata in serializations as needed.
## Syntax
The semantic description presented above can be reliably round-tripped
through a suitable serialization mechanism. JSON-LD provides a
canonical mapping to UTF-8 JSON.
At their core, the query messages are a simple enumeration of the
three possible values of the opinion:
{ NO, NONE, YES }
When represented via integers, such as choosing
{ -1, 0, +1 }
the parity summations across network invariants often become easier to
manipulate.
## Security Considerations
### Privacy
In practice, each honest node gossips its current opinion which
reduces the number of messages that need to be gossiped for a given
proposal. The resulting impact on the privacy of the node's opinion
is not currently analyzed.
### Security with respect to various Adversarial Models
Adversarial models have been tested for which the values for current
parameters of Claro have been tuned. Exposition of the
justification of this tuning need to be completed.
### Local Strategies
#### Random Adversaries
A random adversary optionally chooses to respond to all queries with a
random decision. Note that this adversary may be in some sense
Byzantine but not malicious. The random adversary also models some
software defects involved in not "understanding" how to derive a truth
value for a given proposition.
#### Infantile Adversary
Like a petulant child, an infantile adversary responds with the
opposite vote of the honest majority on an opinion.
### Omniscient Adversaries
Omniscient adversaries have somehow gained an "unfair" participation in
consensus by being able to control `f` of `N` nodes with a out-of-band
"supra-liminal" coordination mechanism. Such adversaries use this
coordinated behavior to delay or sway honest majority consensus.
#### Passive Gossip Adversary
The passive network omniscient adversary is fully aware at all times
of the network state. Such an adversary can always chose to vote in
the most efficient way to block the distributed consensus from
finalizing.
#### Active Gossip Adversary
An omniscient gossip adversary somehow not only controls `f` of `N`
nodes, but has also has corrupted communications between nodes such
that she may inspect, delay, and drop arbitrary messages. Such an
adversary uses capability to corrupt consensus away from honest
decisions to ones favorable to itself. This adversary will, of
course, choose to participate in an honest manner until defecting is
most advantageous.
### Future Directions
Although we have proposed a normative description of the
implementation of the underlying binary consensus algorithm (Claro),
we believe we have prepared for analysis its adversarial performance
in a manner that is amenable to replacement by another member of the
[snow*](#snow*) family.
We have presumed the existence of a general family of algorithms that
can be counted on to vote on nodes in the DAG in a fair manner.
Avalanche provides an example of the construction of votes on UTXO
transactions. One can express all state machine, i.e. account-based
models as checkpoints anchored in UTXO trust, so we believe that this
presupposition has some justification. We can envision a need for
tooling abstraction that allow one to just program the DAG itself, as
they should be of stable interest no matter if Claro isn't.
## Informative References
0. [Logos](\<https://logos.co/\>)
1. [On BFT Consensus Evolution: From Monolithic to
DAG](\<https://dahliamalkhi.github.io/posts/2022/06/dag-bft/\>)
2. [snow-ipfs](\<https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmUy4jh5mGNZvLkjies1RWM4YuvJh5o2FYopNPVYwrRVGV\>)
3. [snow*](\<https://www.avalabs.org/whitepapers\>) The Snow family of
algorithms
4. [Move](\<https://cloud.google.com/composer/docs/how-to/using/writing-dags\>)
Move: a Language for Writing DAG Abstractions
5. [rdf](\<http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#\>)
6. [rdfs](\<http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#\>)
7. [xsd](\<http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#\>)
8. [n3-w3c-notes](\<https://www.w3.org/TeamSubmission/n3/\>)
9. [ntp](\<https://www.ntp.org/downloads.html\>)
## Normative References
0. [Claro](\<https://rdf.logos.co/protocol/Claro/1/0/0/raw\>)
1. [n3](\<https://www.w3.org/DesignIssues/Notation3.html\>)
2. [json-ld](\<https://json-ld.org/\>)
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via
[CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).

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# Nomos Request For Comments(RFC)
Nomos is building secure, flexible, and scalable infrastructure for developers creating applications for the network state.

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---
title: 24/STATUS-CURATION
name: Status Community Directory Curation Voting using Waku v2
status: draft
description: A voting protocol for SNT holders to submit votes to a smart contract. Voting is immutable, which helps avoid sabotage from malicious peers.
editor: Szymon Szlachtowicz \<szymon.s@ethworks.io\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
## Abstract
This specification is a voting protocol for peers to submit votes to a smart contract. Voting is immutable,
this will help avoid sabotage from malicious peers.
## Motivation
In open p2p protocol there is an issue with voting off-chain as there is much room for malicious peers to only include votes that support their case when submitting votes to chain.
Proposed solution is to aggregate votes over waku and allow users to submit votes to smart contract that aren't already submitted.
### Smart contract
Voting should be finalized on chain so that the finished vote is immutable.
Because of that, smart contract needs to be deployed.
When votes are submitted smart contract has to verify what votes are properly signed and that sender has correct amount of SNT.
When Vote is verified the amount of SNT voted on specific topic by specific sender is saved on chain.
### Double voting
Smart contract should also keep a list of all signatures so that no one can send the same vote twice.
Another possibility is to allow each sender to only vote once.
### Initializing Vote
When someone wants to initialize vote he has to send a transaction to smart contract that will create a new voting session.
When initializing a user has to specify type of vote (Addition, Deletion), amount of his initial SNT to submit and public key of community under vote.
Smart contract will return a ID which is identifier of voting session.
Also there will be function on Smart Contract that when given community public key it will return voting session ID or undefined if community isn't under vote.
## Voting
### Sending votes
Sending votes is simple every peer is able to send a message to Waku topic specific to given application:
```
/status-community-directory-curation-vote/1/{voting-session-id}/json
```
vote object that is sent over waku should contain information about:
```ts
type Vote = {
sender: string // address of the sender
vote: string // vote sent eg. 'yes' 'no'
sntAmount: BigNumber //number of snt cast on vote
sign: string // cryptographic signature of a transaction (signed fields: sender,vote,sntAmount,nonce,sessionID)
nonce: number // number of votes cast from this address on current vote (only if we allow multiple votes from the same sender)
sessionID: number // ID of voting session
}
```
### Aggregating votes
Every peer that is opening specific voting session will listen to votes sent over p2p network, and aggregate them for a single transaction to chain.
### Submitting to chain
Every peer that has aggregated at least one vote will be able to send them to smart contract.
When someone votes he will aggregate his own vote and will be able to immediately send it.
Peer doesn't need to vote to be able to submit the votes to the chain.
Smart contract needs to verify that all votes are valid (eg. all senders had enough SNT, all votes are correctly signed) and that votes aren't duplicated on smart contract.
### Finalizing
Once the vote deadline has expired, the smart contract will not accept votes anymore.
Also directory will be updated according to vote results (community added to directory, removed etc.)
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via
[CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).

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---
title: 28/STATUS-FEATURING
name: Status community featuring using waku v2
status: draft
description: To gain new members, current SNT holders can vote to feature an active Status community to the larger Status audience.
editor: Szymon Szlachtowicz \<szymon.s@ethworks.io\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
## Abstract
This specification describes a voting method to feature different active Status Communities.
## Overview
When there is a active community that is seeking new members, current users of community should be able to feature their community so that it will be accessible to larger audience.
Status community curation DApp should provide such a tool.
Rules of featuring:
- Given community can't be featured twice in a row.
- Only one vote per user per community (single user can vote on multiple communities)
- Voting will be done off-chain
- If community hasn't been featured votes for given community are still valid for the next 4 weeks
Since voting for featuring is similar to polling solutions proposed in this spec could be also used for different applications.
### Voting
Voting for featuring will be done through waku v2.
Payload of waku message will be :
```ts
type FeatureVote = {
voter: string // address of a voter
sntAmount: BigNumber // amount of snt voted on featuring
communityPK: string // public key of community
timestamp: number // timestamp of message, must match timestamp of wakuMessage
sign: string // cryptographic signature of a transaction (signed fields: voterAddress,sntAmount,communityPK,timestamp)
}
```
timestamp is necessary so that votes can't be reused after 4 week period
### Counting Votes
Votes will be counted by the DApp itself.
DApp will aggregate all the votes in the last 4 weeks and calculate which communities should be displayed in the Featured tab of DApp.
Rules of counting:
- When multiple votes from the same address on the same community are encountered only the vote with highest timestamp is considered valid.
- If a community has been featured in a previous week it can't be featured in current week.
- In a current week top 5 (or 10) communities with highest amount of SNT votes up to previous Sunday 23:59:59 UTC are considered featured.
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via
[CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).

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---
title: 55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT
name: Status 1-to-1 Chat
status: draft
category: Standards Track
description: A chat protocol to send public and private messages to a single recipient by the Status app.
editor: Aaryamann Challani \<aaryamann@status.im\>
contributors:
- Andrea Piana \<andreap@status.im\>
- Pedro Pombeiro \<pedro@status.im\>
- Corey Petty \<corey@status.im\>
- Oskar Thorén \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\>
- Dean Eigenmann \<dean@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
## Abstract
This specification describes how the Status 1-to-1 chat protocol is implemented on top of the Waku v2 protocol.
This protocol can be used to send messages to a single recipient.
## Terminology
- **Participant**: A participant is a user that is able to send and receive messages.
- **1-to-1 chat**: A chat between two participants.
- **Public chat**: A chat where any participant can join and read messages.
- **Private chat**: A chat where only invited participants can join and read messages.
- **Group chat**: A chat where multiple select participants can join and read messages.
- **Group admin**: A participant that is able to add/remove participants from a group chat.
## Background
This document describes how 2 peers communicate with each other to send messages in a 1-to-1 chat, with privacy and authenticity guarantees.
## Specification
### Overview
This protocol MAY use any key-exchange mechanism previously discussed -
1. [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md)
2. [WAKU2-NOISE](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/noise.md)
This protocol can provide end-to-end encryption to give peers a strong degree of privacy and security.
Public chat messages are publicly readable by anyone since there's no permission model for who is participating in a public chat.
## Flow
### Negotiation of a 1:1 chat
There are two phases in the initial negotiation of a 1:1 chat:
1. **Identity verification** (e.g., face-to-face contact exchange through QR code, Identicon matching).
A QR code serves two purposes simultaneously - identity verification and initial key material retrieval;
1. **Asynchronous initial key exchange**
For more information on account generation and trust establishment, see [65/ACCOUNT-ADDRESS](../65/account-address.md)
### Post Negotiation
After the peers have shared their public key material, a 1:1 chat can be established using the methods described in the key-exchange protocols mentioned above.
### Session management
The 1:1 chat is made robust by having sessions between peers.
It is handled by the key-exchange protocol used. For example,
1. [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md), the session management is described in [54/WAKU2-X3DH-SESSIONS](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md)
2. [WAKU2-NOISE](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/noise.md), the session management is described in [WAKU2-NOISE-SESSIONS](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/noise-sessions/noise-sessions.md)
## Negotiation of a 1:1 chat amongst multiple participants (group chat)
A small, private group chat can be constructed by having multiple participants negotiate a 1:1 chat amongst each other.
Each participant MUST maintain a session with all other participants in the group chat.
This allows for a group chat to be created with a small number of participants.
However, this method does not scale as the number of participants increases, for the following reasons -
1. The number of messages sent over the network increases with the number of participants.
2. Handling the X3DH key exchange for each participant is computationally expensive.
The above issues are addressed in [56/STATUS-COMMUNITIES](../56/communities.md), with other trade-offs.
### Flow
The following flow describes how a group chat is created and maintained.
#### Membership Update Flow
Membership updates have the following wire format:
```protobuf
message MembershipUpdateMessage {
// The chat id of the private group chat
// derived in the following way:
// chat_id = hex(chat_creator_public_key) + "-" + random_uuid
// This chat_id MUST be validated by all participants
string chat_id = 1;
// A list of events for this group chat, first 65 bytes are the signature, then is a
// protobuf encoded MembershipUpdateEvent
repeated bytes events = 2;
oneof chat_entity {
// An optional chat message
ChatMessage message = 3;
// An optional reaction to a message
EmojiReaction emoji_reaction = 4;
}
}
```
Note that in `events`, the first element is the signature, and all other elements after are encoded `MembershipUpdateEvent`'s.
where `MembershipUpdateEvent` is defined as follows:
```protobuf
message MembershipUpdateEvent {
// Lamport timestamp of the event
uint64 clock = 1;
// Optional list of public keys of the targets of the action
repeated string members = 2;
// Name of the chat for the CHAT_CREATED/NAME_CHANGED event types
string name = 3;
// The type of the event
EventType type = 4;
// Color of the chat for the CHAT_CREATED/COLOR_CHANGED event types
string color = 5;
// Chat image
bytes image = 6;
enum EventType {
UNKNOWN = 0;
CHAT_CREATED = 1; // See [CHAT_CREATED](#chat-created)
NAME_CHANGED = 2; // See [NAME_CHANGED](#name-changed)
MEMBERS_ADDED = 3; // See [MEMBERS_ADDED](#members-added)
MEMBER_JOINED = 4; // See [MEMBER_JOINED](#member-joined)
MEMBER_REMOVED = 5; // See [MEMBER_REMOVED](#member-removed)
ADMINS_ADDED = 6; // See [ADMINS_ADDED](#admins-added)
ADMIN_REMOVED = 7; // See [ADMIN_REMOVED](#admin-removed)
COLOR_CHANGED = 8; // See [COLOR_CHANGED](#color-changed)
IMAGE_CHANGED = 9; // See [IMAGE_CHANGED](#image-changed)
}
}
```
\<!-- Note: I don't like defining wire formats which are out of the scope of the rfc this way. Should explore alternatives --\>
Note that the definitions for `ChatMessage` and `EmojiReaction` can be found in [chat_message.proto](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/5fd9e93e9c298ed087e6716d857a3951dbfb3c1e/protocol/protobuf/chat_message.proto#L1) and [emoji_reaction.proto](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/5fd9e93e9c298ed087e6716d857a3951dbfb3c1e/protocol/protobuf/emoji_reaction.proto).
##### Chat Created
When creating a group chat, this is the first event that MUST be sent.
Any event with a clock value lower than this MUST be discarded.
Upon receiving this event a client MUST validate the `chat_id` provided with the update and create a chat with identified by `chat_id`.
By default, the creator of the group chat is the only group admin.
##### Name Changed
To change the name of the group chat, group admins MUST use a `NAME_CHANGED` event.
Upon receiving this event a client MUST validate the `chat_id` provided with the updates and MUST ensure the author of the event is an admin of the chat, otherwise the event MUST be ignored.
If the event is valid the chat name SHOULD be changed according to the provided message.
##### Members Added
To add members to the chat, group admins MUST use a `MEMBERS_ADDED` event.
Upon receiving this event a participant MUST validate the `chat_id` provided with the updates and MUST ensure the author of the event is an admin of the chat, otherwise the event MUST be ignored.
If the event is valid, a participant MUST update the list of members of the chat who have not joined, adding the members received.
##### Member Joined
To signal the intent to start receiving messages from a given chat, new participants MUST use a `MEMBER_JOINED` event.
Upon receiving this event a participant MUST validate the `chat_id` provided with the updates.
If the event is valid a participant MUST add the new participant to the list of participants stored locally.
Any message sent to the group chat MUST now include the new participant.
##### Member Removed
There are two ways in which a member MAY be removed from a group chat:
- A member MAY leave the chat by sending a `MEMBER_REMOVED` event, with the `members` field containing their own public key.
- An admin MAY remove a member by sending a `MEMBER_REMOVED` event, with the `members` field containing the public key of the member to be removed.
Each participant MUST validate the `chat_id` provided with the updates and MUST ensure the author of the event is an admin of the chat, otherwise the event MUST be ignored.
If the event is valid, a participant MUST update the local list of members accordingly.
##### Admins Added
To promote participants to group admin, group admins MUST use an `ADMINS_ADDED` event.
Upon receiving this event, a participant MUST validate the `chat_id` provided with the updates, MUST ensure the author of the event is an admin of the chat, otherwise the event MUST be ignored.
If the event is valid, a participant MUST update the list of admins of the chat accordingly.
##### Admin Removed
Group admins MUST NOT be able to remove other group admins.
An admin MAY remove themselves by sending an `ADMIN_REMOVED` event, with the `members` field containing their own public key.
Each participant MUST validate the `chat_id` provided with the updates and MUST ensure the author of the event is an admin of the chat, otherwise the event MUST be ignored.
If the event is valid, a participant MUST update the list of admins of the chat accordingly.
##### Color Changed
To change the text color of the group chat name, group admins MUST use a `COLOR_CHANGED` event.
##### Image Changed
To change the display image of the group chat, group admins MUST use an `IMAGE_CHANGED` event.
## Security Considerations
1. Inherits the security considerations of the key-exchange mechanism used, e.g., [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) or [WAKU2-NOISE](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/noise.md)
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
1. [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md)
2. [35/WAKU2-NOISE](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/noise.md)
3. [65/STATUS-ACCOUNT](../65/account-address.md)
4. [54/WAKU2-X3DH-SESSIONS](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md)
5. [37/WAKU2-NOISE-SESSIONS](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/noise-sessions/noise-sessions.md)
6. [56/STATUS-COMMUNITIES](../56/communities.md)
7. [chat_message.proto](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/5fd9e93e9c298ed087e6716d857a3951dbfb3c1e/protocol/protobuf/chat_message.proto#L1)
8. [emoji_reaction.proto](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/5fd9e93e9c298ed087e6716d857a3951dbfb3c1e/protocol/protobuf/emoji_reaction.proto)

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---
title: 56/STATUS-COMMUNITIES
name: Status Communities that run over Waku v2
status: draft
category: Standards Track
description: Status Communities allow multiple users to communicate in a discussion space. This is a key feature of the Status application.
editor: Aaryamann Challani \<aaryamann@status.im\>
contributors:
- Andrea Piana \<andreap@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
## Abstract
This document describes the design of Status Communities over Waku v2, allowing for multiple users to communicate in a discussion space.
This is a key feature for the Status messaging app.
## Background and Motivation
The purpose of Status communities, as specified in this document, is allowing for large group chats.
Communities can have further substructure, e.g. specific channels.
Smaller group chats, on the other hand, are out of scope for this document and can be built over [55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](../55/1to1-chat.md).
We refer to these smaller group chats simply as "group chats", to differentiate them from Communities.
For group chats based on [55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](../55/1to1-chat.md), the key exchange mechanism MUST be X3DH, as described in [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md).
However, this method does not scale as the number of participants increases, for the following reasons -
1. The number of messages sent over the network increases with the number of participants.
2. Handling the X3DH key exchange for each participant is computationally expensive.
Having multicast channels reduces the overhead of a group chat based on 1:1 chat.
Additionally, if all the participants of the group chat have a shared key, then the number of messages sent over the network is reduced to one per message.
## Terminology
- **Community**: A group of peers that can communicate with each other.
- **Member**: A peer that is part of a community.
- **Admin**: A member that has administrative privileges. Used interchangeably with "owner".
- **Channel**: A designated subtopic for a community. Used interchangeably with "chat".
## Design Requirements
Due to the nature of communities, the following requirements are necessary for the design of communities -
1. The creator of the Community is the owner of the Community.
2. The Community owner is trusted.
3. The Community owner can add or remove members from the Community.
This extends to banning and kicking members.
4. The Community owner can add, edit and remove channels.
5. Community members can send/receive messages to the channels which they have access to.
6. Communities may be encrypted (private) or unencrypted (public).
7. A Community is uniquely identified by a public key.
8. The public key of the Community is shared out of band.
9. The metadata of the Community can be found by listening on a content topic derived from the public key of the Community.
10. Community members run their own Waku nodes, with the configuration described in [Waku-Protocols](#waku-protocols).
Light nodes solely implementing [19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH](../../waku/standards/core/19/lightpush.md) may not be able to run their own Waku node with the configuration described.
## Design
### Cryptographic Primitives
The following cryptographic primitives are used in the design -
- X3DH
- Single Ratchet
- The single ratchet is used to encrypt the messages sent to the Community.
- The single ratchet is re-keyed when a member is added/removed from the Community.
## Wire format
\<!--
The wire format is described first to give an overview of the protocol.
It is referenced in the flow of community creation and community management.
More or less an intersection of https://github.com/status-im/specs/blob/403b5ce316a270565023fc6a1f8dec138819f4b0/docs/raw/organisation-channels.md and https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/6072bd17ab1e5d9fc42cf844fcb8ad18aa07760c/protocol/protobuf/communities.proto,
--\>
```protobuf
syntax = "proto3";
message IdentityImage {
// payload is a context based payload for the profile image data,
// context is determined by the `source_type`
bytes payload = 1;
// source_type signals the image payload source
SourceType source_type = 2;
// image_type signals the image type and method of parsing the payload
ImageType image_type = 3;
// encryption_keys is a list of encrypted keys that can be used to decrypt an encrypted payload
repeated bytes encryption_keys = 4;
// encrypted signals the encryption state of the payload, default is false.
bool encrypted = 5;
// SourceType are the predefined types of image source allowed
enum SourceType {
UNKNOWN_SOURCE_TYPE = 0;
// RAW_PAYLOAD image byte data
RAW_PAYLOAD = 1;
// ENS_AVATAR uses the ENS record's resolver get-text-data.avatar data
// The `payload` field will be ignored if ENS_AVATAR is selected
// The application will read and parse the ENS avatar data as image payload data, URLs will be ignored
// The parent `ChatMessageIdentity` must have a valid `ens_name` set
ENS_AVATAR = 2;
}
}
// SocialLinks represents social link associated with given chat identity (personal/community)
message SocialLink {
// Type of the social link
string text = 1;
// URL of the social link
string url = 2;
}
// ChatIdentity represents identity of a community/chat
message ChatIdentity {
// Lamport timestamp of the message
uint64 clock = 1;
// ens_name is the valid ENS name associated with the chat key
string ens_name = 2;
// images is a string indexed mapping of images associated with an identity
map\<string, IdentityImage\> images = 3;
// display name is the user set identity
string display_name = 4;
// description is the user set description
string description = 5;
string color = 6;
string emoji = 7;
repeated SocialLink social_links = 8;
// first known message timestamp in seconds (valid only for community chats for now)
// 0 - unknown
// 1 - no messages
uint32 first_message_timestamp = 9;
}
message Grant {
// Community ID (The public key of the community)
bytes community_id = 1;
// The member ID (The public key of the member)
bytes member_id = 2;
// The chat for which the grant is given
string chat_id = 3;
// The Lamport timestamp of the grant
uint64 clock = 4;
}
message CommunityMember {
// The roles a community member MAY have
enum Roles {
UNKNOWN_ROLE = 0;
ROLE_ALL = 1;
ROLE_MANAGE_USERS = 2;
ROLE_MODERATE_CONTENT = 3;
}
repeated Roles roles = 1;
}
message CommunityPermissions {
// The type of access a community MAY have
enum Access {
UNKNOWN_ACCESS = 0;
NO_MEMBERSHIP = 1;
INVITATION_ONLY = 2;
ON_REQUEST = 3;
}
// If the community should be available only to ens users
bool ens_only = 1;
// If the community is private
bool private = 2;
Access access = 3;
}
message CommunityAdminSettings {
// If the Community admin may pin messages
bool pin_message_all_members_enabled = 1;
}
message CommunityChat {
// A map of members in the community to their roles in a chat
map\<string,CommunityMember\> members = 1;
// The permissions of the chat
CommunityPermissions permissions = 2;
// The metadata of the chat
ChatIdentity identity = 3;
// The category of the chat
string category_id = 4;
// The position of chat in the display
int32 position = 5;
}
message CommunityCategory {
// The category id
string category_id = 1;
// The name of the category
string name = 2;
// The position of the category in the display
int32 position = 3;
}
message CommunityInvitation {
// Encrypted/unencrypted community description
bytes community_description = 1;
// The grant offered by the community
bytes grant = 2;
// The chat id requested to join
string chat_id = 3;
// The public key of the community
bytes public_key = 4;
}
message CommunityRequestToJoin {
// The Lamport timestamp of the request
uint64 clock = 1;
// The ENS name of the requester
string ens_name = 2;
// The chat id requested to join
string chat_id = 3;
// The public key of the community
bytes community_id = 4;
// The display name of the requester
string display_name = 5;
}
message CommunityCancelRequestToJoin {
// The Lamport timestamp of the request
uint64 clock = 1;
// The ENS name of the requester
string ens_name = 2;
// The chat id requested to join
string chat_id = 3;
// The public key of the community
bytes community_id = 4;
// The display name of the requester
string display_name = 5;
// Magnet uri for community history protocol
string magnet_uri = 6;
}
message CommunityRequestToJoinResponse {
// The Lamport timestamp of the request
uint64 clock = 1;
// The community description
CommunityDescription community = 2;
// If the request was accepted
bool accepted = 3;
// The grant offered by the community
bytes grant = 4;
// The community public key
bytes community_id = 5;
}
message CommunityRequestToLeave {
// The Lamport timestamp of the request
uint64 clock = 1;
// The community public key
bytes community_id = 2;
}
message CommunityDescription {
// The Lamport timestamp of the message
uint64 clock = 1;
// A mapping of members in the community to their roles
map\<string,CommunityMember\> members = 2;
// The permissions of the Community
CommunityPermissions permissions = 3;
// The metadata of the Community
ChatIdentity identity = 5;
// A mapping of chats to their details
map\<string,CommunityChat\> chats = 6;
// A list of banned members
repeated string ban_list = 7;
// A mapping of categories to their details
map\<string,CommunityCategory\> categories = 8;
// The admin settings of the Community
CommunityAdminSettings admin_settings = 10;
// If the community is encrypted
bool encrypted = 13;
// The list of tags
repeated string tags = 14;
}
```
Note: The usage of the clock is described in the [Clock](#clock) section.
### Content topic usage
"Content topic" refers to the field in [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../../waku/standards/core/14/message.md/#message-attributes), further elaborated in [10/WAKU2](../../waku/standards/core/10/waku2.md/#overview-of-protocol-interaction).
#### Advertising a Community
The content topic that the community is advertised on MUST be derived from the public key of the community.
The content topic MUST be the first four bytes of the keccak-256 hash of the compressed (33 bytes) public key of the community encoded into a hex string.
```
hash = hex(keccak256(encodeToHex(compressedPublicKey)))
topicLen = 4
if len(hash) \< topicLen {
topicLen = len(hash)
}
var topic [4]byte
for i = 0; i \< topicLen; i++ {
topic[i] = hash[i]
}
contentTopic = "/waku/1/0x" + topic + "/rfc26"
```
#### Community channels/chats
The unique identifier for a community channel/chat is the chat id.
\<!-- Don't enforce any constraints on the unique id generation --\>
The content topic that Community channels/chats use MUST be the hex-encoded keccak-256 hash of the public key of the community concatenated with the chat id.
```
hash = hex(keccak256(encodeToHex(compressedPublicKey + chatId)))
topicLen = 4
if len(hash) \< topicLen {
topicLen = len(hash)
}
var topic [4]byte
for i = 0; i \< topicLen; i++ {
topic[i] = hash[i]
}
contentTopic = "/waku/1/0x" + topic + "/rfc26"
```
#### Community event messages
Requests to leave, join, kick and ban, as well as key exchange messages, MUST be sent to the content topic derived from the public key of the community.
The content topic MUST be the hex-encoded keccak-256 hash of the public key of the community.
```
hash = hex(keccak256(encodeToHex(publicKey)))
topicLen = 4
if len(hash) \< topicLen {
topicLen = len(hash)
}
var topic [4]byte
for i = 0; i \< topicLen; i++ {
topic[i] = hash[i]
}
contentTopic = "/waku/1/0x" + topic + "/rfc26"
```
### Community Management
The flows for Community management are as described below.
#### Community Creation Flow
1. The Community owner generates a public/private key pair.
2. The Community owner configures the Community metadata, according to the wire format "CommunityDescription".
3. The Community owner publishes the Community metadata on a content topic derived from the public key of the Community.
the Community metadata SHOULD be encrypted with the public key of the Community. \<!-- TODO: Verify this--\>
The Community metadata MAY be sent during fixed intervals, to ensure that the Community metadata is available to members.
The Community metadata SHOULD be sent every time the Community metadata is updated.
4. The Community owner MAY advertise the Community out of band, by sharing the public key of the Community on other mediums of communication.
#### Community Join Flow (peer requests to join a Community)
1. A peer and the Community owner establish a 1:1 chat as described in [55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](../55/1to1-chat.md).
2. The peer requests to join a Community by sending a "CommunityRequestToJoin" message to the Community.
At this point, the peer MAY send a "CommunityCancelRequestToJoin" message to cancel the request.
3. The Community owner MAY accept or reject the request.
4. If the request is accepted, the Community owner sends a "CommunityRequestToJoinResponse" message to the peer.
5. The Community owner then adds the member to the Community metadata, and publishes the updated Community metadata.
#### Community Join Flow (peer is invited to join a Community)
1. The Community owner and peer establish a 1:1 chat as described in [55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](../55/1to1-chat.md).
2. The peer is invited to join a Community by the Community owner, by sending a "CommunityInvitation" message.
3. The peer decrypts the "CommunityInvitation" message, and verifies the signature.
4. The peer requests to join a Community by sending a "CommunityRequestToJoin" message to the Community.
5. The Community owner MAY accept or reject the request.
6. If the request is accepted, the Community owner sends a "CommunityRequestToJoinResponse" message to the peer.
7. The Community owner then adds the member to the Community metadata, and publishes the updated Community metadata.
#### Community Leave Flow
1. A member requests to leave a Community by sending a "CommunityRequestToLeave" message to the Community.
2. The Community owner MAY accept or reject the request.
3. If the request is accepted, the Community owner removes the member from the Community metadata, and publishes the updated Community metadata.
#### Community Ban Flow
1. The Community owner adds a member to the ban list, revokes their grants, and publishes the updated Community metadata.
2. If the Community is Private, Re-keying is performed between the members of the Community, to ensure that the banned member is unable to decrypt any messages.
### Waku Protocols
The following Waku protocols SHOULD be used to implement Status Communities -
1. [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../waku/standards/core/11/relay.md) - To send and receive messages
2. [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) - To encrypt and decrypt messages
3. [54/WAKU2-X3DH-SESSIONS](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md) - To handle session keys
4. [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../../waku/standards/core/14/message.md) - To wrap community messages in a Waku message
5. [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md) - To store and retrieve messages for offline devices
The following Waku protocols MAY be used to implement Status Communities -
1. [12/WAKU2-FILTER](../../waku/standards/core/12/filter.md) - Content filtering for resource restricted devices
2. [19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH](../../waku/standards/core/19/lightpush.md) - Allows Light clients to participate in the network
### Backups
The member MAY back up their local settings, by encrypting it with their public key, and sending it to a given content topic.
The member MAY then rely on this backup to restore their local settings, in case of a data loss.
This feature relies on [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md) for storing and retrieving messages.
### Clock
The clock used in the wire format refers to the Lamport timestamp of the message.
The Lamport timestamp is a logical clock that is used to determine the order of events in a distributed system.
This allows ordering of messages in an asynchronous network where messages may be received out of order.
## Security Considerations
1. The Community owner is a single point of failure. If the Community owner is compromised, the Community is compromised.
2. Follows the same security considerations as the [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) protocol.
## Future work
1. To scale and optimize the Community management, the Community metadata should be stored on a decentralized storage system, and only the references to the Community metadata should be broadcasted. The following document describes this method in more detail - [Optimizing the `CommunityDescription` dissemination](https://hackmd.io/rD1OfIbJQieDe3GQdyCRTw)
2. Token gating for communities
3. Sharding the content topic used for [#Community Event Messages](#community-event-messages), since members of the community don't need to receive all the control messages.
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
- [55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](../55/1to1-chat.md)
- [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md)
- [19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH](../../waku/standards/core/19/lightpush.md)
- [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../../waku/standards/core/14/message.md)
- [10/WAKU2](../../waku/standards/core/10/waku2.md)
- [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../waku/standards/core/11/relay.md)
- [54/WAKU2-X3DH-SESSIONS](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md)
- [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md)
- [12/WAKU2-FILTER](../../waku/standards/core/12/filter.md)
### informative
- [community.go](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/6072bd17ab1e5d9fc42cf844fcb8ad18aa07760c/protocol/communities/community.go)
- [organisation-channels.md](https://github.com/status-im/specs/blob/403b5ce316a270565023fc6a1f8dec138819f4b0/docs/raw/organisation-channels.md)

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---
title: 61/STATUS-Community-History-Service
name: Status Community History Service
status: draft
category: Standards Track
description: Explains how new members of a Status community can request historical messages from archive nodes.
editor: r4bbit \<r4bbit@status.im\>
contributors:
- Sanaz Taheri \<sanaz@status.im\>
- John Lea \<john@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
## Abstract
Messages are stored permanently by store nodes ([13/WAKU2-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md)) for up to a certain configurable period of time, limited by the overall storage provided by a store node.
Messages older than that period are no longer provided by store nodes, making it impossible for other nodes to request historical messages that go beyond that time range.
This raises issues in the case of Status communities, where recently joined members of a community are not able to request complete message histories of the community channels.
This specification describes how **Control Nodes** (which are specific nodes in Status communities) archive historical message data of their communities, beyond the time range limit provided by Store Nodes using the [BitTorrent](https://bittorrent.org) protocol.
It also describes how the archives are distributed to community members via the Status network, so they can fetch them and gain access to a complete message history.
## Terminology
The following terminology is used throughout this specification. Notice that some actors listed here are nodes that operate in Waku networks only, while others operate in the Status communities layer):
| Name | References |
| -------------------- | --- |
| Waku node | An Waku node ([10/WAKU2](../../waku/standards/core/10/waku2.md)) that implements [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../waku/standards/core/11/relay.md)|
| Store node | A Waku node that implements [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md) |
| Waku network | A group of Waku nodes forming a graph, connected via [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../waku/standards/core/11/relay.md) |
| Status user | An Status account that is used in a Status consumer product, such as Status Mobile or Status Desktop |
| Status node | A Status client run by a Status application |
| Control node | A Status node that owns the private key for a Status community |
| Community member | A Status user that is part of a Status community, not owning the private key of the community |
| Community member node| A Status node with message archive capabilities enabled, run by a community member |
| Live messages | Waku messages received through the Waku network |
| BitTorrent client | A program implementing the [BitTorrent](https://bittorrent.org) protocol |
| Torrent/Torrent file | A file containing metadata about data to be downloaded by BitTorrent clients |
| Magnet link | A link encoding the metadata provided by a torrent file ([Magnet URI scheme](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnet_URI_scheme)) |
## Requirements / Assumptions
This specification has the following assumptions:
- Store nodes([13/WAKU2-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md)) are available 24/7, ensuring constant live message availability.
- The storage time range limit is 30 days.
- Store nodes have enough storage to persist historical messages for up to 30 days.
- No store nodes have storage to persist historical messages older than 30 days.
- All nodes are honest.
- The network is reliable.
Furthermore, it assumes that:
- Control nodes have enough storage to persist historical messages older than 30 days.
- Control nodes provide archives with historical messages **at least** every 30 days.
- Control nodes receive all community messages.
- Control nodes are honest.
- Control nodes know at least one store node from which it can query historical messages.
These assumptions are less than ideal and will be enhanced in future work. This [forum discussion](https://forum.vac.dev/t/status-communities-protocol-and-product-point-of-view/114) provides more details.
## Overview
The following is a high-level overview of the user flow and features this specification describes. For more detailed descriptions, read the dedicated sections in this specification.
### Serving community history archives
Control nodes go through the following (high level) process to provide community members with message histories:
1. Community owner creates a Status community (previously known as [org channels](https://github.com/status-im/specs/pull/151)) which makes its node a Control node.
2. Community owner enables message archive capabilities (on by default but can be turned off as well - see [UI feature spec](https://github.com/status-im/feature-specs/pull/36)).
3. A special type of channel to exchange metadata about the archival data is created, this channel is not visible in the user interface.
4. Community owner invites community members.
5. Control node receives messages published in channels and stores them into a local database.
6. After 7 days, the control node exports and compresses last 7 days worth of messages from database and bundles it together with a [message archive index](#waku-message-archive-index) into a torrent, from which it then creates a magnet link ([Magnet URI scheme](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnet_URI_scheme), [Extensions for Peers to Send Metadata Files](https://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0009.html)).
7. Control node sends the magnet link created in step 6 to community members via special channel created in step 3 through the Waku network.
8. Every subsequent 7 days, steps 6 and 7 are repeated and the new message archive data is appended to the previously created message archive data.
### Serving archives for missed messages
If the control node goes offline (where "offline" means, the control node's main process is no longer running), it MUST go through the following process:
1. Control node restarts
2. Control node requests messages from store nodes for the missed time range for all channels in their community
3. All missed messages are stored into control node's local message database
4. If 7 or more days have elapsed since the last message history torrent was created, the control node will perform step 6 and 7 of [Serving community history archives](#serving-community-history-archives) for every 7 days worth of messages in the missed time range (e.g. if the node was offline for 30 days, it will create 4 message history archives)
### Receiving community history archives
Community member nodes go through the following (high level) process to fetch and restore community message histories:
1. User joins community and becomes community member (see [org channels spec](../56/communities.md))
2. By joining a community, member nodes automatically subscribe to special channel for message archive metadata exchange provided by the community
3. Member node requests live message history (last 30 days) of all the community channels including the special channel from store nodes
4. Member node receives Waku message ([14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../../waku/standards/core/14/message.md)) that contains the metadata magnet link from the special channel
5. Member node extracts the magnet link from the Waku message and passes it to torrent client
6. Member node downloads [message archive index](#message-history-archive-index) file and determines which message archives are not downloaded yet (all or some)
7. Member node fetches missing message archive data via torrent
8. Member node unpacks and decompresses message archive data to then hydrate its local database, deleting any messages for that community that the database previously stored in the same time range as covered by the message history archive
## Storing live messages
For archival data serving, the control node MUST store live messages as [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../../waku/standards/core/14/message.md).
This is in addition to their database of application messages.
This is required to provide confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity of message data distributed via the BitTorrent layer, and later validated by community members when they unpack message history archives.
Control nodes SHOULD remove those messages from their local databases once they are older than 30 days and after they have been turned into message archives and distributed to the BitTorrent network.
### Exporting messages for bundling
Control nodes export Waku messages from their local database for creating and bundling history archives using the following criteria:
- Waku messages to be exported MUST have a `contentTopic` that match any of the topics of the community channels
- Waku messages to be exported MUST have a `timestamp` that lies within a time range of 7 days
The `timestamp` is determined by the context in which the control node attempts to create a message history archives as described below:
1. The control node attempts to create an archive periodically for the past seven days (including the current day). In this case, the `timestamp` has to lie within those 7 days.
2. The control node has been offline (control node's main process has stopped and needs restart) and attempts to create archives for all the live messages it has missed since it went offline. In this case, the `timestamp` has to lie within the day the latest message was received and the current day.
Exported messages MUST be restored as [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../../waku/standards/core/14/message.md) for bundling. Waku messages that are older than 30 days and have been exported for bundling can be removed from the control node's database (control nodes still maintain a database of application messages).
## Message history archives
Message history archives are represented as `WakuMessageArchive` and created from Waku messages exported from the local database.
Message history archives are implemented using the following protocol buffer.
### WakuMessageHistoryArchive
The `from` field SHOULD contain a timestamp of the time range's lower bound.
The type parallels the `timestamp` of [WakuMessage](../../waku/standards/core/14/message.md/#payloads).
The `to` field SHOULD contain a timestamp of the time range's the higher bound.
The `contentTopic` field MUST contain a list of all communiity channel topics.
The `messages` field MUST contain all messages that belong into the archive given its `from`, `to` and `contentTopic` fields.
The `padding` field MUST contain the amount of zero bytes needed so that the overall byte size of the protobuf encoded `WakuMessageArchive` is a multiple of the `pieceLength` used to divide the message archive data into pieces.
This is needed for seamless encoding and decoding of archival data in interation with BitTorrent as explained in [creating message archive torrents](#creating-message-archive-torrents).
```
syntax = "proto3"
message WakuMessageArchiveMetadata {
uint8 version = 1
uint64 from = 2
uint64 to = 3
repeated string contentTopic = 4
}
message WakuMessageArchive {
uint8 version = 1
WakuMessageArchiveMetadata metadata = 2
repeated WakuMessage messages = 3 // `WakuMessage` is provided by 14/WAKU2-MESSAGE
bytes padding = 4
}
```
## Message history archive index
Control nodes MUST provide message archives for the entire community history.
The entirey history consists of a set of `WakuMessageArchive`'s where each archive contains a subset of historical `WakuMessage`s for a time range of seven days.
All the `WakuMessageArchive`s are concatenated into a single file as a byte string (see [Ensuring reproducible data pieces](#ensuring-reproducible-data-pieces)).
Control nodes MUST create a message history archive index (`WakuMessageArchiveIndex`) with metadata that allows receiving nodes to only fetch the message history archives they are interested in.
### WakuMessageArchiveIndex
A `WakuMessageArchiveIndex` is a map where the key is the KECCAK-256 hash of the `WakuMessageArchiveIndexMetadata` derived from a 7-day archive and the value is an instance of that `WakuMessageArchiveIndexMetadata` corresponding to that archive.
The `offset` field MUST contain the position at which the message history archive starts in the byte string of the total message archive data. This MUST be the sum of the length of all previously created message archives in bytes (see [Creating message archive torrents](#creating-message-archive-torrents)).
```
syntax = "proto3"
message WakuMessageArchiveIndexMetadata {
uint8 version = 1
WakuMessageArchiveMetadata metadata = 2
uint64 offset = 3
uint64 num_pieces = 4
}
message WakuMessageArchiveIndex {
map\<string, WakuMessageArchiveIndexMetadata\> archives = 1
}
```
The control node MUST update the `WakuMessageArchiveIndex` every time it creates one or more `WakuMessageArchive`s and bundle it into a new torrent.
For every created `WakuMessageArchive`, there MUST be a `WakuMessageArchiveIndexMetadata` entry in the `archives` field `WakuMessageArchiveIndex`.
# Creating message archive torrents
Control nodes MUST create a torrent file ("torrent") containing metadata to all message history archives.
To create a torrent file, and later serve the message archive data in the BitTorrent network, control nodes MUST store the necessary data in dedicated files on the file system.
A torrent's source folder MUST contain the following two files:
- `data` - Contains all protobuf encoded `WakuMessageArchive`'s (as bit strings) concatenated in ascending order based on their time
- `index` - Contains the protobuf encoded `WakuMessageArchiveIndex`
Control nodes SHOULD store these files in a dedicated folder that is identifiable via the community id.
### Ensuring reproducible data pieces
The control node MUST ensure that the byte string resulting from the protobuf encoded `data` is equal to the byte string `data` from the previously generated message archive torrent, plus the data of the latest 7 days worth of messages encoded as `WakuMessageArchive`.
Therefore, the size of `data` grows every seven days as it's append only.
The control nodes also MUST ensure that the byte size of every individual `WakuMessageArchive` encoded protobuf is a multiple of `pieceLength: ???` (**TODO**) using the `padding` field.
If the protobuf encoded 'WakuMessageArchive` is not a multiple of `pieceLength`, its `padding` field MUST be filled with zero bytes and the `WakuMessageArchive` MUST be re-encoded until its size becomes multiple of `pieceLength`.
This is necessary because the content of the `data` file will be split into pieces of `pieceLength` when the torrent file is created, and the SHA1 hash of every piece is then stored in the torrent file and later used by other nodes to request the data for each individual data piece.
By fitting message archives into a multiple of `pieceLength` and ensuring they fill possible remaining space with zero bytes, control nodes prevent the **next** message archive to occupy that remaining space of the last piece, which will result in a different SHA1 hash for that piece.
#### **Example: Without padding**
Let `WakuMessageArchive` "A1" be of size 20 bytes:
```
0 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
```
With a `pieceLength` of 10 bytes, A1 will fit into `20 / 10 = 2` pieces:
```
0 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 // piece[0] SHA1: 0x123
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 // piece[1] SHA1: 0x456
```
#### **Example: With padding**
Let `WakuMessageArchive` "A2" be of size 21 bytes:
```
0 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20
```
With a `pieceLength` of 10 bytes, A2 will fit into `21 / 10 = 2` pieces. The remainder will introduce a third piece:
```
0 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 // piece[0] SHA1: 0x123
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 // piece[1] SHA1: 0x456
20 // piece[2] SHA1: 0x789
```
The next `WakuMessageArchive` "A3" will be appended ("#3") to the existing data and occupy the remaining space of the third data piece. The piece at index 2 will now produce a different SHA1 hash:
```
0 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 // piece[0] SHA1: 0x123
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 // piece[1] SHA1: 0x456
20 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 // piece[2] SHA1: 0xeef
#3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 // piece[3]
```
By filling up the remaining space of the third piece with A2 using its `padding` field, it is guaranteed that its SHA1 will stay the same:
```
0 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 // piece[0] SHA1: 0x123
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 // piece[1] SHA1: 0x456
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 // piece[2] SHA1: 0x999
#3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 // piece[3]
#3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 // piece[4]
```
### Seeding message history archives
The control node MUST seed the [generated torrent](#creating-message-archive-torrents) until a new `WakuMessageArchive` is created.
The control node SHOULD NOT seed torrents for older message history archives. Only one torrent at a time should be seeded.
### Creating magnet links
Once a torrent file for all message archives is created, the control node MUST derive a magnet link following the [Magnet URI scheme](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnet_URI_scheme) using the underlying BitTorrent protocol client.
### Message archive distribution
Message archives are available via the BitTorrent network as they are being [seeded by the control node](#seeding-message-history-archives).
Other community member nodes will download the message archives from the BitTorrent network once they receive a magnet link that contains a message archive index.
The control node MUST send magnet links containing message archives and the message archive index to a special community channel.
The topic of that special channel follows the following format:
```
/{application-name}/{version-of-the-application}/{content-topic-name}/{encoding}
```
All messages sent with this topic MUST be instances of `ApplicationMetadataMessage` ([62/STATUS-PAYLOAD](../62/payload.md)) with a `payload` of `CommunityMessageArchiveIndex`.
Only the control node MAY post to the special channel. Other messages on this specified channel MUST be ignored by clients.
Community members MUST NOT have permission to send messages to the special channel.
However, community member nodes MUST subscribe to special channel to receive Waku messages containing magnet links for message archives.
### Canonical message histories
Only control nodes are allowed to distribute messages with magnet links via the special channel for magnet link exchange.
Community members MUST NOT be allowed to post any messages to the special channel.
Status nodes MUST ensure that any message that isn't signed by the control node in the special channel is ignored.
Since the magnet links are created from the control node's database (and previously distributed archives), the message history provided by the control node becomes the canonical message history and single source of truth for the community.
Community member nodes MUST replace messages in their local databases with the messages extracted from archives within the same time range.
Messages that the control node didn't receive MUST be removed and are no longer part of the message history of interest, even if it already existed in a community member node's database.
## Fetching message history archives
Generally, fetching message history archives is a three step process:
1. Receive [message archive index](#message-history-archive-index) magnet link as described in [Message archive distribution], download `index` file from torrent, then determine which message archives to download
2. Download individual archives
Community member nodes subscribe to the special channel that control nodes publish magnet links for message history archives to.
There are two scenarios in which member nodes can receive such a magnet link message from the special channel:
1. The member node receives it via live messages, by listening to the special channel
2. The member node requests messages for a time range of up to 30 days from store nodes (this is the case when a new community member joins a community)
### Downloading message archives
When member nodes receive a message with a `CommunityMessageHistoryArchive` ([62/STATUS-PAYLOAD](../62/payload.md)) from the aforementioned channnel, they MUST extract the `magnet_uri` and pass it to their underlying BitTorrent client so they can fetch the latest message history archive index, which is the `index` file of the torrent (see [Creating message archive torrents](#creating-message-archive-torrents)).
Due to the nature of distributed systems, there's no guarantee that a received message is the "last" message. This is especially true when member nodes request historical messages from store nodes.
Therefore, member nodes MUST wait for 20 seconds after receiving the last `CommunityMessageArchive` before they start extracting the magnet link to fetch the latest archive index.
Once a message history archive index is downloaded and parsed back into `WakuMessageArchiveIndex`, community member nodes use a local lookup table to determine which of the listed archives are missing using the KECCAK-256 hashes stored in the index.
For this lookup to work, member nodes MUST store the KECCAK-256 hashes of the `WakuMessageArchiveIndexMetadata` provided by the `index` file for all of the message history archives that have been downlaoded in their local database.
Given a `WakuMessageArchiveIndex`, member nodes can access individual `WakuMessageArchiveIndexMetadata` to download individual archives.
Community member nodes MUST choose one of the following options:
1. **Download all archives** - Request and download all data pieces for `data` provided by the torrent (this is the case for new community member nodes that haven't downloaded any archives yet)
2. **Download only the latest archive** - Request and download all pieces starting at the `offset` of the latest `WakuMessageArchiveIndexMetadata` (this the case for any member node that already has downloaded all previous history and is now interested in only the latst archive)
3. **Download specific archives** - Look into `from` and `to` fields of every `WakuMessageArchiveIndexMetadata` and determine the pieces for archives of a specific time range (can be the case for member nodes that have recently joined the network and are only interested in a subset of the complete history)
### Storing historical messages
When message archives are fetched, community member nodes MUST unwrap the resulting `WakuMessage` instances into `ApplicationMetadataMessage` instances and store them in their local database.
Community member nodes SHOULD NOT store the wrapped `WakuMessage` messages.
All message within the same time range MUST be replaced with the messages provided by the message history archive.
Community members nodes MUST ignore the expiration state of each archive message.
## Considerations
The following are things to cosider when implementing this specification.
## Control node honesty
This spec assumes that all control nodes are honest and behave according to the spec. Meaning they don't inject their own messages into, or remove any messages from historic archives.
## Bandwidth consumption
Community member nodes will download the latest archive they've received from the archive index, which includes messages from the last seven days. Assuming that community members nodes were online for that time range, they have already downloaded that message data and will now download an archive that contains the same.
This means there's a possibility member nodes will download the same data at least twice.
## Multiple community owners
It is possible for control nodes to export the private key of their owned community and pass it to other users so they become control nodes as well.
This means, it's possible for multiple control nodes to exist.
This might conflict with the assumption that the control node serves as a single source of thruth. Multiple control nodes can have different message histories.
Not only will multiple control nodes multiply the amount of archive index messages being distributed to the network, they might also contain different sets of magnet links and their corresponding hashes.
Even if just a single message is missing in one of the histories, the hashes presented in archive indices will look completely different, resulting in the community member node to download the corresponding archive (which might be identical to an archive that was already downloaded, except for that one message).
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
* [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md)
* [BitTorrent](https://bittorrent.org)
* [10/WAKU2](../../waku/standards/core/10/waku2.md)
* [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../waku/standards/core/11/relay.md)
* [Magnet URI scheme](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnet_URI_scheme)
* [forum discussion](https://forum.vac.dev/t/status-communities-protocol-and-product-point-of-view/114)
* [org channels](https://github.com/status-im/specs/pull/151)
* [UI feature spec](https://github.com/status-im/feature-specs/pull/36)
* [Extensions for Peers to Send Metadata Files](https://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0009.html)
* [org channels spec](../56/communities.md)
* [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../../waku/standards/core/14/message.md)
* [62/STATUS-PAYLOAD](../62/payload.md)

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---
title: 63/STATUS-Keycard-Usage
name: Status Keycard Usage
status: draft
category: Standards Track
description: Describes how an application can use the Status Keycard to create, store and transact with different account addresses.
editor: Aaryamann Challani \<aaryamann@status.im\>
contributors:
- Jimmy Debe \<jimmy@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
## Terminology
- **Account**: A valid [BIP-32](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawiki) compliant key.
- **Multiaccount**: An account from which multiple Accounts can be derived.
## Abstract
This specification describes how an application can use the Status Keycard to -
1. Create Multiaccounts
2. Store Multiaccounts
3. Use Multiaccounts for transaction or message signing
4. Derive Accounts from Multiaccounts
More documentation on the Status Keycard can be found [here](https://keycard.tech/docs/)
## Motivation
The Status Keycard is a hardware wallet that can be used to store and sign transactions.
For the purpose of the Status App, this specification describes how the Keycard SHOULD be used to store and sign transactions.
## Usage
### Endpoints
#### 1. Initialize Keycard (`/init-keycard`)
To initialize the keycard for use with the application.
The keycard is locked with a 6 digit pin.
#### Request wire format
```json
{
"pin": 6_digit_pin
}
```
#### Response wire format
```json
{
"password": password_to_unlock_keycard,
"puk": 12_digit_recovery_code,
"pin": provided_pin,
}
```
The keycard MUST be initialized before it can be used with the application.
The application SHOULD provide a way to recover the keycard in case the pin is forgotten.
### 2. Get Application Info (`/get-application-info`)
To fetch if the keycard is ready to be used by the application.
#### Request wire format
The requester MAY add a `pairing` field to filter through the generated keys
```json
{
"pairing": \<shared_secret\>/\<pairing_index\>/\<256_bit_salt\> OR null
}
```
#### Response wire format
##### If the keycard is not initialized yet
```json
{
"initialized?": false
}
```
##### If the keycard is initialized
```json
{
"free-pairing-slots": number,
"app-version": major_version.minor_version,
"secure-channel-pub-key": valid_bip32_key,,
"key-uid": unique_id_of_the_default_key,
"instance-uid": unique_instance_id,
"paired?": bool,
"has-master-key?": bool,
"initialized?" true
}
```
### 3. Pairing the Keycard to the Client device (`/pair`)
To establish a secure communication channel described [here](https://keycard.tech/docs/apdu/opensecurechannel.html), the keycard and the client device need to be paired.
#### Request wire format
```json
{
"password": password_to_unlock_keycard
}
```
#### Response wire format
```json
"\<shared_secret\>/\<pairing_index\>/\<256_bit_salt\>"
```
### 4. Generate a new set of keys (`/generate-and-load-keys`)
To generate a new set of keys and load them onto the keycard.
#### Request wire format
```json
{
"mnemonic": 12_word_mnemonic,
"pairing": \<shared_secret\>/\<pairing_index\>/\<256_bit_salt\>,
"pin": 6_digit_pin
}
```
#### Response wire format
```json
{
"whisper-address": 20_byte_whisper_compatible_address,
"whisper-private-key": whisper_private_key,
"wallet-root-public-key": 256_bit_wallet_root_public_key,
"encryption-public-key": 256_bit_encryption_public_key,,
"wallet-root-address": 20_byte_wallet_root_address,
"whisper-public-key": 256_bit_whisper_public_key,
"address": 20_byte_address,
"wallet-address": 20_byte_wallet_address,,
"key-uid": 64_byte_unique_key_id,
"wallet-public-key": 256_bit_wallet_public_key,
"public-key": 256_bit_public_key,
"instance-uid": 32_byte_unique_instance_id,
}
```
### 5. Get a set of generated keys (`/get-keys`)
To fetch the keys that are currently loaded on the keycard.
#### Request wire format
```json
{
"pairing": \<shared_secret\>/\<pairing_index\>/\<256_bit_salt\>,
"pin": 6_digit_pin
}
```
#### Response wire format
```json
{
"whisper-address": 20_byte_whisper_compatible_address,
"whisper-private-key": whisper_private_key,
"wallet-root-public-key": 256_bit_wallet_root_public_key,
"encryption-public-key": 256_bit_encryption_public_key,
"wallet-root-address": 20_byte_wallet_root_address,
"whisper-public-key": 256_bit_whisper_public_key,
"address": 20_byte_address,
"wallet-address": 20_byte_wallet_address,
"key-uid": 64_byte_unique_key_id,
"wallet-public-key": 256_bit_wallet_public_key,
"public-key": 256_bit_public_key,
"instance-uid": 32_byte_unique_instance_id,
}
```
### 6. Sign a transaction (`/sign`)
To sign a transaction using the keycard, passing in the pairing information and the transaction to be signed.
#### Request wire format
```json
{
"hash": 64_byte_hash_of_the_transaction,
"pairing": \<shared_secret\>/\<pairing_index\>/\<256_bit_salt\>,
"pin": 6_digit_pin,
"path": bip32_path_to_the_key
}
```
#### Response wire format
```json
\<256_bit_signature\>
```
### 7. Export a key (`/export-key`)
To export a key from the keycard, passing in the pairing information and the path to the key to be exported.
#### Request wire format
```json
{
"pairing": \<shared_secret\>/\<pairing_index\>/\<256_bit_salt\>,
"pin": 6_digit_pin,
"path": bip32_path_to_the_key
}
```
#### Response wire format
```json
\<256_bit_public_key\>
```
### 8. Verify a pin (`/verify-pin`)
To verify the pin of the keycard.
#### Request wire format
```json
{
"pin": 6_digit_pin
}
```
#### Response wire format
```json
1_digit_status_code
```
Status code reference:
- 3: PIN is valid
\<!--TODO: what are the other status codes?--\>
### 9. Change the pin (`/change-pin`)
To change the pin of the keycard.
#### Request wire format
```json
{
"new-pin": 6_digit_new_pin,
"current-pin": 6_digit_new_pin,
"pairing": \<shared_secret\>/\<pairing_index\>/\<256_bit_salt\>
}
```
#### Response wire format
##### If the operation was successful
```json
true
```
##### If the operation was unsuccessful
```json
false
```
### 10. Unblock the keycard (`/unblock-pin`)
If the Keycard is blocked due to too many incorrect pin attempts, it can be unblocked using the PUK.
#### Request wire format
```json
{
"puk": 12_digit_recovery_code,
"new-pin": 6_digit_new_pin,
"pairing": \<shared_secret\>/\<pairing_index\>/\<256_bit_salt\>
}
```
#### Response wire format
##### If the operation was successful
```json
true
```
##### If the operation was unsuccessful
```json
false
```
## Flows
Any application that uses the Status Keycard MAY implement the following flows according to the actions listed above.
### 1. A new user wants to use the Keycard with the application
1. The user initializes the Keycard using the `/init-keycard` endpoint.
2. The user pairs the Keycard with the client device using the `/pair` endpoint.
3. The user generates a new set of keys using the `/generate-and-load-keys` endpoint.
4. The user can now use the Keycard to sign transactions using the `/sign` endpoint.
### 2. An existing user wants to use the Keycard with the application
1. The user pairs the Keycard with the client device using the `/pair` endpoint.
2. The user can now use the Keycard to sign transactions using the `/sign` endpoint.
### 3. An existing user wants to use the Keycard with a new client device
1. The user pairs the Keycard with the new client device using the `/pair` endpoint.
2. The user can now use the Keycard to sign transactions using the `/sign` endpoint.
### 4. An existing user wishes to verify the pin of the Keycard
1. The user verifies the pin of the Keycard using the `/verify-pin` endpoint.
### 5. An existing user wishes to change the pin of the Keycard
1. The user changes the pin of the Keycard using the `/change-pin` endpoint.
### 6. An existing user wishes to unblock the Keycard
1. The user unblocks the Keycard using the `/unblock-pin` endpoint.
## Security Considerations
Inherits the security considerations of [Status Keycard](https://keycard.tech/docs/)
## Privacy Considerations
Inherits the privacy considerations of [Status Keycard](https://keycard.tech/docs/)
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
1. [BIP-32 specification](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawiki)
2. [Keycard documentation](https://keycard.tech/docs/)
3. [16/Keycard-Usage](https://specs.status.im/draft/16)

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---
title: 65/STATUS-ACCOUNT-ADDRESS
name: Status Account Address
status: draft
category: Standards Track
description: Details of what a Status account address is and how account addresses are created and used.
editor: Aaryamann Challani \<aaryamann@status.im\>
contributors:
- Corey Petty \<corey@status.im\>
- Oskar Thorén \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\>
- Samuel Hawksby-Robinson \<samuel@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
## Abstract
This specification details what a Status account address is and how account addresses are created and used.
## Background
The core concept of an account in Status is a set of cryptographic keypairs. Namely, the combination of the following:
1. a Waku chat identity keypair
1. a set of cryptocurrency wallet keypairs
The Status node verifies or derives everything else associated with the contact from the above items, including:
- Ethereum address (future verification, currently the same base keypair)
- identicon
- message signatures
## Initial Key Generation
### Public/Private Keypairs
- An ECDSA (secp256k1 curve) public/private keypair MUST be generated via a [BIP43](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0043.mediawiki) derived path from a [BIP39](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0039.mediawiki) mnemonic seed phrase.
- The default paths are defined as such:
- Waku Chat Key (`IK`): `m/43'/60'/1581'/0'/0` (post Multiaccount integration)
- following [EIP1581](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-1581.md)
- Status Wallet paths: `m/44'/60'/0'/0/i` starting at `i=0`
- following [BIP44](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0044.mediawiki)
- NOTE: this (`i=0`) is also the current (and only) path for Waku key before Multiaccount integration
## Account Broadcasting
- A user is responsible for broadcasting certain information publicly so that others may contact them.
### X3DH Prekey bundles
- Refer to [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) for details on the X3DH prekey bundle broadcasting, as well as regeneration.
## Optional Account additions
### ENS Username
- A user MAY register a public username on the Ethereum Name System (ENS). This username is a user-chosen subdomain of the `stateofus.eth` ENS registration that maps to their Waku identity key (`IK`).
### User Profile Picture
- An account MAY edit the `IK` generated identicon with a chosen picture. This picture will become part of the publicly broadcasted profile of the account.
\<!-- TODO: Elaborate on wallet account and multiaccount --\>
## Wire Format
Below is the wire format for the account information that is broadcasted publicly.
An Account is referred to as a Multiaccount in the wire format.
```proto
message MultiAccount {
string name = 1; // name of the account
int64 timestamp = 2; // timestamp of the message
string identicon = 3; // base64 encoded identicon
repeated ColorHash color_hash = 4; // color hash of the identicon
int64 color_id = 5; // color id of the identicon
string keycard_pairing = 6; // keycard pairing code
string key_uid = 7; // unique identifier of the account
repeated IdentityImage images = 8; // images associated with the account
string customization_color = 9; // color of the identicon
uint64 customization_color_clock = 10; // clock of the identicon color, to track updates
message ColorHash {
repeated int64 index = 1;
}
message IdentityImage {
string key_uid = 1; // unique identifier of the image
string name = 2; // name of the image
bytes payload = 3; // payload of the image
int64 width = 4; // width of the image
int64 height = 5; // height of the image
int64 filesize = 6; // filesize of the image
int64 resize_target = 7; // resize target of the image
uint64 clock = 8; // clock of the image, to track updates
}
}
```
The above payload is broadcasted when 2 devices that belong to a user need to be paired.
## Security Considerations
- This specification inherits security considerations of [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) and [54/WAKU2-X3DH-SESSIONS](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md).
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
### normative
- [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md)
- [54/WAKU2-X3DH-SESSIONS](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md)
- [55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](../55/1to1-chat.md)
## informative
- [BIP43](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0043.mediawiki)
- [BIP39](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0039.mediawiki)
- [EIP1581](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-1581.md)
- [BIP44](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0044.mediawiki)
- [Ethereum Name System](https://ens.domains/)
- [Status Multiaccount](../63/account-address.md)

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---
title: 71/STATUS-PUSH-NOTIFICATION-SERVER
name: Push Notification Server
status: draft
category: Standards Track
description: A set of methods to allow Status clients to use push notification services in mobile environments.
editor: Jimmy Debe \<jimmy@status.im\>
contributors:
- Andrea Maria Piana \<andreap@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
## Abstract
A push notification server implementation for IOS devices and Android devices.
This specification provides a set of methods that allow clients to use push notification services in mobile environments.
## Background
Push notification for iOS and Android devices can only be implemented by relying on
[APN](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/NetworkingInternet/Conceptual/RemoteNotificationsPG/APNSOverview.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40008194-CH8-SW1),
Apple Push Notification, service for iOS or
[Firebase](https://firebase.google.com/) for Android.
For some Android devices, foreground services are restricted, requiring a user to grant authorization to applications to use foreground notifications.
Apple iOS devices restrict notifications to a few internal functions that every application can not use.
Applications on iOS can request execution time when they are in the background. This has a limited set of use cases for example,
it will not schedule any time if the application was closed with force quit.
Requesting execution time is not responsive enough to implement a push notification system.
Status provides a set of methods to acheive push notification services.
Since this can not be safely implemented in a privacy-preserving manner, clients need to be given an option to opt-in to receive and send push notifications.
They are disabled by default.
## Specification
The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [2119](https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt).
### Definitions
| Terminology | Description |
| --------------- | --------- |
| client | A node that implements the Status specifications. |
| user | The owner of a device that runs a client. |
| server | A service that performs push notifications. |
| Waku-Store | A Waku node that decides to provide functionality to store messages permanently and deliver the messages to requesting clients. As described in [13/WAKU-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md) specification.|
### Server Components
| Components | Description |
| --------------- | --------- |
| gorush Instance | Only used by push notification servers and MUST be publicly available.|
| Push Notification Server | Used by clients to register for receiving and sending notifications. |
| Registering Client | A client that wants to receive push notifications. |
| Sending Client | A client that wants to send push notifications. |
### Requirements:
The party releasing the app MUST possess a certificate for the Apple Push Notification service and it MUST run a
[gorush](https://github.com/appleboy/gorush) publicly accessible server for sending the actual notification.
The party releasing the app MUST run its own [gorush](https://github.com/appleboy/gorush).
### Push Notification Server Flow
#### Registration Process:
![registration](./images/registration.png)
#### Sending and Receiving Notification Process:
![notification](./images/notification.png)
### Registering Client
Registering a client with a push notification service.
- A client MAY register with one or more push notification services in order to increase availability.
- A client SHOULD make sure that all the notification services they registered with have the same information about their tokens.
- A `PNR message` (Push Notification Registration) MUST be sent to the
[partitioned topic](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md) for the public key of the node, encrypted with this key.
- The message MUST be wrapped in a [`ApplicationMetadataMessage`](../62/payloads.md) with type set to `PUSH_NOTIFICATION_REGISTRATION`.
- The marshaled protobuf payload MUST also be encrypted with AES-GCM using the Diffie–Hellman key generated from the client and server identity.
This is done in order to ensure that the extracted key from the signature will be considered invalid if it can’t decrypt the payload.
The content of the message MUST contain the following [protobuf record](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/):
```protobuf
message PushNotificationRegistration {
enum TokenType {
UNKNOWN_TOKEN_TYPE = 0;
APN_TOKEN = 1;
FIREBASE_TOKEN = 2;
}
TokenType token_type = 1;
string device_token = 2;
string installation_id = 3;
string access_token = 4;
bool enabled = 5;
uint64 version = 6;
repeated bytes allowed_key_list = 7;
repeated bytes blocked_chat_list = 8;
bool unregister = 9;
bytes grant = 10;
bool allow_from_contacts_only = 11;
string apn_topic = 12;
bool block_mentions = 13;
repeated bytes allowed_mentions_chat_list = 14;
}
```
A push notification server will handle the message according to the following rules:
- it MUST extract the public key of the sender from the signature and verify that the payload can be decrypted successfully.
- it MUST verify that `token_type` is supported.
- it MUST verify that `device_token` is non empty.
- it MUST verify that `installation_id` is non empty.
- it MUST verify that `version` is non-zero and greater than the currently stored version for the public key and `installation_id` of the sender, if any.
- it MUST verify that `grant` is non empty and according to the Grant Server specs.
- it MUST verify that `access_token` is a valid uuid.
- it MUST verify that `apn_topic` is set if token_type is APN_TOKEN.
- The message MUST be wrapped in a [`ApplicationMetadataMessage`](../62/payloads.md) with type set to `PUSH_NOTIFICATION_REGISTRATION_RESPONSE`.
The payload of the response is:
```protobuf
message PushNotificationRegistrationResponse {
bool success = 1;
ErrorType error = 2;
bytes request_id = 3;
enum ErrorType {
UNKNOWN_ERROR_TYPE = 0;
MALFORMED_MESSAGE = 1;
VERSION_MISMATCH = 2;
UNSUPPORTED_TOKEN_TYPE = 3;
INTERNAL_ERROR = 4;
}
}
```
A client SHOULD listen for a response sent on the [partitioned topic](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md) that the key used to register.
If success is true the client has registered successfully.
If `success` is `false`:
\> If `MALFORMED_MESSAGE` is returned, the request SHOULD NOT be retried without ensuring that it is correctly formed.
\> If `INTERNAL_ERROR` is returned, the request MAY be retried, but the client MUST backoff exponentially.
#### Handle Errors:
- If the message can’t be decrypted, the message MUST be discarded.
- If `token_type` is not supported, a response MUST be sent with `error` set to `UNSUPPORTED_TOKEN_TYPE`.
- If `token`, `installation_id`, `device_tokens`, `version` are empty, a response MUST be sent with `error` set to `MALFORMED_MESSAGE`.
- If the `version` is equal or less than the currently stored `version`, a response MUST be sent with `error` set to `VERSION_MISMATCH`.
- If any other error occurs the `error` SHOULD be set to `INTERNAL_ERROR`.
- If the response is successful `success` MUST be set to `true` otherwise a response MUST be sent with `success` set to `false`.
- `request_id` SHOULD be set to the [`SHAKE-256`](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/fips/nist.fips.202.pdf) of the encrypted payload.
- The response MUST be sent on the [partitioned topic](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md) of the sender and
MUST not be encrypted using the secure transport to facilitate the usage of ephemeral keys.
- If no response is returned, the request SHOULD be considered failed and
MAY be retried with the same server or a different one, but clients
MUST exponentially backoff after each trial.
## Push Notification Server
A node that handles receiving and sending push notifications for clients.
### Query Topic:
On successful registration the server MUST be listening to the topic derived from:
\> `0x` + HexEncode(Shake256(CompressedClientPublicKey))
Using the topic derivation algorithm described here and listen for client queries.
#### Server Grant:
A client MUST authorize a push notification server to send them push notifications.
This is done by building a grant which is specific to a given client-server pair.
When receiving a grant, the server MUST validate that the signature matches the registering client.
The grant is built as:\<br /\>
`Signature(Keccak256(CompressedPublicKeyOfClient . CompressedPublicKeyOfServer . AccessToken), PrivateKeyOfClient)`
#### Unregistering with a Server:
- To unregister a client MUST send a `PushNotificationRegistration` request as described above with `unregister` set
to `true`, or removing their device information.
- The server MUST remove all data about this user if `unregistering` is `true`, apart from the `hash` of the public key and
the `version` of the last options, in order to make sure that old messages are not processed.
- A client MAY unregister from a server on explicit logout if multiple chat keys are used on a single device.
#### Re-registering with a Server:
- A client SHOULD re-register with the node if the APN or FIREBASE token changes.
- When re-registering a client SHOULD ensure that it has the most up-to-date `PushNotificationRegistration` and
increment `version` if necessary.
- Once re-registered, a client SHOULD advertise the changes.
Changing options is handled the same as re-registering.
#### Advertising a Server:
Each user registered with one or more push notification servers
SHOULD advertise periodically the push notification services they have registered with for each device they own.
```protobuf
message PushNotificationQueryInfo {
string access_token = 1;
string installation_id = 2;
bytes public_key = 3;
repeated bytes allowed_user_list = 4;
bytes grant = 5;
uint64 version = 6;
bytes server_public_key = 7;
}
message ContactCodeAdvertisement {
repeated PushNotificationQueryInfo push_notification_info = 1;
}
```
#### Handle Advertisement Message:
- The message MUST be wrapped in a [`ApplicationMetadataMessage`](../62/payloads.md) with type set to `PUSH_NOTIFICATION_QUERY_INFO`.
- If no filtering is done based on public keys, the access token SHOULD be included in the advertisement.
Otherwise it SHOULD be left empty.
- This SHOULD be advertised on the [contact code topic](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) and
SHOULD be coupled with normal contact-code advertisement.
- When a user register or re-register with a push notification service, their contact-code SHOULD be re-advertised.
- Multiple servers MAY be advertised for the same installation_id for redundancy reasons.
#### Discovering a Server:
To discover a push notification service for a given user, their 
[contact code topic](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) SHOULD be listened to.
A Waku-Store node can be queried for the specific topic to retrieve the most up-to-date contact code.
#### Querying a Server:
If a token is not present in the latest advertisement for a user, the server SHOULD be queried directly.
To query a server a message:
```protobuf
message PushNotificationQuery {
repeated bytes public_keys = 1;
}
```
#### Handle Query Message:
- The message MUST be wrapped in a [`ApplicationMetadataMessage`](../62/payloads.md) with type set to `PUSH_NOTIFICATION_QUERY`.
- it MUST be sent to the server on the topic derived from the hashed public key of the key we are querying,
[as described above](#query-topic).
- An ephemeral key SHOULD be used and SHOULD NOT be encrypted using the [secure transport](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md).
If the server has information about the client a response MUST be sent:
```protobuf
message PushNotificationQueryInfo {
string access_token = 1;
string installation_id = 2;
bytes public_key = 3;
repeated bytes allowed_user_list = 4;
bytes grant = 5;
uint64 version = 6;
bytes server_public_key = 7;
}
message PushNotificationQueryResponse {
repeated PushNotificationQueryInfo info = 1;
bytes message_id = 2;
bool success = 3;
}
```
#### Handle Query Response:
- A `PushNotificationQueryResponse` message MUST be wrapped in a
[`ApplicationMetadataMessage`](../62/payloads.md) with type set to `PUSH_NOTIFICATION_QUERY_RESPONSE`.
Otherwise a response MUST NOT be sent.
- If `allowed_key_list` is not set `access_token` MUST be set and `allowed_key_list` MUST NOT be set.
- If `allowed_key_list` is set `allowed_key_list` MUST be set and `access_token` MUST NOT be set.
- If `access_token` is returned, the `access_token` SHOULD be used to send push notifications.
- If `allowed_key_list` are returned, the client SHOULD decrypt each token by generating an `AES-GCM` symmetric key from the Diffie–Hellman between the target client and itself.
If AES decryption succeeds it will return a valid `uuid` which is what is used for access_token.
The token SHOULD be used to send push notifications.
- The response MUST be sent on the [partitioned topic](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md) of the sender and
MUST NOT be encrypted using the [secure transport](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) to facilitate the usage of ephemeral keys.
- On receiving a response a client MUST verify `grant` to ensure that the server has been authorized to send push notification to a given client.
### Sending Client
Sending a push notification
- When sending a push notification, only the `installation_id` for the devices targeted by the message SHOULD be used.
- If a message is for all the user devices, all the `installation_id` known to the client MAY be used.
- The number of devices MAY be capped in order to reduce resource consumption.
- At least 3 devices SHOULD be targeted, ordered by last activity.
- For any device that a token is available, or that
a token is successfully queried,
a push notification message SHOULD be sent to the corresponding push notification server.
```protobuf
message PushNotification {
string access_token = 1;
string chat_id = 2;
bytes public_key = 3;
string installation_id = 4;
bytes message = 5;
PushNotificationType type = 6;
enum PushNotificationType {
UNKNOWN_PUSH_NOTIFICATION_TYPE = 0;
MESSAGE = 1;
MENTION = 2;
}
bytes author = 7;
}
message PushNotificationRequest {
repeated PushNotification requests = 1;
bytes message_id = 2;
}
```
#### Handle Notification Request:
- A `PushNotificationRequest` message MUST be wrapped in a
[`ApplicationMetadataMessage`](../62/payloads.md) with type set to `PUSH_NOTIFICATION_REQUEST`.
- Where `message` is the encrypted payload of the message and `chat_id` is the `SHAKE-256` of the `chat_id`.
`message_id` is the id of the message `author` is the `SHAKE-256` of the public key of the sender.
- If multiple server are available for a given push notification, only one notification MUST be sent.
- If no response is received a client SHOULD wait at least 3 seconds,
after which the request MAY be retried against a different server.
- This message SHOULD be sent using an ephemeral key.
On receiving the message, the push notification server MUST validate the access token.
If the access token is valid, a notification MUST be sent to the
[gorush](https://github.com/appleboy/gorush) instance with the following data:
```yaml
{
"notifications": [
{
"tokens": ["token_a", "token_b"],
"platform": 1,
"message": "You have a new message",
"data": {
"chat_id": chat_id,
"message": message,
"installation_ids": [installation_id_1, installation_id_2]
}
}
]
}
```
Where platform is 1 for iOS and 2 for Firebase, according to the [gorush documentation](https://github.com/appleboy/gorush).
A server MUST return a response message:
```protobuf
message PushNotificationReport {
bool success = 1;
ErrorType error = 2;
enum ErrorType {
UNKNOWN_ERROR_TYPE = 0;
WRONG_TOKEN = 1;
INTERNAL_ERROR = 2;
NOT_REGISTERED = 3;
}
bytes public_key = 3;
string installation_id = 4;
}
```
```protobuf
message PushNotificationResponse {
bytes message_id = 1;
repeated PushNotificationReport reports = 2;
}
```
Where `message_id` is the `message_id` sent by the client.
#### Handle Notification Response:
- A `PushNotificationResponse` message MUST be wrapped in a [`ApplicationMetadataMessage`](../62/payloads.md) with type set to `PUSH_NOTIFICATION_RESPONSE`.
- The response MUST be sent on the [partitioned topic](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md) of the sender and
MUST not be encrypted using the [secure transport](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) to facilitate the usage of ephemeral keys.
- If the request is accepted `success` MUST be set to `true`. Otherwise `success` MUST be set to `false`.
- If `error` is `BAD_TOKEN` the client MAY query again the server for the token and retry the request.
- If `error` is `INTERNAL_ERROR` the client MAY retry the request.
### Protobuf Description
#### PushNotificationRegistration:
`token_type`: the type of token. Currently supported is `APN_TOKEN` for Apple Push.\<br /\>
`device_token`: the actual push notification token sent by `Firebase` or `APN` and `FIREBASE_TOKEN` for firebase.\<br /\>
`installation_id`: the `installation_id` of the device.\<br /\>
`access_token`: the access token that will be given to clients to send push notifications.\<br /\>
`enabled`: whether the device wants to be sent push notifications.\<br /\>
`version`: a monotonically increasing number identifying the current `PushNotificationRegistration`.
Any time anything is changed in the record it MUST be increased by the client, otherwise the request will not be accepted.\<br /\>
`allowed_key_list`: a list of `access_token` encrypted with the AES key generated by Diffie–Hellman between the publisher and the
allowed contact.\<br /\>
`blocked_chat_list`: a list of `SHA2-256` hashes of chat ids. Any chat id in this list will not trigger a notification.\<br /\>
`unregister`: whether the account should be unregistered.\<br /\>
`grant`: the grant for this specific server.\<br /\>
`allow_from_contacts_only`: whether the client only wants push notifications from contacts.\<br /\>
`apn_topic`: the APN topic for the push notification.\<br /\>
`block_mentions`: whether the client does not want to be notified on mentions.\<br /\>
`allowed_mentions_chat_list`: a list of SHA2-256 hashes of chat ids where we want to receive mentions.\<br /\>
DATA DISCLOSED
- Type of device owned by a given user.
- The `FIREBASE` or `APN` push notification token,
- Hash of the `chat_id` a user is not interested in for notifications,
- The number of times a push notification record has been modified by the user,
- The number of contacts a client has, in case `allowed_key_list` is set.
#### PushNotificationRegistrationResponse:
`success`: whether the registration was successful\<br /\>
`error`: the error type, if any\<br /\>
`request_id`: the `SHAKE-256` hash of the `signature` of the request\<br /\>
`preferences`: the server stored preferences in case of an error\<br /\>
#### ContactCodeAdvertisement:
`push_notification_info`: the information for each device advertised
DATA DISCLOSED
- The chat key of the sender
#### PushNotificationQuery:
`public_keys`: the `SHAKE-256` of the public keys the client is interested in
DATA DISCLOSED
- The hash of the public keys the client is interested in
#### PushNotificationQueryInfo:
`access_token`: the access token used to send a push notification\<br /\>
`installation_id`: the `installation_id` of the device associated with the `access_token`\<br /\>
`public_key`: the `SHAKE-256` of the public key associated with this `access_token` and `installation_id`.\<br /\>
`allowed_key_list`: a list of encrypted access tokens to be returned to the client in case there’s any filtering on public keys in place.\<br /\>
`grant`: the grant used to register with this server.\<br /\>
`version`: the version of the registration on the server.\<br /\>
`server_public_key`: the compressed public key of the server.\<br /\>
#### PushNotificationQueryResponse:
`info`: a list of `PushNotificationQueryInfo`.\<br /\>
`message_id`: the message id of the `PushNotificationQueryInfo` the server is replying to.\<br /\>
`success`: whether the query was successful.\<br /\>
#### PushNotification:
`access_token`: the access token used to send a push notification.\<br /\>
`chat_id`: the `SHAKE-256` of the `chat_id`.\<br /\>
`public_key`: the `SHAKE-256` of the compressed public key of the receiving client.\<br /\>
`installation_id`: the `installation_id` of the receiving client.\<br /\>
`message`: the encrypted message that is being notified on.\<br /\>
`type`: the type of the push notification, either `MESSAGE` or `MENTION`\<br /\>
`author`: the `SHAKE-256` of the public key of the sender
Data disclosed
- The `SHAKE-256` hash of the `chat_id` the notification is to be sent for
- The cypher text of the message
- The `SHAKE-256` hash of the public key of the sender
- The type of notification
#### PushNotificationRequest:
`requests`: a list of PushNotification\<br /\>
`message_id`: the [Status message id](../62/payloads.md)
Data disclosed
- The status `message_id` for which the notification is for
#### PushNotificationResponse:
`message_id`: the `message_id` being notified on.\<br /\>
`reports`: a list of `PushNotificationReport`
#### PushNotificationReport:
`success`: whether the push notification was successful.\<br /\>
`error`: the type of the error in case of failure.\<br /\>
`public_key`: the public key of the user being notified.\<br /\>
`installation_id`: the `installation_id` of the user being notified.
### Anonymous Mode
In order to preserve privacy, the client MAY provide anonymous mode of operations to propagate information about the user.
A client in anonymous mode can register with the server using a key that is different from their chat key.
This will hide their real chat key. This public key is effectively a secret and
SHOULD only be disclosed to clients approved to notify a user.
- A client MAY advertise the access token on the [contact-code topic](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) of the key generated.
- A client MAY share their public key contact updates in the [protobuf record](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/).
- A client receiving a push notification public key SHOULD listen to the contact code topic of the push notification public key for updates.
The method described above effectively does not share the identity of the sender nor the receiver to the server, but
MAY result in missing push notifications as the propagation of the secret is left to the client.
This can be mitigated by [device syncing](../62/payloads.md), but not completely addressed.
## Security/Privacy Considerations
If anonymous mode is not used, when registering with a push notification service a client will disclose:
- The devices that will receive notifications.
- The chat key.
A client MAY disclose:
- The hash of the `chat_id` they want to filter out.
When running in anonymous mode, the client’s chat key is not disclosed.
When querying a push notification server a client will disclose:
- That it is interested in sending push notification to another client, but
querying client’s chat key is not disclosed.
When sending a push notification a client will disclose:
- The `shake-256` of the `chat_id`.
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
1. [PUSH-NOTIFICATION-SERVER, Initial Specification](https://github.com/status-im/specs/blob/master/docs/raw/push-notification-server.md)
2. [Push Notification, Apple Developer](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/NetworkingInternet/Conceptual/RemoteNotificationsPG/APNSOverview.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40008194-CH8-SW1)
3. [Firebase](https://firebase.google.com)
4. [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md)
5. [gorush](https://github.com/appleboy/gorush)
6. [54/WAKU2-X3DH-SESSIONS](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md)
7. [62/PAYLOAD](../62/payloads.md)
8. [SHAKE-256](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/fips/nist.fips.202.pdf)
9. [Protocol Buffers](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers)
10. [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md)

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# Status RFCs
Status is a communitication tool providing privacy features for the user.
Specifcations can also be viewd at [Status](https://status.app/specs).

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---
title: 57/STATUS-Simple-Scaling
name: Status Simple Scaling
status: raw
category: Informational
description: Describes how to scale Status Communities and Status 1-to-1 chats using Waku v2 protocol and components.
editor: Daniel Kaiser \<danielkaiser@status.im\>
contributors:
- Alvaro Revuelta \<alrevuelta@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
## Abstract
This document describes how to scale [56/STATUS-COMMUNITIES](../56/communities.md) as well as [55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](../55/1to1-chat.md)
using Waku v2 protocol and components.
It also adds a few new aspects, where more sophisticated components are not yet researched and evaluated.
\> *Note:* (Parts of) this RFC will be deprecated in the future as we continue research to scale specific components
in a way that aligns better with our principles of decentralization and protecting anonymity.
This document informs about scaling at the current stage of research and shows it is practically possible.
Practical feasibility is also a core goal for us.
We believe in incremental improvement, i.e. having a working decentralized scaling solution with trade-offs is better than a fully centralized solution.
## Background and Motivation
[56/STATUS-COMMUNITIES](../56/communities.md) as well as [55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](../55/1to1-chat.md) use Waku v2 protocols.
Both use Waku content topics (see [23/WAKU2-TOPICS](../../waku/informational/23/topics.md)) for content based filtering.
Waku v2 currently has scaling limitations in two dimensions:
1) Messages that are part of a specific content topic have to be disseminated in a single mesh network (i.e. pubsub topic).
This limits scaling the number of messages disseminated in a specific content topic,
and by extension, the number of active nodes that are part of this content topic.
2) Scaling a large set of content topics requires distributing these over several mesh networks (which this document refers to as pubsub topic shards).
This document focuses on the second scaling dimension.
With the scaling solutions discussed in this document,
each content topics can have a large set of active users, but still has to fit in a single pubsub mesh.
\> *Note:* While it is possible to use the same content topic name on several shards,
each node that is interested in this content topic has to be subscribed to all respective shards, which does not scale.
Splitting content topics in a more sophisticated and efficient way will be part of a future document.
## Relay Shards
Sharding the [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../waku/standards/core/11/relay.md) network is an integral part of scaling the Status app.
[51/WAKU2-RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/relay-sharding.md) specifies shards clusters, which are sets of `1024` shards (separate pubsub mesh networks).
Content topics specified by application protocols can be distributed over these shards.
The Status app protocols are assigned to shard cluster `16`,
as defined in [WAKU2-RELAY-STATIC-SHARD-ALLOC](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/informational/relay-static-shard-alloc.md).
[WAKU2-RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/relay-sharding.md) specifies three sharding methods.
This document uses *static sharding*, which leaves the distribution of content topics to application protocols,
but takes care of shard discovery.
The 1024 shards within the main Status shard cluster are allocated as follows.
### Shard Allocation
| shard index | usage |
| --- | --- |
| 0 - 15 | reserved |
| 16 - 127 | specific (large) communities |
| 128 - 767 | communities |
| 768 - 895 | 1:1 chat |
| 896 - 1023 | media and control msgs |
Shard indices are mapped to pubsub topic names as follows (specified in [WAKU2-RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/relay-sharding.md)).
`/waku/2/rs/\<cluster_id\>/\<shard_number\>`
an example for the shard with index `18` in the Status shard cluster:
`/waku/2/rs/16/18`
In other words, the mesh network with the pubsub topic name `/waku/2/rs/16/18` carries messages associated with shard `18` in the Status shard cluster.
#### Implementation Suggestion
The Waku implementation should offer an interface that allows Status nodes to subscribe to Status specific content topics like
```
subscribe("/status/xyz", 16, 18)
```
The shard cluster index `16` can be kept in the Status app configuration,
so that Status nodes can simply use
```
subscribe("/status/xyz", 18)
```
which means: connect to the `"status/xyz"` content topic on shard `18` within the Status shard cluster.
### Status Communities
In order to associate a community with a shard,
the community description protobuf is extended by the field
`uint16 relay_shard_index = 15`:
```protobuf
syntax = "proto3";
message CommunityDescription {
// The Lamport timestamp of the message
uint64 clock = 1;
// A mapping of members in the community to their roles
map\<string,CommunityMember\> members = 2;
// The permissions of the Community
CommunityPermissions permissions = 3;
// The metadata of the Community
ChatIdentity identity = 5;
// A mapping of chats to their details
map\<string,CommunityChat\> chats = 6;
// A list of banned members
repeated string ban_list = 7;
// A mapping of categories to their details
map\<string,CommunityCategory\> categories = 8;
// The admin settings of the Community
CommunityAdminSettings admin_settings = 10;
// If the community is encrypted
bool encrypted = 13;
// The list of tags
repeated string tags = 14;
// index of the community's shard within the Status shard cluster
uint16 relay_shard_index = 15
}
```
\> *Note*: Currently, Status app has allocated shared cluster `16` in [52/WAKU2-RELAY-STATIC-SHARD-ALLOC](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/informational/relay-static-shard-alloc.md).
Status app could allocate more shard clusters, for instance to establish a test net.
We could add the shard cluster index to the community description as well.
The recommendation for now is to keep it as a configuration option of the Status app.
\> *Note*: Once this RFC moves forward, the new community description protobuf fields should be mentioned in [56/STATUS-COMMUNITIES](../56/communities.md).
Status communities can be mapped to shards in two ways: static, and owner-based.
#### Static Mapping
With static mapping, communities are assigned a specific shard index within the Status shard cluster.
This mapping is similar in nature to the shard cluster allocation in [WAKU2-RELAY-STATIC-SHARD-ALLOC](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/informational/relay-static-shard-alloc.md).
Shard indices allocated in that way are in the range `16 - 127`.
The Status CC community uses index `16` (not to confuse with shard cluster index `16`, which is the Status shard cluster).
#### Owner Mapping
\> *Note*: This way of mapping will be specified post-MVP.
Community owners can choose to map their communities to any shard within the index range `128 - 767`.
### 1:1 Chat
[55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](../55/1to1-chat.md) uses partitioned topics to map 1:1 chats to a set of 5000 content topics.
This document extends this mapping to 8192 content topics that are, in turn, mapped to 128 shards in the index range of `768 - 895`.
```
contentPartitionsNum = 8192
contentPartition = mod(publicKey, contentPartitionsNum)
partitionContentTopic = "contact-discovery-" + contentPartition
partitionContentTopic = keccak256(partitionContentTopic)
shardNum = 128
shardIndex = 768 + mod(publicKey, shardNum)
```
## Infrastructure Nodes
As described in [30/ADAPTIVE-NODES](../../waku/informational/30/adaptive-nodes.md),
Waku supports a continuum of node types with respect to available resources.
Infrastructure nodes are powerful nodes that have a high bandwidth connection and a high up-time.
This document, which informs about simple ways of scaling Status over Waku,
assumes the presence of a set of such infrastructure nodes in each shard.
Infrastructure nodes are especially important for providing connectivity in the roll-out phase.
Infrastructure nodes are not limited to Status fleets, or nodes run by community owners.
Anybody can run infrastructure nodes.
### Statically-Mapped Communities
Infrastructure nodes are provided by the community owner, or by members of the respective community.
### Owner-Mapped Communities
Infrastructure nodes are part of a subset of the shards in the range `128 - 767`.
Recommendations on choosing this subset will be added in a future version of this document.
Status fleet nodes make up a part of these infrastructure nodes.
### 1:1 chat
Infrastructure nodes are part of a subset of the shards in the range `768 - 985` (similar to owner-mapped communities).
Recommendations on choosing this subset will be added in a future version of this document.
Desktop clients can choose to only use filter and lightpush.
\> *Note*: Discussion: I'd suggest to set this as the default for the MVP.
The load on infrastructure nodes would not be higher, because they have to receive and relay each message anyways.
This comes as a trade-off to anonymity and decentralization,
but can significantly improve scaling.
We still have k-anonymity because several chat pairs are mapped into one content topic.
We could improve on this in the future, and research the applicability of PIR (private information retrieval) techniques in the future.
## Infrastructure Shards
Waku messages are typically relayed in larger mesh networks comprised of nodes with varying resource profiles (see [30/ADAPTIVE-NODES](../../waku/informational/30/adaptive-nodes.md).
To maximise scaling, relaying of specific message types can be dedicated to shards where only infrastructure nodes with very strong resource profiles relay messages.
This comes as a trade-off to decentralization.
## Control Message Shards
To get the maximum scaling for select large communities for the Status scaling MVP,
specific control messages that cause significant load (at a high user number) SHOULD be moved to a separate control message shard.
These control messages comprise:
* community description
* membership update
* backup
* community request to join response
* sync profile picture
The relay functionality of control messages shards SHOULD be provided by infrastructure nodes.
Desktop clients should use light protocols as the default for control message shards.
Strong Desktop clients MAY opt in to support the relay network.
Each large community (in the index range of `16 - 127`) can get its dedicated control message shard (in the index range `896 - 1023`) if deemed necessary.
The Status CC community uses shard `896` as its control message shard.
This comes with trade-offs to decentralization and anonymity (see *Security Considerations* section).
## Media Shards
Similar to control messages, media-heavy communities should use separate media shards (in the index range `896 - 1023`) for disseminating messages with large media data.
The Status CC community uses shard `897` as its media shard.
## Infrastructure-focused Community
Large communities MAY choose to mainly rely on infrastructure nodes for *all* message transfers (not limited to control, and media messages).
Desktop clients of such communities should use light protocols as the default.
Strong Desktop clients MAY opt in to support the relay network.
\> *Note*: This is not planned for the MVP.
## Light Protocols
Light protocols may be used to save bandwidth,
at the (global) cost of not contributing to the network.
Using light protocols is RECOMMENDED for resource restricted nodes,
e.g. browsers,
and devices that (temporarily) have a low bandwidth connection or a connection with usage-based billing.
Light protocols comprise
* [19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH](../../waku/standards/core/19/lightpush.md) for sending messages
* [12/WAKU2-FILTER](../../waku/standards/core/12/filter.md) for requesting messages with specific attributes
* [WAKU2-PEER-EXCHANGE](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/peer-exchange/peer-exchange.md) for discovering peers
## Waku Archive
Archive nodes are Waku nodes that offer the Waku archive service via the Waku store protocol ([13/WAKU2-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md)).
They are part of a set of shards and store all messages disseminated in these shards.
Nodes can request history messages via the [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md).
The store service is not limited to a Status fleet.
Anybody can run a Waku Archive node in the Status shards.
\> *Note*: There is no specification for discovering archive nodes associated with specific shards yet.
Nodes expect archive nodes to store all messages, regardless of shard association.
The recommendation for the allocation of archive nodes to shards is similar to the
allocation of infrastructure nodes to shards described above.
In fact, the archive service can be offered by infrastructure nodes.
## Discovery
Shard discovery is covered by [WAKU2-RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/relay-sharding.md).
This allows the Status app to abstract from the discovery process and simply address shards by their index.
### Libp2p Rendezvous and Circuit-Relay
To make nodes behind restrictive NATs discoverable,
this document suggests using [libp2p rendezvous](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/rendezvous/README.md).
Nodes can check whether they are behind a restrictive NAT using the [libp2p AutoNAT protocol](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/autonat/README.md).
\> *Note:* The following will move into [WAKU2-RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/relay-sharding.md), or [33/WAKU2-DISCV5](../../waku/standards/core/33/discv5.md):
Nodes behind restrictive NATs SHOULD not announce their publicly unreachable address via [33/WAKU2-DISCV5](../../waku/standards/core/33/discv5.md) discovery.
It is RECOMMENDED that nodes that are part of the relay network also act as rendezvous points.
This includes accepting register queries from peers, as well as answering rendezvous discover queries.
Nodes MAY opt-out of the rendezvous functionality.
To allow nodes to initiate connections to peers behind restrictive NATs (after discovery via rendezvous),
it is RECOMMENDED that nodes that are part of the Waku relay network also offer
[libp2p circuit relay](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/6634ca7abb2f955645243d48d1cd2fd02a8e8880/relay/circuit-v2.md) functionality.
To minimize the load on circuit-relay nodes, nodes SHOULD
1) make use of the [limiting](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/6634ca7abb2f955645243d48d1cd2fd02a8e8880/relay/circuit-v2.md#reservation)
functionality offered by the libp2p circuit relay protocols, and
2) use [DCUtR](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/relay/DCUtR.md) to upgrade to a direct connection.
Nodes that do not announce themselves at all and only plan to use light protocols,
MAY use rendezvous discovery instead of or along-side [WAKU2-PEER-EXCHANGE](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/peer-exchange/peer-exchange.md).
For these nodes, rendezvous and [WAKU2-PEER-EXCHANGE](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/peer-exchange/peer-exchange.md) offer the same functionality,
but return node sets sampled in different ways.
Using both can help increasing connectivity.
Nodes that are not behind restrictive NATs MAY register at rendezvous points, too;
this helps increasing discoverability, and by extension connectivity.
Such nodes SHOULD, however, not register at circuit relays.
### Announcing Shard Participation
Registering a namespace via [lib-p2p rendezvous](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/rendezvous/README.md#interaction)
is done via a register query:
```
REGISTER{my-app, {QmA, AddrA}}
```
The app name, `my-app` contains the encoding of a single shard in string form:
```
"rs/"| to_string(\<2-byte shard cluster index\>) | "/" | to_string(\<2-byte shard index\>)
```
The string conversion SHOULD remove leading zeros.
\> *Note:* Since the [ns](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/rendezvous/README.md#protobuf) field is of type string,
a more efficient byte encoding is not utilized.
Registering shard 2 in the Status shard cluster (with shard cluster index 16, see [WAKU2-RELAY-STATIC-SHARD-ALLOC](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/informational/relay-static-shard-alloc.md),
the register query would look like
```
REGISTER{"rs/16/2", {QmA, AddrA}}
```
Participation in further shards is registered with further queries; one register query per shard.
A discovery query for nodes that are part of this shard would look like
```
DISCOVER{ns: "rs/16/2"}
```
## DoS Protection
Hereunder we describe the "opt-in message signing for DoS prevention" solution, designed *ad hoc* for Status MVP.
Since publishing messages to pubsub topics has no limits, anyone can publish messages at a very high rate and DoS the network.
This would elevate the bandwidth consumption of all nodes subscribed to said pubsub topic, making it prohibitive (in terms of bandwidth) to be subscribed to it.
In order to scale, we need some mechanism to prevent this from happening, otherwise all scaling efforts will be in vain.
Since RLN is not ready yet, hereunder we describe a simpler approach designed *ad hoc* for Status use case, feasible to implement for the MVP and that validates some of the ideas that will evolve to solutions such as RLN.
With this approach, certain pubsub topics can be optionally configured to only accept messages signed with a given key, that only trusted entities know.
This key can be pre-shared among a set of participants, that are trusted to make fair usage of the network, publishing messages at a reasonable rate/size.
Note that this key can be shared/reused among multiple participants, and only one key is whitelisted per pubsub topic.
This is an opt-in solution that operators can choose to deploy in their shards (i.e. pubsub topics), but it's not enforced in the default one.
Operators can freely choose how they want to generate, and distribute the public keys. It's also their responsibility to handle the private key, sharing it with only trusted parties and keeping proper custody of it.
The following concepts are introduced:
* `private-key-topic`: A private key of 32 bytes, that allows the holder to sign messages and it's mapped to a `protected-pubsub-topic`.
* `app-message-hash`: Application `WakuMessage` hash, calculated as `sha256(concat(pubsubTopic, payload, contentTopic))` with all elements in bytes.
* `message-signature`: ECDSA signature of `application-message-hash` using a given `private-key-topic`, 64 bytes.
* `public-key-topic`: The equivalent public key of `private-key-topic`.
* `protected-pubsub-topic`: Pubsub topic that only accepts messages that were signed with `private-key-topic`, where `verify(message-signature, app-message-hash, public-key-topic)` is only correct if the `message-signature` was produced by `private-key-topic`. See ECDSA signature verification algorithm.
This solution introduces two roles:
* Publisher: A node that knows the `private-key-topic` associated to `public-key-topic`, that can publish messages with a valid `message-signature` that are accepted and relayed by the nodes implementing this feature.
* Relayer: A node that knows the `public-key-topic`, which can be used to verify if the messages were signed with the equivalent `private-key-topic`. It allows distinguishing valid from invalid messages which protect the node against DoS attacks, assuming that the users of the key send messages of a reasonable size and rate. Note that a node can validate messages and relay them or not without knowing the private key.
### Design requirements (publisher)
A publisher that wants to send messages that are relayed in the network for a given `protected-pubsub-topic` shall:
* be able to sign messages with the `private-key-topic` configured for that topic, producing a ECDSA signature of 64 bytes using deterministic signing complying with RFC 6979.
* include the signature of the `app-message-hash` (`message-signature`) that wishes to send in the `WakuMessage` `meta` field.
The `app-message-hash` of the message shall be calculated as the `sha256` hash of the following fields of the message:
```
sha256(concat(pubsubTopic, payload, contentTopic, timestamp, ephemeral))
```
Where fields are serialized into bytes using little-endian. Note that `ephemeral` is a boolean that is serialized to `0` if `false` and `1` if `true`.
### Design requirements (relay)
Requirements for the relay are listed below:
* A valid `protected-pubsub-topic` shall be configured with a `public-key-topic`, (derived from a `private-key-topic`). Note that the relay does not need to know the private key.
For simplicity, there is just one key per topic. Since this approach has clear privacy implications, this configuration is not part of the waku protocol, but of the application.
Requirements on the gossipsub validator:
* Relay nodes should use the existing gossipsub validators that allow to `Accept` or `Reject` messages, according to the following criteria:
* If `timestamp` is not set (equals to 0) then `Reject` the message.
* If the `timestamp` is `abs(current_timestamp-timestamp) \> MessageWindowInSec` then `Reject` the message.
* If `meta` is empty, `Reject` the message.
* If `meta` exists but its size is different than 64 bytes, `Reject` the message.
* If `meta` does not successfully verifies according to the ECDSA signature verification algorithm using `public-key-topic` and `app-message-hash`, then `Reject` the message.
* If and only if all above conditions are met then `Accept` the message.
Other requirements:
* The node shall keep metrics on the messages validation output, `Accept` or `Reject`.
* (Optional). To further strengthen DoS protection, gossipsub [scoring](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md#extended-validators) can be used to trigger disconnections from peers sending multiple invalid messages. See `P4` penalty.
This protects each peer from DoS, since this score is used to trigger disconnections from nodes attempting to DoS them.
### Required changes
This solution is designed to be backward compatible so that nodes validating messages can coexist in the same topic with other nodes that don't perform validation. But note that only nodes that perform message validation will be protected against DoS. Nodes wishing to opt-in this DoS protection feature shall:
* Generate a `private-key-topic` and distribute it to a curated list of users, that are trusted to send messages at a reasonable rate.
* Redeploy the nodes, adding a new configuration where a `protected-pubsub-topic` is configured with a `public-key-topic`, used to verify the messages being relayed.
### Test vectors
Relay nodes complying with this specification shall accept the following message in the configured pubsub topic.
Given the following key pair:
```
private-key-topic = 5526a8990317c9b7b58d07843d270f9cd1d9aaee129294c1c478abf7261dd9e6
public-key-topic = 049c5fac802da41e07e6cdf51c3b9a6351ad5e65921527f2df5b7d59fd9b56ab02bab736cdcfc37f25095e78127500da371947217a8cd5186ab890ea866211c3f6
```
And the following message to send:
```
protected-pubsub-topic = pubsub-topic
contentTopic = content-topic
payload = 1A12E077D0E89F9CAC11FBBB6A676C86120B5AD3E248B1F180E98F15EE43D2DFCF62F00C92737B2FF6F59B3ABA02773314B991C41DC19ADB0AD8C17C8E26757B
timestamp = 1683208172339052800
ephemeral = true
```
The message hash and meta (aka signature) are calculated as follows.
```
app-message-hash = 662F8C20A335F170BD60ABC1F02AD66F0C6A6EE285DA2A53C95259E7937C0AE9
message.meta = 127FA211B2514F0E974A055392946DC1A14052182A6ABEFB8A6CD7C51DA1BF2E40595D28EF1A9488797C297EED3AAC45430005FB3A7F037BDD9FC4BD99F59E63
```
Using `message.meta`, the relay node shall calculate the `app-message-hash` of the received message using `public-key-topic`, and with the values above, the signature should be verified, making the node `Accept` the message and relaying it to other nodes in the network.
## Owner-Mapped Communities
Basic idea:
Tokenized load.
### 1:1 Chat
An idea we plan to explore in the future:
Map 1:1 chats to community shards, if both A and B are part of the respective community.
This increases k-anonymity and benefits from community DoS protection.
It could be rate-limited with RLN.
## Security/Privacy Considerations
This document makes several trade-offs to privacy and anonymity.
Todo: elaborate.
See [WAKU2-ADVERSARIAL-MODELS](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/informational/adversarial-models.md) for information on Waku Anonymity.
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
* [56/STATUS-COMMUNITIES](../56/communities.md)
* [55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](.../55/1to1-chat.md)
* [23/WAKU2-TOPICS](../../waku/informational/23/)
* [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../waku/standards/core/11/relay.md)
* [WAKU2-RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/relay-sharding.md)
* [WAKU2-RELAY-STATIC-SHARD-ALLOC](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/informational/relay-static-shard-alloc.md)
* [30/ADAPTIVE-NODES](../../waku/informational/30/adaptive-nodes.md)
* [19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH](../../waku/standards/core/19/lightpush.md)
* [12/WAKU2-FILTER](../../waku/standards/core/12/filter.md)
* [WAKU2-PEER-EXCHANGE](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/peer-exchange/peer-exchange.md)
* [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md)
* [libp2p rendezvous](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/rendezvous/README.md)
* [libp2p AutoNAT protocol](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/autonat/README.md)
* [33/WAKU2-DISCV5](../../waku/standards/core/33/discv5.md)
* [libp2p circuit relay](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/6634ca7abb2f955645243d48d1cd2fd02a8e8880/relay/circuit-v2.md)
* [limiting](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/6634ca7abb2f955645243d48d1cd2fd02a8e8880/relay/circuit-v2.md#reservation)
* [DCUtR](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/relay/DCUtR.md)
* [scoring](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md#extended-validators)
* [Circuit Relay](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/nat/circuit-relay/)
* [WAKU2-ADVERSARIAL-MODELS](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/informational/adversarial-models.md)
## Informative
* [Circuit Relay](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/nat/circuit-relay/)
* [WAKU2-ENR](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/enr.md)

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---
title: STATUS-WAKU2-USAGE
name: Status Waku2 Usage
status: raw
category: Best Current Practice
description: Defines how the Status application uses the Waku protocols.
editor: Aaryamann Challani \<aaryamann@status.im\>
contributors:
- Jimmy Debe \<jimmy@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
## Abstract
Status is a chat application which has several features, including, but not limited to -
- Private 1:1 chats, described by [55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](/spec/55)
- Large scale group chats, described by [56/STATUS-COMMUNITIES](/spec/56)
This specification describes how a Status implementation will make use of the underlying infrastructure,
Waku, which is described in [10/WAKU2](/spec/10).
## Background
The Status application aspires to achieve censorship resistance and incorporates specific privacy features,
leveraging the comprehensive set of protocols offered by Waku to enhance these attributes.
Waku protocols provide secure communication capabilities over decentralized networks.
Once integrated, an application will benefit from privacy-preserving,
censorship resistance and spam protected communcation.
Since Status uses a large set of Waku protocols,
it is imperative to describe how each are used.
## Terminology
| Name | Description |
| --------------- | --------- |
| `RELAY`| This refers to the Waku Relay protocol, described in [11/WAKU2-RELAY](/spec/11) |
| `FILTER` | This refers to the Waku Filter protocol, described in [12/WAKU2-FILTER](/spec/12) |
| `STORE` | This refers to the Waku Store protocol, described in [13/WAKU2-STORE](/spec/13) |
| `MESSAGE` | This refers to the Waku Message format, described in [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](/spec/14) |
| `LIGHTPUSH` | This refers to the Waku Lightpush protocol, described in [19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH](/spec/19) |
| Discovery | This refers to a peer discovery method used by a Waku node. |
| `Pubsub Topic` / `Content Topic` | This refers to the routing of messages within the Waku network, described in [23/WAKU2-TOPICS](/spec/23/) |
### Waku Node:
Software that is configured with a set of Waku protocols.
A Status client comprises of a Waku node that is a `RELAY` node or a non-relay node.
### Light Client:
A Status client that operates within resource constrained environments is a node configured as light client.
Light clients do not run a `RELAY`.
Instead, Status light clients,
can request services from other `RELAY` node that provide `LIGHTPUSH` service.
## Protocol Usage
The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”,
“NOT RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt).
The following is a list of Waku Protocols used by a Status application.
### 1. `RELAY`
The `RELAY` MUST NOT be used by Status light clients.
The `RELAY` is used to broadcast messages between Status clients.
All Status messages are transformed into [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](/spec/14), which are sent over the wire.
All Status message types are described in [62/STATUS-PAYLOAD](/spec/62).
Status Clients MUST transform the following object into a `MESSAGE` as described below -
```go
type StatusMessage struct {
SymKey[] []byte // [optional] The symmetric key used to encrypt the message
PublicKey []byte // [optional] The public key to use for asymmetric encryption
Sig string // [optional] The private key used to sign the message
PubsubTopic string // The Pubsub topic to publish the message to
ContentTopic string // The Content topic to publish the message to
Payload []byte // A serialized representation of a Status message to be sent
Padding []byte // Padding that must be applied to the Payload
TargetPeer string // [optional] The target recipient of the message
Ephemeral bool // If the message is not to be stored, this is set to `true`
}
```
1. A user MUST only provide either a Symmetric key OR an Asymmetric keypair to encrypt the message.
If both are received, the implementation MUST throw an error.
2. `WakuMessage.Payload` MUST be set to `StatusMessage.Payload`
3. `WakuMessage.Key` MUST be set to `StatusMessage.SymKey`
4. `WakuMessage.Version` MUST be set to `1`
5. `WakuMessage.Ephemeral` MUST be set to `StatusMessage.Ephemeral`
6. `WakuMessage.ContentTopic` MUST be set to `StatusMessage.ContentTopic`
7. `WakuMessage.Timestamp` MUST be set to the current Unix epoch timestamp (in nanosecond precision)
### 2. `STORE`
This protocol MUST remain optional according to the user's preferences,
it MAY be enabled on Light clients as well.
Messages received via [11/WAKU2-RELAY](/spec/11), are stored in a database.
When Waku node running this protocol is service node,
it MUST provide the complete list of network messages.
Status clients SHOULD request historical messages from this service node.
The messages that have the `WakuMessage.Ephemeral` flag set to true will not be stored.
The Status client MAY provide a method to prune the database of older records to save storage.
### 3. `FILTER`
This protocol SHOULD be enabled on Light clients.
This protocol SHOULD be used to filter messages based on a given criteria, such as the `Content Topic` of a `MESSAGE`.
This allows a reduction in bandwidth consumption by the Status client.
#### Content filtering protocol identifers:
The `filter-subcribe` SHOULD be implemented on `RELAY` nodes to provide `FILTER` services.
`filter-subscribe`:
/vac/waku/filter-subscribe/2.0.0-beta1
The `filter-push` SHOULD be implemented on light clients to receive messages.
`filter-push`:
/vac/waku/filter-push/2.0.0-beta1
Status clients SHOULD apply a filter for all the `Content Topic` they are interested in,
such as `Content Topic` derived from -
1. 1:1 chats with other users, described in [55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](/spec/55)
2. Group chats
3. Community Channels, described in [56/STATUS-COMMUNITIES](/spec/56)
### 4. `LIGHTPUSH`
The `LIGHTPUSH` protocol MUST be enabled on Status light clients.
A Status `RELAY` node MAY implement `LIGHTPUSH` to support light clients.
Peers will be able to publish messages,
without running a full-fledged [11/WAKU2-RELAY](/spec/11) protocol.
When a Status client is publishing a message,
it MUST check if Light mode is enabled,
and if so, it MUST publish the message via this protocol.
### 5. Discovery
A discovery method MUST be supported by Light clients and Full clients
Status clients SHOULD make use of the following peer discovery methods that are provided by Waku,
such as -
1. [EIP-1459: DNS-Based Discovery](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459)
2. [33/WAKU2-DISCV5](/spec/33):
A node discovery protocol to create decentralized network of interconnected Waku nodes.
3. [34/WAKU2-PEER-EXCHANGE](/spec/34):
A peer discovery protocol for resource restricted devices.
Status clients MAY use any combination of the above peer discovery methods,
which is suited best for their implementation.
## Security/Privacy Considerations
This specification inherits the security and privacy considerations from the following specifications -
1. [10/WAKU2](/spec/10)
2. [11/WAKU2-RELAY](/spec/11)
3. [12/WAKU2-FILTER](/spec/12)
4. [13/WAKU2-STORE](/spec/13)
5. [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](/spec/14)
6. [23/WAKU2-TOPICS](/spec/23)
7. [19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH](/spec/19)
8. [55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](/spec/55)
9. [56/STATUS-COMMUNITIES](/spec/56)
10. [62/STATUS-PAYLOAD](/spec/62)
11. [EIP-1459: DNS-Based Discovery](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459)
12. [33/WAKU2-DISCV5](/spec/33)
13. [34/WAKU2-PEER-EXCHANGE](/spec/34)
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
1. [55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](/spec/55)
2. [56/STATUS-COMMUNITIES](/spec/56)
3. [10/WAKU2](/spec/10)
4. [11/WAKU2-RELAY](/spec/11)
5. [12/WAKU2-FILTER](/spec/12)
6. [13/WAKU2-STORE](/spec/13)
7. [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](/spec/14)
8. [23/WAKU2-TOPICS](/spec/23)
9. [19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH](/spec/19)
10. [64/WAKU2-NETWORK](/spec/64)
11. [62/STATUS-PAYLOAD](/spec/62)
12. [EIP-1459: DNS-Based Discovery](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459)
13. [33/WAKU2-DISCV5](/spec/33)
14. [34/WAKU2-PEER-EXCHANGE](/spec/34)

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---
title: 1/COSS
name: Consensus-Oriented Specification System
status: draft
category: Best Current Practice
editor: Oskar Thoren \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\>
contributors:
- Pieter Hintjens \<ph@imatix.com\>
- André Rebentisch \<andre@openstandards.de\>
- Alberto Barrionuevo \<abarrio@opentia.es\>
- Chris Puttick \<chris.puttick@thehumanjourney.net\>
- Yurii Rashkovskii \<yrashk@gmail.com\>
- Daniel Kaiser \<danielkaiser@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
This document describes a consensus-oriented specification system (COSS) for building interoperable technical specifications.
COSS is based on a lightweight editorial process that seeks to engage the widest possible range of interested parties and move rapidly to consensus through working code.
This specification is based on [Unprotocols 2/COSS](https://github.com/unprotocols/rfc/blob/master/2/README.md), used by the [ZeromMQ](https://rfc.zeromq.org/) project.
It is equivalent except for some areas:
- recommending the use of a permissive licenses, such as CC0 (with the exception of this document);
- miscellaneous metadata, editor, and format/link updates;
- more inheritance from the [IETF Standards Process][https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.txt],
e.g. using RFC categories: Standards Track, Informational, and Best Common Practice;
- standards track specifications SHOULD follow a specific structure that both streamlines editing,
and helps implementers to quickly comprehend the specification
- specifications MUST feature a header providing specific meta information
## License
Copyright (c) 2008-22 the Editor and Contributors.
This Specification is free software;
you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation;
either version 3 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
This Specification is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY;
without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
See the GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with this program;
if not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses.
## Change Process
This document is governed by the [1/COSS](./coss.md) (COSS).
## Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC 2119](http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2119).
## Goals
The primary goal of COSS is to facilitate the process of writing, proving, and improving new technical specifications.
A "technical specification" defines a protocol, a process, an API, a use of language, a methodology,
or any other aspect of a technical environment that can usefully be documented for the purposes of technical or social interoperability.
COSS is intended to above all be economical and rapid, so that it is useful to small teams with little time to spend on more formal processes.
Principles:
* We aim for rough consensus and running code; [inspired by the IETF Tao](https://www.ietf.org/about/participate/tao/).
* Specifications are small pieces, made by small teams.
* Specifications should have a clearly responsible editor.
* The process should be visible, objective, and accessible to anyone.
* The process should clearly separate experiments from solutions.
* The process should allow deprecation of old specifications.
Specifications should take minutes to explain, hours to design, days to write, weeks to prove, months to become mature, and years to replace.
Specifications have no special status except that accorded by the community.
## Architecture
COSS is designed around fast, easy to use communications tools.
Primarily, COSS uses a wiki model for editing and publishing specifications texts.
* The *domain* is the conservancy for a set of specifications in a certain area.
* Each domain is implemented as an Internet domain, hosting a wiki and optionally other communications tools.
* Each specification is a set of wiki pages, together with comments, attached files, and other resources.
* Important specifications may also exist as subdomains, i.e. child wikis.
Individuals can become members of the domain by completing the necessary legal clearance.
The copyright, patent, and trademark policies of the domain must be clarified in an Intellectual Property policy that applies to the domain.
Specifications exist as multiple pages, one page per version of the specification (see "Branching and Merging", below), which may be assigned URIs that include an incremental number.
Thus, we refer to a specification by specifying its domain, number, and short name.
New versions of the same specification will have new numbers.
The syntax for a specification reference is:
\<domain\>/spec/\<number\>/\<shortname\>
For example, this specification is **rfc.vac.dev/spec/1/COSS**.
The short form **1/COSS** may be used when referring to the specification from other specifications in the same domain.
Every specification (including branches) carries a different number.
## COSS Lifecycle
Every specification has an independent lifecycle that documents clearly its current status.
A specification has six possible states that reflect its maturity and contractual weight:
![Lifecycle diagram](./images/lifecycle.png)
### Raw Specifications
All new specifications are **raw** specifications.
Changes to raw specifications can be unilateral and arbitrary.
Those seeking to implement a raw specification should ask for it to be made a draft specification.
Raw specifications have no contractual weight.
### Draft Specifications
When raw specifications can be demonstrated, they become **draft** specifications.
Changes to draft specifications should be done in consultation with users.
Draft specifications are contracts between the editors and implementers.
### Stable Specifications
When draft specifications are used by third parties, they become **stable** specifications.
Changes to stable specifications should be restricted to cosmetic ones, errata and clarifications.
Stable specifications are contracts between editors, implementers, and end-users.
### Deprecated Specifications
When stable specifications are replaced by newer draft specifications, they become **deprecated** specifications.
Deprecated specifications should not be changed except to indicate their replacements, if any.
Deprecated specifications are contracts between editors, implementers and end-users.
### Retired Specifications
When deprecated specifications are no longer used in products, they become **retired** specifications.
Retired specifications are part of the historical record.
They should not be changed except to indicate their replacements, if any.
Retired specifications have no contractual weight.
### Deleted Specifications
Deleted specifications are those that have not reached maturity (stable) and were discarded.
They should not be used and are only kept for their historical value.
Only Raw and Draft specifications can be deleted.
## Editorial control
A specification MUST have a single responsible editor,
the only person who SHALL change the status of the specification through the lifecycle stages.
A specification MAY also have additional contributors who contribute changes to it.
It is RECOMMENDED to use a process similar to [C4 process](https://github.com/unprotocols/rfc/blob/master/1/README.md)
to maximize the scale and diversity of contributions.
Unlike the original C4 process however, it is RECOMMENDED to use CC0 as a more permissive license alternative.
We SHOULD NOT use GPL or GPL-like license.
One exception is this specification, as this was the original license for this specification.
The editor is responsible for accurately maintaining the state of specifications and for handling all comments on the specification.
## Branching and Merging
Any member of the domain MAY branch a specification at any point.
This is done by copying the existing text, and creating a new specification with the same name and content, but a new number.
The ability to branch a specification is necessary in these circumstances:
* To change the responsible editor for a specification, with or without the cooperation of the current responsible editor.
* To rejuvenate a specification that is stable but needs functional changes.
This is the proper way to make a new version of a specification that is in stable or deprecated status.
* To resolve disputes between different technical opinions.
The responsible editor of a branched specification is the person who makes the branch.
Branches, including added contributions, are derived works and thus licensed under the same terms as the original specification.
This means that contributors are guaranteed the right to merge changes made in branches back into their original specifications.
Technically speaking, a branch is a *different* specification, even if it carries the same name.
Branches have no special status except that accorded by the community.
## Conflict resolution
COSS resolves natural conflicts between teams and vendors by allowing anyone to define a new specification.
There is no editorial control process except that practised by the editor of a new specification.
The administrators of a domain (moderators) may choose to interfere in editorial conflicts,
and may suspend or ban individuals for behaviour they consider inappropriate.
## Specification Structure
### Meta Information
Specifications MUST contain the following metadata.
It is RECOMMENDED that specification metadata is specified as a YAML header (where possible).
This will enable programmatic access to specification metadata.
| Key | Value | Type | Example |
|------------------|----------------------|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **shortname** | short name | string | 1/COSS |
| **title** | full name | string | Consensus-Oriented Specification System |
| **status** | status | string | draft |
| **category** | category | string | Best Current Practice |
| **tags** | 0 or several tags | list | waku-application, waku-core-protocol |
| **editor** | editor name/email | string | Oskar Thoren \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\> |
| **contributors** | contributors | list | - Pieter Hintjens \<ph@imatix.com\>\<br/\> - André Rebentisch \<andre@openstandards.de\>\<br/\> - Alberto Barrionuevo \<abarrio@opentia.es\>\<br/\> - Chris Puttick \<chris.puttick@thehumanjourney.net\>\<br/\> - Yurii Rashkovskii \<yrashk@gmail.com\> |
### Specification Template
Standards Track specifications SHOULD be based on the [Vac RFC template](./images/template.md).
## Conventions
Where possible editors and contributors are encouraged to:
* Refer to and build on existing work when possible, especially IETF specifications.
* Contribute to existing specifications rather than reinvent their own.
* Use collaborative branching and merging as a tool for experimentation.
* Use Semantic Line Breaks: https://sembr.org/.
## Appendix A. Color Coding
It is RECOMMENDED to use color coding to indicate specification's status. Color coded specifications SHOULD use the following color scheme:
* ![raw](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/unprotocols/rfc/master/2/raw.svg)
* ![draft](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/unprotocols/rfc/master/2/draft.svg)
* ![stable](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/unprotocols/rfc/master/2/stable.svg)
* ![deprecated](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/unprotocols/rfc/master/2/deprecated.svg)
* ![retired](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/unprotocols/rfc/master/2/retired.svg)
* ![deleted](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/unprotocols/rfc/master/2/deleted.svg)

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---
title: 2/MVDS
name: Minimum Viable Data Synchronization
status: stable
editor: Sanaz Taheri \<sanaz@status.im\>
contributors:
- Dean Eigenmann \<dean@status.im\>
- Oskar Thorén \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
In this specification, we describe a minimum viable protocol for data synchronization inspired by the Bramble Synchronization Protocol[^1]. This protocol is designed to ensure reliable messaging between peers across an unreliable peer-to-peer (P2P) network where they may be unreachable or unresponsive.
We present a reference implementation[^2] including a simulation to demonstrate its performance.
## Definitions
| Term | Description |
|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Peer** | The other nodes that a node is connected to. |
| **Record** | Defines a payload element of either the type `OFFER`, `REQUEST`, `MESSAGE` or `ACK` |
| **Node** | Some process that is able to store data, do processing and communicate for MVDS. |
## Wire Protocol
### Secure Transport
This specification does not define anything related to the transport of packets. It is assumed that this is abstracted in such a way that any secure transport protocol could be easily implemented. Likewise, properties such as confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and forward secrecy are assumed to be provided by a layer below.
### Payloads
Payloads are implemented using [protocol buffers v3](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/).
```protobuf
syntax = "proto3";
package vac.mvds;
message Payload {
repeated bytes acks = 5001;
repeated bytes offers = 5002;
repeated bytes requests = 5003;
repeated Message messages = 5004;
}
message Message {
bytes group_id = 6001;
int64 timestamp = 6002;
bytes body = 6003;
}
```
*The payload field numbers are kept more "unique" to ensure no overlap with other protocol buffers.*
Each payload contains the following fields:
- **Acks:** This field contains a list (can be empty) of `message identifiers` informing the recipient that sender holds a specific message.
- **Offers:** This field contains a list (can be empty) of `message identifiers` that the sender would like to give to the recipient.
- **Requests:** This field contains a list (can be empty) of `message identifiers` that the sender would like to receive from the recipient.
- **Messages:** This field contains a list of messages (can be empty).
**Message Identifiers:** Each `message` has a message identifier calculated by hashing the `group_id`, `timestamp` and `body` fields as follows:
```
HASH("MESSAGE_ID", group_id, timestamp, body);
```
**Group Identifiers:** Each `message` is assigned into a **group** using the `group_id` field, groups are independent synchronization contexts between peers.
The current `HASH` function used is `sha256`.
## Synchronization
### State
We refer to `state` as set of records for the types `OFFER`, `REQUEST` and `MESSAGE` that every node SHOULD store per peer. `state` MUST NOT contain `ACK` records as we do not retransmit those periodically. The following information is stored for records:
- **Type** - Either `OFFER`, `REQUEST` or `MESSAGE`
- **Send Count** - The amount of times a record has been sent to a peer.
- **Send Epoch** - The next epoch at which a record can be sent to a peer.
### Flow
A maximum of one payload SHOULD be sent to peers per epoch, this payload contains all `ACK`, `OFFER`, `REQUEST` and `MESSAGE` records for the specific peer. Payloads are created every epoch, containing reactions to previously received records by peers or new records being sent out by nodes.
Nodes MAY have two modes with which they can send records: `BATCH` and `INTERACTIVE` mode. The following rules dictate how nodes construct payloads every epoch for any given peer for both modes.
\> ***NOTE:** A node may send messages both in interactive and in batch mode.*
#### Interactive Mode
- A node initially offers a `MESSAGE` when attempting to send it to a peer. This means an `OFFER` is added to the next payload and state for the given peer.
- When a node receives an `OFFER`, a `REQUEST` is added to the next payload and state for the given peer.
- When a node receives a `REQUEST` for a previously sent `OFFER`, the `OFFER` is removed from the state and the corresponding `MESSAGE` is added to the next payload and state for the given peer.
- When a node receives a `MESSAGE`, the `REQUEST` is removed from the state and an `ACK` is added to the next payload for the given peer.
- When a node receives an `ACK`, the `MESSAGE` is removed from the state for the given peer.
- All records that require retransmission are added to the payload, given `Send Epoch` has been reached.
\<p align="center"\>
\<img src="../assets/mvds/interactive.png" /\>
\<br /\>
Figure 1: Delivery without retransmissions in interactive mode.
\</p\>
#### Batch Mode
1. When a node sends a `MESSAGE`, it is added to the next payload and the state for the given peer.
2. When a node receives a `MESSAGE`, an `ACK` is added to the next payload for the corresponding peer.
3. When a node receives an `ACK`, the `MESSAGE` is removed from the state for the given peer.
4. All records that require retransmission are added to the payload, given `Send Epoch` has been reached.
\<!-- diagram --\>
\<p align="center"\>
\<img src="../assets/mvds/batch.png" /\>
\<br /\>
Figure 2: Delivery without retransmissions in batch mode.
\</p\>
\> ***NOTE:** Batch mode is higher bandwidth whereas interactive mode is higher latency.*
\<!-- Interactions with state, flow chart with retransmissions? --\>
### Retransmission
The record of the type `Type` SHOULD be retransmitted every time `Send Epoch` is smaller than or equal to the current epoch.
`Send Epoch` and `Send Count` MUST be increased every time a record is retransmitted. Although no function is defined on how to increase `Send Epoch`, it SHOULD be exponentially increased until reaching an upper bound where it then goes back to a lower epoch in order to prevent a record's `Send Epoch`'s from becoming too large.
\> ***NOTE:** We do not retransmission `ACK`s as we do not know when they have arrived, therefore we simply resend them every time we receive a `MESSAGE`.*
## Formal Specification
MVDS has been formally specified using TLA+: \<https://github.com/vacp2p/formalities/tree/master/MVDS\>.
## Acknowledgments
- Preston van Loon
- Greg Markou
- Rene Nayman
- Jacek Sieka
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## Footnotes
[^1]: akwizgran et al. [BSP](https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-spec/blob/master/protocols/BSP.md). Briar.
[^2]: \<https://github.com/vacp2p/mvds\>

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---
title: 25/LIBP2P-DNS-DISCOVERY
name: Libp2p Peer Discovery via DNS
status: deleted
editor: Hanno Cornelius \<hanno@status.im\>
contributors:
sidebar_position: 1
---
`25/LIBP2P-DNS-DISCOVERY` specifies a scheme to implement [`libp2p`](https://libp2p.io/) peer discovery via DNS for Waku v2.
The generalised purpose is to retrieve an arbitrarily long, authenticated, updateable list of [`libp2p` peers](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/peer-id/) to bootstrap connection to a `libp2p` network.
Since [`10/WAKU2`](https://rfc.vac.dev/spec/10/) currently specifies use of [`libp2p` peer identities](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/peer-id/),
this method is suitable for a new Waku v2 node to discover other Waku v2 nodes to connect to.
This specification is largely based on [EIP-1459](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459),
with the only deviation being the type of address being encoded (`multiaddr` vs `enr`).
Also see [this earlier explainer](https://vac.dev/dns-based-discovery) for more background on the suitability of DNS based discovery for Waku v2.
# List encoding
The peer list MUST be encoded as a [Merkle tree](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Merkle_tree).
EIP-1459 specifies [the URL scheme](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459#specification) to refer to such a DNS node list.
This specification uses the same approach, but with a `matree` scheme:
```
matree://\<key\>@\<fqdn\>
```
where
- `matree` is the selected `multiaddr` Merkle tree scheme
- `\<fqdn\>` is the fully qualified domain name on which the list can be found
- `\<key\>` is the base32 encoding of the compressed 32-byte binary public key that signed the list.
The example URL from EIP-1459, adapted to the above scheme becomes:
```
matree://AM5FCQLWIZX2QFPNJAP7VUERCCRNGRHWZG3YYHIUV7BVDQ5FDPRT2@peers.example.org
```
Each entry within the Merkle tree MUST be contained within a [DNS TXT record](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1035.txt)
and stored in a subdomain (except for the base URL `matree` entry).
The content of any TXT record MUST be small enough to fit into the 512-byte limit imposed on UDP DNS packets,
which limits the number of hashes that can be contained within a branch entry.
The subdomain name for each entry is the base32 encoding of the abbreviated keccak256 hash of its text content.
See [this example](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459#dns-record-structure) of a fully populated tree for more information.
# Entry types
The following entry types are derived from [EIP-1459](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459)
and adapted for use with `multiaddrs`:
## Root entry
The tree root entry MUST use the following format:
```
matree-root:v1 m=\<ma-root\> l=\<link-root\> seq=\<sequence number\> sig=\<signature\>
```
where
- `ma-root` and `link-root` refer to the root hashes of subtrees
containing `multiaddrs` and links to other subtrees, respectively
- `sequence-number` is the tree's update sequence number.
This number SHOULD increase with each update to the tree.
- `signature` is a 65-byte secp256k1 EC signature
over the keccak256 hash of the root record content,
excluding the `sig=` part,
encoded as URL-safe base64
## Branch entry
Branch entries MUST take the format:
```
matree-branch:\<h₁\>,\<h₂\>,...,\<hₙ\>
```
where
- `\<h₁\>,\<h₂\>,...,\<hₙ\>` are the hashes of other subtree entries
## Leaf entries
There are two types of leaf entries:
### Link entries
For the subtree pointed to by `link-root`,
leaf entries MUST take the format:
```
matree://\<key\>@\<fqdn\>
```
which links to a different list located in another domain.
### `multiaddr` entries
For the subtree pointed to by `ma-root`,
leaf entries MUST take the format:
```
ma:\<multiaddr\>
```
which contains the `multiaddr` of a `libp2p` peer.
# Client protocol
A client MUST adhere to the [client protocol](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459#client-protocol) as specified in EIP-1459,
and adapted for usage with `multiaddr` entry types below:
To find nodes at a given DNS name a client MUST perform the following steps:
1. Resolve the TXT record of the DNS name and check whether it contains a valid `matree-root:v1` entry.
2. Verify the signature on the root against the known public key
and check whether the sequence number is larger than or equal to any previous number seen for that name.
3. Resolve the TXT record of a hash subdomain indicated in the record
and verify that the content matches the hash.
4. If the resolved entry is of type:
- `matree-branch`: parse the list of hashes and continue resolving them (step 3).
- `ma`: import the `multiaddr` and add it to a local list of discovered nodes.
# Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via
[CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
# References
1. [`10/WAKU2`](https://rfc.vac.dev/spec/10/)
1. [EIP-1459: Client Protocol](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459#client-protocol)
1. [EIP-1459: Node Discovery via DNS ](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459)
1. [`libp2p`](https://libp2p.io/)
1. [`libp2p` peer identity](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/peer-id/)
1. [Merkle trees](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Merkle_tree)

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# Alice and Bob: remote log data sync
msc {
hscale="2", wordwraparcs=on;
alice [label="Alice"],
cas [label="CAS"],
ns [label="NS"],
bob [label="Bob"];
--- [label="Alice replicates data to a remote log"];
alice => cas [label="Add content"];
cas => alice [label="Address"];
alice => ns [label="Update NameUpdate"];
ns => alice [label="Response"];
--- [label="Bob comes online"];
bob => ns [label="Fetch"];
ns => bob [label="Content"];
bob => cas [label="Fetch Query"];
cas => bob [label="Content"];
}

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---
title: 3/REMOTE-LOG
name: Remote log specification
status: draft
editor: Oskar Thorén \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\>
contributors:
- Dean Eigenmann \<dean@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
A remote log is a replication of a local log. This means a node can read data that originally came from a node that is offline.
This specification is complemented by a proof of concept implementation[^1].
## Definitions
| Term | Definition |
| ----------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| CAS | Content-addressed storage. Stores data that can be addressed by its hash. |
| NS | Name system. Associates mutable data to a name. |
| Remote log | Replication of a local log at a different location. |
## Wire Protocol
### Secure Transport, storage, and name system
This specification does not define anything related to: secure transport,
content addressed storage, or the name system. It is assumed these capabilities
are abstracted away in such a way that any such protocol can easily be
implemented.
\<!-- TODO: Elaborate on properties required here. --\>
### Payloads
Payloads are implemented using [protocol buffers v3](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/).
**CAS service**:
```protobuf
syntax = "proto3";
package vac.cas;
service CAS {
rpc Add(Content) returns (Address) {}
rpc Get(Address) returns (Content) {}
}
message Address {
bytes id = 1;
}
message Content {
bytes data = 1;
}
```
\<!-- XXX/TODO: Can we get rid of the id/data complication and just use bytes? --\>
**NS service**:
```protobuf
syntax = "proto3";
package vac.cas;
service NS {
rpc Update(NameUpdate) returns (Response) {}
rpc Fetch(Query) returns (Content) {}
}
message NameUpdate {
string name = 1;
bytes content = 2;
}
message Query {
string name = 1;
}
message Content {
bytes data = 1;
}
message Response {
bytes data = 1;
}
```
\<!-- XXX: Response and data type a bit weird, Ok/Err enum? --\>
\<!-- TODO: Do we want NameInit here? --\>
**Remote log:**
```protobuf
syntax = "proto3";
package vac.cas;
message RemoteLog {
repeated Pair pair = 1;
bytes tail = 2;
message Pair {
bytes remoteHash = 1;
bytes localHash = 2;
bytes data = 3;
}
}
```
\<!-- TODO: Better name for Pair, Mapping? --\>
\<!-- TODO: Consider making more useful in conjunction with metadata field. It makes sense to explicitly list what sequence a message is \<local hash, remote hash, data, seqid\> this way I can easily sync a messages prior or after a specific number. To enable this to be dynamic it might make sense to add page info so that I am aware which page I can find seqid on --\>
## Synchronization
### Roles
There are four fundamental roles:
1. Alice
2. Bob
2. Name system (NS)
3. Content-addressed storage (CAS)
The *remote log* protobuf is what is stored in the name system.
"Bob" can represent anything from 0 to N participants. Unlike Alice, Bob only needs read-only access to NS and CAS.
\<!-- TODO: Document random node as remote log --\>
\<!-- TODO: Document how to find initial remote log (e.g. per sync contexts --\>
### Flow
\<!-- diagram --\>
\<p align="center"\>
\<img src="./images/remote-log.png" /\>
\<br /\>
Figure 1: Remote log data synchronization.
\</p\>
\<!-- Document the flow wrt operations --\>
### Remote log
The remote log lets receiving nodes know what data they are missing. Depending
on the specific requirements and capabilities of the nodes and name system, the
information can be referred to differently. We distinguish between three rough
modes:
1. Fully replicated log
2. Normal sized page with CAS mapping
3. "Linked list" mode - minimally sized page with CAS mapping
**Data format:**
```
| H1_3 | H2_3 |
| H1_2 | H2_2 |
| H1_1 | H2_1 |
| ------------|
| next_page |
```
Here the upper section indicates a list of ordered pairs, and the lower section
contains the address for the next page chunk. `H1` is the native hash function,
and `H2` is the one used by the CAS. The numbers corresponds to the messages.
To indicate which CAS is used, a remote log SHOULD use a multiaddr.
**Embedded data:**
A remote log MAY also choose to embed the wire payloads that corresponds to the
native hash. This bypasses the need for a dedicated CAS and additional
round-trips, with a trade-off in bandwidth usage.
```
| H1_3 | | C_3 |
| H1_2 | | C_2 |
| H1_1 | | C_1 |
| -------------|
| next_page |
```
Here `C` stands for the content that would be stored at the CAS.
Both patterns can be used in parallel, e,g. by storing the last `k` messages
directly and use CAS pointers for the rest. Together with the `next_page` page
semantics, this gives users flexibility in terms of bandwidth and
latency/indirection, all the way from a simple linked list to a fully replicated
log. The latter is useful for things like backups on durable storage.
### Next page semantics
The pointer to the 'next page' is another remote log entry, at a previous point
in time.
\<!-- TODO: Determine requirement re overlapping, adjacent, and/or missing entries --\>
\<!-- TODO: Document message ordering append only requirements --\>
### Interaction with MVDS
[vac.mvds.Message](../2/mvds.md/#payloads) payloads are the only payloads that MUST be uploaded. Other messages types MAY be uploaded, depending on the implementation.
## Acknowledgments
TBD.
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## Footnotes
[^1]: \<https://github.com/vacp2p/research/tree/master/remote_log\>

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---
title: 32/RLN-V1
name: Rate Limit Nullifier
status: raw
editor: Rasul Ibragimov \<curryrasul@gmail.com\>
contributors:
- Barry Whitehat \<barrywhitehat@protonmail.com\>
- Sanaz Taheri \<sanaz@status.im\>
- Oskar Thorén \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\>
- Onur Kilic \<onurkilic1004@gmail.com\>
- Blagoj Dimovski \<blagoj.dimovski@yandex.com\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
## Abstract
The following specification covers the RLN construct as well as some auxiliary libraries useful for interacting with it.
Rate limiting nullifier (RLN) is a construct based on zero-knowledge proofs that provides an anonymous rate-limited signaling/messaging framework suitable for decentralized (and centralized) environments.
Anonymity refers to the unlinkability of messages to their owner.
## Motivation
RLN guarantees a messaging rate is enforced cryptographically while preserving the anonymity of the message owners.
A wide range of applications can benefit from RLN and provide desirable security features.
For example, an e-voting system can integrate RLN to contain the voting rate while protecting the voters-vote unlinkability.
Another use case is to protect an anonymous messaging system against DDoS and spam attacks by containing messaging rate of users.
This latter use case is explained in [17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY RFC](../../waku/standards/core/17/rln-relay.md).
## Flow
The users participate in the protocol by first registering to an application-defined group referred by the _membership group_.
Registration to the group is mandatory for signaling in the application.
After registration, group members can generate Zero-knowledge Proof of membership for their signals and can participate in the application.
Usually, the membership requires a financial or social stake which
is beneficial for the prevention of Sybil attacks and double-signaling.
Group members are allowed to send one signal per external nullifier (an identifier that groups signals and can be thought of as a voting booth).
If a user generates more signals than allowed,
the user risks being slashed - by revealing his membership secret credentials.
If the financial stake is put in place, the user also risks his stake being taken.
Generally the flow can be described by the following steps:
1. Registration
2. Signaling
3. Verification and slashing
## Registration
Depending on the application requirements, the registration can be implemented in different ways, for example:
- centralized registrations, by using a central server
- decentralized registrations, by using a smart contract
What is important is that the users' identity commitments (explained in section [User Indetity](#user-identity)) are stored in a Merkle tree,
and the users can obtain a Merkle proof proving that they are part of the group.
Also depending on the application requirements,
usually a financial or social stake is introduced.
An example for financial stake is: For each registration a certain amount of ETH is required.
An example for social stake is using InterRep as a registry -
users need to prove that they have a highly reputable social media account.
### Implementation notes
#### User identity
The user's identity is composed of:
```
{
identity_secret: [identity_nullifier, identity_trapdoor],
identity_secret_hash: poseidonHash(identity_secret),
identity_commitment: poseidonHash([identity_secret_hash])
}
```
For registration, the user needs to submit their `identity_commitment` (along with any additional registration requirements) to the registry.
Upon registration, they should receive `leaf_index` value which represents their position in the Merkle tree.
Receiving a `leaf_index` is not a hard requirement and is application specific.
The other way around is the users calculating the `leaf_index` themselves upon successful registration.
## Signaling
After registration,
the users can participate in the application by sending signals to the other participants in a decentralised manner or to a centralised server.
Along with their signal,
they need to generate a ZK-Proof by using the circuit with the specification described above.
For generating a proof,
the users need to obtain the required parameters or compute them themselves,
depending on the application implementation and client libraries supported by the application.
For example the users can store the membership Merkle tree on their end and
generate a Merkle proof whenever they want to generate a signal.
### Implementation notes
#### Signal hash
The signal hash can be generated by hashing the raw signal (or content) using the `keccak256` hash function.
#### External nullifier
The external nullifier MUST be computed as the Poseidon hash of the current epoch (e.g. a value equal to or derived from the current UNIX timestamp divided by the epoch length) and the RLN identifier.
```
external_nullifier = poseidonHash([epoch, rln_identifier])
```
#### Obtaining Merkle proof
The Merkle proof should be obtained locally or from a trusted third party.
By using the [incremental Merkle tree algorithm](https://github.com/appliedzkp/incrementalquintree/blob/master/ts/IncrementalQuinTree.ts),
the Merkle can be obtained by providing the `leaf_index` of the `identity_commitment`.
The proof (`Merkle_proof`) is composed of the following fields:
```
{
root: bigint
indices: number[]
path_elements: bigint[][]
}
```
1. **root** - The root of membership group Merkle tree at the time of publishing the message
2. **indices** - The index fields of the leafs in the Merkle tree - used by the Merkle tree algorithm for verification
3. **path_elements** - Auxiliary data structure used for storing the path to the leaf - used by the Merkle proof algorithm for verificaton
#### Generating proof
For proof generation,
the user need to submit the following fields to the circuit:
```
{
identity_secret: identity_secret_hash,
path_elements: Merkle_proof.path_elements,
identity_path_index: Merkle_proof.indices,
x: signal_hash,
external_nullifier: external_nullifier
}
```
#### Calculating output
The proof output is calculated locally,
in order for the required fields for proof verification to be sent along with the proof.
The proof output is composed of the `y` share of the secret equation and the `internal_nullifier`.
The `internal_nullifier` represents a unique fingerprint of a user for a given `epoch` and app.
The following fields are needed for proof output calculation:
```
{
identity_secret_hash: bigint,
external_nullifier: bigint,
x: bigint,
}
```
The output `[y, internal_nullifier]` is calculated in the following way:
```
a_0 = identity_secret_hash
a_1 = poseidonHash([a0, external_nullifier])
y = a_0 + x * a_1
internal_nullifier = poseidonHash([a_1])
```
It relies on the properties of the [Shamir's Secret sharing scheme](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shamir%27s_Secret_Sharing).
#### Sending the output message
The user's output message (`output_message`),
containing the signal should contain the following fields at minimum:
```
{
signal: signal, # non-hashed signal
proof: zk_proof,
internal_nullifier: internal_nullifier,
x: x, # signal_hash
y: y,
rln_identifier: rln_identifier
}
```
Additionally depending on the application,
the following fields might be required:
```
{
root: Merkle_proof.root,
epoch: epoch
}
```
## Verification and slashing
The slashing implementation is dependent on the type of application.
If the application is implemented in a centralised manner,
and everything is stored on a single server,
the slashing will be implemented only on the server.
Otherwise if the application is distributed,
the slashing will be implemented on each user's client.
### Implementation notes
Each user of the protocol (server or otherwise) will need to store metadata for each message received by each user,
for the given `epoch`.
The data can be deleted when the `epoch` passes.
Storing metadata is required, so that if a user sends more than one unique signal per `epoch`,
they can be slashed and removed from the protocol.
The metadata stored contains the `x`, `y` shares and the `internal_nullifier` for the user for each message.
If enough such shares are present, the user's secret can be retreived.
One way of storing received metadata (`messaging_metadata`) is the following format:
```
{
[external_nullifier]: {
[internal_nullifier]: {
x_shares: [],
y_shares: []
}
}
}
```
#### Verification
The output message verification consists of the following steps:
- `external_nullifier` correctness
- non-duplicate message check
- `zk_proof` verification
- spam verification
**1. `external_nullifier` correctness**
Upon received `output_message`, first the `epoch` and `rln_identifier` fields are checked,
to ensure that the message matches the current `external_nullifier`.
If the `external_nullifier` is correct the verification continues, otherwise, the message is discarded.
**2. non-duplicate message check**
The received message is checked to ensure it is not duplicate.
The duplicate message check is performed by verifying that the `x` and `y` fields do not exist in the `messaging_metadata` object.
If the `x` and `y` fields exist in the `x_shares` and `y_shares` array for the `external_nullifier` and
the `internal_nullifier` the message can be considered as a duplicate.
Duplicate messages are discarded.
**3. `zk_proof` verification**
The `zk_proof` should be verified by providing the `zk_proof` field to the circuit verifier along with the `public_signal`:
```
[
y,
Merkle_proof.root,
internal_nullifier,
x, # signal_hash
external_nullifier
]
```
If the proof verification is correct,
the verification continues, otherwise the message is discarded.
**4. Double signaling verification**
After the proof is verified the `x`, and `y` fields are added to the `x_shares` and `y_shares` arrays of the `messaging_metadata` `external_nullifier` and `internal_nullifier` object.
If the length of the arrays is equal to the signaling threshold (`limit`), the user can be slashed.
#### Slashing
After the verification, the user can be slashed if two different shares are present to reconstruct their `identity_secret_hash` from `x_shares` and `y_shares` fields,
for their `internal_nullifier`.
The secret can be retreived by the properties of the Shamir's secret sharing scheme.
In particular the secret (`a_0`) can be retrieved by computing [Lagrange polynomials](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lagrange_polynomial).
After the secret is retreived,
the user's `identity_commitment` can be generated from the secret and it can be used for removing the user from the membership Merkle tree (zeroing out the leaf that contains the user's `identity_commitment`).
Additionally, depending on the application the `identity_secret_hash` can be used for taking the user's provided stake.
## Technical overview
The main RLN construct is implemented using a [ZK-SNARK](https://z.cash/technology/zksnarks/) circuit.
However, it is helpful to describe the other necessary outside components for interaction with the circuit,
which together with the ZK-SNARK circuit enable the above mentioned features.
### Terminology
| Term | Description |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **ZK-SNARK** | https://z.cash/technology/zksnarks/ |
| **Stake** | Financial or social stake required for registering in the RLN applications. Common stake examples are: locking cryptocurrency (financial), linking reputable social identity. |
| **Identity secret** | An array of two unique random components (identity nullifier and identity trapdoor), which must be kept private by the user. Secret hash and identity commitment are derived from this array. |
| **Identity nullifier** | Random 32 byte value used as component for identity secret generation. |
| **Identity trapdoor** | Random 32 byte value used as component for identity secret generation. |
| **Identity secret hash** | The hash of the identity secret, obtained using the Poseidon hash function. It is used for deriving the identity commitment of the user, and as a private input for zk proof generation. The secret hash should be kept private by the user. |
| **Identity commitment** | Hash obtained from the `Identity secret hash` by using the poseidon hash function. It is used by the users for registering in the protocol. |
| **Signal** | The message generated by a user. It is an arbitrary bit string that may represent a chat message, a URL request, protobuf message, etc. |
| **Signal hash** | Keccak256 hash of the signal modulo circuit's field characteristic, used as an input in the RLN circuit. |
| **RLN Identifier** | Random finite field value unique per RLN app. It is used for additional cross-application security. The role of the RLN identifier is protection of the user secrets from being compromised when signals are being generated with the same credentials in different apps. |
| **RLN membership tree** | Merkle tree data structure, filled with identity commitments of the users. Serves as a data structure that ensures user registrations. |
| **Merkle proof** | Proof that a user is member of the RLN membership tree. |
### RLN ZK-Circuit specific terms
| Term | Description |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **x** | Keccak hash of the signal, same as signal hash (Defined above). |
| **A0** | The identity secret hash. |
| **A1** | Poseidon hash of [A0, External nullifier] (see about External nullifier below). |
| **y** | The result of the polynomial equation (y = a0 + a1*x). The public output of the circuit. |
| **External nullifier** | Poseidon hash of [Epoch, RLN Identifier]. An identifier that groups signals and can be thought of as a voting booth. |
| **Internal nullifier** | Poseidon hash of [A1]. This field ensures that a user can send only one valid signal per external nullifier without risking being slashed. Public input of the circuit. |
### ZK Circuits specification
Anonymous signaling with a controlled rate limit is enabled by proving that the user is part of a group which has high barriers to entry (form of stake) and
enabling secret reveal if more than 1 unique signal is produced per external nullifier.
The membership part is implemented using membership [Merkle trees](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merkle_tree) and Merkle proofs,
while the secret reveal part is enabled by using the Shamir's Secret Sharing scheme.
Essentially the protocol requires the users to generate zero-knowledge proof to be able to send signals and participate in the application.
The zero knowledge proof proves that the user is member of a group,
but also enforces the user to share part of their secret for each signal in an external nullifier.
The external nullifier is usually represented by timestamp or a time interval.
It can also be thought of as a voting booth in voting applications.
The ZK Circuit is implemented using a [Groth-16 ZK-SNARK](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/260.pdf),
using the [circomlib](https://docs.circom.io/) library.
#### System parameters
- `DEPTH` - Merkle tree depth
#### Circuit parameters
**Public Inputs**
- `x`
- `external_nullifier`
**Private Inputs**
* `identity_secret_hash`
* `path_elements` - rln membership proof component
* `identity_path_index` - rln membership proof component
**Outputs**
- `y`
- `root` - the rln membership tree root
- `internal_nullifier`
#### Hash function
Canonical [Poseidon hash implementation](https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/458.pdf) is used,
as implemented in the [circomlib library](https://github.com/iden3/circomlib/blob/master/circuits/poseidon.circom), according to the Poseidon paper.
This Poseidon hash version (canonical implementation) uses the following parameters:
| Hash inputs | `t` | `RF` | `RP`|
|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|
|1 | 2 | 8 | 56|
|2 | 3 | 8 | 57|
|3 | 4 | 8 | 56|
|4 | 5 | 8 | 60|
|5 | 6 | 8 | 60|
|6 | 7 | 8 | 63|
|7 | 8 | 8 | 64|
|8 | 9 | 8 | 63|
#### Membership implementation
For a valid signal, a user's `identity_commitment` (more on identity commitments below) must exist in identity membership tree.
Membership is proven by providing a membership proof (witness).
The fields from the membership proof required for the verification are:
`path_elements` and `identity_path_index`.
[IncrementalQuinTree](https://github.com/appliedzkp/incrementalquintree) algorithm is used for constructing the Membership Merkle tree.
The circuits are reused from this repository.
You can find out more details about the IncrementalQuinTree algorithm [here](https://ethresear.ch/t/gas-and-circuit-constraint-benchmarks-of-binary-and-quinary-incremental-Merkle-trees-using-the-poseidon-hash-function/7446).
### Slashing and Shamir's Secret Sharing
Slashing is enabled by using polynomials and [Shamir's Secret sharing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shamir%27s_Secret_Sharing).
In order to produce a valid proof, `identity_secret_hash` as a private input to the circuit.
Then a secret equation is created in the form of:
```
y = a_0 + x * a_1,
```
where `a_0` is the `identity_secret_hash` and `a_1 = hash(a_0, external nullifier)`.
Along with the generated proof,
the users need to provide a `(x, y)` share which satisfies the line equation,
in order for their proof to be verified.
`x` is the hashed signal, while the `y` is the circuit output.
With more than one pair of unique shares, anyone can derive `a_0`, i.e. the `identity_secret_hash` .
The hash of a signal will be the evaluation point `x`.
In this way, a member who sends more than one unique signal per `external_nullifier` risks their identity secret being revealed.
Note that shares used in different epochs and different RLN apps cannot be used to derive the identity secret hash.
Thanks to the `external_nullifier` definition, also shares computed from same secret within same epoch but in different RLN apps cannot be used to derive the identity secret hash.
The `rln_identifier` is a random value from a finite field,
unique per RLN app,
and is used for additional cross-application security - to protect the user secrets being compromised if they use the same credentials accross different RLN apps.
If `rln_identifier` is not present,
the user uses the same credentials and sends a different message for two different RLN apps using the same `external_nullifier`,
then their user signals can be grouped by the `internal_nullifier` which could lead the user's secret revealed.
This is because two separate signals under the same `internal_nullifier` can be treated as rate limiting violation.
With adding the `rln_identifier` field we obscure the `internal_nullifier`,
so this kind of attack can be hardened because we don't have the same `internal_nullifier` anymore.
### Identity credentials generation
In order to be able to generate valid proofs, the users need to be part of the identity membership Merkle tree.
They are part of the identity membership Merkle tree if their `identity_commitment` is placed in a leaf in the tree.
The identity credentials of a user are composed of:
- `identity_secret`
- `identity_secret_hash`
- `identity_commitment`
#### `identity_secret`
The `identity_secret` is generated in the following way:
```
identity_nullifier = random_32_byte_buffer
identity_trapdoor = random_32_byte_buffer
identity_secret = [identity_nullifier, identity_trapdoor]
```
The same secret should not be used accross different protocols,
because revealing the secret at one protocol could break privacy for the user in the other protocols.
#### `identity_secret_hash`
The `identity_secret_hash` is generated by obtaining a Poseidon hash of the `identity_secret` array:
```
identity_secret_hash = poseidonHash(identity_secret)
```
#### `identity_commitment`
The `identity_commitment` is generated by obtaining a Poseidon hash of the `identity_secret_hash`:
```
identity_commitment = poseidonHash([identity_secret_hash])
```
## Appendix A: Security considerations
RLN is an experimental and still un-audited technology. This means that the circuits have not been yet audited.
Another consideration is the security of the underlying primitives.
zk-SNARKS require a trusted setup for generating a prover and verifier keys.
The standard for this is to use trusted [Multi-Party Computation (MPC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_multi-party_computation) ceremony,
which requires two phases.
Trusted MPC ceremony has not yet been performed for the RLN circuits.
### SSS security assumptions
Shamir-Secret Sharing requires polynomial coefficients to be independent of each other.
However, `a_1` depends on `a_0` through the Poseidon hash algorithm.
Due to the design of Poseidon, it is possible to [attack](https://github.com/Rate-Limiting-Nullifier/rln-circuits/pull/7#issuecomment-1416085627) the protocol.
It was decided *not* to change the circuits design, since at the moment the attack is infeasible. Therefore, implementers must be aware that the current version provides approximately 160-bit security and not 254.
Possible improvements:
* [change the circuit](https://github.com/Rate-Limiting-Nullifier/rln-circuits/pull/7#issuecomment-1416085627) to make coefficients independent;
* switch to other hash function (Keccak, SHA);
## Appendix B: Identity scheme choice
The hashing scheme used is based on the design decisions which also include the Semaphore circuits.
Our goal was to ensure compatibility of the secrets for apps that use Semaphore and
RLN circuits while also not compromising on security because of using the same secrets.
For example let's say there is a voting app that uses Semaphore,
and also a chat app that uses RLN.
The UX would be better if the users would not need to care about complicated identity management (secrets and commitments) t
hey use for each app, and it would be much better if they could use a single id commitment for this.
Also in some cases these kind of dependency is required -
RLN chat app using Interep as a registry (instead of using financial stake).
One potential concern about this interoperability is a slashed user on the RLN app side
having their security compromised on the semaphore side apps as well.
I.e obtaining the user's secret, anyone would be able to generate valid semaphore proofs as the slashed user.
We don't want that, and we should keep user's app specific security threats in the domain of that app alone.
To achieve the above interoperability UX while preventing the shared app security model
(i.e slashing user on an RLN app having impact on Semaphore apps),
we had to do the follow in regard the identity secret and identity commitment:
```
identity_secret = [identity_nullifier, identity_trapdoor]
identity_secret_hash = poseidonHash(identity_secret)
identity_commitment = poseidonHash([identity_secret_hash])
```
Secret components for generating Semaphore proof:
```
identity_nullifier
identity_trapdoor
```
Secret components for generting RLN proof:
```
identity_secret_hash
```
When a user is slashed on the RLN app side, their identity secret hash is revealed.
However a semaphore proof can't be generated because we do not know the user's nullifier and trapdoor.
With this design we achieve:
identity commitment (Semaphore) == identity commitment (RLN)
secret (semaphore) != secret (RLN).
This is the only option we had for the scheme in order to satisfy the properties described above.
Also for RLN we do a single secret component input for the circuit.
Thus we need to hash the secret array (two components) to a secret hash,
and we use that as a secret component input.
## Appendix C: Auxiliary tooling
There are few additional tools implemented for easier integrations and usage of the RLN protocol.
[`zerokit`](https://github.com/vacp2p/zerokit) is a set of Zero Knowledge modules, written in Rust and designed to be used in many different environments.
Among different modules, it supports `Semaphore` and `RLN`.
[`zk-kit`](https://github.com/appliedzkp/zk-kit) is a typescript library which exposes APIs for identity credentials generation,
as well as proof generation.
It supports various protocols (`Semaphore`, `RLN`).
[`zk-keeper`](https://github.com/akinovak/zk-keeper) is a browser plugin which allows for safe credential storing and proof generation.
You can think of MetaMask for ZK-Proofs.
It uses `zk-kit` under the hood.
## Appendix D: Example usage
The following examples are code snippets using the `zerokit` RLN module.
The examples are written in [rust](https://www.rust-lang.org/).
### Creating a RLN object
```rust
use rln::protocol::*;
use rln::public::*;
use std::io::Cursor;
// We set the RLN parameters:
// - the tree height;
// - the circuit resource folder (requires a trailing "/").
let tree_height = 20;
let resources = Cursor::new("../zerokit/rln/resources/tree_height_20/");
// We create a new RLN instance
let mut rln = RLN::new(tree_height, resources);
```
### Generating identity credentials
```rust
// We generate an identity tuple
let mut buffer = Cursor::new(Vec::\<u8\>::new());
rln.extended_key_gen(&mut buffer).unwrap();
// We deserialize the keygen output to obtain
// the identiy_secret and id_commitment
let (identity_trapdoor, identity_nullifier, identity_secret_hash, id_commitment) = deserialize_identity_tuple(buffer.into_inner());
```
### Adding ID commitment to the RLN Merkle tree
```rust
// We define the tree index where id_commitment will be added
let id_index = 10;
// We serialize id_commitment and pass it to set_leaf
let mut buffer = Cursor::new(serialize_field_element(id_commitment));
rln.set_leaf(id_index, &mut buffer).unwrap();
```
### Setting epoch and signal
```rust
// We generate epoch from a date seed and we ensure is
// mapped to a field element by hashing-to-field its content
let epoch = hash_to_field(b"Today at noon, this year");
// We set our signal
let signal = b"RLN is awesome";
```
### Generating proof
```rust
// We prepare input to the proof generation routine
let proof_input = prepare_prove_input(identity_secret, id_index, epoch, signal);
// We generate a RLN proof for proof_input
let mut in_buffer = Cursor::new(proof_input);
let mut out_buffer = Cursor::new(Vec::\<u8\>::new());
rln.generate_rln_proof(&mut in_buffer, &mut out_buffer)
.unwrap();
// We get the public outputs returned by the circuit evaluation
let proof_data = out_buffer.into_inner();
```
### Verifiying proof
```rust
// We prepare input to the proof verification routine
let verify_data = prepare_verify_input(proof_data, signal);
// We verify the zk-proof against the provided proof values
let mut in_buffer = Cursor::new(verify_data);
let verified = rln.verify(&mut in_buffer).unwrap();
// We ensure the proof is valid
assert!(verified);
```
For more details please visit the [`zerokit`](https://github.com/vacp2p/zerokit) library.
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/)
## References
- [1] https://medium.com/privacy-scaling-explorations/rate-limiting-nullifier-a-spam-protection-mechanism-for-anonymous-environments-bbe4006a57d
- [2] https://github.com/appliedzkp/zk-kit
- [3] https://github.com/akinovak/zk-keeper
- [4] https://z.cash/technology/zksnarks/
- [5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merkle_tree
- [6] https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/260.pdf
- [7] https://docs.circom.io/
- [8] https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/458.pdf
- [9] https://github.com/appliedzkp/incrementalquintree
- [10] https://ethresear.ch/t/gas-and-circuit-constraint-benchmarks-of-binary-and-quinary-incremental-merkle-trees-using-the-poseidon-hash-function/7446
- [11] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shamir%27s_Secret_Sharing
- [12] https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/24/security-considerations-of-zk-snark-parameter-multi-party-computation/
- [13] https://github.com/Rate-Limiting-Nullifier/rln-circuits/
- [14] https://rate-limiting-nullifier.github.io/rln-docs/

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---
title: 4/MVDS-META
name: MVDS Metadata Field
status: draft
editor: Sanaz Taheri \<sanaz@status.im\>
contributors:
- Dean Eigenmann \<dean@status.im\>
- Andrea Maria Piana \<andreap@status.im\>
- Oskar Thorén \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
In this specification, we describe a method to construct message history that will aid the consistency guarantees of [2/MVDS](../2/mvds.md). Additionally, we explain how data sync can be used for more lightweight messages that do not require full synchronization.
## Motivation
In order for more efficient synchronization of conversational messages, information should be provided allowing a node to more effectively synchronize the dependencies for any given message.
## Format
We introduce the metadata message which is used to convey information about a message and how it SHOULD be handled.
```protobuf
package vac.mvds;
message Metadata {
repeated bytes parents = 1;
bool ephemeral = 2;
}
```
Nodes MAY transmit a `Metadata` message by extending the MVDS [message](../2/mvds.md/#payloads) with a `metadata` field.
```diff
message Message {
bytes group_id = 6001;
int64 timestamp = 6002;
bytes body = 6003;
+ Metadata metadata = 6004;
}
```
### Fields
| Name | Description |
| ---------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `parents` | list of parent [`message identifier`s](../2/mvds.md/#payloads) for the specific message. |
| `ephemeral` | indicates whether a message is ephemeral or not. |
## Usage
### `parents`
This field contains a list of parent [`message identifier`s](../2/mvds.md/#payloads) for the specific message. It MUST NOT contain any messages as parent whose `ack` flag was set to `false`. This establishes a directed acyclic graph (DAG)[^2] of persistent messages.
Nodes MAY buffer messages until dependencies are satisfied for causal consistency[^3], they MAY also pass the messages straight away for eventual consistency[^4].
A parent is any message before a new message that a node is aware of that has no children.
The number of parents for a given message is bound by [0, N], where N is the number of nodes participating in the conversation, therefore the space requirements for the `parents` field is O(N).
If a message has no parents it is considered a root. There can be multiple roots, which might be disconnected, giving rise to multiple DAGs.
### `ephemeral`
When the `ephemeral` flag is set to `false`, a node MUST send an acknowledgment when they have received and processed a message. If it is set to `true`, it SHOULD NOT send any acknowledgment. The flag is `false` by default.
Nodes MAY decide to not persist ephemeral messages, however they MUST NOT be shared as part of the message history.
Nodes SHOULD send ephemeral messages in batch mode. As their delivery is not needed to be guaranteed.
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## Footnotes
[^1]: [2/MVDS](../2/mvds.md)
[^2]: \<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Directed_acyclic_graph\>
[^3]: Jepsen. [Causal Consistency](https://jepsen.io/consistency/models/causal). Jepsen, LLC.
[^4]: \<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eventual_consistency\>

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---
title: 46/GOSSIPSUB-TOR-PUSH
name: Gossipsub Tor Push
status: raw
category: Standards Track
editor: Daniel Kaiser \<danielkaiser@status.im\>
contributors:
sidebar_position: 1
---
## Abstract
This document extends the [libp2p gossipsub specification](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/README.md)
specifying gossipsub Tor Push,
a gossipsub-internal way of pushing messages into a gossipsub network via Tor.
Tor Push adds sender identity protection to gossipsub.
**Protocol identifier**: /meshsub/1.1.0
Note: Gossipsub Tor Push does not have a dedicated protocol identifier.
It uses the same identifier as gossipsub and works with all [pubsub](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/tree/master/pubsub) based protocols.
This allows nodes that are oblivious to Tor Push to process messages received via Tor Push.
## Background
Without extensions, [libp2p gossipsub](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/README.md)
does not protect sender identities.
A possible design of an anonymity extension to gossipsub is pushing messages through an anonymization network before they enter the gossipsub network.
[Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) is currently the largest anonymization network.
It is well researched and works reliably.
Basing our solution on Tor both inherits existing security research, as well as allows for a quick deployment.
Using the anonymization network approach, even the first gossipsub node that relays a given message cannot link the message to its sender (within a relatively strong adversarial model).
Taking the low bandwidth overhead and the low latency overhead into consideration, Tor offers very good anonymity properties.
## Functional Operation
Tor Push allows nodes to push messages over Tor into the gossipsub network.
The approach specified in this document is fully backwards compatible.
Gossipsub nodes that do not support Tor Push can receive and relay Tor Push messages,
because Tor Push uses the same Protocol ID as gossipsub.
Messages are sent over Tor via [SOCKS5](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1928).
Tor Push uses a dedicated libp2p context to prevent information leakage.
To significantly increase resilience and mitigate circuit failures,
Tor Push establishes several connections, each to a different randomly selected gossipsub node.
## Specification
This section specifies the format of Tor Push messages, as well as how Tor Push messages are received and sent, respectively.
### Wire Format
The wire format of a Tor Push message corresponds verbatim to a typical [libp2p pubsub message](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/tree/master/pubsub#the-message).
```
message Message {
optional string from = 1;
optional bytes data = 2;
optional bytes seqno = 3;
required string topic = 4;
optional bytes signature = 5;
optional bytes key = 6;
}
```
### Receiving Tor Push Messages
Any node supporting a protocol with ID `/meshsub/1.1.0` (e.g. gossipsub), can receive Tor Push messages.
Receiving nodes are oblivious to Tor Push and will process incoming messages according to the respective `meshsub/1.1.0` specification.
### Sending Tor Push Messages
In the following, we refer to nodes sending Tor Push messages as Tp-nodes (Tor Push nodes).
Tp-nodes MUST setup a separate libp2p context, i.e. [libp2p switch](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/multiplex/switch/),
which MUST NOT be used for any purpose other than Tor Push.
We refer to this context as Tp-context.
The Tp-context MUST NOT share any data, e.g. peer lists, with the default context.
Tp-peers are peers a Tp-node plans to send Tp-messages to.
Tp-peers MUST support `/meshsub/1.1.0`.
For retrieving Tp-peers, Tp-nodes SHOULD use an ambient peer discovery method that retrieves a random peer sample (from the set of all peers), e.g. [33/WAKU2-DISCV5](../../waku/standards/core/33/discv5.md).
Tp-nodes MUST establish a connection as described in sub-section [Tor Push Connection Establishment](#connection-establishment) to at least one Tp-peer.
To significantly increase resilience, Tp-nodes SHOULD establish Tp-connections to `D` peers,
where `D` is the [desired gossipsub out-degree](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.0.md#parameters),
with a default value of `8`.
Each Tp-message MUST be sent via the Tp-context over at least one Tp-connection.
To increase resilience, Tp-messages SHOULD be sent via the Tp-context over all available Tp-connections.
Control messages of any kind, e.g. gossipsub graft, MUST NOT be sent via Tor Push.
#### Connection Establishment
Tp-nodes establish a `/meshsub/1.1.0` connection to tp-peers via [SOCKS5](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1928) over [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/).
Establishing connections, which in turn establishes the respective Tor circuits, can be done ahead of time.
#### Epochs
Tor Push introduces epochs.
The default epoch duration is 10 minutes.
(We might adjust this default value based on experiments and evaluation in future versions of this document.
It seems a good trade-off between traceablity and circuit building overhead.)
For each epoch, the Tp-context SHOULD be refreshed, which includes
* libp2p peer-ID
* Tp-peer list
* connections to Tp-peers
Both Tp-peer selection for the next epoch and establishing connections to the newly selected peers SHOULD be done during the current epoch
and be completed before the new epoch starts.
This avoids adding latency to message transmission.
## Security/Privacy Considerations
### Fingerprinting Attacks
Protocols that feature distinct patterns are prone to fingerprinting attacks when using them over Tor Push.
Both malicious guards and exit nodes could detect these patterns
and link the sender and receiver, respectively, to transmitted traffic.
As a mitigation, such protocols can introduce dummy messages and/or padding to hide patterns.
### DoS
#### General DoS against Tor
Using untargeted DoS to prevent Tor Push messages from entering the gossipsub network would cost vast resources,
because Tor Push transmits messages over several circuits and the Tor network is well established.
#### Targeting the Guard
Denying the service of a specific guard node blocks Tp-nodes using the respective guard.
Tor guard selection will replace this guard [TODO elaborate].
Still, messages might be delayed during this window which might be critical to certain applications.
#### Targeting the Gossipsub Network
Without sophisticated rate limiting (for example using [17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY](../../waku/standards/core/17/rln-relay.md)),
attackers can spam the gossipsub network.
It is not enough to just block peers that send too many messages,
because these messages might actually come from a Tor exit node that many honest Tp-nodes use.
Without Tor Push, protocols on top of gossipsub could block peers if they exceed a certain message rate.
With Tor Push, this would allow the reputation-based DoS attack described in
[Bitcoin over Tor isn't a Good Idea](https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7163022).
#### Peer Discovery
The discovery mechanism could be abused to link requesting nodes to their Tor connections to discovered nodes.
An attacker that controls both the node that responds to a discovery query,
and the node who’s ENR the response contains,
can link the requester to a Tor connection that is expected to be opened to the node represented by the returned ENR soon after.
Further, the discovery mechanism (e.g. discv5) could be abused to distribute disproportionately many malicious nodes.
For instance if p% of the nodes in the network are malicious,
an attacker could manipulate the discovery to return malicious nodes with 2p% probability.
The discovery mechanism needs to be resilient against this attack.
### Roll-out Phase
During the roll-out phase of Tor Push, during which only a few nodes use Tor Push,
attackers can narrow down the senders of Tor messages to the set of gossipsub nodes that do not originate messages.
Nodes who want anonymity guarantees even during the roll-out phase can use separate network interfaces for their default context and Tp-context, respectively.
For the best protection, these contexts should run on separate physical machines.
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
* [libp2p gossipsub](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/README.md)
* [libp2p pubsub](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/tree/master/pubsub)
* [libp2p pubsub message](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/tree/master/pubsub#the-message)
* [libp2p switch](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/multiplex/switch)
* [SOCKS5](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1928)
* [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/)
* [33/WAKU2-DISCV5](../../waku/standards/core/33/discv5.md)
* [Bitcoin over Tor isn't a Good Idea](https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7163022)
* [17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY](../../waku/standards/core/17/rln-relay.md)

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---
title: 48/RLN-INTEREP-SPEC
name: Interep as group management for RLN
status: raw
category:
editor: Aaryamann Challani \<aaryamann@status.im\>
contributors:
sidebar_position: 1
---
## Abstract
This spec integrates [Interep](https://interep.link) into the [RLN](../32/rln-v1.md) spec.
Interep is a group management protocol that allows for the creation of groups of users and the management of their membership.
It is used to manage the membership of the RLN group.
Interep ties in web2 identities with reputation, and sorts the users into groups based on their reputation score.
For example, a GitHub user with over 100 followers is considered to have "gold" reputation.
Interep uses [Semaphore](https://semaphore.appliedzkp.org/) under the hood to allow anonymous signaling of membership in a group.
Therefore, a user with a "gold" reputation can prove the existence of their membership without revealing their identity.
RLN is used for spam prevention, and Interep is used for group management.
By using Interep with RLN, we allow users to join RLN membership groups without the need for on-chain financial stake.
## Motivation
To have Sybil-Resistant group management, there are [implementations](https://github.com/vacp2p/rln-contract) of RLN which make use of financial stake on-chain.
However, this is not ideal because it reduces the barrier of entry for honest participants.
In this case, honest participants will most likely have a web2 identity accessible to them, which can be used for joining an Interep reputation group.
By modifying the RLN spec to use Interep, we can have Sybil-Resistant group management without the need for on-chain financial stake.
Since RLN and Interep both use Semaphore-style credentials, it is possible to use the same set of credentials for both.
## Functional Operation
Using Interep with RLN involves the following steps -
1. Generate Semaphore credentials
2. Verify reputation and join Interep group
3. Join RLN membership group via interaction with Smart Contract, by passing a proof of membership to the Interep group
### 1. Generate Semaphore credentials
Semaphore credentials are generated in a standard way, depicted in the [Semaphore documentation](https://semaphore.appliedzkp.org/docs/guides/identities#create-deterministic-identities).
### 2. Verify reputation and join Interep group
Using the Interep app deployed on [Goerli](https://goerli.interep.link/), the user can check their reputation tier and join the corresponding group.
This results in a transaction to the Interep contract, which adds them to the group.
### 3. Join RLN membership group
Instead of sending funds to the RLN contract to join the membership group, the user can send a proof of membership to the Interep group.
This proof is generated by the user, and is verified by the contract.
The contract ensures that the user is a member of the Interep group, and then adds them to the RLN membership group.
Following is the modified signature of the register function in the RLN contract -
```solidity
/// @param groupId: Id of the group.
/// @param signal: Semaphore signal.
/// @param nullifierHash: Nullifier hash.
/// @param externalNullifier: External nullifier.
/// @param proof: Zero-knowledge proof.
/// @param idCommitment: ID Commitment of the member.
function register(
uint256 groupId,
bytes32 signal,
uint256 nullifierHash,
uint256 externalNullifier,
uint256[8] calldata proof,
uint256 idCommitment
)
```
## Verification of messages
Messages are verified the same way as in the [RLN spec](../32/rln-v1.md/#verification).
## Slashing
The slashing mechanism is the same as in the [RLN spec](../32/rln-v1.md/#slashing).
It is important to note that the slashing may not have the intended effect on the user, since the only consequence is that they cannot send messages.
This is due to the fact that the user can send a identity commitment in the registration to the RLN contract, which is different than the one used in the Interep group.
## Proof of Concept
A proof of concept is available at [vacp2p/rln-interp-contract](https://github.com/vacp2p/rln-interep-contract) which integrates Interep with RLN.
## Security Considerations
1. As mentioned in [Slashing](#slashing), the slashing mechanism may not have the intended effect on the user.
2. This spec inherits the security considerations of the [RLN spec](../32/rln-v1.md/#security-considerations).
3. This spec inherits the security considerations of [Interep](https://docs.interep.link/).
4. A user may make multiple registrations using the same Interep proofs but different identity commitments. The way to mitigate this is to check if the nullifier hash has been detected previously in proof verification.
## References
1. [RLN spec](../32/rln-v1.md)
2. [Interep](https://interep.link)
3. [Semaphore](https://semaphore.appliedzkp.org/)
4. [Decentralized cloudflare using Interep](https://ethresear.ch/t/decentralised-cloudflare-using-rln-and-rich-user-identities/10774)
5. [Interep contracts](https://github.com/interep-project/contracts)
6. [RLN contract](https://github.com/vacp2p/rln-contract)
7. [RLNP2P](https://rlnp2p.vac.dev/)

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---
title: 58/RLN-V2
name: Rate Limit Nullifier V2
status: raw
editor: Rasul Ibragimov \<curryrasul@gmail.com\>
contributors:
- Lev Soukhanov \<0xdeadfae@gmail.com\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
## Abstract
The protocol specified in this document is an improvement of [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md), being more general construct, that allows to set various limits for an epoch (it's 1 message per epoch in [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md)) while remaining almost as simple as it predecessor.
Moreover, it allows to set different rate-limits for different RLN app users based on some public data, e.g. stake or reputation.
## Motivation
The main goal of this RFC is to generalize [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md) and expand its applications.
There are two different subprotocols based on this protocol:
* RLN-Same - RLN with the same rate-limit for all users;
* RLN-Diff - RLN that allows to set different rate-limits for different users.
It is important to note that by using a large epoch limit value, users will be able to remain anonymous, because their `internal_nullifiers` will not be repeated until they exceed the limit.
## Flow
As in [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md), the general flow can be described by three steps:
1. Registration
2. Signaling
3. Verification and slashing
The two sub-protocols have different flows, and hence are defined separately.
### Important note
All terms and parameters used remain the same as in [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md), more details [here](../32/rln-v1.md/#technical-overview)
## RLN-Same flow
### Registration
The registration process in the RLN-Same subprotocol does not differ from [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md).
### Signalling
#### Proof generation
For proof generation, the user needs to submit the following fields to the circuit:
```
{
identity_secret: identity_secret_hash,
path_elements: Merkle_proof.path_elements,
identity_path_index: Merkle_proof.indices,
x: signal_hash,
message_id: message_id,
external_nullifier: external_nullifier,
message_limit: message_limit
}
```
#### Calculating output
The following fields are needed for proof output calculation:
```
{
identity_secret_hash: bigint,
external_nullifier: bigint,
message_id: bigint,
x: bigint,
}
```
The output `[y, internal_nullifier]` is calculated in the following way:
```
a_0 = identity_secret_hash
a_1 = poseidonHash([a0, external_nullifier, message_id])
y = a_0 + x * a_1
internal_nullifier = poseidonHash([a_1])
```
## RLN-Diff flow
### Registration
**id_commitment** in [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md) is equal to `poseidonHash(identity_secret)`.
The goal of RLN-Diff is to set different rate-limits for different users.
It follows that **id_commitment** must somehow depend on the `user_message_limit` parameter, where 0 \<= `user_message_limit` \<= `message_limit`.
There are few ways to do that:
1. Sending `identity_secret_hash` = `poseidonHash(identity_secret, userMessageLimit)` and zk proof that `user_message_limit` is valid (is in the right range).
This approach requires zkSNARK verification, which is an expensive operation on the blockchain.
2. Sending the same `identity_secret_hash` as in [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md) (`poseidonHash(identity_secret)`) and a user_message_limit publicly to a server or smart-contract where `rate_commitment` = `poseidonHash(identity_secret_hash, userMessageLimit)` is calculated.
The leaves in the membership Merkle tree would be the rate_commitments of the users.
This approach requires additional hashing in the Circuit, but it eliminates the need for zk proof verification for the registration.
Both methods are correct, and the choice of the method is left to the implementer.
It is recommended to use second method for the reasons already described.
The following flow description will also be based on the second method.
### Signalling
#### Proof generation
For proof generation, the user need to submit the following fields to the circuit:
```
{
identity_secret: identity_secret_hash,
path_elements: Merkle_proof.path_elements,
identity_path_index: Merkle_proof.indices,
x: signal_hash,
message_id: message_id,
external_nullifier: external_nullifier,
user_message_limit: message_limit
}
```
#### Calculating output
The Output is calculated in the same way as the RLN-Same sub-protocol.
### Verification and slashing
Verification and slashing in both subprotocols remain the same as in [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md).
The only difference that may arise is the `message_limit` check in RLN-Same, since it is now a public input of the Circuit.
### ZK Circuits specification
The design of the [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md) circuits is different from the circuits of this protocol.
RLN-v2 requires additional algebraic constraints.
The membership proof and Shamir's Secret Sharing constraints remain unchanged.
The ZK Circuit is implemented using a [Groth-16 ZK-SNARK](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/260.pdf),
using the [circomlib](https://docs.circom.io/) library.
Both schemes contain compile-time constants/system parameters:
* DEPTH - depth of membership Merkle tree
* LIMIT_BIT_SIZE - bit size of `limit` numbers, e.g. for the 16 - maximum `limit` number is 65535.
The main difference of the protocol is that instead of a new polynomial (a new value `a_1`) for a new epoch, a new polynomial is generated for each message.
The user assigns an identifier to each message; the main requirement is that this identifier be in the range from 1 to `limit`.
This is proven using range constraints.
### RLN-Same circuit
#### Circuit parameters
**Public Inputs**
- `x`
- `external_nullifier`
- `message_limit` - limit per epoch
**Private Inputs**
- `identity_secret_hash`
- `path_elements`
- `identity_path_index`
- `message_id`
**Outputs**
- `y`
- `root`
- `internal_nullifier`
### RLN-Diff circuit
In the RLN-Diff scheme, instead of the public parameter `message_limit`, a parameter is used that is set for each user during registration (`user_message_limit`); the `message_id` value is compared to it in the same way as it is compared to `message_limit` in the case of RLN-Same.
#### Circuit parameters
**Public Inputs**
- `x`
- `external_nullifier`
**Private Inputs**
- `identity_secret_hash`
- `path_elements`
- `identity_path_index`
- `message_id`
- `user_message_limit`
**Outputs**
- `y`
- `root`
- `internal_nullifier`
## Appendix A: Security considerations
Although there are changes in the circuits, this spec inherits all the security considerations of [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md).
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
- [1](https://zkresear.ch/t/rate-limit-nullifier-v2-circuits/102)
- [2](https://github.com/Rate-Limiting-Nullifier/rln-circuits-v2)
- [3](../32/rln-v1.md/#technical-overview)

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---
title: 70/ETH-SECPM
name: Secure channel setup using Ethereum accounts
status: raw
category: Standards Track
editor: Ramses Fernandez \<ramses@status.im\>
contributors:
sidebar_position: 1
---
## Motivation
The need for secure communications has become paramount.
Traditional centralized messaging protocols are susceptible to various security threats,
including unauthorized access, data breaches, and single points of failure.
Therefore a decentralized approach to secure communication becomes increasingly relevant,
offering a robust solution to address these challenges.
This specification outlines a private messaging service using the Ethereum blockchain as authentication service.
Rooted in the existing [model](https://rfc.vac.dev/spec/20/),
this proposal addresses the deficiencies related to forward privacy and authentication inherent in the current framework.
The specification is divided into 3 sections:
- Private 1-to-1 communications protocol, based on [Signal's double ratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/).
- Private group messaging protocol, based on the [MLS protocol](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/).
- Description of an Ethereum-based authentication protocol, based on [SIWE](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4361).
## Private 1-to-1 communications protocol
### Theory
The specification is based on the noise protocol framework.
It corresponds to the double ratchet scheme combined with the X3DH algorithm, which will be used to initialize the former.
We chose to express the protocol in noise to be be able to use the noise streamlined implementation and proving features.
The X3DH algorithm provides both authentication and forward secrecy, as stated in the [X3DH specification](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/).
This protocol will consist of several stages:
1. Key setting for X3DH: this step will produce prekey bundles for Bob which will be fed into X3DH. It will also allow Alice to generate the keys required to run the X3DH algorithm correctly.
2. Execution of X3DH: This step will output a common secret key `SK` together with an additional data vector `AD`. Both will be used in the double ratchet algorithm initialization.
3. Execution of the double ratchet algorithm for forward secure, authenticated communications, using the common secret key `SK`, obtained from X3DH, as a root key.
The protocol assumes the following requirements:
- Alice knows Bob’s Ethereum address.
- Bob is willing to participate in the protocol, and publishes his public key.
- Bob’s ownership of his public key is verifiable,
- Alice wants to send message M to Bob.
- An eavesdropper cannot read M’s content even if she is storing it or relaying it.
### Syntax
#### Cryptographic suite
The following cryptographic functions MUST be used:
- `X488` as Diffie-Hellman function `DH`.
- `SHA256` as KDF.
- `AES256-GCM` as AEAD algorithm.
- `SHA512` as hash function.
- `XEd448` for digital signatures.
#### X3DH initialization
This scheme MUST work on the curve curve448.
The X3DH algorithm corresponds to the IX pattern in Noise.
Bob and Alice MUST define personal key pairs `(ik_B, IK_B)` and `(ik_A, IK_A)` respectively where:
- The key `ik` must be kept secret,
- and the key `IK` is public.
Bob MUST generate new keys using `(ik_B, IK_B) = GENERATE_KEYPAIR(curve = curve448)`.
Bob MUST also generate a public key pair `(spk_B, SPK_B) = GENERATE_KEYPAIR(curve = curve448)`.
`SPK` is a public key generated and stored at medium-term.
Both signed prekey and the certificate MUST undergo periodic replacement.
After replacing the key,
Bob keeps the old private key of `SPK` for some interval, dependant on the implementation.
This allows Bob to decrypt delayed messages.
Bob MUST sign `SPK` for authentication: `SigSPK = XEd448(ik, Encode(SPK))`
A final step requires the definition of `prekey_bundle = (IK, SPK, SigSPK, OPK_i)`
One-time keys `OPK` MUST be generated as `(opk_B, OPK_B) = GENERATE_KEYPAIR(curve = curve448)`.
Before sending an initial message to Bob, Alice MUST generate an AD: `AD = Encode(IK_A) || Encode(IK_B)`.
Alice MUST generate ephemeral key pairs `(ek, EK) = GENERATE_KEYPAIR(curve = curve448)`.
The function `Encode()` transforms an curve448 public key into a byte sequence.
This is specified in the [RFC 7748](http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc7748.txt) on elliptic curves for security.
One MUST consider `q = 2^446 - 13818066809895115352007386748515426880336692474882178609894547503885` for digital signatures with `(XEd448_sign, XEd448_verify)`:
```
XEd448_sign((ik, IK), message):
Z = randbytes(64)
r = SHA512(2^456 - 2 || ik || message || Z )
R = (r * convert_mont(5)) % q
h = SHA512(R || IK || M)
s = (r + h * ik) % q
return (R || s)
```
```
XEd448_verify(u, message, (R || s)):
if (R.y \>= 2^448) or (s \>= 2^446): return FALSE
h = (SHA512(R || 156326 || message)) % q
R_check = s * convert_mont(5) - h * 156326
if R == R_check: return TRUE
return FALSE
```
```
convert_mont(u):
u_masked = u % mod 2^448
inv = ((1 - u_masked)^(2^448 - 2^224 - 3)) % (2^448 - 2^224 - 1)
P.y = ((1 + u_masked) * inv)) % (2^448 - 2^224 - 1)
P.s = 0
return P
```
#### Use of X3DH
This specification combines the double ratchet with X3DH using the following data as initialization for the former:
- The `SK` output from X3DH becomes the `SK` input of the double ratchet. See section 3.3 of [Signal Specification](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/) for a detailed description.
- The `AD` output from X3DH becomes the `AD` input of the double ratchet. See sections 3.4 and 3.5 of [Signal Specification](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/) for a detailed description.
- Bob’s signed prekey `SigSPKB` from X3DH is used as Bob’s initial ratchet public key of the double ratchet.
X3DH has three phases:
1. Bob publishes his identity key and prekeys to a server, a network, or dedicated smart contract.
2. Alice fetches a prekey bundle from the server, and uses it to send an initial message to Bob.
3. Bob receives and processes Alice's initial message.
Alice MUST perform the following computations:
```
dh1 = DH(IK_A, SPK_B, curve = curve448)
dh2 = DH(EK_A, IK_B, curve = curve448)
dh3 = DH(EK_A, SPK_B)
SK = KDF(dh1 || dh2 || dh3)
```
Alice MUST send to Bob a message containing:
- `IK_A, EK_A`.
- An identifier to Bob's prekeys used.
- A message encrypted with AES256-GCM using `AD` and `SK`.
Upon reception of the initial message, Bob MUST:
1. Perform the same computations above with the `DH()` function.
2. Derive `SK` and construct `AD`.
3. Decrypt the initial message encrypted with `AES256-GCM`.
4. If decryption fails, abort the protocol.
#### Initialization of the double datchet
In this stage Bob and Alice have generated key pairs and agreed a shared secret `SK` using X3DH.
Alice calls `RatchetInitAlice()` defined below:
```
RatchetInitAlice(SK, IK_B):
state.DHs = GENERATE_KEYPAIR(curve = curve448)
state.DHr = IK_B
state.RK, state.CKs = HKDF(SK, DH(state.DHs, state.DHr))
state.CKr = None
state.Ns, state.Nr, state.PN = 0
state.MKSKIPPED = {}
```
The HKDF function MUST be the proposal by [Krawczyk and Eronen](http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5869.txt).
In this proposal `chaining_key` and `input_key_material` MUST be replaced with `SK` and the output of `DH` respectively.
Similarly, Bob calls the function `RatchetInitBob()` defined below:
```
RatchetInitBob(SK, (ik_B,IK_B)):
state.DHs = (ik_B, IK_B)
state.Dhr = None
state.RK = SK
state.CKs, state.CKr = None
state.Ns, state.Nr, state.PN = 0
state.MKSKIPPED = {}
```
#### Encryption
This function performs the symmetric key ratchet.
```
RatchetEncrypt(state, plaintext, AD):
state.CKs, mk = HMAC-SHA256(state.CKs)
header = HEADER(state.DHs, state.PN, state.Ns)
state.Ns = state.Ns + 1
return header, AES256-GCM_Enc(mk, plaintext, AD || header)
```
The `HEADER` function creates a new message header containing the public key from the key pair output of the `DH`function.
It outputs the previous chain length `pn`, and the message number `n`.
The returned header object contains ratchet public key `dh` and integers `pn` and `n`.
#### Decryption
The function `RatchetDecrypt()` decrypts incoming messages:
```
RatchetDecrypt(state, header, ciphertext, AD):
plaintext = TrySkippedMessageKeys(state, header, ciphertext, AD)
if plaintext != None:
return plaintext
if header.dh != state.DHr:
SkipMessageKeys(state, header.pn)
DHRatchet(state, header)
SkipMessageKeys(state, header.n)
state.CKr, mk = HMAC-SHA256(state.CKr)
state.Nr = state.Nr + 1
return AES256-GCM_Dec(mk, ciphertext, AD || header)
```
Auxiliary functions follow:
```
DHRatchet(state, header):
state.PN = state.Ns
state.Ns = state.Nr = 0
state.DHr = header.dh
state.RK, state.CKr = HKDF(state.RK, DH(state.DHs, state.DHr))
state.DHs = GENERATE_KEYPAIR(curve = curve448)
state.RK, state.CKs = HKDF(state.RK, DH(state.DHs, state.DHr))
```
```
SkipMessageKeys(state, until):
if state.NR + MAX_SKIP \< until:
raise Error
if state.CKr != none:
while state.Nr \< until:
state.CKr, mk = HMAC-SHA256(state.CKr)
state.MKSKIPPED[state.DHr, state.Nr] = mk
state.Nr = state.Nr + 1
```
```
TrySkippedMessageKey(state, header, ciphertext, AD):
if (header.dh, header.n) in state.MKSKIPPED:
mk = state.MKSKIPPED[header.dh, header.n]
delete state.MKSKIPPED[header.dh, header.n]
return AES256-GCM_Dec(mk, ciphertext, AD || header)
else: return None
```
## Information retrieval
### Static data
Some data, such as the key pairs `(ik, IK)` for Alice and Bob, MAY NOT be regenerated after a period of time.
Therefore the prekey bundle MAY be stored in long-term storage solutions, such as a dedicated smart contract which outputs such a key pair when receiving an Ethereum wallet address.
Storing static data is done using a dedicated smart contract `PublicKeyStorage` which associates the Ethereum wallet address of a user with his public key.
This mapping is done by `PublicKeyStorage` using a `publicKeys` function, or a `setPublicKey` function.
This mapping is done if the user passed an authorization process.
A user who wants to retrieve a public key associated with a specific wallet address calls a function `getPublicKey`.
The user provides the wallet address as the only input parameter for `getPublicKey`.
The function outputs the associated public key from the smart contract.
### Ephemeral data
Storing ephemeral data on Ethereum MAY be done using a combination of on-chain and off-chain solutions.
This approach provides an efficient solution to the problem of storing updatable data in Ethereum.
1. Ethereum stores a reference or a hash that points to the off-chain data.
2. Off-chain solutions can include systems like IPFS, traditional cloud storage solutions, or decentralized storage networks such as a [Swarm](https://www.ethswarm.org).
In any case, the user stores the associated IPFS hash, URL or reference in Ethereum.
The fact of a user not updating the ephemeral information can be understood as Bob not willing to participate in any communication.
This applies to `KeyPackage`, which in the MLS specification are meant to be stored in a directory provided by the delivery service.
If such an element does not exist, `KeyPackage` MUST be stored according to one of the two options outlined above.
## Private group messaging protocol
### Theory
The [Messaging Layer Security](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/)(MLS) protocol aims at providing a group of users with end-to-end encryption in an authenticated and asynchronous way.
The main security characteristics of the protocol are: Message confidentiality and authentication, sender authentication,
membership agreement, post-remove and post-update security, and forward secrecy and post-compromise security.
The MLS protocol achieves: low-complexity, group integrity, synchronization and extensibility.
The extension to group chat described in forthcoming sections is built upon the [MLS](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/) protocol.
### Syntax
Each MLS session uses a single cipher suite that specifies the primitives to be used in group key computations. The cipher suite MUST use:
- `X488` as Diffie-Hellman function.
- `SHA256` as KDF.
- `AES256-GCM` as AEAD algorithm.
- `SHA512` as hash function.
- `XEd448` for digital signatures.
Formats for public keys, signatures and public-key encryption MUST follow Section 5.1 of [RFC9420](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/).
### Hash-based identifiers
Some MLS messages refer to other MLS objects by hash.
These identifiers MUST be computed according to Section 5.2 of [RFC9420](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/).
### Credentials
Each member of a group presents a credential that provides one or more identities for the member and associates them with the member's signing key.
The identities and signing key are verified by the Authentication Service in use for a group.
Credentials MUST follow the specifications of section 5.3 of [RFC9420](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/).
### Message framing
Handshake and application messages use a common framing structure providing encryption to ensure confidentiality within the group, and signing to authenticate the sender.
The structure is:
- `PublicMessage`: represents a message that is only signed, and not encrypted.
The definition and the encoding/decoding of a `PublicMessage` MUST follow the specification in section 6.2 of [RFC9420](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/).
- `PrivateMessage`: represents a signed and encrypted message, with protections for both the content of the message and related metadata.
The definition, and the encoding/decoding of a `PrivateMessage` MUST follow the specification in section 6.3 of [RFC9420](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/).
Applications MUST use `PrivateMessage` to encrypt application messages.
Applications SHOULD use `PrivateMessage` to encode handshake messages.
Each encrypted MLS message carries a "generation" number which is a per-sender incrementing counter.
If a group member observes a gap in the generation sequence for a sender,
then they know that they have missed a message from that sender.
### Nodes contents
The nodes of a ratchet tree contain several types of data:
- Leaf nodes describe individual members.
- Parent nodes describe subgroups.
Contents of each kind of node, and its structure MUST follow the indications described in sections 7.1 and 7.2 of [RFC9420](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/).
### Leaf node validation
`KeyPackage` objects describe the client's capabilities and provides keys that can be used to add the client to a group.
The validity of a leaf node needs to be verified at the following stages:
- When a leaf node is downloaded in a `KeyPackage`, before it is used to add the client to the group.
- When a leaf node is received by a group member in an Add, Update, or Commit message.
- When a client validates a ratchet tree.
A client MUST verify the validity of a leaf node following the instructions of section 7.3 in [RFC9420](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/).
### Ratchet tree evolution
Whenever a member initiates an epoch change, they MAY need to refresh the key pairs of their leaf and of the nodes on their direct path. This is done to keep forward secrecy and post-compromise security.
The member initiating the epoch change MUST follow this procedure procedure.
A member updates the nodes along its direct path as follows:
- Blank all the nodes on the direct path from the leaf to the root.
- Generate a fresh HPKE key pair for the leaf.
- Generate a sequence of path secrets, one for each node on the leaf's filtered direct path.
It MUST follow the procedure described in section 7.4 of [RFC9420](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/).
- Compute the sequence of HPKE key pairs `(node_priv,node_pub)`, one for each node on the leaf's direct path.
It MUST follow the procedure described in section 7.4 of [RFC9420](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/).
### Views of the tree synchronization
After generating fresh key material and applying it to update their local tree state, the generator broadcasts this update to other members of the group.
This operation MUST be done according to section 7.5 of [RFC9420](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/).
### Leaf synchronization
Changes to group memberships MUST be represented by adding and removing leaves of the tree.
This corresponds to increasing or decreasing the depth of the tree, resulting in the number of leaves being doubled or halved.
These operations MUST be done as described in section 7.7 of [RFC9420](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/).
### Tree and parent hashing
Group members can agree on the cryptographic state of the group by generating a hash value that represents the contents of the group ratchet tree and the member’s credentials.
The hash of the tree is the hash of its root node, defined recursively from the leaves.
Tree hashes summarize the state of a tree at point in time.
The hash of a leaf is the hash of the `LeafNodeHashInput` object.
At the same time, the hash of a parent node including the root, is the hash of a `ParentNodeHashInput` object.
Parent hashes capture information about how keys in the tree were populated.
Tree and parent hashing MUST follow the directions in Sections 7.8 and 7.9 of [RFC9420](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/).
### Key schedule
Group keys are derived using the `Extract` and `Expand` functions from the KDF for the group's cipher suite, as well as the functions defined below:
```
ExpandWithLabel(Secret, Label, Context, Length) = KDF.Expand(Secret, KDFLabel, Length)
DeriveSecret(Secret, Label) = ExpandWithLabel(Secret, Label, "", KDF.Nh)
```
`KDFLabel` MUST be specified as:
```
struct {
uint16 length;
opaque label\<V\>;
opaque context\<V\>;
} KDFLabel;
```
The fields of `KDFLabel` MUST be:
```
length = Length;
label = "MLS 1.0 " + Label;
context = Context;
```
Each member of the group MUST maintaint a `GroupContext` object summarizing the state of the group.
The sturcture of such object MUST be:
```
struct {
ProtocolVersion version = mls10;
CipherSuite cipher_suite;
opaque group_id\<V\>;
uint64 epoch;
opaque tree_hash\<V\>;
opaque confirmed_trasncript_hash\<V\>;
Extension extension\<V\>;
} GroupContext;
```
The use of key scheduling MUST follow the indications in sections 8.1 - 8.7 in [RFC9420](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/).
### Secret trees
For the generation of encryption keys and nonces, the key schedule begins with the `encryption_secret` at the root and derives a tree of secrets with the same structure as the group's ratchet tree.
Each leaf in the secret tree is associated with the same group member as the corresponding leaf in the ratchet tree.
If `N` is a parent node in the secret tree, the secrets of the children of `N` MUST be defined following section 9 of [RFC9420](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/).
#### Encryption keys
MLS encrypts three different types of information:
- Metadata (sender information).
- Handshake messages (Proposal and Commit).
- Application messages.
For handshake and application messages, a sequence of keys is derived via a sender ratchet.
Each sender has their own sender ratchet, and each step along the ratchet is called a generation. These procedures MUST follow section 9.1 of [RFC9420](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/).
#### Deletion schedule
All security-sensitive values MUST be deleted as soon as they are consumed.
A sensitive value S is consumed if:
- S was used to encrypt or (successfully) decrypt a message.
- A key, nonce, or secret derived from S has been consumed.
The deletion procedure MUST follow the instruction described in section 9.2 of [RFC9420](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/).
### Key packages
KeyPackage objects are used to ease the addition of clients to a group asynchronously.
A KeyPackage object specifies:
- Protocol version and cipher suite supported by the client.
- Public keys that can be used to encrypt Welcome messages. Welcome messages provide new members with the information to initialize their state for the epoch in which they were added or in which they want to add themselves to the group
- The content of the leaf node that should be added to the tree to represent this client.
KeyPackages are intended to be used only once and SHOULD NOT be reused.
Clients MAY generate and publish multiple KeyPackages to support multiple cipher suites.
The structure of the object MUST be:
```
struct {
ProtocolVersion version;
CipherSuite cipher_suite;
HPKEPublicKey init_key;
LeafNode leaf_node;
Extension extensions\<V\>;
/* SignWithLabel(., "KeyPackageTBS", KeyPackageTBS) */
opaque signature\<V\>;
}
```
```
struct {
ProtocolVersion version;
CipheSuite cipher_suite;
HPKEPublicKey init_key;
LeafNode leaf_node;
Extension extensions\<V\>;
}
```
`KeyPackage` object MUST be verified when:
- A `KeyPackage` is downloaded by a group member, before it is used to add the client to the group.
- When a `KeyPackage` is received by a group member in an `Add` message.
Verification MUST be done as follows:
- Verify that the cipher suite and protocol version of the `KeyPackage` match those in the `GroupContext`.
- Verify that the `leaf_node` of the `KeyPackage` is valid for a `KeyPackage`.
- Verify that the signature on the `KeyPackage` is valid.
- Verify that the value of `leaf_node.encryption_key` is different from the value of the `init_key field`.
HPKE public keys are opaque values in a format defined by Section 4 of [RFC9180](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9180/).
Signature public keys are represented as opaque values in a format defined by the cipher suite's signature scheme.
### Group creation
A group is always created with a single member.
Other members are then added to the group using the usual Add/Commit mechanism.
The creator of a group MUST set:
- the group ID.
- cipher suite.
- initial extensions for the group.
If the creator intends to add other members at the time of creation, then it SHOULD fetch `KeyPackages` for those members, and select a cipher suite and extensions according to their capabilities.
The creator MUST use the capabilities information in these `KeyPackages` to verify that the chosen version and cipher suite is the best option supported by all members.
Group IDs SHOULD be constructed so they are unique with high probability.
To initialize a group, the creator of the group MUST initialize a one-member group with the following initial values:
- Ratchet tree: A tree with a single node, a leaf node containing an HPKE public key and credential for the creator.
- Group ID: A value set by the creator.
- Epoch: `0`.
- Tree hash: The root hash of the above ratchet tree.
- Confirmed transcript hash: The zero-length octet string.
- Epoch secret: A fresh random value of size `KDF.Nh`.
- Extensions: Any values of the creator's choosing.
The creator MUST also calculate the interim transcript hash:
- Derive the `confirmation_key` for the epoch according to Section 8 of [RFC9420](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/).
- Compute a `confirmation_tag` over the empty `confirmed_transcript_hash` using the `confirmation_key` as described in Section 8.1 of [RFC9420](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/).
- Compute the updated `interim_transcript_hash` from the `confirmed_transcript_hash` and the `confirmation_tag` as described in Section 8.2 [RFC9420](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/).
All members of a group MUST support the cipher suite and protocol version in use. Additional requirements MAY be imposed by including a `required_capabilities` extension in the `GroupContext`.
```
struct {
ExtensionType extension_types\<V\>;
ProposalType proposal_types\<V\>;
CredentialType credential_types\<V\>;
}
```
### Group evolution
Group membership can change, and existing members can change their keys in order to achieve post-compromise security.
In MLS, each such change is accomplished by a two-step process:
- A proposal to make the change is broadcast to the group in a Proposal message.
- A member of the group or a new member broadcasts a Commit message that causes one or more proposed changes to enter into effect.
The group evolves from one cryptographic state to another each time a Commit message is sent and processed.
These states are called epochs and are uniquely identified among states of the group by eight-octet epoch values.
Proposals are included in a `FramedContent` by way of a `Proposal` structure that indicates their type:
```
struct {
ProposalType proposal_type;
select (Proposal.proposal_type) {
case add: Add:
case update: Update;
case remove: Remove;
case psk: PreSharedKey;
case reinit: ReInit;
case external_init: ExternalInit;
case group_context_extensions: GroupContextExtensions;
}
```
On receiving a `FramedContent` containing a `Proposal`, a client MUST verify the signature inside `FramedContentAuthData` and that the epoch field of the enclosing FramedContent is equal to the epoch field of the current GroupContext object.
If the verification is successful, then the Proposal SHOULD be cached in such a way that it can be retrieved by hash in a later Commit message.
Proposals are organized as follows:
- `Add`: requests that a client with a specified KeyPackage be added to the group.
- `Update`: similar to Add, it replaces the sender's LeafNode in the tree instead of adding a new leaf to the tree.
- `Remove`: requests that the member with the leaf index removed be removed from the group.
- `ReInit`: requests to reinitialize the group with different parameters.
- `ExternalInit`: used by new members that want to join a group by using an external commit.
- `GroupContentExtensions`: it is used to update the list of extensions in the GroupContext for the group.
Proposals structure and semantics MUST follow sections 12.1.1 - 12.1.7 of [RFC9420](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/).
Any list of commited proposals MUST be validated either by a the group member who created the commit, or any group member processing such commit.
The validation MUST be done according to one of the procedures described in Section 12.2 of [RFC9420](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/).
When creating or processing a Commit, a client applies a list of proposals to the ratchet tree and `GroupContext`.
The client MUST apply the proposals in the list in the order described in Section 12.3 of [RFC9420](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/).
### Commit messages
Commit messages initiate new group epochs.
It informs group members to update their representation of the state of the group by applying the proposals and advancing the key schedule.
Each proposal covered by the Commit is included by a `ProposalOrRef` value.
`ProposalOrRef` identify the proposal to be applied by value or by reference.
Commits that refer to new Proposals from the committer can be included by value.
Commits for previously sent proposals from anyone can be sent by reference.
Proposals sent by reference are specified by including the hash of the `AuthenticatedContent`.
Group members that have observed one or more valid proposals within an epoch MUST send a Commit message before sending application data.
A sender and a receiver of a Commit MUST verify that the committed list of proposals is valid.
The sender of a Commit SHOULD include all valid proposals received during the current epoch.
Functioning of commits MUST follow the instructions of Section 12.4 of [RFC9420](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/).
### Application messages
Handshake messages provide an authenticated group key exchange to clients.
To protect application messages sent among the members of a group, the `encryption_secret` provided by the key schedule is used to derive a sequence of nonces and keys for message encryption.
Each client MUST maintain their local copy of the key schedule for each epoch during which they are a group member.
They derive new keys, nonces, and secrets as needed. This data MUST be deleted as soon as they have been used.
Group members MUST use the AEAD algorithm associated with the negotiated MLS ciphersuite to encrypt and decrypt Application messages according to the Message Framing section.
The group identifier and epoch allow a device to know which group secrets should be used and from which Epoch secret to start computing other secrets and keys.
Application messages SHOULD be padded to provide resistance against traffic analysis techniques.
This avoids additional information to be provided to an attacker in order to guess the length of the encrypted message.
Padding SHOULD be used on messages with zero-valued bytes before AEAD encryption.
Functioning of application messages MUST follow the instructions of Section 15 of [RFC9420](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/).
### Considerations with respect to decentralization
The MLS protocol assumes the existence on a (central, untrusted) *delivery service*, whose responsabilites include:
- Acting as a directory service providing the initial keying material for clients to use.
- Routing MLS messages among clients.
The central delivery service can be avoided in protocols using the publish/gossip approach, such as [gossipsub](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/tree/master/pubsub/gossipsub).
Concerning keys, each node can generate and disseminate their encryption key among the other nodes, so they can create a local version of the tree that allows for the generation of the group key.
Another important component is the *authentication service*, which is replaced with SIWE in this specification.
## Ethereum-based authentication protocol
### Theory
Sign-in with Ethereum describes how Ethereum accounts authenticate with off-chain services by signing a standard message format
parameterized by scope, session details, and security mechanisms.
Sign-in with Ethereum (SIWE), which is described in the [EIP 4361](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4361), MUST be the authentication method required.
### Syntax
#### Message format (ABNF)
A SIWE Message MUST conform with the following Augmented Backus–Naur Form ([RFC 5234](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5234)) expression.
```
sign-in-with-ethereum =
[ scheme "://" ] domain %s" wants you to sign in with your Ethereum account:" LF
address LF
LF
[ statement LF ]
LF
%s"URI: " uri LF
%s"Version: " version LF
%s"Chain ID: " chain-id LF
%s"Nonce: " nonce LF
%s"Issued At: " issued-at
[ LF %s"Expiration Time: " expiration-time ]
[ LF %s"Not Before: " not-before ]
[ LF %s"Request ID: " request-id ]
[ LF %s"Resources:"
resources ]
scheme = ALPHA *( ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "-" / "." )
; See RFC 3986 for the fully contextualized
; definition of "scheme".
domain = authority
; From RFC 3986:
; authority = [ userinfo "@" ] host [ ":" port ]
; See RFC 3986 for the fully contextualized
; definition of "authority".
address = "0x" 40*40HEXDIG
; Must also conform to captilization
; checksum encoding specified in EIP-55
; where applicable (EOAs).
statement = *( reserved / unreserved / " " )
; See RFC 3986 for the definition
; of "reserved" and "unreserved".
; The purpose is to exclude LF (line break).
uri = URI
; See RFC 3986 for the definition of "URI".
version = "1"
chain-id = 1*DIGIT
; See EIP-155 for valid CHAIN_IDs.
nonce = 8*( ALPHA / DIGIT )
; See RFC 5234 for the definition
; of "ALPHA" and "DIGIT".
issued-at = date-time
expiration-time = date-time
not-before = date-time
; See RFC 3339 (ISO 8601) for the
; definition of "date-time".
request-id = *pchar
; See RFC 3986 for the definition of "pchar".
resources = *( LF resource )
resource = "- " URI
```
This specification defines the following SIWE Message fields that can be parsed from a SIWE Message by following the rules in ABNF Message Format:
- `scheme` OPTIONAL. The URI scheme of the origin of the request.
Its value MUST be a [RFC 3986](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986) URI scheme.
- `domain` REQUIRED. The domain that is requesting the signing.
Its value MUST be a [RFC 3986](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986) authority. The authority includes an OPTIONAL port.
If the port is not specified, the default port for the provided scheme is assumed.
If scheme is not specified, HTTPS is assumed by default.
- `address` REQUIRED. The Ethereum address performing the signing.
Its value SHOULD be conformant to mixed-case checksum address encoding specified in ERC-55 where applicable.
- `statement` OPTIONAL. A human-readable ASCII assertion that the user will sign which MUST NOT include '\n' (the byte 0x0a).
- `uri` REQUIRED. An [RFC 3986](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986) URI referring to the resource that is the subject of the signing.
- `version` REQUIRED. The current version of the SIWE Message, which MUST be 1 for this specification.
- `chain-id` REQUIRED. The EIP-155 Chain ID to which the session is bound, and the network where Contract Accounts MUST be resolved.
- `nonce` REQUIRED. A random string (minimum 8 alphanumeric characters) chosen by the relying party and used to prevent replay attacks.
- `issued-at` REQUIRED. The time when the message was generated, typically the current time.
Its value MUST be an ISO 8601 datetime string.
- `expiration-time` OPTIONAL. The time when the signed authentication message is no longer valid.
Its value MUST be an ISO 8601 datetime string.
- `not-before` OPTIONAL. The time when the signed authentication message will become valid.
Its value MUST be an ISO 8601 datetime string.
- `request-id` OPTIONAL. An system-specific identifier that MAY be used to uniquely refer to the sign-in request.
- `resources` OPTIONAL. A list of information or references to information the user wishes to have resolved as part of authentication by the relying party.
Every resource MUST be a RFC 3986 URI separated by "\n- " where \n is the byte 0x0a.
#### Signing and Verifying Messages with Ethereum Accounts
- For Externally Owned Accounts, the verification method specified in [ERC-191](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-191) MUST be used.
- For Contract Accounts,
- The verification method specified in [ERC-1271](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1271) SHOULD be used.
Otherwise, the implementer MUST clearly define the verification method to attain security and interoperability for both wallets and relying parties.
- When performing [ERC-1271](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1271) signature verification, the contract performing the verification MUST be resolved from the specified `chain-id`.
- Implementers SHOULD take into consideration that [ERC-1271](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1271) implementations are not required to be pure functions.
They can return different results for the same inputs depending on blockchain state.
This can affect the security model and session validation rules.
#### Resolving Ethereum Name Service (ENS) Data
- The relying party or wallet MAY additionally perform resolution of ENS data, as this can improve the user experience by displaying human-friendly information that is related to the `address`.
Resolvable ENS data include:
- The primary ENS name.
- The ENS avatar.
- Any other resolvable resources specified in the ENS documentation.
- If resolution of ENS data is performed, implementers SHOULD take precautions to preserve user privacy and consent.
Their `address` could be forwarded to third party services as part of the resolution process.
#### Implementer steps: specifying the request origin
The `domain` and, if present, the `scheme`, in the SIWE Message MUST correspond to the origin from where the signing request was made.
#### Implementer steps: verifying a signed message
The SIWE Message MUST be checked for conformance to the ABNF Message Format and its signature MUST be checked as defined in Signing and Verifying Messages with Ethereum Accounts.
#### Implementer steps: creating sessions
Sessions MUST be bound to the address and not to further resolved resources that can change.
#### Implementer steps: interpreting and resolving resources
Implementers SHOULD ensure that that URIs in the listed resources are human-friendly when expressed in plaintext form.
#### Wallet implementer steps: verifying the message format
The full SIWE message MUST be checked for conformance to the ABNF defined in ABNF Message Format.
Wallet implementers SHOULD warn users if the substring `"wants you to sign in with your Ethereum account"` appears anywhere in an [ERC-191](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-191) message signing request unless the message fully conforms to the format defined ABNF Message Format.
#### Wallet implementer steps: verifying the request origin
Wallet implementers MUST prevent phishing attacks by verifying the origin of the request against the `scheme` and `domain` fields in the SIWE Message.
The origin SHOULD be read from a trusted data source such as the browser window or over WalletConnect [ERC-1328](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1328) sessions for comparison against the signing message contents.
Wallet implementers MAY warn instead of rejecting the verification if the origin is pointing to localhost.
The following is a RECOMMENDED algorithm for Wallets to conform with the requirements on request origin verification defined by this specification.
The algorithm takes the following input variables:
- fields from the SIWE message.
- `origin` of the signing request: the origin of the page which requested the signin via the provider.
- `allowedSchemes`: a list of schemes allowed by the Wallet.
- `defaultScheme`: a scheme to assume when none was provided. Wallet implementers in the browser SHOULD use https.
- developer mode indication: a setting deciding if certain risks should be a warning instead of rejection. Can be manually configured or derived from `origin` being localhost.
The algorithm is described as follows:
- If `scheme` was not provided, then assign `defaultScheme` as scheme.
- If `scheme` is not contained in `allowedSchemes`, then the `scheme` is not expected and the Wallet MUST reject the request.
Wallet implementers in the browser SHOULD limit the list of allowedSchemes to just 'https' unless a developer mode is activated.
- If `scheme` does not match the scheme of origin, the Wallet SHOULD reject the request.
Wallet implementers MAY show a warning instead of rejecting the request if a developer mode is activated.
In that case the Wallet continues processing the request.
- If the `host` part of the `domain` and `origin` do not match, the Wallet MUST reject the request unless the Wallet is in developer mode.
In developer mode the Wallet MAY show a warning instead and continues procesing the request.
- If `domain` and `origin` have mismatching subdomains, the Wallet SHOULD reject the request unless the Wallet is in developer mode.
In developer mode the Wallet MAY show a warning instead and continues procesing the request.
- Let `port` be the port component of `domain`, and if no port is contained in domain, assign port the default port specified for the scheme.
- If `port` is not empty, then the Wallet SHOULD show a warning if the `port` does not match the port of `origin`.
- If `port` is empty, then the Wallet MAY show a warning if `origin` contains a specific port.
- Return request origin verification completed.
#### Wallet implementer steps: creating SIWE interfaces
Wallet implementers MUST display to the user the following fields from the SIWE Message request by default and prior to signing, if they are present: `scheme`, `domain`, `address`, `statement`, and `resources`.
Other present fields MUST also be made available to the user prior to signing either by default or through an extended interface.
Wallet implementers displaying a plaintext SIWE Message to the user SHOULD require the user to scroll to the bottom of the text area prior to signing.
Wallet implementers MAY construct a custom SIWE user interface by parsing the ABNF terms into data elements for use in the interface.
The display rules above still apply to custom interfaces.
#### Wallet implementer steps: supporting internationalization (i18n)
After successfully parsing the message into ABNF terms, translation MAY happen at the UX level per human language.
## Privacy and Security Considerations
- The double ratchet "recommends" using AES in CBC mode. Since encryption must be with an AEAD encryption scheme, we will use AES in GCM mode instead (supported by Noise).
- For the information retrieval, the algorithm MUST include a access control mechanisms to restrict who can call the set and get functions.
- One SHOULD include event logs to track changes in public keys.
- The curve vurve448 MUST be chosen due to its higher security level: 224-bit security instead of the 128-bit security provided by X25519.
- It is important that Bob MUST NOT reuse `SPK`.
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
# References
- [Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5234)
- [Gossipsub](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/tree/master/pubsub/gossipsub)
- [HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function](https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5869.txt)
- [Hybrid Public Key Encryption](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9180/)
- [Security Analysis and Improvements for the IETF MLS Standard for Group Messaging](https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1189.pdf)
- [Signed Data Standard](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-191)
- [Sign-In with Ethereum](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4361)
- [Standard Signature Validation Method for Contracts](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1271)
- [The Double Ratchet Algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/)
- [The Messaging Layer Security Protocol](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9420/)
- [The X3DH Key Agreement Protocol](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/)
- [Toy Ethereum Private Messaging Protocol](https://rfc.vac.dev/spec/20/)
- [Uniform Resource Identifier](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986)
- [WalletConnect URI Format](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1328)

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# Vac RFCs
Vac builds public good protocols for the decentralise web.
Vac acts as a custodian for the protocols that live in the RFC-Index repository.
With the goal of widespread adoption,
Vac will make sure the protocols adhere to the set of principles,
including but not limited to liberty, security, privacy, decentralisation, and inclusivity.
To learn more, visit [Vac Research](https://vac.dev/)

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# Vac Raw Specifications
All Vac specifications that have not reached **draft** status will live in this repository.
To learn more about **raw** specifications, take a look at [1/COSS](../1/coss.md).

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---
title: XX/(WAKU2|LOGOS|CODEX|*)-TEMPLATE
name: (Waku v2 | Logos | Codex) RFC Template
status: (raw|draft|stable)
category: (Standards Track|Informational|Best Current Practice)
editor: Daniel Kaiser \<danielkaiser@status.im\>
contributors:
sidebar_position: 1
---
# (Info, remove this section)
This section contains meta info about writing RFCs.
This section (including its subsections) MUST be removed.
[COSS](https://rfc.vac.dev/spec/1/) explains the Vac RFC process.
## Tags
The `tags` metadata SHOULD contain a list of tags if applicable.
Currently identified tags comprise
* `waku/core-protocol` for Waku protocol definitions (e.g. store, relay, light push),
* `waku/application` for applications built on top of Waku protocol (e.g. eth-dm, toy-chat),
# Abstract
# Background / Rationale / Motivation
This section serves as an introduction providing background information and a motivation/rationale for why the specified protocol is useful.
# Theory / Semantics
A standard track RFC in `stable` status MUST feature this section.
A standard track RFC in `raw` or `draft` status SHOULD feature this section.
This section SHOULD explain in detail how the proposed protocol works.
It may touch on the wire format where necessary for the explanation.
This section MAY also specify endpoint behaviour when receiving specific messages, e.g. the behaviour of certain caches etc.
# Wire Format Specification / Syntax
A standard track RFC in `stable` status MUST feature this section.
A standard track RFC in `raw` or `draft` status SHOULD feature this section.
This section SHOULD not contain explanations of semantics and focus on concisely defining the wire format.
Implementations MUST adhere to these exact formats to interoperate with other implementations.
It is fine, if parts of the previous section that touch on the wire format are repeated.
The purpose of this section is having a concise definition of what an implementation sends and accepts.
Parts that are not specified here are considered implementation details. Implementors are free to decide on how to implement these details.
An optional *implementation suggestions* section may provide suggestions on how to approach implementation details, and, if available, point to existing implementations for reference.
# Implementation Suggestions (optional)
# (Further Optional Sections)
# Security/Privacy Considerations
A standard track RFC in `stable` status MUST feature this section.
A standard track RFC in `raw` or `draft` status SHOULD feature this section.
Informational RFCs (in any state) may feature this section.
If there are none, this section MUST explicitly state that fact.
This section MAY contain additional relevant information, e.g. an explanation as to why there are no security consideration for the respective document.
# Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
# References
References MAY be subdivided into normative and informative.
## normative
A list of references that MUST be read to fully understand and/or implement this protocol.
See [RFC3967 Section 1.1](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3967#section-1.1).
## informative
A list of additional references.

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## Waku RFCs
Waku builds a family of privacy-preserving, censorship-resistant communication protocols for web3 applications.
Contributors can visit [Waku RFCs](https://github.com/waku-org/specs) for new Waku specifications under discussion.

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---
title: 5/WAKU0
name: Waku v0
status: deprecated
editor: Oskar Thorén \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\>
contributors:
- Adam Babik \<adam@status.im\>
- Andrea Maria Piana \<andreap@status.im\>
- Dean Eigenmann \<dean@status.im\>
- Kim De Mey \<kimdemey@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
This specification describes the format of Waku messages within the ÐΞVp2p Wire Protocol. This spec substitutes [EIP-627](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-627). Waku is a fork of the original Whisper protocol that enables better usability for resource restricted devices, such as mostly-offline bandwidth-constrained smartphones. It does this through (a) light node support, (b) historic messages (with a mailserver) (c) expressing topic interest for better bandwidth usage and (d) basic rate limiting.
## Motivation
Waku was created to incrementally improve in areas that Whisper is lacking in, with special attention to resource restricted devices. We specify the standard for Waku messages in order to ensure forward compatibility of different Waku clients, backwards compatibility with Whisper clients, as well as to allow multiple implementations of Waku and its capabilities. We also modify the language to be more unambiguous, concise and consistent.
## Definitions
| Term | Definition |
| --------------- | ----------------------------------------------------- |
| **Light node** | A Waku node that does not forward any messages. |
| **Envelope** | Messages sent and received by Waku nodes. |
| **Node** | Some process that is able to communicate for Waku. |
## Underlying Transports and Prerequisites
### Use of DevP2P
For nodes to communicate, they MUST implement devp2p and run RLPx. They MUST have some way of connecting to other nodes. Node discovery is largely out of scope for this spec, but see the appendix for some suggestions on how to do this.
### Gossip based routing
In Whisper, messages are gossiped between peers. Whisper is a form of rumor-mongering protocol that works by flooding to its connected peers based on some factors. Messages are eligible for retransmission until their TTL expires. A node SHOULD relay messages to all connected nodes if an envelope matches their PoW and bloom filter settings. If a node works in light mode, it MAY choose not to forward envelopes. A node MUST NOT send expired envelopes, unless the envelopes are sent as a [mailserver](./mailserver.md) response. A node SHOULD NOT send a message to a peer that it has already sent before.
## Wire Specification
### Use of RLPx transport protocol
All Waku messages are sent as devp2p RLPx transport protocol, version 5[^1] packets. These packets MUST be RLP-encoded arrays of data containing two objects: packet code followed by another object (whose type depends on the packet code). See [informal RLP spec](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/RLP) and the [Ethereum Yellow Paper, appendix B](https://ethereum.github.io/yellowpaper/paper.pdf) for more details on RLP.
Waku is a RLPx subprotocol called `waku` with version `0`. The version number corresponds to the major version in the header spec. Minor versions should not break compatibility of `waku`, this would result in a new major. (Some exceptions to this apply in the Draft stage of where client implementation is rapidly change).
### ABNF specification
Using [Augmented Backus-Naur form (ABNF)](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5234) we have the following format:
```abnf
; Packet codes 0 - 127 are reserved for Waku protocol
packet-code = 1*3DIGIT
; rate limits
limit-ip = 1*DIGIT
limit-peerid = 1*DIGIT
limit-topic = 1*DIGIT
rate-limits = "[" limit-ip limit-peerid limit-topic "]"
pow-requirement-key = 48
bloom-filter-key = 49
light-node-key = 50
confirmations-enabled-key = 51
rate-limits-key = 52
topic-interest-key = 53
status-options = "["
[ pow-requirement-key pow-requirement ]
[ bloom-filter-key bloom-filter ]
[ light-node-key light-node ]
[ confirmations-enabled-key confirmations-enabled ]
[ rate-limits-key rate-limits ]
[ topic-interest-key topic-interest ]
"]"
status = "[" version status-options "]"
status-update = status-options
; version is "an integer (as specified in RLP)"
version = DIGIT
confirmations-enabled = BIT
light-node = BIT
; pow is "a single floating point value of PoW.
; This value is the IEEE 754 binary representation
; of a 64-bit floating point number.
; Values of qNAN, sNAN, INF and -INF are not allowed.
; Negative values are also not allowed."
pow = 1*DIGIT "." 1*DIGIT
pow-requirement = pow
; bloom filter is "a byte array"
bloom-filter = *OCTET
waku-envelope = "[" expiry ttl topic data nonce "]"
; List of topics interested in
topic-interest = "[" *10000topic "]"
; 4 bytes (UNIX time in seconds)
expiry = 4OCTET
; 4 bytes (time-to-live in seconds)
ttl = 4OCTET
; 4 bytes of arbitrary data
topic = 4OCTET
; byte array of arbitrary size
; (contains encrypted message)
data = OCTET
; 8 bytes of arbitrary data
; (used for PoW calculation)
nonce = 8OCTET
messages = 1*waku-envelope
; mail server / client specific
p2p-request = waku-envelope
p2p-message = 1*waku-envelope
; packet-format needs to be paired with its
; corresponding packet-format
packet-format = "[" packet-code packet-format "]"
required-packet = 0 status /
1 messages /
22 status-update /
optional-packet = 126 p2p-request / 127 p2p-message
packet = "[" required-packet [ optional-packet ] "]"
```
All primitive types are RLP encoded. Note that, per RLP specification, integers are encoded starting from `0x00`.
### Packet Codes
The message codes reserved for Waku protocol: 0 - 127.
Messages with unknown codes MUST be ignored without generating any error, for forward compatibility of future versions.
The Waku sub-protocol MUST support the following packet codes:
| Name | Int Value |
| -------------------------- | ------------- |
| Status | 0 |
| Messages | 1 |
| Status Update | 22 |
The following message codes are optional, but they are reserved for specific purpose.
| Name | Int Value | Comment |
|----------------------------|-----------|---------|
| Batch Ack | 11 | |
| Message Response | 12 | |
| P2P Request | 126 | |
| P2P Message | 127 | |
### Packet usage
#### Status
The Status message serves as a Waku handshake and peers MUST exchange this
message upon connection. It MUST be sent after the RLPx handshake and prior to
any other Waku messages.
A Waku node MUST await the Status message from a peer before engaging in other Waku protocol activity with that peer.
When a node does not receive the Status message from a peer, before a configurable timeout, it SHOULD disconnect from that peer.
Upon retrieval of the Status message, the node SHOULD validate the message
received and validated the Status message. Note that its peer might not be in
the same state.
When a node is receiving other Waku messages from a peer before a Status
message is received, the node MUST ignore these messages and SHOULD disconnect from that peer. Status messages received after the handshake is completed MUST also be ignored.
The status message MUST contain an association list containing various options. All options within this association list are OPTIONAL, ordering of the key-value pairs is not guaranteed and therefore MUST NOT be relied on. Unknown keys in the association list SHOULD be ignored.
#### Messages
This packet is used for sending the standard Waku envelopes.
#### Status Update
The Status Update message is used to communicate an update of the settings of the node.
The format is the same as the Status message, all fields are optional.
If none of the options are specified the message MUST be ignored and considered a noop.
Fields that are omitted are considered unchanged, fields that haven't changed SHOULD not
be transmitted.
**PoW Requirement update**
When PoW is updated, peers MUST NOT deliver the sender envelopes with PoW lower than specified in this message.
PoW is defined as average number of iterations, required to find the current BestBit (the number of leading zero bits in the hash), divided by message size and TTL:
PoW = (2**BestBit) / (size * TTL)
PoW calculation:
fn short_rlp(envelope) = rlp of envelope, excluding env_nonce field.
fn pow_hash(envelope, env_nonce) = sha3(short_rlp(envelope) ++ env_nonce)
fn pow(pow_hash, size, ttl) = 2**leading_zeros(pow_hash) / (size * ttl)
where size is the size of the RLP-encoded envelope, excluding `env_nonce` field (size of `short_rlp(envelope)`).
**Bloom filter update**
The bloom filter is used to identify a number of topics to a peer without compromising (too much) privacy over precisely what topics are of interest. Precise control over the information content (and thus efficiency of the filter) may be maintained through the addition of bits.
Blooms are formed by the bitwise OR operation on a number of bloomed topics. The bloom function takes the topic and projects them onto a 512-bit slice. At most, three bits are marked for each bloomed topic.
The projection function is defined as a mapping from a 4-byte slice S to a 512-bit slice D; for ease of explanation, S will dereference to bytes, whereas D will dereference to bits.
LET D[*] = 0
FOREACH i IN { 0, 1, 2 } DO
LET n = S[i]
IF S[3] & (2 ** i) THEN n += 256
D[n] = 1
END FOR
A full bloom filter (all the bits set to 1) means that the node is to be considered a `Full Node` and it will accept any topic.
If both Topic Interest and bloom filter are specified, Topic Interest always takes precedence and bloom filter MUST be ignored.
If only bloom filter is specified, the current Topic Interest MUST be discarded and only the updated bloom filter MUST be used when forwarding or posting envelopes.
A bloom filter with all bits set to 0 signals that the node is not currently interested in receiving any envelope.
**Topic Interest update**
This packet is used by Waku nodes for sharing their interest in messages with specific topics. It does this in a more bandwidth considerate way, at the expense of some metadata protection. Peers MUST only send envelopes with specified topics.
It is currently bounded to a maximum of 10000 topics. If you are interested in more topics than that, this is currently underspecified and likely requires updating it. The constant is subject to change.
If only Topic Interest is specified, the current bloom filter MUST be discarded and only the updated Topic Interest MUST be used when forwarding or posting envelopes.
An empty array signals that the node is not currently interested in receiving any envelope.
**Rate Limits update**
This packet is used for informing other nodes of their self defined rate limits.
In order to provide basic Denial-of-Service attack protection, each node SHOULD define its own rate limits. The rate limits SHOULD be applied on IPs, peer IDs, and envelope topics.
Each node MAY decide to whitelist, i.e. do not rate limit, selected IPs or peer IDs.
If a peer exceeds node's rate limits, the connection between them MAY be dropped.
Each node SHOULD broadcast its rate limits to its peers using the rate limits packet. The rate limits MAY also be sent as an optional parameter in the handshake.
Each node SHOULD respect rate limits advertised by its peers. The number of packets SHOULD be throttled in order not to exceed peer's rate limits. If the limit gets exceeded, the connection MAY be dropped by the peer.
**Message Confirmations update**
Message confirmations tell a node that a message originating from it has been received by its peers, allowing a node to know whether a message has or has not been received.
A node MAY send a message confirmation for any batch of messages received with a packet Messages Code.
A message confirmation is sent using Batch Acknowledge packet or Message Response packet. The Batch Acknowledge packet is followed by a keccak256 hash of the envelopes batch data.
The current `version` of the message response is `1`.
Using [Augmented Backus-Naur form (ABNF)](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5234) we have the following format:
```abnf
; a version of the Message Response
version = 1*DIGIT
; keccak256 hash of the envelopes batch data (raw bytes) for which the confirmation is sent
hash = *OCTET
hasherror = *OCTET
; error code
code = 1*DIGIT
; a descriptive error message
description = *ALPHA
error = "[" hasherror code description "]"
errors = *error
response = "[" hash errors "]"
confirmation = "[" version response "]"
```
The supported codes:
`1`: means time sync error which happens when an envelope is too old or created in the future (the root cause is no time sync between nodes).
The drawback of sending message confirmations is that it increases the noise in the network because for each sent message, a corresponding confirmation is broadcast by one or more peers.
#### P2P Request
This packet is used for sending Dapp-level peer-to-peer requests, e.g. Waku Mail Client requesting old messages from the [Waku Mail Server](./mailserver.md).
#### P2P Message
This packet is used for sending the peer-to-peer messages, which are not supposed to be forwarded any further. E.g. it might be used by the Waku Mail Server for delivery of old (expired) messages, which is otherwise not allowed.
### Payload Encryption
Asymmetric encryption uses the standard Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme with SECP-256k1 public key.
Symmetric encryption uses AES GCM algorithm with random 96-bit nonce.
### Packet code Rationale
Packet codes `0x00` and `0x01` are already used in all Waku / Whisper versions. Packet code `0x02` and `0x03` were previously used in Whisper but are deprecated as of Waku v0.4
Packet code `0x22` is used to dynamically change the settings of a node.
Packet codes `0x7E` and `0x7F` may be used to implement Waku Mail Server and Client. Without P2P messages it would be impossible to deliver the old messages, since they will be recognized as expired, and the peer will be disconnected for violating the Whisper protocol. They might be useful for other purposes when it is not possible to spend time on PoW, e.g. if a stock exchange will want to provide live feed about the latest trades.
## Additional capabilities
Waku supports multiple capabilities. These include light node, rate limiting and bridging of traffic. Here we list these capabilities, how they are identified, what properties they have and what invariants they must maintain.
Additionally there is the capability of a mailserver which is documented in its on [specification](mailserver.md).
### Light node
The rationale for light nodes is to allow for interaction with waku on resource restricted devices as bandwidth can often be an issue.
Light nodes MUST NOT forward any incoming messages, they MUST only send their own messages. When light nodes happen to connect to each other, they SHOULD disconnect. As this would result in messages being dropped between the two.
Light nodes are identified by the `light_node` value in the status message.
### Accounting for resources (experimental)
Nodes MAY implement accounting, keeping track of resource usage. It is heavily inspired by Swarm's [SWAP protocol](https://www.bokconsulting.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/tron-fischer-sw3.pdf), and works by doing pairwise accounting for resources.
Each node keeps track of resource usage with all other nodes. Whenever an envelope is received from a node that is expected (fits bloom filter or topic interest, is legal, etc) this is tracked.
Every epoch (say, every minute or every time an event happens) statistics SHOULD be aggregated and saved by the client:
| peer | sent | received |
|-------|------|----------|
| peer1 | 0 | 123 |
| peer2 | 10 | 40 |
In later versions this will be amended by nodes communication thresholds, settlements and disconnect logic.
## Upgradability and Compatibility
### General principles and policy
These are policies that guide how we make decisions when it comes to upgradability, compatibility, and extensibility:
1. Waku aims to be compatible with previous and future versions.
2. In cases where we want to break this compatibility, we do so gracefully and as a single decision point.
3. To achieve this, we employ the following two general strategies:
- a) Accretion (including protocol negotiation) over changing data
- b) When we want to change things, we give it a new name (for example, a version number).
Examples:
- We enable bridging between `shh/6` and `waku/0` until such a time as when we are ready to gracefully drop support for `shh/6` (1, 2, 3).
- When we add parameter fields, we (currently) do so by accreting them in a list, so old clients can ignore new fields (dynamic list) and new clients can use new capabilities (1, 3).
- To better support (2) and (3) in the future, we will likely release a new version that gives better support for open, growable maps (association lists or native map type) (3)
- When we we want to provide a new set of messages that have different requirements, we do so under a new protocol version and employ protocol versioning. This is a form of accretion at a level above - it ensures a client can support both protocols at once and drop support for legacy versions gracefully. (1,2,3)
### Backwards Compatibility
Waku is a different subprotocol from Whisper so it isn't directly compatible. However, the data format is the same, so compatibility can be achieved by the use of a bridging mode as described below. Any client which does not implement certain packet codes should gracefully ignore the packets with those codes. This will ensure the forward compatibility.
### Waku-Whisper bridging
`waku/0` and `shh/6` are different DevP2P subprotocols, however they share the same data format making their envelopes compatible. This means we can bridge the protocols naively, this works as follows.
**Roles:**
- Waku client A, only Waku capability
- Whisper client B, only Whisper capability
- WakuWhisper bridge C, both Waku and Whisper capability
**Flow:**
1. A posts message; B posts message.
2. C picks up message from A and B and relays them both to Waku and Whisper.
3. A receives message on Waku; B on Whisper.
**Note**: This flow means if another bridge C1 is active, we might get duplicate relaying for a message between C1 and C2. I.e. Whisper(\<\>Waku\<\>Whisper)\<\>Waku, A-C1-C2-B. Theoretically this bridging chain can get as long as TTL permits.
### Forward Compatibility
It is desirable to have a strategy for maintaining forward compatibility between `waku/0` and future version of waku. Here we outline some concerns and strategy for this.
- **Connecting to nodes with multiple versions:** The way this SHOULD be accomplished in the future is by negotiating the versions of subprotocols, within the `hello` message nodes transmit their capabilities along with a version. As suggested in [EIP-8](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-8), if a node connects that has a higher version number for a specific capability, the node with a lower number SHOULD assume backwards compatibility. The node with the higher version will decide if compatibility can be assured between versions, if this is not the case it MUST disconnect.
- **Adding new packet codes:** New packet codes can be added easily due to the available packet codes. Unknown packet codes SHOULD be ignored. Upgrades that add new packet codes SHOULD implement some fallback mechanism if no response was received for nodes that do not yet understand this packet.
- **Adding new options in `status-options`:** New options can be added to the `status-options` association list in the `status` and `status-update` packet as options are OPTIONAL and unknown option keys SHOULD be ignored. A node SHOULD NOT disconnect from a peer when receiving `status-options` with unknown option keys.
## Appendix A: Security considerations
There are several security considerations to take into account when running Waku. Chief among them are: scalability, DDoS-resistance and privacy. These also vary depending on what capabilities are used. The security considerations for extra capabilities such as [mailservers](./mailserver.md#security-considerations) can be found in their respective specifications.
### Scalability and UX
**Bandwidth usage:**
In version 0 of Waku, bandwidth usage is likely to be an issue. For more investigation into this, see the theoretical scaling model described [here](https://github.com/vacp2p/research/tree/dcc71f4779be832d3b5ece9c4e11f1f7ec24aac2/whisper_scalability).
**Gossip-based routing:**
Use of gossip-based routing doesn't necessarily scale. It means each node can see a message multiple times, and having too many light nodes can cause propagation probability that is too low. See [Whisper vs PSS](https://our.status.im/whisper-pss-comparison/) for more and a possible Kademlia based alternative.
**Lack of incentives:**
Waku currently lacks incentives to run nodes, which means node operators are more likely to create centralized choke points.
### Privacy
**Light node privacy:**
The main privacy concern with light nodes is that directly connected peers will know that a message originates from them (as it are the only ones it sends). This means nodes can make assumptions about what messages (topics) their peers are interested in.
**Bloom filter privacy:**
By having a bloom filter where only the topics you are interested in are set, you reveal which messages you are interested in. This is a fundamental tradeoff between bandwidth usage and privacy, though the tradeoff space is likely suboptimal in terms of the [Anonymity](https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/954.pdf) [trilemma](https://petsymposium.org/2019/files/hotpets/slides/coordination-helps-anonymity-slides.pdf).
**Privacy guarantees not rigorous:**
Privacy for Whisper / Waku haven't been studied rigorously for various threat models like global passive adversary, local active attacker, etc. This is unlike e.g. Tor and mixnets.
**Topic hygiene:**
Similar to bloom filter privacy, if you use a very specific topic you reveal more information. See scalability model linked above.
### Spam resistance
**PoW bad for heterogeneous devices:**
Proof of work is a poor spam prevention mechanism. A mobile device can only have a very low PoW in order not to use too much CPU / burn up its phone battery. This means someone can spin up a powerful node and overwhelm the network.
### Censorship resistance
**Devp2p TCP port blockable:**
By default Devp2p runs on port `30303`, which is not commonly used for any other service. This means it is easy to censor, e.g. airport WiFi. This can be mitigated somewhat by running on e.g. port `80` or `443`, but there are still outstanding issues. See libp2p and Tor's Pluggable Transport for how this can be improved.
## Appendix B: Implementation Notes
### Implementation Matrix
| Client | Spec supported | Details |
|--------|----------------|---------|
| **Status-go** | 0.5 | [details](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/develop/WAKU.md) |
| **Nimbus** | 0.4 | [details](https://github.com/status-im/nimbus/tree/8747fe1ecd36fe778bb92b97634db84d364fede8/waku) |
### Recommendations for clients
Notes useful for implementing Waku mode.
1. Avoid duplicate envelopes
To avoid duplicate envelopes, only connect to one Waku node. Benign duplicate envelopes is an intrinsic property of Whisper which often leads to a N factor increase in traffic, where N is the number of peers you are connected to.
2. Topic specific recommendations
Consider partition topics based on some usage, to avoid too much traffic on a single topic.
### Node discovery
Resource restricted devices SHOULD use [EIP-1459](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459) to discover nodes.
Known static nodes MAY also be used.
## Changelog
### Version 0.6
Released [April 21,2020](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/9e650995f24179844857520c68fa3e8f6018b125)
- Mark spec as Deprecated mode in terms of its lifecycle.
### Version 0.5
Released [March 17,2020](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/7b9dc562bc50c6bb844ac575cb221ec9cda2530a)
- Clarify the preferred way of handling unknown keys in the `status-options` association list.
- Correct spec/implementation mismatch: Change RLP keys to be the their int values in order to reflect production behavior
### Version 0.4
Released [February 21, 2020](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/17bd066e317bbe33af07146b721d73f24de47e88).
- Simplify implementation matrix with latest state
- Introduces a new required packet code Status Code (`0x22`) for communicating option changes
- Deprecates the following packet codes: PoW Requirement (`0x02`), Bloom Filter (`0x03`), Rate limits (`0x20`), Topic interest (`0x21`) - all superseded by the new Status Code (`0x22`)
- Increased `topic-interest` capacity from 1000 to 10000
### Version 0.3
Released [February 13, 2020](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/73138d6ba954ab4c315e1b8d210ac7631b6d1428).
- Recommend DNS based node discovery over other Discovery methods.
- Mark spec as Draft mode in terms of its lifecycle.
- Simplify Changelog and misc formatting.
- Handshake/Status message not compatible with shh/6 nodes; specifying options as association list.
- Include topic-interest in Status handshake.
- Upgradability policy.
- `topic-interest` packet code.
### Version 0.2
Released [December 10, 2019](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/blob/waku-0.2.0/waku.md).
- General style improvements.
- Fix ABNF grammar.
- Mailserver requesting/receiving.
- New packet codes: topic-interest (experimental), rate limits (experimental).
- More details on handshake modifications.
- Accounting for resources mode (experimental)
- Appendix with security considerations: scalability and UX, privacy, and spam resistance.
- Appendix with implementation notes and implementation matrix across various clients with breakdown per capability.
- More details on handshake and parameters.
- Describe rate limits in more detail.
- More details on mailserver and mail client API.
- Accounting for resources mode (very experimental).
- Clarify differences with Whisper.
### Version 0.1
Initial version. Released [November 21, 2019](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/blob/b59b9247f2ac1bf45c75bd3227a2e5dd87b6d7b0/waku.md).
### Differences between shh/6 and waku/0
Summary of main differences between this spec and Whisper v6, as described in [EIP-627](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-627):
- RLPx subprotocol is changed from `shh/6` to `waku/0`.
- Light node capability is added.
- Optional rate limiting is added.
- Status packet has following additional parameters: light-node,
confirmations-enabled and rate-limits
- Mail Server and Mail Client functionality is now part of the specification.
- P2P Message packet contains a list of envelopes instead of a single envelope.
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## Footnotes
[^1]: Felix Lange et al. [The RLPx Transport Protocol](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/rlpx.md). Ethereum.

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## Deprecated RFCs
Deprecated specifications are no longer used in Waku products.
This subdirectory is for achrive purpose and
should not be used in production ready implementations.
Visit [Waku RFCs](https://github.com/waku-org/specs) for new Waku specifications under discussion.

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---
title: 22/TOY-CHAT
name: Waku v2 Toy Chat
status: draft
editor: Franck Royer \<franck@status.im\>
contributors:
- Hanno Cornelius \<hanno@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
**Content Topic**: `/toy-chat/2/huilong/proto`.
This specification explains a toy chat example using Waku v2.
This protocol is mainly used to:
1. Dogfood Waku v2,
2. Show an example of how to use Waku v2.
Currently, all main Waku v2 implementations support the toy chat protocol:
[nim-waku](https://github.com/status-im/nim-waku/blob/master/examples/v2/chat2.nim),
js-waku ([NodeJS](https://github.com/status-im/js-waku/tree/main/examples/cli-chat) and [web](https://github.com/status-im/js-waku/tree/main/examples/web-chat))
and [go-waku](https://github.com/status-im/go-waku/tree/master/examples/chat2).
Note that this is completely separate from the protocol the Status app is using for its chat functionality.
# Design
The chat protocol enables sending and receiving messages in a chat room.
There is currently only one chat room, which is tied to the content topic.
The messages SHOULD NOT be encrypted.
The `contentTopic` MUST be set to `/toy-chat/2/huilong/proto`.
# Payloads
```protobuf
syntax = "proto3";
message Chat2Message {
uint64 timestamp = 1;
string nick = 2;
bytes payload = 3;
}
```
- `timestamp`: The time at which the message was sent, in Unix Epoch seconds,
- `nick`: The nickname of the user sending the message,
- `payload`: The text of the messages, UTF-8 encoded.
# Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).

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---
title: 23/WAKU2-TOPICS
name: Waku v2 Topic Usage Recommendations
status: draft
category: Informational
editor: Oskar Thoren \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\>
contributors:
- Hanno Cornelius \<hanno@status.im\>
- Daniel Kaiser \<danielkaiser@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
This document outlines recommended usage of topic names in Waku v2.
In [10/WAKU2 spec](../../standards/core/10/waku2.md) there are two types of topics:
- pubsub topics, used for routing
- Content topics, used for content-based filtering
## Pubsub Topics
Pubsub topics are used for routing of messages (see [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../standards/core/11/relay.md)),
and can be named implicitly by Waku sharding (see [RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/relay-sharding.md)).
This document comprises recommendations for explicitly naming pubsub topics (e.g. when choosing *named sharding* as specified in [RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/relay-sharding.md)).
### Pubsub Topic Format
Pubsub topics SHOULD follow the following structure:
`/waku/2/{topic-name}`
This namespaced structure makes compatibility, discoverability, and automatic handling of new topics easier.
The first two parts indicate
1) it relates to the Waku protocol domain, and
2) the version is 2.
If applicable, it is RECOMMENDED to structure `{topic-name}` in a hierarchical way as well.
\> *Note*: In previous versions of this document, the structure was `/waku/2/{topic-name}/{encoding}`.
The now deprecated `/{encoding}` was always set to `/proto`,
which indicated that the [data field](../../standards/core/11/RELAY.md/#protobuf-definition) in pubsub is serialized/encoded as protobuf.
The inspiration for this format was taken from
[Ethereum 2 P2P spec](https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/dev/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#topics-and-messages).
However, because the payload of messages transmitted over [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../standards/core/11/relay.md) must be a [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../../standards/core/14/message.md),
which specifies the wire format as protobuf,`/proto` is the only valid encoding.
This makes the `/proto` indication obsolete.
The encoding of the `payload` field of a Waku Message is indicated by the `/{encoding}` part of the content topic name.
Specifying an encoding is only significant for the actual payload/data field.
Waku preserves this option by allowing to specify an encoding for the WakuMessage payload field as part of the content topic name.
### Default PubSub Topic
The Waku v2 default pubsub topic is:
`/waku/2/default-waku/proto`
The `{topic name}` part is `default-waku/proto`, which indicates it is default topic for exchanging WakuMessages;
`/proto` remains for backwards compatibility.
### Application Specific Names
Larger apps can segregate their pubsub meshes using topics named like:
```
/waku/2/status/
/waku/2/walletconnect/
```
This indicates that these networks carry WakuMessages, but for different domains completely.
### Named Topic Sharding Example
The following is an example of named sharding, as specified in [RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/relay-sharding.md).
```
waku/2/waku-9_shard-0/
...
waku/2/waku-9_shard-9/
```
This indicates explicitly that the network traffic has been partitioned into 10 buckets.
## Content Topics
The other type of topic that exists in Waku v2 is a content topic.
This is used for content based filtering.
See [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE spec](../../standards/core/14/message.md) for where this is specified.
Note that this doesn't impact routing of messages between relaying nodes,
but it does impact how request/reply protocols such as
[12/WAKU2-FILTER](../../standards/core/14/filter.md) and [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../standards/core/13/store.md) are used.
This is especially useful for nodes that have limited bandwidth,
and only want to pull down messages that match this given content topic.
Since all messages are relayed using the relay protocol regardless of content topic,
you MAY use any content topic you wish without impacting how messages are relayed.
### Content Topic Format
The format for content topics is as follows:
`/{application-name}/{version-of-the-application}/{content-topic-name}/{encoding}`
The name of a content topic is application-specific.
As an example, here's the content topic used for an upcoming testnet:
`/toychat/2/huilong/proto`
### Content Topic Naming Recommendations
Application names should be unique to avoid conflicting issues with other protocols.
Applications should specify their version (if applicable) in the version field.
The `{content-topic-name}` portion of the content topic is up to the application,
and depends on the problem domain.
It can be hierarchical, for instance to separate content, or to indicate different bandwidth and privacy guarantees.
The encoding field indicates the serialization/encoding scheme for the [WakuMessage payload](../../standards/core/14/message.md/#payloads) field.
## Differences with Waku v1
In [5/WAKU1](../../deprecated/5/waku0.md) there is no actual routing.
All messages are sent to all other nodes.
This means that we are implicitly using the same pubsub topic that would be something like:
```
/waku/1/default-waku/rlp
```
Topics in Waku v1 correspond to Content Topics in Waku v2.
### Bridging Waku v1 and Waku v2
To bridge Waku v1 and Waku v2 we have a [15/WAKU-BRIDGE](../../standards/core/15/bridge.md).
For mapping Waku v1 topics to Waku v2 content topics,
the following structure for the content topic SHOULD be used:
```
/waku/1/\<4bytes-waku-v1-topic\>/rfc26
```
The `\<4bytes-waku-v1-topic\>` SHOULD be the lowercase hex representation of the 4-byte Waku v1 topic.
A `0x` prefix SHOULD be used.
`/rfc26` indicates that the bridged content is encoded according to RFC [26/WAKU2-PAYLOAD](../../standards/application/26/payload.md).
See [15/WAKU-BRIDGE](../../standards/core/15/bridge.md) for a description of the bridged fields.
This creates a direct mapping between the two protocols.
For example:
```
/waku/1/0x007f80ff/rfc26
```
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via
[CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
* [10/WAKU2 spec](../../standards/core/10/waku2.md)
* [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../standards/core/11/relay.md)
* [RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/relay-sharding.md)
* [Ethereum 2 P2P spec](https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/dev/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#topics-and-messages)
* [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../../standards/core/14/message.md)
* [12/WAKU2-FILTER](../../standards/core/14/filter.md)
* [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../standards/core/13/store.md)
* [6/WAKU1](../../deprecated/5/waku0.md)
* [15/WAKU-BRIDGE](../../standards/core/15/bridge.md)
* [26/WAKU-PAYLOAD](../../standards/application/26/payload.md)

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---
title: 27/WAKU2-PEERS
name: Waku v2 Client Peer Management Recommendations
status: draft
editor: Hanno Cornelius \<hanno@status.im\>
contributors:
sidebar_position: 1
---
`27/WAKU2-PEERS` describes a recommended minimal set of peer storage and peer management features to be implemented by Waku v2 clients.
In this context, peer _storage_ refers to a client's ability to keep track of discovered or statically-configured peers and their metadata.
It also deals with matters of peer _persistence_,
or the ability to store peer data on disk to resume state after a client restart.
Peer _management_ is a closely related concept and refers to the set of actions a client MAY choose to perform based on its knowledge of its connected peers,
e.g. triggering reconnects/disconnects, keeping certain connections alive, etc.
## Peer store
The peer store SHOULD be an in-memory data structure where information about discovered or configured peers are stored.
It SHOULD be considered the main source of truth for peer-related information in a Waku v2 client.
Clients MAY choose to persist this store on-disk.
### Tracked peer metadata
It is RECOMMENDED that a Waku v2 client tracks at least the following information about each of its peers in a peer store:
| Metadata | Description |
| --- | --- |
| _Public key_ | The public key for this peer. This is related to the libp2p [`Peer ID`](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/peer-id/). |
| _Addresses_ | Known transport layer [`multiaddrs`](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/addressing/) for this peer. |
| _Protocols_ | The libp2p [`protocol IDs`](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/protocols/#protocol-ids) supported by this peer. This can be used to track the client's connectivity to peers supporting different Waku v2 protocols, e.g. [`11/WAKU2-RELAY`](../../standards/core/11/relay.md) or [`13/WAKU2-STORE`](../../standards/core/13/store.md). |
| _Connectivity_ | Tracks the peer's current connectedness state. See [**Peer connectivity**](#peer-connectivity) below. |
| _Disconnect time_ | The timestamp at which this peer last disconnected. This becomes important when managing [peer reconnections](#reconnecting-peers) |
### Peer connectivity
A Waku v2 client SHOULD track _at least_ the following connectivity states for each of its peers:
- **`NotConnected`**: The peer has been discovered or configured on this client,
but no attempt has yet been made to connect to this peer.
This is the default state for a new peer.
- **`CannotConnect`**: The client attempted to connect to this peer, but failed.
- **`CanConnect`**: The client was recently connected to this peer and disconnected gracefully.
- **`Connected`**: The client is actively connected to this peer.
This list does not preclude clients from tracking more advanced connectivity metadata,
such as a peer's blacklist status (see [`18/WAKU2-SWAP`](../../standards/application/18/swap.md)).
### Persistence
A Waku v2 client MAY choose to persist peers across restarts,
using any offline storage technology, such as an on-disk database.
Peer persistence MAY be used to resume peer connections after a client restart.
## Peer management
Waku v2 clients will have different requirements when it comes to managing the peers tracked in the [**peer store**](#peer-store).
It is RECOMMENDED that clients support:
- [automatic reconnection](#reconnecting-peers) to peers under certain conditions
- [connection keep-alive](#connection-keep-alive)
### Reconnecting peers
A Waku v2 client MAY choose to reconnect to previously connected, managed peers under certain conditions.
Such conditions include, but are not limited to:
- Reconnecting to all `relay`-capable peers after a client restart. This will require [persistent peer storage](#persistence).
If a client chooses to automatically reconnect to previous peers,
it MUST respect the [backing off period](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md#prune-backoff-and-peer-exchange) specified for GossipSub v1.1 before attempting to reconnect.
This requires keeping track of the [last time each peer was disconnected](#tracked-peer-metadata).
### Connection keep-alive
A Waku v2 client MAY choose to implement a keep-alive mechanism to certain peers.
If a client chooses to implement keep-alive on a connection,
it SHOULD do so by sending periodic [libp2p pings](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/protocols/#ping) as per `10/WAKU2` [client recommendations](../../standards/core/10/WAKU2.md/#recommendations-for-clients).
The recommended period between pings SHOULD be _at most_ 50% of the shortest idle connection timeout for the specific client and transport.
For example, idle TCP connections often times out after 10 to 15 minutes.
\> **Implementation note:** the `nim-waku` client currently implements a keep-alive mechanism every `5 minutes`,
in response to a TCP connection timeout of `10 minutes`.
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via
[CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
- [`Peer ID`](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/peer-id/)
- [`multiaddrs`](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/addressing/)
- [`protocol IDs`](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/protocols/#protocol-ids)
- [`11/WAKU2-RELAY`](../../standards/core/11/relay.md)
- [`13/WAKU2-STORE`](../../standards/core/13/store.md)
- [`18/WAKU2-SWAP`](../../standards/application/18/swap.md)
- [backing off period](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md#prune-backoff-and-peer-exchange)
- [libp2p pings](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/protocols/#ping)
- [`10/WAKU2` client recommendations](https://rfc.vac.dev/spec/10/#recommendations-for-clients)

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---
title: 29/WAKU2-CONFIG
name: Waku v2 Client Parameter Configuration Recommendations
status: draft
editor: Hanno Cornelius \<hanno@status.im\>
contributors:
sidebar_position: 1
---
`29/WAKU2-CONFIG` describes the RECOMMENDED values to assign to configurable parameters for Waku v2 clients.
Since Waku v2 is built on [libp2p](https://github.com/libp2p/specs),
most of the parameters and reasonable defaults are derived from there.
Waku v2 relay messaging is specified in [`11/WAKU2-RELAY`](../../standards/core/11/relay.md),
a minor extension of the [libp2p GossipSub protocol](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/README.md).
GossipSub behaviour is controlled by a series of adjustable parameters.
Waku v2 clients SHOULD configure these parameters to the recommended values below.
## GossipSub v1.0 parameters
GossipSub v1.0 parameters are defined in the [corresponding libp2p specification](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.0.md#parameters).
We repeat them here with RECOMMMENDED values for `11/WAKU2-RELAY` implementations.
| Parameter | Purpose | RECOMMENDED value |
|----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|
| `D` | The desired outbound degree of the network | 6 |
| `D_low` | Lower bound for outbound degree | 4 |
| `D_high` | Upper bound for outbound degree | 8 |
| `D_lazy` | (Optional) the outbound degree for gossip emission | `D` |
| `heartbeat_interval` | Time between heartbeats | 1 second |
| `fanout_ttl` | Time-to-live for each topic's fanout state | 60 seconds |
| `mcache_len` | Number of history windows in message cache | 5 |
| `mcache_gossip` | Number of history windows to use when emitting gossip | 3 |
| `seen_ttl` | Expiry time for cache of seen message ids | 2 minutes |
## GossipSub v1.1 parameters
GossipSub v1.1 extended GossipSub v1.0 and introduced [several new parameters](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md#overview-of-new-parameters).
We repeat the global parameters here with RECOMMMENDED values for `11/WAKU2-RELAY` implementations.
| Parameter | Description | RECOMMENDED value |
|----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|
| `PruneBackoff` | Time after pruning a mesh peer before we consider grafting them again. | 1 minute |
| `FloodPublish` | Whether to enable flood publishing | true |
| `GossipFactor` | % of peers to send gossip to, if we have more than `D_lazy` available | 0.25 |
| `D_score` | Number of peers to retain by score when pruning from oversubscription | `D_low` |
| `D_out` | Number of outbound connections to keep in the mesh. | `D_low` - 1 |
`11/WAKU2-RELAY` clients SHOULD implement a peer scoring mechanism with the parameter constraints as [specified by libp2p](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md#overview-of-new-parameters).
## Other configuration
The following behavioural parameters are not specified by `libp2p`,
but nevertheless describes constraints that `11/WAKU2-RELAY` clients MAY choose to implement.
| Parameter | Description | RECOMMENDED value |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|
| `BackoffSlackTime` | Slack time to add to prune backoff before attempting to graft again | 2 seconds |
| `IWantPeerBudget` | Maximum number of IWANT messages to accept from a peer within a heartbeat | 25 |
| `IHavePeerBudget` | Maximum number of IHAVE messages to accept from a peer within a heartbeat | 10 |
| `IHaveMaxLength` | Maximum number of messages to include in an IHAVE message | 5000 |
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via
[CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
- [libp2p](https://github.com/libp2p/specs)
- [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../standards/core/11/relay.md)
- [libp2p GossipSub protocol](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/README.md)
- [corresponding libp2p specification](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.0.md#parameters)
- [several new parameters](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md#overview-of-new-parameters)

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---
title: 30/ADAPTIVE-NODES
name: Adaptive nodes
status: draft
editor: Oskar Thorén \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\>
contributors:
sidebar_position: 1
---
This is an informational spec that show cases the concept of adaptive nodes.
## Node types - a continuum
We can look at node types as a continuum, from more restricted to less restricted, fewer resources to more resources.
![Node types - a continuum](./images/adaptive_node_continuum2.png)
### Possible limitations
- Connectivity: Not publicly connectable vs static IP and DNS
- Connectivity: Mostly offline to mostly online to always online
- Resources: Storage, CPU, Memory, Bandwidth
### Accessibility and motivation
Some examples:
- Opening browser window: costs nothing, but contribute nothing
- Desktop: download, leave in background, contribute somewhat
- Cluster: expensive, upkeep, but can contribute a lot
These are also illustrative, so a node in a browser in certain environment might contribute similarly to Desktop.
### Adaptive nodes
We call these nodes *adaptive nodes* to highlights different modes of contributing, such as:
- Only leeching from the network
- Relaying messages for one or more topics
- Providing services for lighter nodes such as lightpush and filter
- Storing historical messages to various degrees
- Ensuring relay network can't be spammed with RLN
### Planned incentives
Incentives to run a node is currently planned around:
- SWAP for accounting and settlement of services provided
- RLN RELAY for spam protection
- Other incentivization schemes are likely to follow and is an area of active research
## Node protocol selection
Each node can choose which protocols to support, depending on its resources and goals.
![Protocol selection](./images/adaptive_node_protocol_selection2.png)
In the case of protocols like [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../standards/core/11/relay.md) etc (12, 13, 19, 21) these correspond to Libp2p protocols.
However, other protocols like 16/WAKU2-RPC (local HTTP JSON-RPC), 25/LIBP2P-DNS-DISCOVERY, Discovery v5 (DevP2P) or interfacing with distributed storage, are running on different network stacks.
This is in addition to protocols that specify payloads, such as 14/WAKU2-MESSAGE, 26/WAKU2-PAYLOAD, or application specific ones. As well as specs that act more as recommendations, such as 23/WAKU2-TOPICS or 27/WAKU2-PEERS.
## Waku network visualization
We can better visualize the network with some illustrative examples.
### Topology and topics
The first one shows an example topology with different PubSub topics for the relay protocol.
![Waku Network visualization](./images/adaptive_node_network_topology_protocols2.png)
### Legend
![Waku Network visualization legend](./images/adaptive_node_network_topology_protocols_legend.png)
The dotted box shows what content topics (application-specific) a node is interested in.
A node that is purely providing a service to the network might not care.
In this example, we see support for toy chat, a topic in Waku v1 (Status chat), WalletConnect, and SuperRare community.
### Auxiliary network
This is a separate component with its own topology.
Behavior and interaction with other protocols specified in Vac RFCs, e.g. 25/LIBP2P-DNS-DISCOVERY, 15/WAKU-BRIDGE, etc.
### Node Cross Section
This one shows a cross-section of nodes in different dimensions and shows how the connections look different for different protocols.
![Node Cross Section](./images/adaptive_node_cross_section2.png)
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
- [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../standards/core/11/relay.md)

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---
title: 18/WAKU2-SWAP
name: Waku SWAP Accounting
status: draft
editor: Oskar Thorén \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\>
contributor: Ebube Ud \<ebube@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
## Abstract
This specification outlines how we do accounting and settlement based on the provision and usage of resources, most immediately bandwidth usage and/or storing and retrieving of Waku message. This enables nodes to cooperate and efficiently share resources, and in the case of unequal nodes to settle the difference through a relaxed payment mechanism in the form of sending cheques.
**Protocol identifier***: `/vac/waku/swap/2.0.0-beta1`
## Motivation
The Waku network makes up a service network, and some nodes provide a useful service to other nodes. We want to account for that, and when imbalances arise, settle this. The core of this approach has some theoretical backing in game theory, and variants of it have practically been proven to work in systems such as Bittorrent. The specific model use was developed by the Swarm project (previously part of Ethereum), and we re-use contracts that were written for this purpose.
By using a delayed payment mechanism in the form of cheques, a barter-like mechanism can arise, and nodes can decide on their own policy as opposed to be strictly tied to a specific payment scheme. Additionally, this delayed settlement eases requirements on the underlying network in terms of transaction speed or costs.
Theoretically, nodes providing and using resources over a long, indefinite, period of time can be seen as an iterated form of [Prisoner's Dilemma (PD)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma). Specifically, and more intuitively, since we have a cost and benefit profile for each provision/usage (of Waku Message's, e.g.), and the pricing can be set such that mutual cooperation is incentivized, this can be analyzed as a form of donations game.
## Game Theory - Iterated prisoner's dilemma / donation game
What follows is a sketch of what the game looks like between two nodes. We can look at it as a special case of iterated prisoner's dilemma called a [Donation game](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma#Special_case:_donation_game) where each node can cooperate with some benefit `b` at a personal cost `c`, where `b\>c`.
From A's point of view:
A/B | Cooperate | Defect
-----|----------|-------
Cooperate | b-c | -c
Defect | b | 0
What this means is that if A and B cooperates, A gets some benefit `b` minus a cost `c`. If A cooperates and B defects she only gets the cost, and if she defects and B cooperates A only gets the benefit. If both defect they get neither benefit nor cost.
The generalized form of PD is:
A/B | Cooperate | Defect
-----|----------|-------
Cooperate | R | S
Defect | T | P
With R=reward, S=Sucker's payoff, T=temptation, P=punishment
And the following holds:
- `T\>R\>P\>S`
- `2R\>T+S`
In our case, this means `b\>b-c\>0\>-c` and `2(b-c)\> b-c` which is trivially true.
As this is an iterated game with no clear finishing point in most circumstances, a tit-for-tat strategy is simple, elegant and functional. To be more theoretically precise, this also requires reasonable assumptions on error rate and discount parameter. This captures notions such as "does the perceived action reflect the intended action" and "how much do you value future (uncertain) actions compared to previous actions". See [Axelrod - Evolution of Cooperation (book)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Evolution_of_Cooperation) for more details. In specific circumstances, nodes can choose slightly different policies if there's a strong need for it. A policy is simply how a node chooses to act given a set of circumstances.
A tit-for-tat strategy basically means:
- cooperate first (perform service/beneficial action to other node)
- defect when node stops cooperating (disconnect and similar actions), i.e. when it stops performing according to set parameters re settlement
- resume cooperation if other node does so
This can be complemented with node selection mechanisms.
## SWAP protocol overview
We use SWAP for accounting and settlement in conjunction with other request/reply protocols in Waku v2,
where accounting is done in a pairwise manner.
It is an acronym with several possible meanings (as defined in the Book
of Swarm), for example:
- service wanted and provided
- settle with automated payments
- send waiver as payment
- start without a penny
This approach is based on communicating payment thresholds and sending cheques as indications of later payments.
Communicating payment thresholds MAY be done out-of-band or as part of the handshake.
Sending cheques is done once payment threshold is hit.
See [Book of Swarm](https://web.archive.org/web/20210126130038/https://gateway.ethswarm.org/bzz/latest.bookofswarm.eth) section 3.2. on Peer-to-peer accounting etc., for more context and details.
### Accounting
Nodes perform their own accounting for each relevant peer based on some "volume"/bandwidth metric. For now we take this to mean the number of `WakuMessage`s exchanged.
Additionally, a price is attached to each unit. Currently, this is simply a "karma counter" and equal to 1 per message.
Each accounting balance SHOULD be w.r.t. to a given protocol it is accounting for.
NOTE: This may later be complemented with other metrics, either as part of SWAP or more likely outside of it. For example, online time can be communicated and attested to as a form of enhanced quality of service to inform peer selection.
### Flow
Assuming we have two store nodes, one operating mostly as a client (A) and another as server (B).
1. Node A performs a handshake with B node. B node responds and both nodes communicate their payment threshold.
2. Node A and B creates an accounting entry for the other peer, keep track of peer and current balance.
3. Node A issues a `HistoryRequest`, and B responds with a `HistoryResponse`. Based on the number of WakuMessages in the response, both nodes update their accounting records.
4. When payment threshold is reached, Node A sends over a cheque to reach a neutral balance. Settlement of this is currently out of scope, but would occur through a SWAP contract (to be specified). (mock and hard phase).
5. If disconnect threshold is reached, Node B disconnects Node A (mock and hard phase).
Note that not all of these steps are mandatory in initial stages, see below for more details. For example, the payment threshold MAY initially be set out of bounds, and policy is only activated in the mock and hard phase.
### Protobufs
We use protobuf to specify the handshake and signature. This current protobuf is a work in progress. This is needed for mock and hard phase.
A handshake gives initial information about payment thresholds and possibly other information. A cheque is best thought of as a promise to pay at a later date.
```protobuf
message Handshake {
bytes payment_threshold = 1;
}
// TODO Signature?
// Should probably be over the whole Cheque type
message Cheque {
bytes beneficiary = 1;
// TODO epoch time or block time?
uint32 date = 2;
// TODO ERC20 extension?
// For now karma counter
uint32 amount = 3;
}
```
## Incremental integration and roll-out
To incrementally integrate this into Waku v2, we have divided up the roll-out into three phases:
- Soft - accounting only
- Mock - send mock cheques and take word for it
- Hard Test - blockchain integration and deployed to public testnet (Goerli, Optimism testnet or similar)
- Hard Main - deployed to a public mainnet
An implementation MAY support any of these phases.
### Soft phase
In the soft phase only accounting is performed, without consequence for the
peers. No disconnect or sending of cheques is performed at this tage.
SWAP protocol is performed in conjunction with another request-reply protocol to account for its usage.
It SHOULD be done for [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../standards/core/13/store.md)
and it MAY be done for other request/reply protocols.
A client SHOULD log accounting state per peer
and SHOULD indicate when a peer is out of bounds (either of its thresholds met).
### Mock phase
In the mock phase, we send mock cheques and send cheques/disconnect peers as appropriate.
- If a node reaches a disconnect threshold, which MUST be outside the payment threshold, it SHOULD disconnect the other peer.
- If a node is within payment balance, the other node SHOULD stay connected to it.
- If a node receives a valid Cheque it SHOULD update its internal accounting records.
- If any node behaves badly, the other node is free to disconnect and pick another node.
- Peer rating is out of scope of this specification.
### Hard phase
In the hard phase, in addition to sending cheques and activating policy, this is
done with blockchain integration on a public testnet. More details TBD.
This also includes settlements where cheques can be redeemed.
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
1. [Prisoner's Dilemma](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma)
2. [Axelrod - Evolution of Cooperation (book)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Evolution_of_Cooperation)
3. [Book of Swarm](https://web.archive.org/web/20210126130038/https://gateway.ethswarm.org/bzz/latest.bookofswarm.eth)
4. [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../standards/core/13/store.md)
\<!--
General TODOs:
- Find new link for book of swarm
- Illustrate payment and disconnection thresholds (mscgen not great for this?)
- Elaborate on how accounting works with amount in the context of e.g. store
- Illustrate flow
- Specify chequeboo
--\>

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---
title: 20/TOY-ETH-PM
name: Toy Ethereum Private Message
status: draft
editor: Franck Royer \<franck@status.im\>
contributors:
sidebar_position: 1
---
**Content Topics**:
- Public Key Broadcast: `/eth-pm/1/public-key/proto`,
- Private Message: `/eth-pm/1/private-message/proto`.
This specification explains the Toy Ethereum Private Message protocol
which enables a peer to send an encrypted message to another peer
using the Waku v2 network, and the peer's Ethereum address.
The main purpose of this specification is to demonstrate how Waku v2 can be used for encrypted messaging purposes,
using Ethereum accounts for identity.
This protocol caters for Web3 wallets restrictions, allowing it to be implemented only using standard Web3 API.
In the current state, the protocol has privacy and features [limitations](#limitations), has not been audited
and hence is not fit for production usage.
We hope this can be an inspiration for developers wishing to build on top of Waku v2.
## Goal
Alice wants to send an encrypted message to Bob, where only Bob can decrypt the message.
Alice only knows Bob's Ethereum Address.
## Variables
Here are the variables used in the protocol and their definition:
- `B` is Bob's Ethereum address (or account),
- `b` is the private key of `B`, and is only known by Bob.
- `B'` is Bob's Encryption Public Key, for which `b'` is the private key.
- `M` is the private message that Alice sends to Bob.
## Design Requirements
The proposed protocol MUST adhere to the following design requirements:
1. Alice knows Bob's Ethereum address,
2. Bob is willing to participate to Eth-PM, and publishes `B'`,
3. Bob's ownership of `B'` MUST be verifiable,
4. Alice wants to send message `M` to Bob,
5. Bob SHOULD be able to get `M` using [10/WAKU2 spec](../../standards/core/10/waku2.md),
6. Participants only have access to their Ethereum Wallet via the Web3 API,
7. Carole MUST NOT be able to read `M`'s content even if she is storing it or relaying it,
8. [Waku Message Version 1](../../standards/application/26/payload.md) Asymmetric Encryption is used for encryption purposes.
## Limitations
Alice's details are not included in the message's structure,
meaning that there is no programmatic way for Bob to reply to Alice
or verify her identity.
Private messages are sent on the same content topic for all users.
As the recipient data is encrypted, all participants must decrypt all messages which can lead to scalability issues.
This protocol does not guarantee Perfect Forward Secrecy nor Future Secrecy:
If Bob's private key is compromised, past and future messages could be decrypted.
A solution combining regular [X3DH](https://www.signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/)
bundle broadcast with [Double Ratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/) encryption would remove these limitations;
See the [Status secure transport spec](https://specs.status.im/spec/5) for an example of a protocol that achieves this in a peer-to-peer setting.
Bob MUST decide to participate in the protocol before Alice can send him a message.
This is discussed in more in details in [Consideration for a non-interactive/uncoordinated protocol](#consideration-for-a-non-interactiveuncoordinated-protocol)
## The protocol
### Generate Encryption KeyPair
First, Bob needs to generate a keypair for Encryption purposes.
Bob SHOULD get 32 bytes from a secure random source as Encryption Private Key, `b'`.
Then Bob can compute the corresponding SECP-256k1 Public Key, `B'`.
### Broadcast Encryption Public Key
For Alice to encrypt messages for Bob,
Bob SHOULD broadcast his Encryption Public Key `B'`.
To prove that the Encryption Public Key `B'` is indeed owned by the owner of Bob's Ethereum Account `B`,
Bob MUST sign `B'` using `B`.
### Sign Encryption Public Key
To prove ownership of the Encryption Public Key,
Bob must sign it using [EIP-712](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-712) v3,
meaning calling `eth_signTypedData_v3` on his Wallet's API.
Note: While v4 also exists,
it is not available on all wallets and the features brought by v4 is not needed for the current use case.
The `TypedData` to be passed to `eth_signTypedData_v3` MUST be as follows, where:
- `encryptionPublicKey` is Bob's Encryption Public Key, `B'`, in hex format, **without** `0x` prefix.
- `bobAddress` is Bob's Ethereum address, corresponding to `B`, in hex format, **with** `0x` prefix.
```js
const typedData = {
domain: {
chainId: 1,
name: 'Ethereum Private Message over Waku',
version: '1',
},
message: {
encryptionPublicKey: encryptionPublicKey,
ownerAddress: bobAddress,
},
primaryType: 'PublishEncryptionPublicKey',
types: {
EIP712Domain: [
{ name: 'name', type: 'string' },
{ name: 'version', type: 'string' },
{ name: 'chainId', type: 'uint256' },
],
PublishEncryptionPublicKey: [
{ name: 'encryptionPublicKey', type: 'string' },
{ name: 'ownerAddress', type: 'string' },
],
},
}
```
### Public Key Message
The resulting signature is then included in a `PublicKeyMessage`, where
- `encryption_public_key` is Bob's Encryption Public Key `B'`, not compressed,
- `eth_address` is Bob's Ethereum Address `B`,
- `signature` is the EIP-712 as described above.
```protobuf
syntax = "proto3";
message PublicKeyMessage {
bytes encryption_public_key = 1;
bytes eth_address = 2;
bytes signature = 3;
}
```
This MUST be wrapped in a Waku Message version 0, with the Public Key Broadcast content topic.
Finally, Bob SHOULD publish the message on Waku v2.
## Consideration for a non-interactive/uncoordinated protocol
Alice has to get Bob's public Key to send a message to Bob.
Because an Ethereum Address is part of the hash of the public key's account,
it is not enough in itself to deduce Bob's Public Key.
This is why the protocol dictates that Bob MUST send his Public Key first,
and Alice MUST receive it before she can send him a message.
Moreover, nim-waku, the reference implementation of [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../standards/core/13/store.md)),
stores messages for a maximum period of 30 days.
This means that Bob would need to broadcast his public key at least every 30 days to be reachable.
Below we are reviewing possible solutions to mitigate this "sign up" step.
### Retrieve the public key from the blockchain
If Bob has signed at least one transaction with his account then his Public Key can be extracted from the transaction's ECDSA signature.
The challenge with this method is that standard Web3 Wallet API does not allow Alice to specifically retrieve all/any transaction sent by Bob.
Alice would instead need to use the `eth.getBlock` API to retrieve Ethereum blocks one by one.
For each block, she would need to check the `from` value of each transaction until she finds a transaction sent by Bob.
This process is resource intensive and can be slow when using services such as Infura due to rate limits in place,
which makes it inappropriate for a browser or mobile phone environment.
An alternative would be to either run a backend that can connect directly to an Ethereum node,
use a centralized blockchain explorer
or use a decentralized indexing service such as [The Graph](https://thegraph.com/).
Note that these would resolve a UX issue only if a sender wants to proceed with _air drops_.
Indeed, if Bob does not publish his Public Key in the first place
then it can be an indication that he simply does not participate in this protocol and hence will not receive messages.
However, these solutions would be helpful if the sender wants to proceed with an _air drop_ of messages:
Send messages over Waku for users to retrieve later, once they decide to participate in this protocol.
Bob may not want to participate first but may decide to participate at a later stage
and would like to access previous messages.
This could make sense in an NFT offer scenario:
Users send offers to any NFT owner,
NFT owner may decide at some point to participate in the protocol and retrieve previous offers.
### Publishing the public in long term storage
Another improvement would be for Bob not having to re-publish his public key every 30 days or less.
Similarly to above, if Bob stops publishing his public key then it may be an indication that he does not participate in the protocol anymore.
In any case, the protocol could be modified to store the Public Key in a more permanent storage, such as a dedicated smart contract on the blockchain.
## Send Private Message
Alice MAY monitor the Waku v2 to collect Ethereum Address and Encryption Public Key tuples.
Alice SHOULD verify that the `signature`s of `PublicKeyMessage`s she receives are valid as per EIP-712.
She SHOULD drop any message without a signature or with an invalid signature.
Using Bob's Encryption Public Key, retrieved via [10/WAKU2](../../standards/core/10/waku2.md), Alice MAY now send an encrypted message to Bob.
If she wishes to do so, Alice MUST encrypt her message `M` using Bob's Encryption Public Key `B'`,
as per [26/WAKU-PAYLOAD Asymmetric Encryption specs](../../standards/application/26/payload.md/#asymmetric).
Alice SHOULD now publish this message on the Private Message content topic.
# Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
- [10/WAKU2 spec](../../standards/core/10/waku2.md)
- [Waku Message Version 1](../../standards/application/26/payload.md)
- [X3DH](https://www.signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/)
- [Double Ratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/)
- [Status secure transport spec](https://specs.status.im/spec/5)
- [EIP-712](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-712)
- [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../standards/core/13/store.md))
- [The Graph](https://thegraph.com/)

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---
title: 21/WAKU2-FAULT-TOLERANT-STORE
name: Waku v2 Fault-Tolerant Store
status: draft
editor: Sanaz Taheri \<sanaz@status.im\>
contributors:
sidebar_position: 1
---
The reliability of [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../standards/core/13/store.md) protocol heavily relies on the fact that full nodes i.e., those who persist messages have high availability and uptime and do not miss any messages.
If a node goes offline, then it will risk missing all the messages transmitted in the network during that time.
In this specification, we provide a method that makes the store protocol resilient in presence of faulty nodes.
Relying on this method, nodes that have been offline for a time window will be able to fix the gap in their message history when getting back online.
Moreover, nodes with lower availability and uptime can leverage this method to reliably provide the store protocol services as a full node.
## Method description
As the first step towards making the [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../standards/core/13/store.md) protocol fault-tolerant, we introduce a new type of time-based query through which nodes fetch message history from each other based on their desired time window.
This method operates based on the assumption that the querying node knows some other nodes in the store protocol which have been online for that targeted time window.
## Security Consideration
The main security consideration to take into account while using this method is that a querying node has to reveal its offline time to the queried node.
This will gradually result in the extraction of the node's activity pattern which can lead to inference attacks.
## Wire Specification
We extend the [HistoryQuery](../../standards/core/13/store.md/#payloads) protobuf message with two fields of `start_time` and `end_time` to signify the time range to be queried.
### Payloads
```diff
syntax = "proto3";
message HistoryQuery {
// the first field is reserved for future use
string pubsubtopic = 2;
repeated ContentFilter contentFilters = 3;
PagingInfo pagingInfo = 4;
+ sint64 start_time = 5;
+ sint64 end_time = 6;
}
```
### HistoryQuery
RPC call to query historical messages.
- `start_time`: this field MAY be filled out to signify the starting point of the queried time window.
This field holds the Unix epoch time in nanoseconds.
The `messages` field of the corresponding [`HistoryResponse`](../../standards/core/13/store.md/#HistoryResponse) MUST contain historical waku messages whose [`timestamp`](../../standards/core/14/message.md/#Payloads) is larger than or equal to the `start_time`.
- `end_time` this field MAY be filled out to signify the ending point of the queried time window.
This field holds the Unix epoch time in nanoseconds.
The `messages` field of the corresponding [`HistoryResponse`](../../standards/core/13/store.md/#HistoryResponse) MUST contain historical waku messages whose [`timestamp`](../../standards/core/14/message.md/#Payloads) is less than or equal to the `end_time`.
A time-based query is considered valid if its `end_time` is larger than or equal to the `start_time`.
Queries that do not adhere to this condition will not get through e.g. an open-end time query in which the `start_time` is given but no `end_time` is supplied is not valid.
If both `start_time` and `end_time` are omitted then no time-window filter takes place.
In order to account for nodes asynchrony, and assuming that nodes may be out of sync for at most 20 seconds (i.e., 20000000000 nanoseconds), the querying nodes SHOULD add an offset of 20 seconds to their offline time window.
That is if the original window is [`l`,`r`] then the history query SHOULD be made for `[start_time: l - 20s, end_time: r + 20s]`.
Note that `HistoryQuery` preserves `AND` operation among the queried attributes.
As such, The `messages` field of the corresponding [`HistoryResponse`](../../standards/core/13/store.md/#HistoryResponse) MUST contain historical waku messages that satisfy the indicated `pubsubtopic` AND `contentFilters` AND the time range [`start_time`, `end_time`].
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via
[CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
- [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../standards/core/13/store.md)
- [`timestamp`](../../standards/core/14/message.md/#Payloads)

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---
title: 26/WAKU2-PAYLOAD
name: Waku Message Payload Encryption
status: draft
editor: Oskar Thoren \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\>
contributors:
sidebar_position: 1
---
This specification describes how Waku provides confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity, as well as some form of unlinkability.
Specifically, it describes how encryption, decryption and signing works in [6/WAKU1](../../standards/core/6/waku1.md) and in [10/WAKU2 spec](../../standards/core/10/waku2.md) with [14/WAKU-MESSAGE version 1](../../standards/core/14/message.md/#version1).
This specification effectively replaces [7/WAKU-DATA](../../standards/application/7/DATA.md) as well as [6/WAKU1 Payload encryption](../../standards/core/6/waku1.md/#payload-encryption) but written in a way that is agnostic and self-contained for Waku v1 and Waku v2.
Large sections of the specification originate from [EIP-627: Whisper spec](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-627) as well from [RLPx Transport Protocol spec (ECIES encryption)](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/rlpx.md#ecies-encryption) with some modifications.
## Design requirements
- *Confidentiality*: The adversary should not be able to learn what data is being sent from one Waku node to one or several other Waku nodes.
- *Authenticity*: The adversary should not be able to cause Waku endpoint to accept data from any third party as though it came from the other endpoint.
- *Integrity*: The adversary should not be able to cause a Waku endpoint to accept data that has been tampered with.
Notable, *forward secrecy* is not provided for at this layer.
If this property is desired, a more fully featured secure communication protocol can be used on top, such as [Status 5/SECURE-TRANSPORT](https://specs.status.im/spec/5).
It also provides some form of *unlinkability* since:
- only participants who are able to decrypt a message can see its signature
- payload are padded to a fixed length
## Cryptographic primitives
- AES-256-GCM (for symmetric encryption)
- ECIES
- ECDSA
- KECCAK-256
ECIES is using the following cryptosystem:
- Curve: secp256k1
- KDF: NIST SP 800-56 Concatenation Key Derivation Function, with SHA-256 option
- MAC: HMAC with SHA-256
- AES: AES-128-CTR
## Specification
For 6/WAKU1, the `data` field is used in the `waku envelope`, and the field MAY contain the encrypted payload.
For 10/WAKU2, the `payload` field is used in `WakuMessage` and MAY contain the encrypted payload.
The fields that are concatenated and encrypted as part of the `data` (Waku v1) / `payload` (Waku v2) field are:
- flags
- payload-length
- payload
- padding
- signature
### ABNF
Using [Augmented Backus-Naur form (ABNF)](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5234) we have the following format:
```abnf
; 1 byte; first two bits contain the size of payload-length field,
; third bit indicates whether the signature is present.
flags = 1OCTET
; contains the size of payload.
payload-length = 4*OCTET
; byte array of arbitrary size (may be zero).
payload = *OCTET
; byte array of arbitrary size (may be zero).
padding = *OCTET
; 65 bytes, if present.
signature = 65OCTET
data = flags payload-length payload padding [signature]
; This field is called payload in Waku v2
payload = data
```
### Signature
Those unable to decrypt the payload/data are also unable to access the signature.
The signature, if provided, is the ECDSA signature of the Keccak-256 hash of the unencrypted data using the secret key of the originator identity.
The signature is serialized as the concatenation of the `r`, `s` and `v` parameters of the SECP-256k1 ECDSA signature, in that order.
`r` and `s` MUST be big-endian encoded, fixed-width 256-bit unsigned.
`v` MUST be an 8-bit big-endian encoded, non-normalized and should be either 27 or 28.
See [Ethereum "Yellow paper": Appendix F Signing transactions](https://ethereum.github.io/yellowpaper/paper.pdf) for more information on signature generation, parameters and public key recovery.
### Encryption
#### Symmetric
Symmetric encryption uses AES-256-GCM for [authenticated encryption](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_encryption).
The output of encryption is of the form (`ciphertext`, `tag`, `iv`) where `ciphertext` is the encrypted message, `tag` is a 16 byte message authentication tag and `iv` is a 12 byte initialization vector (nonce).
The message authentication `tag` and initialization vector `iv` field MUST be appended to the resulting `ciphertext`, in that order.
Note that previous specifications and some implementations might refer to `iv` as `nonce` or `salt`.
#### Asymmetric
Asymmetric encryption uses the standard Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) with SECP-256k1 public key.
#### ECIES
This section originates from the [RLPx Transport Protocol spec](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/rlpx.md#ecies-encryption) spec with minor modifications.
The cryptosystem used is:
- The elliptic curve secp256k1 with generator `G`.
- `KDF(k, len)`: the NIST SP 800-56 Concatenation Key Derivation Function.
- `MAC(k, m)`: HMAC using the SHA-256 hash function.
- `AES(k, iv, m)`: the AES-128 encryption function in CTR mode.
Special notation used: `X || Y` denotes concatenation of `X` and `Y`.
Alice wants to send an encrypted message that can be decrypted by Bob's static private key `kB`. Alice knows about Bobs static public key `KB`.
To encrypt the message `m`, Alice generates a random number `r` and corresponding elliptic curve public key `R = r * G` and computes the shared secret `S = Px` where `(Px, Py) = r * KB`.
She derives key material for encryption and authentication as `kE || kM = KDF(S, 32)` as well as a random initialization vector `iv`.
Alice sends the encrypted message `R || iv || c || d` where `c = AES(kE, iv , m)` and `d = MAC(sha256(kM), iv || c)` to Bob.
For Bob to decrypt the message `R || iv || c || d`, he derives the shared secret `S = Px` where `(Px, Py) = kB * R` as well as the encryption and authentication keys `kE || kM = KDF(S, 32)`.
Bob verifies the authenticity of the message by checking whether `d == MAC(sha256(kM), iv || c)` then obtains the plaintext as `m = AES(kE, iv || c)`.
### Padding
The padding field is used to align data size, since data size alone might reveal important metainformation.
Padding can be arbitrary size.
However, it is recommended that the size of Data Field (excluding the IV and tag) before encryption (i.e. plain text) SHOULD be a multiple of 256 bytes.
### Decoding a message
In order to decode a message, a node SHOULD try to apply both symmetric and asymmetric decryption operations.
This is because the type of encryption is not included in the message.
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
1. [6/WAKU1](../../standards/core/6/waku1.md)
2. [10/WAKU2 spec](../../standards/core/10/waku2.md)
3. [14/WAKU-MESSAGE version 1](../../standards/core/14/message.md/#version1)
4. [7/WAKU-DATA](../../standards/application/7/DATA.md)
5. [EIP-627: Whisper spec](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-627)
6. [RLPx Transport Protocol spec (ECIES encryption)](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/rlpx.md#ecies-encryption)
7. [Status 5/SECURE-TRANSPORT](https://specs.status.im/spec/5)
8. [Augmented Backus-Naur form (ABNF)](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5234)
9. [Ethereum "Yellow paper": Appendix F Signing transactions](https://ethereum.github.io/yellowpaper/paper.pdf)
10. [authenticated encryption](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_encryption)

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---
title: 53/WAKU2-X3DH
name: X3DH usage for Waku payload encryption
status: draft
category: Standards Track
editor: Aaryamann Challani \<aaryamann@status.im\>
contributors:
- Andrea Piana \<andreap@status.im\>
- Pedro Pombeiro \<pedro@status.im\>
- Corey Petty \<corey@status.im\>
- Oskar Thorén \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\>
- Dean Eigenmann \<dean@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
## Abstract
This document describes a method that can be used to provide a secure channel between two peers, and thus provide confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and forward secrecy.
It is transport-agnostic and works over asynchronous networks.
It builds on the [X3DH](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/) and [Double Ratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/) specifications, with some adaptations to operate in a decentralized environment.
## Motivation
Nodes on a network may want to communicate with each other in a secure manner, without other nodes network being able to read their messages.
## Specification
### Definitions
- **Perfect Forward Secrecy** is a feature of specific key-agreement protocols which provide assurances that session keys will not be compromised even if the private keys of the participants are compromised.
Specifically, past messages cannot be decrypted by a third-party who manages to get a hold of a private key.
- **Secret channel** describes a communication channel where a Double Ratchet algorithm is in use.
### Design Requirements
- **Confidentiality**: The adversary should not be able to learn what data is being exchanged between two Status clients.
- **Authenticity**: The adversary should not be able to cause either endpoint to accept data from any third party as though it came from the other endpoint.
- **Forward Secrecy**: The adversary should not be able to learn what data was exchanged between two clients if, at some later time, the adversary compromises one or both of the endpoints.
- **Integrity**: The adversary should not be able to cause either endpoint to accept data that has been tampered with.
All of these properties are ensured by the use of [Signal's Double Ratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/)
### Conventions
Types used in this specification are defined using the [Protobuf](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/) wire format.
## Specification
### End-to-End Encryption
End-to-end encryption (E2EE) takes place between two clients.
The main cryptographic protocol is a Double Ratchet protocol, which is derived from the [Off-the-Record protocol](https://otr.cypherpunks.ca/Protocol-v3-4.1.1.html), using a different ratchet.
[The Waku v2 protocol](../../standards/core/10/waku2.md) subsequently encrypts the message payload, using symmetric key encryption.
Furthermore, the concept of prekeys (through the use of [X3DH](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/)) is used to allow the protocol to operate in an asynchronous environment.
It is not necessary for two parties to be online at the same time to initiate an encrypted conversation.
### Cryptographic Protocols
This protocol uses the following cryptographic primitives:
- X3DH
- Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange (secp256k1)
- KECCAK-256
- ECDSA
- ECIES
- Double Ratchet
- HMAC-SHA-256 as MAC
- Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange (Curve25519)
- AES-256-CTR with HMAC-SHA-256 and IV derived alongside an encryption key
The node achieves key derivation using [HKDF](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5869).
### Pre-keys
Every client SHOULD initially generate some key material which is stored locally:
- Identity keypair based on secp256k1 - `IK`
- A signed prekey based on secp256k1 - `SPK`
- A prekey signature - `Sig(IK, Encode(SPK))`
More details can be found in the `X3DH Prekey bundle creation` section of [2/ACCOUNT](https://specs.status.im/spec/2#x3dh-prekey-bundles).
Prekey bundles MAY be extracted from any peer's messages, or found via searching for their specific topic, `{IK}-contact-code`.
The following methods can be used to retrieve prekey bundles from a peer's messages:
- contact codes;
- public and one-to-one chats;
- QR codes;
- ENS record;
- Decentralized permanent storage (e.g. Swarm, IPFS).
- Waku
Waku SHOULD be used for retrieving prekey bundles.
Since bundles stored in QR codes or ENS records cannot be updated to delete already used keys, the bundle MAY be rotated every 24 hours, and distributed via Waku.
### Flow
The key exchange can be summarized as follows:
1. Initial key exchange: Two parties, Alice and Bob, exchange their prekey bundles, and derive a shared secret.
2. Double Ratchet: The two parties use the shared secret to derive a new encryption key for each message they send.
3. Chain key update: The two parties update their chain keys. The chain key is used to derive new encryption keys for future messages.
4. Message key derivation: The two parties derive a new message key from their chain key, and use it to encrypt a message.
#### 1. Initial key exchange flow (X3DH)
[Section 3 of the X3DH protocol](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/#sending-the-initial-message) describes the initial key exchange flow, with some additional context:
- The peers' identity keys `IK_A` and `IK_B` correspond to their public keys;
- Since it is not possible to guarantee that a prekey will be used only once in a decentralized world, the one-time prekey `OPK_B` is not used in this scenario;
- Nodes SHOULD not send Bundles to a centralized server, but instead provide them in a decentralized way as described in the [Pre-keys section](#pre-keys).
Alice retrieves Bob's prekey bundle, however it is not specific to Alice. It contains:
([reference wire format](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/a904d9325e76f18f54d59efc099b63293d3dcad3/services/shhext/chat/encryption.proto#L12))
**Wire format:**
``` protobuf
// X3DH prekey bundle
message Bundle {
// Identity key 'IK_B'
bytes identity = 1;
// Signed prekey 'SPK_B' for each device, indexed by 'installation-id'
map\<string,SignedPreKey\> signed_pre_keys = 2;
// Prekey signature 'Sig(IK_B, Encode(SPK_B))'
bytes signature = 4;
// When the bundle was created locally
int64 timestamp = 5;
}
```
([reference wire format](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/a904d9325e76f18f54d59efc099b63293d3dcad3/services/shhext/chat/encryption.proto#L5))
``` protobuf
message SignedPreKey {
bytes signed_pre_key = 1;
uint32 version = 2;
}
```
The `signature` is generated by sorting `installation-id` in lexicographical order, and concatenating the `signed-pre-key` and `version`:
`installation-id-1signed-pre-key1version1installation-id2signed-pre-key2-version-2`
#### 2. Double Ratchet
Having established the initial shared secret `SK` through X3DH, it SHOULD be used to seed a Double Ratchet exchange between Alice and Bob.
Refer to the [Double Ratchet spec](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/) for more details.
The initial message sent by Alice to Bob is sent as a top-level `ProtocolMessage` ([reference wire format](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/a904d9325e76f18f54d59efc099b63293d3dcad3/services/shhext/chat/encryption.proto#L65)) containing a map of `DirectMessageProtocol` indexed by `installation-id` ([reference wire format](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/1ac9dd974415c3f6dee95145b6644aeadf02f02c/services/shhext/chat/encryption.proto#L56)):
``` protobuf
message ProtocolMessage {
// The installation id of the sender
string installation_id = 2;
// A sequence of bundles
repeated Bundle bundles = 3;
// One to one message, encrypted, indexed by installation_id
map\<string,DirectMessageProtocol\> direct_message = 101;
// Public message, not encrypted
bytes public_message = 102;
}
```
``` protobuf
message EncryptedMessageProtocol {
X3DHHeader X3DH_header = 1;
DRHeader DR_header = 2;
DHHeader DH_header = 101;
// Encrypted payload
// if a bundle is available, contains payload encrypted with the Double Ratchet algorithm;
// otherwise, payload encrypted with output key of DH exchange (no Perfect Forward Secrecy).
bytes payload = 3;
}
```
Where:
- `X3DH_header`: the `X3DHHeader` field in `DirectMessageProtocol` contains:
([reference wire format](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/a904d9325e76f18f54d59efc099b63293d3dcad3/services/shhext/chat/encryption.proto#L47))
``` protobuf
message X3DHHeader {
// Alice's ephemeral key `EK_A`
bytes key = 1;
// Bob's bundle signed prekey
bytes id = 4;
}
```
- `DR_header`: Double ratchet header ([reference wire format](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/a904d9325e76f18f54d59efc099b63293d3dcad3/services/shhext/chat/encryption.proto#L31)). Used when Bob's public bundle is available:
``` protobuf
message DRHeader {
// Alice's current ratchet public key (as mentioned in [DR spec section 2.2](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/#symmetric-key-ratchet))
bytes key = 1;
// number of the message in the sending chain
uint32 n = 2;
// length of the previous sending chain
uint32 pn = 3;
// Bob's bundle ID
bytes id = 4;
}
```
- `DH_header`: Diffie-Hellman header (used when Bob's bundle is not available):
([reference wire format](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/a904d9325e76f18f54d59efc099b63293d3dcad3/services/shhext/chat/encryption.proto#L42))
``` protobuf
message DHHeader {
// Alice's compressed ephemeral public key.
bytes key = 1;
}
```
#### 3. Chain key update
The chain key MUST be updated according to the `DR_Header` received in the `EncryptedMessageProtocol` message, described in [2.Double Ratchet](#2-double-ratchet).
#### 4. Message key derivation
The message key MUST be derived from a single ratchet step in the symmetric-key ratchet as described in [Symmetric key ratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/#symmetric-key-ratchet)
The message key MUST be used to encrypt the next message to be sent.
## Security Considerations
1. Inherits the security considerations of [X3DH](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/#security-considerations) and [Double Ratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/#security-considerations).
2. Inherits the security considerations of the [Waku v2 protocol](../../standards/core/10/waku2.md).
3. The protocol is designed to be used in a decentralized manner, however, it is possible to use a centralized server to serve prekey bundles. In this case, the server is trusted.
## Privacy Considerations
1. This protocol does not provide message unlinkability. It is possible to link messages signed by the same keypair.
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
- [X3DH](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/)
- [Double Ratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/)
- [Signal's Double Ratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/)
- [Protobuf](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/)
- [Off-the-Record protocol](https://otr.cypherpunks.ca/Protocol-v3-4.1.1.html)
- [The Waku v2 protocol](../../standards/core/10/waku2.md)
- [HKDF](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5869)
- [2/ACCOUNT](https://specs.status.im/spec/2#x3dh-prekey-bundles)
- [reference wire format](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/a904d9325e76f18f54d59efc099b63293d3dcad3/services/shhext/chat/encryption.proto#L12)
- [Symmetric key ratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/#symmetric-key-ratchet)
-
-

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---
title: 54/WAKU2-X3DH-SESSIONS
name: Session management for Waku X3DH
status: draft
category: Standards Track
editor: Aaryamann Challani \<aaryamann@status.im\>
contributors:
- Andrea Piana \<andreap@status.im\>
- Pedro Pombeiro \<pedro@status.im\>
- Corey Petty \<corey@status.im\>
- Oskar Thorén \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\>
- Dean Eigenmann \<dean@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
## Abstract
This document specifies how to manage sessions based on an X3DH key exchange.
This includes how to establish new sessions, how to re-establish them, how to maintain them, and how to close them.
[53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../standards/application/53/X3DH.md) specifies the Waku `X3DH` protocol for end-to-end encryption.
Once two peers complete an X3DH handshake, they SHOULD establish an X3DH session.
## Session Establishment
A node identifies a peer by their `installation-id` which MAY be interpreted as a device identifier.
### Discovery of pre-key bundles
The node's pre-key bundle MUST be broadcast on a content topic derived from the node's public key, so that the first message may be PFS-encrypted.
Each peer MUST publish their pre-key bundle periodically to this topic, otherwise they risk not being able to perform key-exchanges with other peers.
Each peer MAY publish to this topic when their metadata changes, so that the other peer can update their local record.
If peer A wants to send a message to peer B, it MUST derive the topic from peer B's public key, which has been shared out of band.
Partitioned topics have been used to balance privacy and efficiency of broadcasting pre-key bundles.
The number of partitions that MUST be used is 5000.
The topic MUST be derived as follows:
```
var partitionsNum *big.Int = big.NewInt(5000)
var partition *big.Int = big.NewInt(0).Mod(peerBPublicKey, partitionsNum)
partitionTopic := "contact-discovery-" + strconv.FormatInt(partition.Int64(), 10)
var hash []byte = keccak256(partitionTopic)
var topicLen int = 4
if len(hash) \< topicLen {
topicLen = len(hash)
}
var contactCodeTopic [4]byte
for i = 0; i \< topicLen; i++ {
contactCodeTopic[i] = hash[i]
}
```
### Initialization
A node initializes a new session once a successful X3DH exchange has taken place.
Subsequent messages will use the established session until re-keying is necessary.
### Negotiated topic to be used for the session
After the peers have performed the initial key exchange, they MUST derive a topic from their shared secret to send messages on.
To obtain this value, take the first four bytes of the keccak256 hash of the shared secret encoded in hexadecimal format.
```
sharedKey, err := ecies.ImportECDSA(myPrivateKey).GenerateShared(
ecies.ImportECDSAPublic(theirPublicKey),
16,
16,
)
hexEncodedKey := hex.EncodeToString(sharedKey)
var hash []byte = keccak256(hexEncodedKey)
var topicLen int = 4
if len(hash) \< topicLen {
topicLen = len(hash)
}
var topic [4]byte
for i = 0; i \< topicLen; i++ {
topic[i] = hash[i]
}
```
To summarize, following is the process for peer B to establish a session with peer A:
1. Listen to peer B's Contact Code Topic to retrieve their bundle information, including a list of active devices
2. Peer A sends their pre-key bundle on peer B's partitioned topic
3. Peer A and peer B perform the key-exchange using the shared pre-key bundles
3. The negotiated topic is derived from the shared secret
4. Peers A & B exchange messages on the negotiated topic
### Concurrent sessions
If a node creates two sessions concurrently between two peers, the one with the symmetric key first in byte order SHOULD be used, this marks that the other has expired.
### Re-keying
On receiving a bundle from a given peer with a higher version, the old bundle SHOULD be marked as expired and a new session SHOULD be established on the next message sent.
### Multi-device support
Multi-device support is quite challenging as there is not a central place where information on which and how many devices (identified by their respective `installation-id`) a peer has, is stored.
Furthermore, account recovery always needs to be taken into consideration, where a user wipes clean the whole device and the node loses all the information about any previous sessions.
Taking these considerations into account, the way the network propagates multi-device information using X3DH bundles, which will contain information about paired devices as well as information about the sending device.
This means that every time a new device is paired, the bundle needs to be updated and propagated with the new information, the user has the responsibility to make sure the pairing is successful.
The method is loosely based on [Signal's Sesame Algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/sesame/).
### Pairing
A new `installation-id` MUST be generated on a per-device basis.
The device should be paired as soon as possible if other devices are present.
If a bundle is received, which has the same `IK` as the keypair present on the device, the devices MAY be paired.
Once a user enables a new device, a new bundle MUST be generated which includes pairing information.
The bundle MUST be propagated to contacts through the usual channels.
Removal of paired devices is a manual step that needs to be applied on each device, and consist simply in disabling the device, at which point pairing information will not be propagated anymore.
### Sending messages to a paired group
When sending a message, the peer SHOULD send a message to other `installation-id` that they have seen.
The node caps the number of devices to `n`, ordered by last activity.
The node sends messages using pairwise encryption, including their own devices.
Where `n` is the maximum number of devices that can be paired.
### Account recovery
Account recovery is the same as adding a new device, and it MUST be handled the same way.
### Partitioned devices
In some cases (i.e. account recovery when no other pairing device is available, device not paired), it is possible that a device will receive a message that is not targeted to its own `installation-id`.
In this case an empty message containing bundle information MUST be sent back, which will notify the receiving end not to include the device in any further communication.
## Security Considerations
1. Inherits all security considerations from [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../standards/application/53/X3DH.md).
### Recommendations
1. The value of `n` SHOULD be configured by the app-protocol.
- The default value SHOULD be 3, since a larger number of devices will result in a larger bundle size, which may not be desirable in a peer-to-peer network.
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
1. [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../standards/application/53/X3DH.md)
2. [Signal's Sesame Algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/sesame/)

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# Sequence diagram for Waku v2 (WakuMessage, WakuData, Relay, Store, Filter)
# PNG generated with https://mscgen.js.org
msc {
hscale="1",
wordwraparcs=true;
a [label="A\nrelay\n(0)"],
b [label="B relay(pubtopic1)\n(0)"],
c [label="C relay(pubtopic2)\n(0)"],
d [label="D relay(pubtopic1), store(pubtopic1), filter\n(0)"],
e [label="E\nrelay, store\n(0)"],
f [label="F\nrelay, filter\n(0)"];
a rbox a [label="msg1=WakuMessage(contentTopic1, data) [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE] (1)"];
a note a [label="If version=1, encrypt data per [7/WAKU-DATA] (1)"];
f => d [label="FilterRequest(pubtopic1, contentTopic1) [12/WAKU2-FILTER] (2)"];
d rbox d [label="Subscribe F to filter [12/WAKU2-FILTER] (2)"];
a => b [label="Publish msg1 on pubtopic1 [11/WAKU2-RELAY] (3)"];
b => d [label="relay msg1 on pubtopic1 [11/WAKU2-RELAY] (3)"];
d rbox d [label="store: saves msg1 [13/WAKU2-STORE] (4)"];
d => f [label="MessagePush(msg1)[12/WAKU2-FILTER] (5)"];
---;
e note e [label="E comes online (6)"];
e => d [label="HistoryQuery(pubtopic1, contentTopic1) [13/WAKU2-STORE] (6)"];
d => e [label="HistoryResponse(msg1, ...) [13/WAKU2-STORE] (6)"];
}

BIN
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@ -0,0 +1,499 @@
---
title: 10/WAKU2
name: Waku v2
status: draft
editor: Oskar Thorén \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\>
contributors:
- Sanaz Taheri \<sanaz@status.im\>
- Hanno Cornelius \<hanno@status.im\>
- Reeshav Khan \<reeshav@status.im\>
- Daniel Kaiser \<danielkaiser@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
## Abstract
Waku v2 is family of modular peer-to-peer protocols for secure communication.
The protocols are designed to be secure, privacy-preserving, censorship-resistant and being able to run in resource restricted environments.
At a high level, it implements Pub/Sub over [libp2p](https://github.com/libp2p/specs) and adds a set of capabilities to it.
These capabilities are things such as:
(i) retrieving historical messages for mostly-offline devices
(ii) adaptive nodes, allowing for heterogeneous nodes to contribute to the network
(iii) preserving bandwidth usage for resource-restriced devices
This makes Waku ideal for running a p2p protocol on mobile and in similarly restricted environments.
Historically, it has its roots in [6/WAKU1](../6/waku1.md),
which stems from [Whisper](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-627), originally part of the Ethereum stack.
However, Waku v2 acts more as a thin wrapper for PubSub and has a different API.
It is implemented in an iterative manner where initial focus is on porting essential functionality to libp2p.
See [rough road map (2020)](https://vac.dev/waku-v2-plan) for more historical context.
## Motivation and goals
Waku as a family of protocols is designed to have a set of properties that are useful for many applications:
1. **Useful for generalized messaging.**
Many applications require some form of messaging protocol to communicate between different subsystems or different nodes.
This messaging can be human-to-human or machine-to-machine or a mix.
Waku is designed to work for all these scenarios.
2. **Peer-to-peer.**
Applications sometimes have requirements that make them suitable for peer-to-peer solutions:
- Censorship-resistant with no single point of failure
- Adaptive and scalable network
- Shared infrastructure
3. **Runs anywhere.**
Applications often run in restricted environments, where resources or the environment is restricted in some fashion.
For example:
- Limited bandwidth, CPU, memory, disk, battery, etc
- Not being publicly connectable
- Only being intermittently connected; mostly-offline
4. **Privacy-preserving.**
Applications often have a desire for some privacy guarantees, such as:
- Pseudonymity and not being tied to any personally identifiable information (PII)
- Metadata protection in transit
- Various forms of unlinkability, etc
5. **Modular design.**
Applications often have different trade-offs when it comes to what properties they and their users value.
Waku is designed in a modular fashion where an application protocol or node can choose what protocols they run.
We call this concept *adaptive nodes*.
For example:
- Resource usage vs metadata protection
- Providing useful services to the network vs mostly using it
- Stronger guarantees for spam protection vs economic registration cost
For more on the concept of adaptive nodes and what this means in practice,
please see the [30/ADAPTIVE-NODES](../../../informational/30/adaptive-nodes.md) spec.
## Network interaction domains
While Waku is best thought of as a single cohesive thing, there are three network interaction domains:
(a) gossip domain
(b) discovery domain
(c) req/resp domain
### Protocols and identifiers
Since Waku v2 is built on top of libp2p, many protocols have a libp2p protocol identifier.
The current main [protocol identifiers](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/protocols/) are:
1. `/vac/waku/relay/2.0.0`
2. `/vac/waku/store/2.0.0-beta4`
3. `/vac/waku/filter/2.0.0-beta1`
4. `/vac/waku/lightpush/2.0.0-beta1`
This is in addition to protocols that specify messages, payloads, and recommended usages.
Since these aren't negotiated libp2p protocols, they are referred to by their RFC ID.
For example:
- [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md) and [26/WAKU-PAYLOAD](../../application/26/payload.md) for message payloads
- [23/WAKU2-TOPICS](../../../informational/23/topics.md) and [27/WAKU2-PEERS](../../../informational/27/peers.md) for recommendations around usage
There are also more experimental libp2p protocols such as:
1. `/vac/waku/swap/2.0.0-beta1`
2. `/vac/waku/waku-rln-relay/2.0.0-alpha1`
These protocols and their semantics are elaborated on in their own specs.
### Use of libp2p and protobuf
Unless otherwise specified, all protocols are implemented over libp2p and use Protobuf by default.
Since messages are exchanged over a [bi-directional binary stream](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/protocols/),
as a convention, libp2p protocols prefix binary message payloads with the length of the message in bytes.
This length integer is encoded as a [protobuf varint](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/docs/encoding#varints).
### Gossip domain
Waku is using gossiping to disseminate messages throughout the network.
**Protocol identifier**: `/vac/waku/relay/2.0.0`
See [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md) spec for more details.
For an experimental privacy-preserving economic spam protection mechanism, see [17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY](../17/rln-relay.md).
See [23/WAKU2-TOPICS](../../../informational/23/topics.md) for more information about recommended topic usage.
### Direct use of libp2p protocols
In addition to `/vac/waku/*` protocols, Waku v2 MAY directly use the following libp2p protocols:
* [libp2p ping protocol](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/protocols/#ping) with protocol id
```
/ipfs/ping/1.0.0
```
for liveness checks between peers, or to keep peer-to-peer connections alive.
* [libp2p identity and identity/push](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/protocols/#identify) with protocol IDs
```
/ipfs/id/1.0.0
```
and
```
/ipfs/id/push/1.0.0
```
respectively, as basic means for capability discovery.
These protocols are anyway used by the libp2p connection establishment layer Waku v2 is built on.
We plan to introduce a new Vac capability discovery protocol with better anonymity properties and more functionality.
# Transports
Waku v2 is built in top of libp2p, and like libp2p it strives to be transport agnostic.
We define a set of recommended transports in order to achieve a baseline of interoperability between clients.
This section describes these recommended transports.
Waku client implementations SHOULD support the TCP transport.
Where TCP is supported it MUST be enabled for both dialing and listening, even if other transports are available.
Waku v2 nodes where the environment do not allow to use TCP directly, MAY use other transports.
A Waku v2 node SHOULD support secure websockets for bidirectional communication streams, for example in a web browser context.
A node MAY support unsecure websockets if required by the application or running environment.
### Discovery domain
#### Discovery methods
Waku v2 can retrieve a list of nodes to connect to using DNS-based discovery as per [EIP-1459](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459).
While this is a useful way of bootstrapping connection to a set of peers,
it MAY be used in conjunction with an [ambient peer discovery](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/publish-subscribe/#discovery) procedure to find still other nodes to connect to,
such as [Node Discovery v5](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/8fd5f7e1c1ec496a9d8dc1640a8548b8a8b5986b/discv5/discv5.md).
More ambient peer discovery methods are being tested for Waku v2,
and will be specified for wider adoption.
It is possible to bypass the discovery domain by specifying static nodes.
#### Use of ENR
[31/WAKU2-ENR](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/enr.md) describes the usage of [EIP-778 ENR (Ethereum Node Records)](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-778) for Waku v2 discovery purposes.
It introduces two new ENR fields, `multiaddrs` and `waku2`, that a Waku v2 node MAY use for discovery purposes.
These fields MUST be used under certain conditions, as set out in the spec.
Both EIP-1459 DNS-based discovery and Node Discovery v5 operates on ENR,
and it's reasonable to expect even wider utility for ENR in Waku v2 networks in future.
### Request/Reply domain
In addition to the Gossip domain,
Waku provides a set of Request/Reply protocols.
They are primarily used in order to get Waku to run in resource restricted environments,
such as low bandwidth or being mostly offline.
#### Historical message support
**Protocol identifier***: `/vac/waku/store/2.0.0-beta4`
This is used to fetch historical messages for mostly offline devices.
See [13/WAKU2-STORE spec](../13/store.md) spec for more details.
There is also an experimental fault-tolerant addition to the store protocol that relaxes the high availability requirement.
See [21/WAKU2-FT-STORE](../../application/21/ft-store.md)
#### Content filtering
**Protocol identifier***: `/vac/waku/filter/2.0.0-beta1`
This is used to make fetching of a subset of messages more bandwidth preserving.
See [12/WAKU2-FILTER](../12/filter.md) spec for more details.
#### Light push
**Protocol identifier***: `/vac/waku/lightpush/2.0.0-beta1`
This is used for nodes with short connection windows and limited bandwidth to publish messages into the Waku network.
See [19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH](../19/lightpush.md) spec for more details.
#### Other protocols
The above is a non-exhaustive list,
and due to the modular design of Waku there may be other protocols here that provide a useful service to the Waku network.
### Overview of protocol interaction
See the sequence diagram below for an overview of how different protocols interact.
![Overview of how protocols interact in Waku v2.](./images/overview.png)
0. We have six nodes, A-F.
The protocols initially mounted are indicated as such.
The PubSub topics `pubtopic1` and `pubtopic2` is used for routing and indicates that it is subscribed to messages on that topic for relay, see [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md) for details.
Ditto for [13/WAKU2-STORE](../13/store.md) where it indicates that these messages are persisted on that node.
1. Node A creates a WakuMessage `msg1` with a ContentTopic `contentTopic1`.
See [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../core/14/message.md) for more details.
If WakuMessage version is set to 1, we use the [6/WAKU1](../6/waku1.md) compatible `data` field with encryption.
See [7/WAKU-DATA](../../application/7/data.md) for more details.
2. Node F requests to get messages filtered by PubSub topic `pubtopic1` and ContentTopic `contentTopic1`.
Node D subscribes F to this filter and will in the future forward messages that match that filter.
See [12/WAKU2-FILTER](../12/filter.md) for more details.
3. Node A publishes `msg1` on `pubtopic1` and subscribes to that relay topic pick it up.
It then gets relayed further from B to D, but not C since it doesn't subscribe to that topic.
See [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md).
4. Node D saves `msg1` for possible later retrieval by other nodes.
See [13/WAKU2-STORE](../13/store.md).
5. Node D also pushes `msg1` to F, as it has previously subscribed F to this filter.
See [12/WAKU2-FILTER](../12/filter.md).
6. At a later time, Node E comes online.
It then requests messages matching `pubtopic1` and `contentTopic1` from Node D.
Node D responds with messages meeting this (and possibly other) criteria. See [13/WAKU2-STORE](../13/store.md).
## Appendix A: Upgradability and Compatibility
### Compatibility with Waku v1
Waku v1 and Waku v2 are different protocols all together.
They use a different transport protocol underneath; Waku v1 is devp2p RLPx based while Waku v2 uses libp2p.
The protocols themselves also differ as does their data format.
Compatibility can be achieved only by using a bridge that not only talks both devp2p RLPx and libp2p, but that also transfers (partially) the content of a packet from one version to the other.
See [15/WAKU-BRIDGE](../15/bridge.md) for details on a bidirectional bridge mode.
# Appendix B: Security
Each protocol layer of Waku v2 provides a distinct service and is associated with a separate set of security features and concerns.
Therefore, the overall security of Waku v2 depends on how the different layers are utilized.
In this section, we overview the security properties of Waku v2 protocols against a static adversarial model which is described below.
Note that a more detailed security analysis of each Waku protocol is supplied in its respective specification as well.
## Primary Adversarial Model
In the primary adversarial model, we consider adversary as a passive entity that attempts to collect information from others to conduct an attack,
but it does so without violating protocol definitions and instructions.
The following are **not** considered as part of the adversarial model:
- An adversary with a global view of all the peers and their connections.
- An adversary that can eavesdrop on communication links between arbitrary pairs of peers
(unless the adversary is one end of the communication).
Specifically, the communication channels are assumed to be secure.
## Security Features
### Pseudonymity
Waku v2 by default guarantees pseudonymity for all of the protocol layers since parties do not have to disclose their true identity
and instead they utilize libp2p `PeerID` as their identifiers.
While pseudonymity is an appealing security feature, it does not guarantee full anonymity since the actions taken under the same pseudonym
i.e., `PeerID` can be linked together and potentially result in the re-identification of the true actor.
### Anonymity / Unlinkability
At a high level, anonymity is the inability of an adversary in linking an actor to its data/performed action (the actor and action are context-dependent).
To be precise about linkability, we use the term Personally Identifiable Information (PII) to refer to any piece of data that could potentially be used to uniquely identify a party.
For example, the signature verification key, and the hash of one's static IP address are unique for each user and hence count as PII.
Notice that users' actions can be traced through their PIIs (e.g., signatures) and hence result in their re-identification risk.
As such, we seek anonymity by avoiding linkability between actions and the actors / actors' PII. Concerning anonymity, Waku v2 provides the following features:
**Publisher-Message Unlinkability**:
This feature signifies the unlinkability of a publisher to its published messages in the 11/WAKU2-RELAY protocol.
The [Publisher-Message Unlinkability](../11/relay.md/#security-analysis) is enforced through the `StrictNoSign` policy due to which the data fields of pubsub messages that count as PII for the publisher must be left unspecified.
**Subscriber-Topic Unlinkability**:
This feature stands for the unlinkability of the subscriber to its subscribed topics in the 11/WAKU2-RELAY protocol.
The [Subscriber-Topic Unlinkability](../11/relay.md/#security-analysis) is achieved through the utilization of a single PubSub topic.
As such, subscribers are not re-identifiable from their subscribed topic IDs as the entire network is linked to the same topic ID.
This level of unlinkability / anonymity is known as [k-anonymity](https://www.privitar.com/blog/k-anonymity-an-introduction/) where k is proportional to the system size (number of subscribers).
Note that there is no hard limit on the number of the pubsub topics, however, the use of one topic is recommended for the sake of anonymity.
### Spam protection
This property indicates that no adversary can flood the system (i.e., publishing a large number of messages in a short amount of time), either accidentally or deliberately, with any kind of message i.e. even if the message content is valid or useful.
Spam protection is partly provided in `11/WAKU2-RELAY` through the [scoring mechanism](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md#spam-protection-measures) provided for by GossipSub v1.1.
At a high level, peers utilize a scoring function to locally score the behavior of their connections and remove peers with a low score.
### Data confidentiality, Integrity, and Authenticity
Confidentiality can be addressed through data encryption whereas integrity and authenticity are achievable through digital signatures.
These features are provided for in [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE (version 1)](../14/message.md/#version-1)` through payload encryption as well as encrypted signatures.
## Security Considerations
**Lack of anonymity/unlinkability in the protocols involving direct connections including `13/WAKU2-STORE` and `12/WAKU2-FILTER` protocols**:
The anonymity/unlinkability is not guaranteed in the protocols like `13/WAKU2-STORE` and `12/WAKU2-FILTER` where peers need to have direct connections to benefit from the designated service.
This is because during the direct connections peers utilize `PeerID` to identify each other,
therefore the service obtained in the protocol is linkable to the beneficiary's `PeerID` (which counts as PII).
For `13/WAKU2-STORE`, the queried node would be able to link the querying node's `PeerID` to its queried topics.
Likewise, in the `12/WAKU2-FILTER`, a full node can link the light node's `PeerID`s to its content filter.
\<!-- TODO: to inspect the nim-libp2p codebase and figure out the exact use of PeerIDs in direct communication, it might be the case that the requester does not have to disclose its PeerID--\>
\<!--TODO: might be good to add a figure visualizing the Waku protocol stack and the security features of each layer--\>
## Appendix C: Implementation Notes
### Implementation Matrix
There are multiple implementations of Waku v2 and its protocols:
- [nim-waku (Nim)](https://github.com/status-im/nim-waku/)
- [go-waku (Go)](https://github.com/status-im/go-waku/)
- [js-waku (NodeJS and Browser)](https://github.com/status-im/js-waku/)
Below you can find an overview of the specs that they implement as they relate to Waku v2.
This includes Waku v1 specs, as they are used for bridging between the two networks.
| Spec | nim-waku (Nim) | go-waku (Go) | js-waku (Node JS) | js-waku (Browser JS) |
| ---- | -------------- | ------------ | ----------------- | -------------------- |
|[6/WAKU1](../6/waku1.md)|✔|||
|[7/WAKU-DATA](../7/data.md)|✔|✔||
|[8/WAKU-MAIL](../../application/8/mail.md)|✔|||
|[9/WAKU-RPC](../9/waku2-rpc.md)|✔|||
|[10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md)|✔|🚧|🚧|🚧|
|[11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md)|✔|✔|✔|✔|
|[12/WAKU2-FILTER](../12/filter.md)|✔|✔||
|[13/WAKU2-STORE](../13/store.md)|✔|✔|✔\*|✔\*|
|[14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md))|✔|✔|✔|✔|
|[15/WAKU2-BRIDGE](../15/bridge.md)|✔|||
|[16/WAKU2-RPC](../16/rpc.md)|✔|||
|[17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY](../17/rln-relay.md)|🚧|||
|[18/WAKU2-SWAP](../../application/18/swap.md)|🚧|||
|[19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH](../19/lightpush.md)|✔|✔|✔\**|✔\**|
|[21/WAKU2-FAULT-TOLERANT-STORE](../../application/21/fault-tolerant-store.md)|✔|✔||
*js-waku implements [13/WAKU2-STORE](../13/store.md) as a querying node only.
**js-waku only implements [19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH](../19/lightpush.md) requests.
### Recommendations for clients
To implement a minimal Waku v2 client, we recommend implementing the following subset in the following order:
- [10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md) - this spec
- [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md) - for basic operation
- [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md) - version 0 (unencrypted)
- [13/WAKU2-STORE](../13/store.md) - for historical messaging (query mode only)
To get compatibility with Waku v1:
- [7/WAKU-DATA](../7/data.md)
- [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md) - version 1 (encrypted with `7/WAKU-DATA`)
For an interoperable keep-alive mechanism:
- [libp2p ping protocol](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/protocols/#ping),
with periodic pings to connected peers
## Appendix D: Future work
The following features are currently experimental and under research and initial implementation:
**Economic Spam resistance**:
We aim to enable an incentivized spam protection technique to enhance `11/WAKU2-RELAY` by using rate limiting nullifiers.
More details on this can be found in [17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY](../17/rln-relay.md).
In this advanced method, peers are limited to a certain rate of messaging per epoch and an immediate financial penalty is enforced for spammers who break this rate.
**Prevention of Denial of Service (DoS) and Node Incentivization**:
Denial of service signifies the case where an adversarial node exhausts another node's service capacity (e.g., by making a large number of requests) and makes it unavailable to the rest of the system.
DoS attack is to be mitigated through the accounting model as described in [18/WAKU2-SWAP](../../application/18/swap.md).
In a nutshell, peers have to pay for the service they obtain from each other.
In addition to incentivizing the service provider, accounting also makes DoS attacks costly for malicious peers.
The accounting model can be used in `13/WAKU2-STORE` and `12/WAKU2-FILTER` to protect against DoS attacks.
Additionally, this gives node operators who provide a useful service to the network an incentive to perform that service.
See [18/WAKU2-SWAP](../../application/18/swap.md) for more details on this piece of work.
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
1. [libp2p specs](https://github.com/libp2p/specs)
2. [6/WAKU1](../6/waku1.md)
3. [Whisper spec (EIP627)](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-627)
4. [Waku v2 plan](https://vac.dev/waku-v2-plan)
5. [30/ADAPTIVE-NODES](../../../informational/30/adaptive-nodes.md)
6. [Protocol Identifiers](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/protocols/)
7. [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md)
8. [26/WAKU-PAYLOAD](../../application/26/payload.md)
9. [23/WAKU2-TOPICS](../../../informational/23/topics.md)
10. [27/WAKU2-PEERS](../../../informational/27/peers.md)
11. [bi-directional binary stream](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/protocols/)
12. [Protobuf varint encoding](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/docs/encoding#varints)
13. [11/WAKU2-RELAY spec](../11/relay.md)
14. [17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY](../17/rln-relay.md)
15. [EIP-1459](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459)
16. [Ambient peer discovery](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/publish-subscribe/#discovery)
17. [Node Discovery v5](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/8fd5f7e1c1ec496a9d8dc1640a8548b8a8b5986b/discv5/discv5.md)
18. [31/WAKU2-ENR](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/enr.md)
19. [EIP-778 ENR (Ethereum Node Records)](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-778)
20. [13/WAKU2-STORE spec](../13/store.md)
21. [21/WAKU2-FT-STORE](../../application/21/ft-store.md)
22. [12/WAKU2-FILTER](../12/filter.md)
23. [19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH](../19/lightpush.md)
24. [7/WAKU-DATA](../../application/7/data.md)
25. [15/WAKU-BRIDGE](../15/bridge.md)
26. [k-anonymity](https://www.privitar.com/blog/k-anonymity-an-introduction/)
27. [GossipSub v1.1](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md)
28. [nim-waku (Nim)](https://github.com/status-im/nim-waku/)
29. [go-waku (Go)](https://github.com/status-im/go-waku/)
30. [js-waku (NodeJS and Browser)](https://github.com/status-im/js-waku/)
31. [8/WAKU-MAIL](../../application/8/mail.md)
32. [9/WAKU-RPC](../9/waku2-rpc.md)
33. [16/WAKU2-RPC](../16/rpc.md)
34. [18/WAKU2-SWAP spec](../../application/18/swap.md)
35. [21/WAKU2-FAULT-TOLERANT-STORE](../../application/21/fault-tolerant-store.md)

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---
title: 11/WAKU2-RELAY
name: Waku v2 Relay
status: stable
editor: Hanno Cornelius \<hanno@status.im\>
contributors:
- Oskar Thorén \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\>
- Sanaz Taheri \<sanaz@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
`11/WAKU2-RELAY` specifies a [Publish/Subscribe approach](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/publish-subscribe/) to peer-to-peer messaging with a strong focus on privacy, censorship-resistance, security and scalability.
Its current implementation is a minor extension of the [libp2p GossipSub protocol](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/README.md) and prescribes gossip-based dissemination.
As such the scope is limited to defining a separate [`protocol id`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/connections/README.md#protocol-negotiation) for `11/WAKU2-RELAY`, establishing privacy and security requirements, and defining how the underlying GossipSub is to be interpreted and implemented within the Waku and cryptoeconomic domain.
`11/WAKU2-RELAY` should not be confused with [libp2p circuit relay](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/tree/master/relay).
**Protocol identifier**: `/vac/waku/relay/2.0.0`
## Security Requirements
The `11/WAKU2-RELAY` protocol is designed to provide the following security properties under a static [Adversarial Model](#adversarial-model).
Note that data confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity are currently considered out of scope for `11/WAKU2-RELAY` and must be handled by higher layer protocols such as [`14/WAKU2-MESSAGE`](../14/message.md).
\<!-- May add the definition of the unsupported feature:
Confidentiality indicates that an adversary should not be able to learn the data carried by the `WakuRelay` protocol.
Integrity indicates that the data transferred by the `WakuRelay` protocol can not be tampered with by an adversarial entity without being detected.
Authenticity no adversary can forge data on behalf of a targeted publisher and make it accepted by other subscribers as if the origin is the target. --\>
- **Publisher-Message Unlinkability**:
This property indicates that no adversarial entity can link a published `Message` to its publisher.
This feature also implies the unlinkability of the publisher to its published topic ID as the `Message` embodies the topic IDs.
- **Subscriber-Topic Unlinkability**:
This feature stands for the inability of any adversarial entity from linking a subscriber to its subscribed topic IDs.
\<!-- TODO: more requirements can be added, but that needs further and deeper investigation--\>
### Terminology
_Personally identifiable information_ (PII) refers to any piece of data that can be used to uniquely identify a user.
For example, the signature verification key, and the hash of one's static IP address are unique for each user and hence count as PII.
## Adversarial Model
- Any entity running the `11/WAKU2-RELAY` protocol is considered an adversary.
This includes publishers, subscribers, and all the peers' direct connections.
Furthermore, we consider the adversary as a passive entity that attempts to collect information from others to conduct an attack but it does so without violating protocol definitions and instructions.
For example, under the passive adversarial model, no malicious subscriber hides the messages it receives from other subscribers as it is against the description of `11/WAKU2-RELAY`.
However, a malicious subscriber may learn which topics are subscribed to by which peers.
- The following are **not** considered as part of the adversarial model:
- An adversary with a global view of all the peers and their connections.
- An adversary that can eavesdrop on communication links between arbitrary pairs of peers (unless the adversary is one end of the communication).
In other words, the communication channels are assumed to be secure.
## Wire Specification
The [PubSub interface specification](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md) defines the protobuf RPC messages exchanged between peers participating in a GossipSub network.
We republish these messages here for ease of reference and define how `11/WAKU2-RELAY` uses and interprets each field.
### Protobuf definitions
The PubSub RPC messages are specified using [protocol buffers v2](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/)
```protobuf
syntax = "proto2";
message RPC {
repeated SubOpts subscriptions = 1;
repeated Message publish = 2;
message SubOpts {
optional bool subscribe = 1;
optional string topicid = 2;
}
message Message {
optional string from = 1;
optional bytes data = 2;
optional bytes seqno = 3;
repeated string topicIDs = 4;
optional bytes signature = 5;
optional bytes key = 6;
}
}
```
\> **_NOTE:_**
The various [control messages](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.0.md#control-messages) defined for GossipSub are used as specified there.
\> **_NOTE:_**
The [`TopicDescriptor`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) is not currently used by `11/WAKU2-RELAY`.
### Message fields
The `Message` protobuf defines the format in which content is relayed between peers.
`11/WAKU2-RELAY` specifies the following usage requirements for each field:
- The `from` field MUST NOT be used, following the [`StrictNoSign` signature policy](#signature-policy).
- The `data` field MUST be filled out with a `WakuMessage`.
See [`14/WAKU2-MESSAGE`](../14/message.md) for more details.
- The `seqno` field MUST NOT be used, following the [`StrictNoSign` signature policy](#signature-policy).
- The `topicIDs` field MUST contain the content-topics that a message is being published on.
- The `signature` field MUST NOT be used, following the [`StrictNoSign` signature policy](#signature-policy).
- The `key` field MUST NOT be used, following the [`StrictNoSign` signature policy](#signature-solicy).
### SubOpts fields
The `SubOpts` protobuf defines the format in which subscription options are relayed between peers.
A `11/WAKU2-RELAY` node MAY decide to subscribe or unsubscribe from topics by sending updates using `SubOpts`.
The following usage requirements apply:
- The `subscribe` field MUST contain a boolean, where `true` indicates subscribe and `false` indicates unsubscribe to a topic.
- The `topicid` field MUST contain the pubsub topic.
\> Note: The `topicid` refering to pubsub topic and
`topicId` refering to content-topic are detailed in [23/WAKU2-TOPICS](../../../informational/23/topics.md).
### Signature Policy
The [`StrictNoSign` option](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#signature-policy-options) MUST be used, to ensure that messages are built without the `signature`, `key`, `from` and `seqno` fields.
Note that this does not merely imply that these fields be empty, but that they MUST be _absent_ from the marshalled message.
## Security Analysis
\<!-- TODO: realized that the prime security objective of the `WakuRelay` protocol is to provide peers unlinkability as such this feature is prioritized over other features e.g., unlinkability is preferred over authenticity and integrity. It might be good to motivate unlinkability and its impact on the relay protocol or other protocols invoking relay protocol.--\>
- **Publisher-Message Unlinkability**:
To address publisher-message unlinkability, one should remove any PII from the published message.
As such, `11/WAKU2-RELAY` follows the `StrictNoSign` policy as described in [libp2p PubSub specs](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/tree/master/pubsub#message-signing).
As the result of the `StrictNoSign` policy, `Message`s should be built without the `from`, `signature` and `key` fields since each of these three fields individually counts as PII for the author of the message (one can link the creation of the message with libp2p peerId and thus indirectly with the IP address of the publisher).
Note that removing identifiable information from messages cannot lead to perfect unlinkability.
The direct connections of a publisher might be able to figure out which `Message`s belong to that publisher by analyzing its traffic.
The possibility of such inference may get higher when the `data` field is also not encrypted by the upper-level protocols. \<!-- TODO: more investigation on traffic analysis attacks and their success probability--\>
- **Subscriber-Topic Unlinkability:**
To preserve subscriber-topic unlinkability, it is recommended by [`10/WAKU2`](../10/waku2.md) to use a single PubSub topic in the `11/WAKU2-RELAY` protocol.
This allows an immediate subscriber-topic unlinkability where subscribers are not re-identifiable from their subscribed topic IDs as the entire network is linked to the same topic ID.
This level of unlinkability / anonymity is known as [k-anonymity](https://www.privitar.com/blog/k-anonymity-an-introduction/) where k is proportional to the system size (number of participants of Waku relay protocol).
However, note that `11/WAKU2-RELAY` supports the use of more than one topic.
In case that more than one topic id is utilized, preserving unlinkability is the responsibility of the upper-level protocols which MAY adopt [partitioned topics technique](https://specs.status.im/spec/10#partitioned-topic) to achieve K-anonymity for the subscribed peers.
## Future work
- **Economic spam resistance**:
In the spam-protected `11/WAKU2-RELAY` protocol, no adversary can flood the system with spam messages (i.e., publishing a large number of messages in a short amount of time).
Spam protection is partly provided by GossipSub v1.1 through [scoring mechanism](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md#spam-protection-measures).
At a high level, peers utilize a scoring function to locally score the behavior of their connections and remove peers with a low score.
`11/WAKU2-RELAY` aims at enabling an advanced spam protection mechanism with economic disincentives by utilizing Rate Limiting Nullifiers.
In a nutshell, peers must conform to a certain message publishing rate per a system-defined epoch, otherwise, they get financially penalized for exceeding the rate.
More details on this new technique can be found in [`17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY`](../17/rln-relay.md).
\<!-- TODO havn't checked if all the measures in libp2p GossipSub v1.1 are taken in the nim-libp2p as well, may need to audit the code --\>
- Providing **Unlinkability**, **Integrity** and **Authenticity** simultaneously:
Integrity and authenticity are typically addressed through digital signatures and Message Authentication Code (MAC) schemes, however, the usage of digital signatures (where each signature is bound to a particular peer) contradicts with the unlinkability requirement (messages signed under a certain signature key are verifiable by a verification key that is bound to a particular publisher).
As such, integrity and authenticity are missing features in `11/WAKU2-RELAY` in the interest of unlinkability.
In future work, advanced signature schemes like group signatures can be utilized to enable authenticity, integrity, and unlinkability simultaneously.
In a group signature scheme, a member of a group can anonymously sign a message on behalf of the group as such the true signer is indistinguishable from other group members. \<!-- TODO: shall I add a reference for group signatures?--\>
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via
[CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
1. [`10/WAKU2`](../10/waku2.md)
1. [`14/WAKU2-MESSAGE`](../14/message.md)
1. [`17/WAKU-RLN`](../17/rln-relay.md)
1. [GossipSub v1.0](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.0.md)
1. [GossipSub v1.1](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md)
1. [K-anonimity](https://www.privitar.com/blog/k-anonymity-an-introduction/)
1. [`libp2p` concepts: Publish/Subscribe](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/publish-subscribe/)
1. [`libp2p` protocol negotiation](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/connections/README.md#protocol-negotiation)
1. [Partitioned topics](https://specs.status.im/spec/10#partitioned-topic)
1. [Protocol Buffers](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/)
1. [PubSub interface for libp2p (r2, 2019-02-01)](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md)
1. [Waku v1 spec](../6/waku1.md)
1. [Whisper spec (EIP627)](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-627)

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---
title: 12/WAKU2-FILTER
name: Waku v2 Filter
status: draft
version: 01
editor: Hanno Cornelius \<hanno@status.im\>
contributors:
- Dean Eigenmann \<dean@status.im\>
- Oskar Thorén \<oskar@status.im\>
- Sanaz Taheri \<sanaz@status.im\>
- Ebube Ud \<ebube@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
previous versions: [00](./previous-versions00)
---
`WakuFilter` is a protocol that enables subscribing to messages that a peer receives. This is a more lightweight version of `WakuRelay` specifically designed for bandwidth restricted devices. This is due to the fact that light nodes subscribe to full-nodes and only receive the messages they desire.
## Content filtering
**Protocol identifiers**:
- _filter-subscribe_: `/vac/waku/filter-subscribe/2.0.0-beta1`
- _filter-push_: `/vac/waku/filter-push/2.0.0-beta1`
Content filtering is a way to do [message-based
filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Publish%E2%80%93subscribe_pattern#Message_filtering).
Currently the only content filter being applied is on `contentTopic`. This
corresponds to topics in Waku v1.
## Rationale
Unlike the `store` protocol for historical messages, this protocol allows for
native lower latency scenarios such as instant messaging. It is thus
complementary to it.
Strictly speaking, it is not just doing basic request response, but performs
sender push based on receiver intent. While this can be seen as a form of light
pub/sub, it is only used between two nodes in a direct fashion. Unlike the
Gossip domain, this is meant for light nodes which put a premium on bandwidth.
No gossiping takes place.
It is worth noting that a light node could get by with only using the `store`
protocol to query for a recent time window, provided it is acceptable to do
frequent polling.
## Design Requirements
The effectiveness and reliability of the content filtering service enabled by `WakuFilter` protocol rely on the *high availability* of the full nodes as the service providers. To this end, full nodes must feature *high uptime* (to persistently listen and capture the network messages) as well as *high Bandwidth* (to provide timely message delivery to the light nodes).
## Security Consideration
Note that while using `WakuFilter` allows light nodes to save bandwidth, it comes with a privacy cost in the sense that they need to disclose their liking topics to the full nodes to retrieve the relevant messages. Currently, anonymous subscription is not supported by the `WakuFilter`, however, potential solutions in this regard are sketched below in [Future Work](#future-work) section.
### Terminology
The term Personally identifiable information (PII) refers to any piece of data that can be used to uniquely identify a user. For example, the signature verification key, and the hash of one's static IP address are unique for each user and hence count as PII.
## Adversarial Model
Any node running the `WakuFilter` protocol i.e., both the subscriber node and the queried node are considered as an adversary. Furthermore, we consider the adversary as a passive entity that attempts to collect information from other nodes to conduct an attack but it does so without violating protocol definitions and instructions. For example, under the passive adversarial model, no malicious node intentionally hides the messages matching to one's subscribed content filter as it is against the description of the `WakuFilter` protocol.
The following are not considered as part of the adversarial model:
- An adversary with a global view of all the nodes and their connections.
- An adversary that can eavesdrop on communication links between arbitrary pairs of nodes (unless the adversary is one end of the communication). In specific, the communication channels are assumed to be secure.
### Protobuf
```protobuf
syntax = "proto3";
// 12/WAKU2-FILTER rfc: https://rfc.vac.dev/spec/12/
package waku.filter.v2;
// Protocol identifier: /vac/waku/filter-subscribe/2.0.0-beta1
message FilterSubscribeRequest {
enum FilterSubscribeType {
SUBSCRIBER_PING = 0;
SUBSCRIBE = 1;
UNSUBSCRIBE = 2;
UNSUBSCRIBE_ALL = 3;
}
string request_id = 1;
FilterSubscribeType filter_subscribe_type = 2;
// Filter criteria
optional string pubsub_topic = 10;
repeated string content_topics = 11;
}
message FilterSubscribeResponse {
string request_id = 1;
uint32 status_code = 10;
optional string status_desc = 11;
}
// Protocol identifier: /vac/waku/filter-push/2.0.0-beta1
message MessagePush {
WakuMessage waku_message = 1;
optional string pubsub_topic = 2;
}
```
### Filter-Subscribe
A filter service node MUST support the _filter-subscribe_ protocol
to allow filter clients to subscribe, modify, refresh and unsubscribe a desired set of filter criteria.
The combination of different filter criteria for a specific filter client node is termed a "subscription".
A filter client is interested in receiving messages matching the filter criteria in its registered subscriptions.
Since a filter service node is consuming resources to provide this service,
it MAY account for usage and adapt its service provision to certain clients.
An incentive mechanism is currently planned but underspecified.
#### Filter Subscribe Request
A client node MUST send all filter requests in a `FilterSubscribeRequest` message.
This request MUST contain a `request_id`.
The `request_id` MUST be a uniquely generated string.
Each request MUST include a `filter_subscribe_type`, indicating the type of request.
#### Filter Subscribe Response
In return to any `FilterSubscribeRequest`,
a filter service node SHOULD respond with a `FilterSubscribeResponse` with a `requestId` matching that of the request.
This response MUST contain a `status_code` indicating if the request was successful or not.
Successful status codes are in the `2xx` range.
Client nodes SHOULD consider all other status codes as error codes and assume that the requested operation had failed.
In addition, the filter service node MAY choose to provide a more detailed status description in the `status_desc` field.
#### Filter matching
In the description of each request type below,
the term "filter criteria" refers to the combination of `pubsub_topic` and a set of `content_topics`.
The request MAY include filter criteria, conditional to the selected `filter_subscribe_type`.
If the request contains filter criteria,
it MUST contain a `pubsub_topic`
and the `content_topics` set MUST NOT be empty.
A `WakuMessage` matches filter criteria when its `content_topic` is in the `content_topics` set
and it was published on a matching `pubsub_topic`.
#### Filter Subscribe Types
The following filter subscribe types are defined:
##### SUBSCRIBER_PING
A filter client that sends a `FilterSubscribeRequest` with `filter_subscribe_type` set to `SUBSCRIBER_PING`
requests that the service node SHOULD indicate if it has any active subscriptions for this client.
The filter client SHOULD exclude any filter criteria from the request.
The filter service node SHOULD respond with a success code if it has any active subscriptions for this client
or an error code if not.
The filter service node SHOULD ignore any filter criteria in the request.
##### SUBSCRIBE
A filter client that sends a `FilterSubscribeRequest` with `filter_subscribe_type` set to `SUBSCRIBE`
requests that the service node SHOULD push messages matching this filter to the client.
The filter client MUST include the desired filter criteria in the request.
A client MAY use this request type to _modify_ an existing subscription
by providing _additional_ filter criteria in a new request.
A client MAY use this request type to _refresh_ an existing subscription
by providing _the same_ filter criteria in a new request.
The filter service node SHOULD respond with a success code if it successfully honored this request
or an error code if not.
The filter service node SHOULD respond with an error code and discard the request
if the subscribe request does not contain valid filter criteria,
i.e. both a `pubsub_topic` _and_ a non-empty `content_topics` set.
##### UNSUBSCRIBE
A filter client that sends a `FilterSubscribeRequest` with `filter_subscribe_type` set to `UNSUBSCRIBE`
requests that the service node SHOULD _stop_ pushing messages matching this filter to the client.
The filter client MUST include the filter criteria it desires to unsubscribe from in the request.
A client MAY use this request type to _modify_ an existing subscription
by providing _a subset of_ the original filter criteria to unsubscribe from in a new request.
The filter service node SHOULD respond with a success code if it successfully honored this request
or an error code if not.
The filter service node SHOULD respond with an error code and discard the request
if the unsubscribe request does not contain valid filter criteria,
i.e. both a `pubsub_topic` _and_ a non-empty `content_topics` set.
##### UNSUBSCRIBE_ALL
A filter client that sends a `FilterSubscribeRequest` with `filter_subscribe_type` set to `UNSUBSCRIBE_ALL`
requests that the service node SHOULD _stop_ pushing messages matching _any_ filter to the client.
The filter client SHOULD exclude any filter criteria from the request.
The filter service node SHOULD remove any existing subscriptions for this client.
It SHOULD respond with a success code if it successfully honored this request
or an error code if not.
### Filter-Push
A filter client node MUST support the _filter-push_ protocol
to allow filter service nodes to push messages matching registered subscriptions to this client.
A filter service node SHOULD push all messages
matching the filter criteria in a registered subscription
to the subscribed filter client.
These [`WakuMessage`s](../14/message.md) are likely to come from [`11/WAKU2-RELAY`](../11/relay.md),
but there MAY be other sources or protocols where this comes from.
This is up to the consumer of the protocol.
If a message push fails,
the filter service node MAY consider the client node to be unreachable.
If a specific filter client node is not reachable from the service node for a period of time,
the filter service node MAY choose to stop pushing messages to the client and remove its subscription.
This period is up to the service node implementation.
We consider `1 minute` to be a reasonable default.
#### Message Push
Each message MUST be pushed in a `MessagePush` message.
Each `MessagePush` MUST contain one (and only one) `waku_message`.
If this message was received on a specific `pubsub_topic`,
it SHOULD be included in the `MessagePush`.
A filter client SHOULD NOT respond to a `MessagePush`.
Since the filter protocol does not include caching or fault-tolerance,
this is a best effort push service with no bundling
or guaranteed retransmission of messages.
A filter client SHOULD verify that each `MessagePush` it receives
originated from a service node where the client has an active subscription
and that it matches filter criteria belonging to that subscription.
---
## Future Work
\<!-- Alternative title: Filter-subscriber unlinkability --\>
**Anonymous filter subscription**: This feature guarantees that nodes can anonymously subscribe for a message filter (i.e., without revealing their exact content filter). As such, no adversary in the `WakuFilter` protocol would be able to link nodes to their subscribed content filers. The current version of the `WakuFilter` protocol does not provide anonymity as the subscribing node has a direct connection to the full node and explicitly submits its content filter to be notified about the matching messages. However, one can consider preserving anonymity through one of the following ways:
- By hiding the source of the subscription i.e., anonymous communication. That is the subscribing node shall hide all its PII in its filter request e.g., its IP address. This can happen by the utilization of a proxy server or by using Tor\<!-- TODO: if nodes have to disclose their PeerIDs (e.g., for authentication purposes) when connecting to other nodes in the WakuFilter protocol, then Tor does not preserve anonymity since it only helps in hiding the IP. So, the PeerId usage in switches must be investigated further. Depending on how PeerId is used, one may be able to link between a subscriber and its content filter despite hiding the IP address--\>.
Note that the current structure of filter requests i.e., `FilterRPC` does not embody any piece of PII, otherwise, such data fields must be treated carefully to achieve anonymity.
- By deploying secure 2-party computations in which the subscribing node obtains the messages matching a content filter whereas the full node learns nothing about the content filter as well as the messages pushed to the subscribing node. Examples of such 2PC protocols are [Oblivious Transfers](https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-1-4419-5906-5_9#:~:text=Oblivious%20transfer%20(OT)%20is%20a,information%20the%20receiver%20actually%20obtains.) and one-way Private Set Intersections (PSI).
## Changelog
### Next
- Added initial threat model and security analysis.
### 2.0.0-beta2
Initial draft version. Released [2020-10-28](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/5ceeb88cee7b918bb58f38e7c4de5d581ff31e68)
- Fix: Ensure contentFilter is a repeated field, on implementation
- Change: Add ability to unsubscribe from filters. Make `subscribe` an explicit boolean indication. Edit protobuf field order to be consistent with libp2p.
### 2.0.0-beta1
Initial draft version. Released [2020-10-05](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/31857c7434fa17efc00e3cd648d90448797d107b)
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via
[CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
- [message-based
filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Publish%E2%80%93subscribe_pattern#Message_filtering)
- [`WakuMessage`s](../14/message.md)
- [`11/WAKU2-RELAY`](../11/relay.md)
- [Oblivious Transfers](https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-1-4419-5906-5_9#:~:text=Oblivious%20transfer%20(OT)%20is%20a,information%20the%20receiver%20actually%20obtains)
- previous versions: [00](./previous-versions00)
1. [Message Filtering (Wikipedia)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Publish%E2%80%93subscribe_pattern#Message_filtering)
2. [Libp2p PubSub spec - topic validation](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/tree/master/pubsub#topic-validation)

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---
title: 12/WAKU2-FILTER
name: Waku v2 Filter
status: draft
editor: Hanno Cornelius \<hanno@status.im\>
contributors:
- Dean Eigenmann \<dean@status.im\>
- Oskar Thorén \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\>
- Sanaz Taheri \<sanaz@status.im\>
- Ebube Ud \<ebube@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
version: 00
---
`WakuFilter` is a protocol that enables subscribing to messages that a peer receives. This is a more lightweight version of `WakuRelay` specifically designed for bandwidth restricted devices. This is due to the fact that light nodes subscribe to full-nodes and only receive the messages they desire.
## Content filtering
**Protocol identifier***: `/vac/waku/filter/2.0.0-beta1`
Content filtering is a way to do [message-based
filtering](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Publish%E2%80%93subscribe_pattern#Message_filtering).
Currently the only content filter being applied is on `contentTopic`. This
corresponds to topics in Waku v1.
## Rationale
Unlike the `store` protocol for historical messages, this protocol allows for
native lower latency scenarios such as instant messaging. It is thus
complementary to it.
Strictly speaking, it is not just doing basic request response, but performs
sender push based on receiver intent. While this can be seen as a form of light
pub/sub, it is only used between two nodes in a direct fashion. Unlike the
Gossip domain, this is meant for light nodes which put a premium on bandwidth.
No gossiping takes place.
It is worth noting that a light node could get by with only using the `store`
protocol to query for a recent time window, provided it is acceptable to do
frequent polling.
## Design Requirements
The effectiveness and reliability of the content filtering service enabled by `WakuFilter` protocol rely on the *high availability* of the full nodes as the service providers. To this end, full nodes must feature *high uptime* (to persistently listen and capture the network messages) as well as *high Bandwidth* (to provide timely message delivery to the light nodes).
## Security Consideration
Note that while using `WakuFilter` allows light nodes to save bandwidth, it comes with a privacy cost in the sense that they need to disclose their liking topics to the full nodes to retrieve the relevant messages. Currently, anonymous subscription is not supported by the `WakuFilter`, however, potential solutions in this regard are sketched below in [Future Work](#future-work) section.
### Terminology
The term Personally identifiable information (PII) refers to any piece of data that can be used to uniquely identify a user. For example, the signature verification key, and the hash of one's static IP address are unique for each user and hence count as PII.
## Adversarial Model
Any node running the `WakuFilter` protocol i.e., both the subscriber node and the queried node are considered as an adversary. Furthermore, we consider the adversary as a passive entity that attempts to collect information from other nodes to conduct an attack but it does so without violating protocol definitions and instructions. For example, under the passive adversarial model, no malicious node intentionally hides the messages matching to one's subscribed content filter as it is against the description of the `WakuFilter` protocol.
The following are not considered as part of the adversarial model:
- An adversary with a global view of all the nodes and their connections.
- An adversary that can eavesdrop on communication links between arbitrary pairs of nodes (unless the adversary is one end of the communication). In specific, the communication channels are assumed to be secure.
### Protobuf
```protobuf
message FilterRequest {
bool subscribe = 1;
string topic = 2;
repeated ContentFilter contentFilters = 3;
message ContentFilter {
string contentTopic = 1;
}
}
message MessagePush {
repeated WakuMessage messages = 1;
}
message FilterRPC {
string requestId = 1;
FilterRequest request = 2;
MessagePush push = 3;
}
```
#### FilterRPC
A node MUST send all Filter messages (`FilterRequest`, `MessagePush`) wrapped inside a
`FilterRPC` this allows the node handler to determine how to handle a message as the Waku
Filter protocol is not a request response based protocol but instead a push based system.
The `requestId` MUST be a uniquely generated string. When a `MessagePush` is sent
the `requestId` MUST match the `requestId` of the subscribing `FilterRequest` whose filters
matched the message causing it to be pushed.
#### FilterRequest
A `FilterRequest` contains an optional topic, zero or more content filters and
a boolean signifying whether to subscribe or unsubscribe to the given filters.
True signifies 'subscribe' and false signifies 'unsubscribe'.
A node that sends the RPC with a filter request and `subscribe` set to 'true'
requests that the filter node SHOULD notify the light requesting node of messages
matching this filter.
A node that sends the RPC with a filter request and `subscribe` set to 'false'
requests that the filter node SHOULD stop notifying the light requesting node
of messages matching this filter if it is currently doing so.
The filter matches when content filter and, optionally, a topic is matched.
Content filter is matched when a `WakuMessage` `contentTopic` field is the same.
A filter node SHOULD honor this request, though it MAY choose not to do so. If
it chooses not to do so it MAY tell the light why. The mechanism for doing this
is currently not specified. For notifying the light node a filter node sends a
MessagePush message.
Since such a filter node is doing extra work for a light node, it MAY also
account for usage and be selective in how much service it provides. This
mechanism is currently planned but underspecified.
#### MessagePush
A filter node that has received a filter request SHOULD push all messages that
match this filter to a light node. These [`WakuMessage`'s](../14/message.md) are likely to come from the
`relay` protocol and be kept at the Node, but there MAY be other sources or
protocols where this comes from. This is up to the consumer of the protocol.
A filter node MUST NOT send a push message for messages that have not been
requested via a FilterRequest.
If a specific light node isn't connected to a filter node for some specific
period of time (e.g. a TTL), then the filter node MAY choose to not push these
messages to the node. This period is up to the consumer of the protocol and node
implementation, though a reasonable default is one minute.
---
# Future Work
\<!-- Alternative title: Filter-subscriber unlinkability --\>
**Anonymous filter subscription**: This feature guarantees that nodes can anonymously subscribe for a message filter (i.e., without revealing their exact content filter). As such, no adversary in the `WakuFilter` protocol would be able to link nodes to their subscribed content filers. The current version of the `WakuFilter` protocol does not provide anonymity as the subscribing node has a direct connection to the full node and explicitly submits its content filter to be notified about the matching messages. However, one can consider preserving anonymity through one of the following ways:
- By hiding the source of the subscription i.e., anonymous communication. That is the subscribing node shall hide all its PII in its filter request e.g., its IP address. This can happen by the utilization of a proxy server or by using Tor\<!-- TODO: if nodes have to disclose their PeerIDs (e.g., for authentication purposes) when connecting to other nodes in the WakuFilter protocol, then Tor does not preserve anonymity since it only helps in hiding the IP. So, the PeerId usage in switches must be investigated further. Depending on how PeerId is used, one may be able to link between a subscriber and its content filter despite hiding the IP address--\>.
Note that the current structure of filter requests i.e., `FilterRPC` does not embody any piece of PII, otherwise, such data fields must be treated carefully to achieve anonymity.
- By deploying secure 2-party computations in which the subscribing node obtains the messages matching a content filter whereas the full node learns nothing about the content filter as well as the messages pushed to the subscribing node. Examples of such 2PC protocols are [Oblivious Transfers](https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-1-4419-5906-5_9#:~:text=Oblivious%20transfer%20(OT)%20is%20a,information%20the%20receiver%20actually%20obtains.) and one-way Private Set Intersections (PSI).
## Changelog
### Next
- Added initial threat model and security analysis.
### 2.0.0-beta2
Initial draft version. Released [2020-10-28](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/5ceeb88cee7b918bb58f38e7c4de5d581ff31e68)
- Fix: Ensure contentFilter is a repeated field, on implementation
- Change: Add ability to unsubscribe from filters. Make `subscribe` an explicit boolean indication. Edit protobuf field order to be consistent with libp2p.
### 2.0.0-beta1
Initial draft version. Released [2020-10-05](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/31857c7434fa17efc00e3cd648d90448797d107b)
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via
[CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
1. [Message Filtering (Wikipedia)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Publish%E2%80%93subscribe_pattern#Message_filtering)
2. [Libp2p PubSub spec - topic validation](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/tree/master/pubsub#topic-validation)

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---
title: 13/WAKU2-STORE
name: Waku v2 Store
status: draft
editor: Sanaz Taheri \<sanaz@status.im\>
contributors:
- Dean Eigenmann \<dean@status.im\>
- Oskar Thorén \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\>
- Aaryamann Challani \<aaryamann@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
## Abstract
This specification explains the `13/WAKU2-STORE` protocol which enables querying of messages received through the relay protocol and
stored by other nodes.
It also supports pagination for more efficient querying of historical messages.
**Protocol identifier***: `/vac/waku/store/2.0.0-beta4`
## Terminology
The term PII, Personally Identifiable Information,
refers to any piece of data that can be used to uniquely identify a user.
For example, the signature verification key, and
the hash of one's static IP address are unique for each user and hence count as PII.
## Design Requirements
The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”,
“RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119](https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt).
Nodes willing to provide the storage service using `13/WAKU2-STORE` protocol,
SHOULD provide a complete and full view of message history.
As such, they are required to be *highly available* and
specifically have a *high uptime* to consistently receive and store network messages.
The high uptime requirement makes sure that no message is missed out hence a complete and
intact view of the message history is delivered to the querying nodes.
Nevertheless, in case storage provider nodes cannot afford high availability,
the querying nodes may retrieve the historical messages from multiple sources to achieve a full and intact view of the past.
The concept of `ephemeral` messages introduced in [`14/WAKU2-MESSAGE`](../14/message.md) affects `13/WAKU2-STORE` as well.
Nodes running `13/WAKU2-STORE` SHOULD support `ephemeral` messages as specified in [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md).
Nodes running `13/WAKU2-STORE` SHOULD NOT store messages with the `ephemeral` flag set to `true`.
## Adversarial Model
Any peer running the `13/WAKU2-STORE` protocol, i.e.
both the querying node and the queried node, are considered as an adversary.
Furthermore,
we currently consider the adversary as a passive entity that attempts to collect information from other peers to conduct an attack but
it does so without violating protocol definitions and instructions.
As we evolve the protocol,
further adversarial models will be considered.
For example, under the passive adversarial model,
no malicious node hides or
lies about the history of messages as it is against the description of the `13/WAKU2-STORE` protocol.
The following are not considered as part of the adversarial model:
- An adversary with a global view of all the peers and their connections.
- An adversary that can eavesdrop on communication links between arbitrary pairs of peers (unless the adversary is one end of the communication).
In specific, the communication channels are assumed to be secure.
## Wire Specification
Peers communicate with each other using a request / response API.
The messages sent are Protobuf RPC messages which are implemented using [protocol buffers v3](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/).
The following are the specifications of the Protobuf messages.
### Payloads
```protobuf
syntax = "proto3";
message Index {
bytes digest = 1;
sint64 receiverTime = 2;
sint64 senderTime = 3;
string pubsubTopic = 4;
}
message PagingInfo {
uint64 pageSize = 1;
Index cursor = 2;
enum Direction {
BACKWARD = 0;
FORWARD = 1;
}
Direction direction = 3;
}
message ContentFilter {
string contentTopic = 1;
}
message HistoryQuery {
// the first field is reserved for future use
string pubsubtopic = 2;
repeated ContentFilter contentFilters = 3;
PagingInfo pagingInfo = 4;
}
message HistoryResponse {
// the first field is reserved for future use
repeated WakuMessage messages = 2;
PagingInfo pagingInfo = 3;
enum Error {
NONE = 0;
INVALID_CURSOR = 1;
}
Error error = 4;
}
message HistoryRPC {
string request_id = 1;
HistoryQuery query = 2;
HistoryResponse response = 3;
}
```
#### Index
To perform pagination,
each `WakuMessage` stored at a node running the `13/WAKU2-STORE` protocol is associated with a unique `Index` that encapsulates the following parts.
- `digest`: a sequence of bytes representing the SHA256 hash of a `WakuMessage`.
The hash is computed over the concatenation of `contentTopic` and `payload` fields of a `WakuMessage` (see [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md)).
- `receiverTime`: the UNIX time in nanoseconds at which the `WakuMessage` is received by the receiving node.
- `senderTime`: the UNIX time in nanoseconds at which the `WakuMessage` is generated by its sender.
- `pubsubTopic`: the pubsub topic on which the `WakuMessage` is received.
#### PagingInfo
`PagingInfo` holds the information required for pagination. It consists of the following components.
- `pageSize`: A positive integer indicating the number of queried `WakuMessage`s in a `HistoryQuery`
(or retrieved `WakuMessage`s in a `HistoryResponse`).
- `cursor`: holds the `Index` of a `WakuMessage`.
- `direction`: indicates the direction of paging which can be either `FORWARD` or `BACKWARD`.
#### ContentFilter
`ContentFilter` carries the information required for filtering historical messages.
- `contentTopic` represents the content topic of the queried historical `WakuMessage`.
This field maps to the `contentTopic` field of the [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md).
#### HistoryQuery
RPC call to query historical messages.
- The `pubsubTopic` field MUST indicate the pubsub topic of the historical messages to be retrieved.
This field denotes the pubsub topic on which `WakuMessage`s are published.
This field maps to `topicIDs` field of `Message` in [`11/WAKU2-RELAY`](../11/relay.md).
Leaving this field empty means no filter on the pubsub topic of message history is requested.
This field SHOULD be left empty in order to retrieve the historical `WakuMessage` regardless of the pubsub topics on which they are published.
- The `contentFilters` field MUST indicate the list of content filters based on which the historical messages are to be retrieved.
Leaving this field empty means no filter on the content topic of message history is required.
This field SHOULD be left empty in order to retrieve historical `WakuMessage` regardless of their content topics.
- `PagingInfo` holds the information required for pagination.
Its `pageSize` field indicates the number of `WakuMessage`s to be included in the corresponding `HistoryResponse`.
It is RECOMMENDED that the queried node defines a maximum page size internally.
If the querying node leaves the `pageSize` unspecified,
or if the `pageSize` exceeds the maximum page size,
the queried node SHOULD auto-paginate the `HistoryResponse` to no more than the configured maximum page size.
This allows mitigation of long response time for `HistoryQuery`.
In the forward pagination request,
the `messages` field of the `HistoryResponse` SHALL contain, at maximum,
the `pageSize` amount of `WakuMessage` whose `Index` values are larger than the given `cursor`
(and vise versa for the backward pagination).
Note that the `cursor` of a `HistoryQuery` MAY be empty (e.g., for the initial query), as such, and
depending on whether the `direction` is `BACKWARD` or `FORWARD` the last or the first `pageSize` `WakuMessage` SHALL be returned, respectively.
#### Sorting Messages
The queried node MUST sort the `WakuMessage` based on their `Index`,
where the `senderTime` constitutes the most significant part and the `digest` comes next, and
then perform pagination on the sorted result.
As such, the retrieved page contains an ordered list of `WakuMessage` from the oldest messages to the most recent one.
Alternatively, the `receiverTime` (instead of `senderTime` ) MAY be used to sort messages during the paging process.
However, it is RECOMMENDED the use of the `senderTime` for sorting as it is invariant and
consistent across all the nodes.
This has the benefit of `cursor` reusability i.e.,
a `cursor` obtained from one node can be consistently used to query from another node.
However, this `cursor` reusability does not hold when the `receiverTime` is utilized as the receiver time is affected by the network delay and
nodes' clock asynchrony.
#### HistoryResponse
RPC call to respond to a HistoryQuery call.
- The `messages` field MUST contain the messages found,
these are [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md) types.
- `PagingInfo` holds the paging information based on which the querying node can resume its further history queries.
The `pageSize` indicates the number of returned Waku messages (i.e., the number of messages included in the `messages` field of `HistoryResponse`).
The `direction` is the same direction as in the corresponding `HistoryQuery`.
In the forward pagination, the `cursor` holds the `Index` of the last message in the `HistoryResponse` `messages` (and the first message in the backward paging).
Regardless of the paging direction, the retrieved `messages` are always sorted in ascending order based on their timestamp as explained in the [sorting messages](#sorting-messages) section, that is, from the oldest to the most recent.
The requester SHALL embed the returned `cursor` inside its next `HistoryQuery` to retrieve the next page of the [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md).
The `cursor` obtained from one node SHOULD NOT be used in a request to another node because the result may be different.
- The `error` field contains information about any error that has occurred while processing the corresponding `HistoryQuery`.
`NONE` stands for no error.
This is also the default value.
`INVALID_CURSOR` means that the `cursor` field of `HistoryQuery` does not match with the `Index` of any of the `WakuMessage` persisted by the queried node.
## Security Consideration
The main security consideration to take into account while using this protocol is that a querying node have to reveal their content filters of interest to the queried node, hence potentially compromising their privacy.
## Future Work
- **Anonymous query**: This feature guarantees that nodes can anonymously query historical messages from other nodes i.e.,
without disclosing the exact topics of [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md) they are interested in.
As such, no adversary in the `13/WAKU2-STORE` protocol would be able to learn which peer is interested in which content filters i.e.,
content topics of [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md).
The current version of the `13/WAKU2-STORE` protocol does not provide anonymity for historical queries,
as the querying node needs to directly connect to another node in the `13/WAKU2-STORE` protocol and
explicitly disclose the content filters of its interest to retrieve the corresponding messages.
However, one can consider preserving anonymity through one of the following ways:
- By hiding the source of the request i.e., anonymous communication.
That is the querying node shall hide all its PII in its history request e.g., its IP address.
This can happen by the utilization of a proxy server or by using Tor.
Note that the current structure of historical requests does not embody any piece of PII, otherwise,
such data fields must be treated carefully to achieve query anonymity.
\<!-- TODO: if nodes have to disclose their PeerIDs (e.g., for authentication purposes) when connecting to other nodes in the store protocol, then Tor does not preserve anonymity since it only helps in hiding the IP. So, the PeerId usage in switches must be investigated further. Depending on how PeerId is used, one may be able to link between a querying node and its queried topics despite hiding the IP address--\>
- By deploying secure 2-party computations in which the querying node obtains the historical messages of a certain topic,
the queried node learns nothing about the query.
Examples of such 2PC protocols are secure one-way Private Set Intersections (PSI).
\<!-- TODO: add a reference for PSIs? --\> \<!-- TODO: more techniques to be included --\>
\<!-- TODO: Censorship resistant: this is about a node that hides the historical messages from other nodes. This attack is not included in the specs since it does not fit the passive adversarial model (the attacker needs to deviate from the store protocol).--\>
- **Robust and verifiable timestamps**: Messages timestamp is a way to show that the message existed prior to some point in time.
However, the lack of timestamp verifiability can create room for a range of attacks,
including injecting messages with invalid timestamps pointing to the far future.
To better understand the attack,
consider a store node whose current clock shows `2021-01-01 00:00:30` (and assume all the other nodes have a synchronized clocks +-20seconds).
The store node already has a list of messages,
`(m1,2021-01-01 00:00:00), (m2,2021-01-01 00:00:01), ..., (m10:2021-01-01 00:00:20)`,
that are sorted based on their timestamp.
An attacker sends a message with an arbitrary large timestamp e.g.,
10 hours ahead of the correct clock `(m',2021-01-01 10:00:30)`.
The store node places `m'` at the end of the list,
`(m1,2021-01-01 00:00:00), (m2,2021-01-01 00:00:01), ..., (m10:2021-01-01 00:00:20), (m',2021-01-01 10:00:30)`.
Now another message arrives with a valid timestamp e.g.,
`(m11, 2021-01-01 00:00:45)`.
However, since its timestamp precedes the malicious message `m'`,
it gets placed before `m'` in the list i.e.,
`(m1,2021-01-01 00:00:00), (m2,2021-01-01 00:00:01), ..., (m10:2021-01-01 00:00:20), (m11, 2021-01-01 00:00:45), (m',2021-01-01 10:00:30)`.
In fact, for the next 10 hours,
`m'` will always be considered as the most recent message and
served as the last message to the querying nodes irrespective of how many other messages arrive afterward.
A robust and verifiable timestamp allows the receiver of a message to verify that a message has been generated prior to the claimed timestamp.
One solution is the use of [open timestamps](https://opentimestamps.org/) e.g.,
block height in Blockchain-based timestamps.
That is, messages contain the most recent block height perceived by their senders at the time of message generation.
This proves accuracy within a range of minutes (e.g., in Bitcoin blockchain) or
seconds (e.g., in Ethereum 2.0) from the time of origination.
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via
[CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
1. [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md)
2. [protocol buffers v3](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/)
3. [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md)
4. [Open timestamps](https://opentimestamps.org/)

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---
title: 14/WAKU2-MESSAGE
name: Waku v2 Message
status: draft
category: Standards Track
editor: Oskar Thorén \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\>
contributors:
- Sanaz Taheri \<sanaz@status.im\>
- Aaryamann Challani \<aaryamann@status.im\>
- Lorenzo Delgado \<lorenzo@status.im\>
- Abhimanyu Rawat \<abhi@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
## Abstract
Waku v2 is a family of modular peer-to-peer protocols for secure communication.
These protocols are designed to be secure, privacy-preserving, and censorship-resistant and can run in resource-restricted environments.
At a high level, Waku v2 implements a Pub/Sub messaging pattern over libp2p and adds capabilities.
The present document specifies the Waku v2 message format, a way to encapsulate the messages sent with specific information security goals, and Whisper/Waku v1 backward compatibility.
## Motivation
When sending messages over Waku, there are multiple requirements:
- One may have a separate encryption layer as part of the application.
- One may want to provide efficient routing for resource-restricted devices.
- One may want to provide compatibility with [Waku v1 envelopes](../6/waku1.md).
- One may want encrypted payloads by default.
- One may want to provide unlinkability to get metadata protection.
This specification attempts to provide for these various requirements.
## Semantics
### Waku Message
A Waku message is constituted by the combination of data payload and attributes that, for example, a *publisher* sends to a *topic* and is eventually delivered to *subscribers*.
Waku message attributes are key-value pairs of metadata associated with a message.
And the message data payload is the part of the transmitted Waku message that is the actual message information.
The data payload is also treated as a Waku message attribute for convenience.
### Message Attributes
* The `payload` attribute MUST contain the message data payload to be sent.
* The `content_topic` attribute MUST specify a string identifier that can be used for content-based filtering,
as described in [23/WAKU2-TOPICS](../../../informational/23/topics.md).
* The `meta` attribute, if present, contains an arbitrary application-specific variable-length byte array with a maximum length limit of 64 bytes.
This attribute can be utilized to convey supplementary details to various Waku protocols, thereby enabling customized processing based on its contents.
* The `version` attribute, if present, contains a version number to discriminate different types of payload encryption.
If omitted, the value SHOULD be interpreted as version 0.
* The `timestamp` attribute, if present, signifies the time at which the message was generated by its sender.
This attribute MAY contain the Unix epoch time in nanoseconds.
If the attribute is omitted, it SHOULD be interpreted as timestamp 0.
* The `ephemeral` attribute, if present, signifies the transient nature of the message.
For example, an ephemeral message SHOULD not be persisted by the Waku network.
If this attribute is set to `true`, the message SHOULD be interpreted as ephemeral.
If, instead, the attribute is omitted or set to `false`, the message SHOULD be interpreted as non-ephemeral.
## Wire Format
The Waku message wire format is specified using [protocol buffers v3](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/).
```protobuf
syntax = "proto3";
message WakuMessage {
bytes payload = 1;
string content_topic = 2;
optional uint32 version = 3;
optional sint64 timestamp = 10;
optional bytes meta = 11;
optional bool ephemeral = 31;
}
```
An example proto file following this specification can be found [here (vacp2p/waku)](https://github.com/vacp2p/waku/blob/main/waku/message/v1/message.proto).
## Payload encryption
The Waku message payload MAY be encrypted.
The message `version` attribute indicates the schema used to encrypt the payload data.
- **Version 0:**
The payload SHOULD be interpreted as unencrypted; additionally, it CAN indicate that the message payload has been encrypted at the application layer.
- **Version 1:**
The payload SHOULD be encrypted using Waku v1 payload encryption specified in [26/WAKU-PAYLOAD](../../application/26/payload.md).
This provides asymmetric and symmetric encryption.
The key agreement is performed out of band.
And provides an encrypted signature and padding for some form of unlinkability.
- **Version 2:**
The payload SHOULD be encoded according to [35/WAKU2-NOISE]([/spec/35](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/noise.md)).
Waku Noise protocol provides symmetric encryption and asymmetric key exchange.
Any `version` value not included in this list is reserved for future specification.
And, in this case, the payload SHOULD be interpreted as unencrypted by the Waku layer.
## Whisper/Waku v1 envelope compatibility
Whisper/Waku v1 envelopes are compatible with Waku v2 messages format.
* Whisper/Waku v1 `topic` field SHOULD be mapped to Waku v2 message's `content_topic` attribute.
* Whisper/Waku v1 `data` field SHOULD be mapped to Waku v2 message's `payload` attribute.
Waku v2 implements a pub/sub messaging pattern over libp2p.
This makes redundant some Whisper/Waku v1 envelope fields (e.g., `expiry`, `ttl`, `topic`, etc.), so they can be ignored.
## Deterministic message hashing
In Protocol Buffers v3, the deterministic serialization is not canonical across the different implementations and languages.
It is also unstable across different builds with schema changes due to unknown fields.
To overcome this interoperability limitation, a Waku v2 message's hash MUST be computed following this schema:
```
message_hash = sha256(concat(pubsub_topic, message.payload, message.content_topic, message.meta, message.timestamp))
```
If an optional attribute, such as `meta`, is absent, the concatenation of attributes SHOULD exclude it. This recommendation is made to ensure that the concatenation process proceeds smoothly when certain attributes are missing and to maintain backward compatibility.
This hashing schema is deemed appropriate for use cases where a cross-implementation deterministic hash is needed, such as message deduplication and integrity validation. The collision probability offered by this hashing schema can be considered negligible. This is due to the deterministic concatenation order of the message attributes, coupled with using a SHA-2 (256-bit) hashing algorithm.
### Test vectors
Waku message hash computation (`meta` size of 12 bytes):
```
pubsub_topic = "/waku/2/default-waku/proto" (0x2f77616b752f322f64656661756c742d77616b752f70726f746f)
message.payload = 0x010203045445535405060708
message.content_topic = "/waku/2/default-content/proto" (0x2f77616b752f322f64656661756c742d636f6e74656e742f70726f746f)
message.meta = 0x73757065722d736563726574
message.timestamp = 0x175789bfa23f8400
message_hash = 0x64cce733fed134e83da02b02c6f689814872b1a0ac97ea56b76095c3c72bfe05
```
Waku message hash computation (`meta` size of 64 bytes):
```
pubsub_topic = "/waku/2/default-waku/proto" (0x2f77616b752f322f64656661756c742d77616b752f70726f746f)
message.payload = 0x010203045445535405060708
message.content_topic = "/waku/2/default-content/proto" (0x2f77616b752f322f64656661756c742d636f6e74656e742f70726f746f)
message.meta = 0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f
message.timestamp = 0x175789bfa23f8400
message_hash = 0x7158b6498753313368b9af8f6e0a0a05104f68f972981da42a43bc53fb0c1b27
```
Waku message hash computation (`meta` attribute not present):
```
pubsub_topic = "/waku/2/default-waku/proto" (0x2f77616b752f322f64656661756c742d77616b752f70726f746f)
message.payload = 0x010203045445535405060708
message.content_topic = "/waku/2/default-content/proto" (0x2f77616b752f322f64656661756c742d636f6e74656e742f70726f746f)
message.meta = \<not-present\>
message.timestamp = 0x175789bfa23f8400
message_hash = 0xa2554498b31f5bcdfcbf7fa58ad1c2d45f0254f3f8110a85588ec3cf10720fd8
```
Waku message hash computation (`payload` length 0):
```
pubsub_topic = "/waku/2/default-waku/proto" (0x2f77616b752f322f64656661756c742d77616b752f70726f746f)
message.payload = []
message.content_topic = "/waku/2/default-content/proto" (0x2f77616b752f322f64656661756c742d636f6e74656e742f70726f746f)
message.meta = 0x73757065722d736563726574
message.timestamp = 0x175789bfa23f8400
message_hash = 0x483ea950cb63f9b9d6926b262bb36194d3f40a0463ce8446228350bd44e96de4
```
## Security Considerations
### Confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity
The level of confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of the Waku message payload is discretionary.
Accordingly, the application layer shall utilize the encryption and signature schemes supported by Waku v2 to meet the application-specific privacy needs.
### Reliability of the `timestamp` attribute
The Waku message `timestamp` attribute is set by the sender.
Therefore, because message timestamps aren’t independently verified, this attribute is prone to exploitation and misuse.
It should not solely be relied upon for operations such as message ordering.
For example, a malicious actor can arbitrarily set the `timestamp` of a Waku message to a high value so that it always shows up as the most recent message in a chat application.
Applications using Waku messages’ `timestamp` attribute are recommended to use additional methods for more robust message ordering.
An example of how to deal with message ordering against adversarial message timestamps can be found in the Status protocol, see [6/PAYLOADS](../6/waku1.md/#clock-vs-timestamp-and-message-ordering).
### Reliability of the `ephemeral` attribute
The Waku message `ephemeral` attribute is set by the sender.
Since there is currently no incentive mechanism for network participants to behave correctly, this attribute is inherently insecure.
A malicious actor can tamper with the value of a Waku message’s `ephemeral` attribute, and the receiver would not be able to verify the integrity of the message.
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
- [6/WAKU1](/spec/6/)
- [Google Protocol buffers v3](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/)
- [26/WAKU-PAYLOAD](../../application/26/payload.md)
- [35/WAKU2-NOISE]([/spec/35](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/noise.md))
- [6/PAYLOADS](https://specs.status.im/spec/6#clock-vs-timestamp-and-message-ordering)

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---
title: 15/WAKU-BRIDGE
name: Waku Bridge
status: draft
editor: Hanno Cornelius \<hanno@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
A bridge between Waku v1 and Waku v2.
## Bridge
A bridge requires supporting both Waku versions:
* Waku v1 - using devp2p RLPx protocol
* Waku v2 - using libp2p protocols
Packets received on the Waku v1 network SHOULD be published just once on the
Waku v2 network. More specifically, the bridge SHOULD publish
this through the Waku Relay (PubSub domain).
Publishing such packet will require the creation of a new `Message` with a
new `WakuMessage` as data field. The `data` and `topic` field from the Waku v1
`Envelope` MUST be copied to the `payload` and `contentTopic` fields of the
`WakuMessage`. Other fields such as nonce, expiry and ttl will be dropped as
they become obsolete in Waku v2.
Before this is done, the usual envelope verification still applies:
* Expiry & future time verification
* PoW verification
* Size verification
Bridging SHOULD occur through the `WakuRelay`, but it MAY also be done on other Waku
v2 protocols (e.g. `WakuFilter`). The latter is however not advised as it will
increase the complexity of the bridge and because of the
[Security Considerations](#security-considerations) explained further below.
Packets received on the Waku v2 network SHOULD be posted just once on the Waku
v1 network. The Waku v2 `WakuMessage` contains only the `payload` and
`contentTopic` fields. The bridge MUST create a new Waku v1 `Envelope` and
copy over the `payload` and `contentFilter` fields to the `data` and `topic`
fields. Next, before posting on the network, the bridge MUST set a new expiry
and ttl and do the PoW nonce calculation.
### Security Considerations
As mentioned above, a bridge will be posting new Waku v1 envelopes, which
requires doing the PoW nonce calculation.
This could be a DoS attack vector, as the PoW calculation will make it more
expensive to post the message compared to the original publishing on the Waku v2
network. Low PoW setting will lower this problem, but it is likely that it is
still more expensive.
For this reason, bridges SHOULD probably be run independently of other nodes, so
that a bridge that gets overwhelmed does not disrupt regular Waku v2 to v2
traffic.
Bridging functionality SHOULD also be carefully implemented so that messages do
not bounce back and forth between the two networks. The bridge SHOULD properly
track messages with a seen filter so that no amplification can be achieved here.
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via
[CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).

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---
title: 16/WAKU2-RPC
name: Waku v2 RPC API
status: draft
editor: Hanno Cornelius \<hanno@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
## Introduction
This specification describes the JSON-RPC API that Waku v2 nodes MAY adhere to. Refer to the [Waku v2 specification](../10/waku2.md) for more information on Waku v2.
## Wire Protocol
### Transport
Nodes SHOULD expose an accessible [JSON-RPC](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification) API. The JSON-RPC version SHOULD be `2.0`. Below is an example request:
```json
{
"jsonrpc":"2.0",
"method":"get_waku_v2_debug_info",
"params":[],
"id":1
}
```
#### Fields
| Field | Description |
| --------- | --------------------------------------------------- |
| `jsonrpc` | Contains the used JSON-RPC version (`Default: 2.0`) |
| `method` | Contains the JSON-RPC method that is being called |
| `params` | An array of parameters for the request |
| `id` | The request ID |
### Types
In this specification, the primitive types `Boolean`, `String`, `Number` and `Null`, as well as the structured types `Array` and `Object`, are to be interpreted according to the [JSON-RPC specification](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#conventions). It also adopts the same capitalisation conventions.
The following structured types are defined for use throughout the document:
### WakuMessage
Refer to [`Waku Message` specification](../14/message.md) for more information.
`WakuMessage` is an `Object` containing the following fields:
| Field | Type | Inclusion | Description |
| ---: | :---: | :---: | --- |
| `payload` | `String` | mandatory | The message payload as a [base64 (with padding)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4648) encoded data string |
| `contentTopic` | `String` | optional | Message content topic for optional content-based filtering |
| `version` | `Number` | optional | Message version. Used to indicate type of payload encryption. Default version is 0 (no payload encryption). |
| `timestamp` | `Number` | optional | The time at which the message is generated by its sender. This field holds the Unix epoch time in nanoseconds as a 64-bits integer value. |
| `ephemeral` | `Boolean` | optional | This flag indicates the transient nature of the message. Indicates if the message is eligible to be stored by the `store` protocol, [13/WAKU2-STORE](../13/store.md). |
## Method naming
The JSON-RPC methods in this document are designed to be mappable to HTTP REST endpoints. Method names follow the pattern `\<method_type\>_waku_\<protocol_version\>_\<api\>_\<api_version\>_\<resource\>`
- `\<method_type\>`: prefix of the HTTP method type that most closely matches the JSON-RPC function. Supported `method_type` values are `get`, `post`, `put`, `delete` or `patch`.
- `\<protocol_version\>`: Waku version. Currently **v2**.
- `\<api\>`: one of the listed APIs below, e.g. `store`, `debug`, or `relay`.
- `\<api_version\>`: API definition version. Currently **v1** for all APIs.
- `\<resource\>`: the resource or resource path being addressed
The method `post_waku_v2_relay_v1_message`, for example, would map to the HTTP REST endpoint `POST /waku/v2/relay/v1/message`.
## Debug API
### Types
The following structured types are defined for use on the Debug API:
#### WakuInfo
`WakuInfo` is an `Object` containing the following fields:
| Field | Type | Inclusion | Description |
| ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- |
| `listenAddresses` | `Array`[`String`] | mandatory | Listening addresses of the node |
| `enrUri` | `String` | optional | ENR URI of the node |
#### WakuInfo
### `get_waku_v2_debug_v1_info`
The `get_waku_v2_debug_v1_info` method retrieves information about a Waku v2 node
#### Parameters
none
#### Response
- [**`WakuInfo`**](#wakuinfo) - information about a Waku v2 node
### `get_waku_v2_debug_v1_version`
The `get_waku_v2_debug_v1_version` method retrieves the version of a Waku v2 node as a string.
The version SHOULD follow [semantic versioning](https://semver.org/).
In case the node's current build is based on a git commit between semantic versions,
the retrieved version string MAY contain the git commit hash alone or in combination with the latest semantic version.
#### Parameters
none
#### Response
- **`string`** - represents the version of a Waku v2 node
## Relay API
Refer to the [Waku Relay specification](../11/relay.md) for more information on the relaying of messages.
### `post_waku_v2_relay_v1_message`
The `post_waku_v2_relay_v1_message` method publishes a message to be relayed on a [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor)
#### Parameters
| Field | Type | Inclusion | Description |
| ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- |
| `topic` | `String` | mandatory | The [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) being published on |
| `message` | [`WakuMessage`](#wakumessage) | mandatory | The `message` being relayed |
#### Response
- **`Bool`** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
### `post_waku_v2_relay_v1_subscriptions`
The `post_waku_v2_relay_v1_subscriptions` method subscribes a node to an array of [PubSub `topics`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor).
#### Parameters
| Field | Type | Inclusion | Description |
| ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- |
| `topics` | `Array`[`String`] | mandatory | The [PubSub `topics`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) being subscribed to |
#### Response
- **`Bool`** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
### `delete_waku_v2_relay_v1_subscriptions`
The `delete_waku_v2_relay_v1_subscriptions` method unsubscribes a node from an array of [PubSub `topics`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor).
#### Parameters
| Field | Type | Inclusion | Description |
| ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- |
| `topics` | `Array`[`String`] | mandatory | The [PubSub `topics`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) being unsubscribed from |
#### Response
- **`Bool`** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
### `get_waku_v2_relay_v1_messages`
The `get_waku_v2_relay_v1_messages` method returns a list of messages that were received on a subscribed [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) after the last time this method was called. The server MUST respond with an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) if no subscription exists for the polled `topic`. If no message has yet been received on the polled `topic`, the server SHOULD return an empty list. This method can be used to poll a `topic` for new messages.
#### Parameters
| Field | Type | Inclusion | Description |
| ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- |
| `topic` | `String` | mandatory | The [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) to poll for the latest messages |
#### Response
- **`Array`[[`WakuMessage`](#wakumessage)]** - the latest `messages` on the polled `topic` or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
## Relay Private API
The Private API provides functionality to encrypt/decrypt `WakuMessage` payloads using either symmetric or asymmetric cryptography. This allows backwards compatibility with [Waku v1 nodes](../6/waku1.md).
It is the API client's responsibility to keep track of the keys used for encrypted communication. Since keys must be cached by the client and provided to the node to encrypt/decrypt payloads, a Private API SHOULD NOT be exposed on non-local or untrusted nodes.
### Types
The following structured types are defined for use on the Private API:
#### KeyPair
`KeyPair` is an `Object` containing the following fields:
| Field | Type | Inclusion | Description |
| ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- |
| `privateKey` | `String` | mandatory | Private key as hex encoded data string |
| `publicKey` | `String` | mandatory | Public key as hex encoded data string |
### `get_waku_v2_private_v1_symmetric_key`
Generates and returns a symmetric key that can be used for message encryption and decryption.
#### Parameters
none
#### Response
- **`String`** - A new symmetric key as hex encoded data string
### `get_waku_v2_private_v1_asymmetric_keypair`
Generates and returns a public/private key pair that can be used for asymmetric message encryption and decryption.
#### Parameters
none
#### Response
- **[`KeyPair`](#keypair)** - A new public/private key pair as hex encoded data strings
### `post_waku_v2_private_v1_symmetric_message`
The `post_waku_v2_private_v1_symmetric_message` method publishes a message to be relayed on a [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor).
Before being relayed, the message payload is encrypted using the supplied symmetric key. The client MUST provide a symmetric key.
#### Parameters
| Field | Type | Inclusion | Description |
| ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- |
| `topic` | `String` | mandatory | The [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) being published on |
| `message` | [`WakuMessage`](#wakumessage) | mandatory | The (unencrypted) `message` being relayed |
| `symkey` | `String` | mandatory | The hex encoded symmetric key to use for payload encryption. This field MUST be included if symmetric key cryptography is selected |
#### Response
- **`Bool`** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
### `post_waku_v2_private_v1_asymmetric_message`
The `post_waku_v2_private_v1_asymmetric_message` method publishes a message to be relayed on a [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor).
Before being relayed, the message payload is encrypted using the supplied public key. The client MUST provide a public key.
#### Parameters
| Field | Type | Inclusion | Description |
| ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- |
| `topic` | `String` | mandatory | The [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) being published on |
| `message` | [`WakuMessage`](#wakumessage) | mandatory | The (unencrypted) `message` being relayed |
| `publicKey` | `String` | mandatory | The hex encoded public key to use for payload encryption. This field MUST be included if asymmetric key cryptography is selected |
#### Response
- **`Bool`** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
### `get_waku_v2_private_v1_symmetric_messages`
The `get_waku_v2_private_v1_symmetric_messages` method decrypts and returns a list of messages that were received on a subscribed [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) after the last time this method was called. The server MUST respond with an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) if no subscription exists for the polled `topic`. If no message has yet been received on the polled `topic`, the server SHOULD return an empty list. This method can be used to poll a `topic` for new messages.
Before returning the messages, the server decrypts the message payloads using the supplied symmetric key. The client MUST provide a symmetric key.
#### Parameters
| Field | Type | Inclusion | Description |
| ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- |
| `topic` | `String` | mandatory | The [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) to poll for the latest messages |
| `symkey` | `String` | mandatory | The hex encoded symmetric key to use for payload decryption. This field MUST be included if symmetric key cryptography is selected |
#### Response
- **`Array`[[`WakuMessage`](#wakumessage)]** - the latest `messages` on the polled `topic` or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
### `get_waku_v2_private_v1_asymmetric_messages`
The `get_waku_v2_private_v1_asymmetric_messages` method decrypts and returns a list of messages that were received on a subscribed [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) after the last time this method was called. The server MUST respond with an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) if no subscription exists for the polled `topic`. If no message has yet been received on the polled `topic`, the server SHOULD return an empty list. This method can be used to poll a `topic` for new messages.
Before returning the messages, the server decrypts the message payloads using the supplied private key. The client MUST provide a private key.
#### Parameters
| Field | Type | Inclusion | Description |
| ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- |
| `topic` | `String` | mandatory | The [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) to poll for the latest messages |
| `privateKey` | `String` | mandatory | The hex encoded private key to use for payload decryption. This field MUST be included if asymmetric key cryptography is selected |
#### Response
- **`Array`[[`WakuMessage`](#wakumessage)]** - the latest `messages` on the polled `topic` or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
## Store API
Refer to the [Waku Store specification](../13/store.md) for more information on message history retrieval.
### Types
The following structured types are defined for use on the Store API:
#### StoreResponse
`StoreResponse` is an `Object` containing the following fields:
| Field | Type | Inclusion | Description |
| ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- |
| `messages` | `Array`[[`WakuMessage`](#wakumessage)] | mandatory | Array of retrieved historical messages |
| `pagingOptions` | [`PagingOptions`](#pagingOptions) | [conditional](#get_waku_v2_store_v1_messages) | Paging information from which to resume further historical queries |
#### PagingOptions
`PagingOptions` is an `Object` containing the following fields:
| Field | Type | Inclusion | Description |
| ----: |:-----------------:| :---: |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| `pageSize` | `Number` | mandatory | Number of messages to retrieve per page |
| `cursor` | [`Index`](#index) | optional | Message [`Index`](#index) from which to perform pagination. If not included and `forward` is set to `true`, paging will be performed from the beginning of the list. If not included and `forward` is set to `false`, paging will be performed from the end of the list. |
| `forward` | `Bool` | mandatory | `true` if paging forward, `false` if paging backward |
#### Index
`Index` is an `Object` containing the following fields:
| Field | Type | Inclusion | Description |
| ----: | :---: | :---: |-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| `digest` | `String` | mandatory | A hash for the message at this [`Index`](#index) |
| `receivedTime` | `Number` | mandatory | UNIX timestamp in nanoseconds at which the message at this [`Index`](#index) was received |
#### ContentFilter
`ContentFilter` is an `Object` containing the following fields:
| Field | Type | Inclusion | Description |
| ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- |
| `contentTopic` | `String` | mandatory | The content topic of a [`WakuMessage`](#wakumessage) |
### `get_waku_v2_store_v1_messages`
The `get_waku_v2_store_v1_messages` method retrieves historical messages on specific content topics. This method MAY be called with [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions), to retrieve historical messages on a per-page basis. If the request included [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions), the node MUST return messages on a per-page basis and include [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions) in the response. These [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions) MUST contain a `cursor` pointing to the [`Index`](#index) from which a new page can be requested.
#### Parameters
| Field | Type | Inclusion | Description |
| ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- |
| `pubsubTopic` | `String` | optional | The pubsub topic on which a [`WakuMessage`](#wakumessage) is published |
| `contentFilters` | `Array`[[`ContentFilter`](#contentfilter)] | optional | Array of content filters to query for historical messages |
| `startTime` | `Number`| optional | The inclusive lower bound on the [`timestamp`](../14/message.md/#message-attributes) of queried [`WakuMessage`s](#wakumessage). This field holds the Unix epoch time in nanoseconds as a 64-bits integer value. |
| `endTime` | `Number` | optional | The inclusive upper bound on the [`timestamp`](../14/message.md/#message-attributes) of queried [`WakuMessage`s](#wakumessage). This field holds the Unix epoch time in nanoseconds as a 64-bits integer value. |
| `pagingOptions` | [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions) | optional | Pagination information |
#### Response
- [**`StoreResponse`**](#storeresponse) - the response to a `query` for historical messages.
## Filter API
Refer to the [Waku Filter specification](../12/filter.md) for more information on content filtering.
### Types
The following structured types are defined for use on the Filter API:
#### ContentFilter
`ContentFilter` is an `Object` containing the following fields:
| Field | Type | Inclusion | Description |
| ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- |
| `contentTopic` | `String` | mandatory | message content topic |
### `post_waku_v2_filter_v1_subscription`
The `post_waku_v2_filter_v1_subscription` method creates a subscription in a [light node](../12/filter.md/#rationale) for messages that matches a content filter and, optionally, a [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor).
#### Parameters
| Field | Type | Inclusion | Description |
| ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- |
| `contentFilters` | `Array`[[`ContentFilter`](#contentfilter)] | mandatory | Array of content filters being subscribed to |
| `topic` | `String` | optional | Message topic |
#### Response
- **`Bool`** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
### `delete_waku_v2_filter_v1_subscription`
The `delete_waku_v2_filter_v1_subscription` method removes subscriptions in a [light node](../12/filter.md/#rationale) matching a content filter and, optionally, a [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor).
#### Parameters
| Field | Type | Inclusion | Description |
| ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- |
| `contentFilters` | `Array`[[`ContentFilter`](#contentfilter)] | mandatory | Array of content filters being unsubscribed from |
| `topic` | `String` | optional | Message topic |
#### Response
- **`Bool`** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
### `get_waku_v2_filter_v1_messages`
The `get_waku_v2_filter_v1_messages` method returns a list of messages that were received on a subscribed content `topic` after the last time this method was called. The server MUST respond with an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) if no subscription exists for the polled content `topic`. If no message has yet been received on the polled content `topic`, the server SHOULD respond with an empty list. This method can be used to poll a content `topic` for new messages.
#### Parameters
| Field | Type | Inclusion | Description |
| ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- |
| `contentTopic` | `String` | mandatory | The content topic to poll for the latest messages |
#### Response
- **`Array`[[`WakuMessage`](#wakumessage)]** - the latest `messages` on the polled content `topic` or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
## Admin API
The Admin API provides privileged accesses to the internal operations of a Waku v2 node.
### Types
The following structured types are defined for use on the Admin API:
#### WakuPeer
`WakuPeer` is an `Object` containing the following fields:
| Field | Type | Inclusion | Description |
| ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- |
| `multiaddr` | `String` | mandatory | Multiaddress containing this peer's location and identity |
| `protocol` | `String` | mandatory | Protocol that this peer is registered for |
| `connected` | `bool` | mandatory | `true` if peer has active connection for this `protocol`, `false` if not |
### `get_waku_v2_admin_v1_peers`
The `get_waku_v2_admin_v1_peers` method returns an array of peers registered on this node. Since a Waku v2 node may open either continuous or ad hoc connections, depending on the negotiated protocol, these peers may have different connected states. The same peer MAY appear twice in the returned array, if it is registered for more than one protocol.
#### Parameters
none
#### Response
- **`Array`[[`WakuPeer`](#wakupeer)]** - Array of peers registered on this node
### `post_waku_v2_admin_v1_peers`
The `post_waku_v2_admin_v1_peers` method connects a node to a list of peers.
#### Parameters
| Field | Type | Inclusion | Description |
| ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- |
| `peers` | `Array`[`String`] | mandatory | Array of peer `multiaddrs` to connect to. Each `multiaddr` must contain the [location and identity addresses](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/addressing/) of a peer. |
#### Response
- **`Bool`** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
## Example usage
### Store API
#### `get_waku_v2_store_v1_messages`
This method is part of the `store` API and the specific resources to retrieve are (historical) `messages`. The protocol (`waku`) is on `v2`, whereas the Store API definition is on `v1`.
1. `get` *all* the historical messages for content topic **"/waku/2/default-content/proto"**; no paging required
#### Request
```curl -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":"id","method":"get_waku_v2_store_v1_messages", "params":["", [{"contentTopic":"/waku/2/default-content/proto"}]]}' --header "Content-Type: application/json" http://localhost:8545```
```jsonrpc
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": "id",
"method": "get_waku_v2_store_v1_messages",
"params": [
"",
[
{"contentTopic": "/waku/2/default-content/proto"}
]
]
}
```
#### Response
```jsonrpc
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": "id",
"result": {
"messages": [
{
"payload": dGVzdDE,
"contentTopic": "/waku/2/default-content/proto",
"version": 0
},
{
"payload": dGVzdDI,
"contentTopic": "/waku/2/default-content/proto",
"version": 0
},
{
"payload": dGVzdDM,
"contentTopic": "/waku/2/default-content/proto",
"version": 0
}
],
"pagingInfo": null
},
"error": null
}
```
---
2. `get` a single page of historical messages for content topic **"/waku/2/default-content/proto"**; 2 messages per page, backward direction. Since this is the initial query, no `cursor` is provided, so paging will be performed from the end of the list.
#### Request
```curl -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":"id","method":"get_waku_v2_store_v1_messages", "params":[ "", [{"contentTopic":"/waku/2/default-content/proto"}],{"pageSize":2,"forward":false}]}' --header "Content-Type: application/json" http://localhost:8545```
```jsonrpc
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": "id",
"method": "get_waku_v2_store_v1_messages",
"params": [
"",
[
{"contentTopic": "/waku/2/default-content/proto"}
],
{
"pageSize": 2,
"forward": false
}
]
}
```
#### Response
```jsonrpc
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": "id",
"result": {
"messages": [
{
"payload": dGVzdDI,
"contentTopic": "/waku/2/default-content/proto",
"version": 0
},
{
"payload": dGVzdDM,
"contentTopic": "/waku/2/default-content/proto",
"version": 0
}
],
"pagingInfo": {
"pageSize": 2,
"cursor": {
"digest": "abcdef",
"receivedTime": 1605887187000000000
},
"forward": false
}
},
"error": null
}
```
---
3. `get` the next page of historical messages for content topic **"/waku/2/default-content/proto"**, using the cursor received above; 2 messages per page, backward direction.
#### Request
```curl -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":"id","method":"get_waku_v2_store_v1_messages", "params":[ "", [{"contentTopic":"/waku/2/default-content/proto"}],{"pageSize":2,"cursor":{"digest":"abcdef","receivedTime":1605887187000000000},"forward":false}]}' --header "Content-Type: application/json" http://localhost:8545```
```jsonrpc
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": "id",
"method": "get_waku_v2_store_v1_messages",
"params": [
"",
[
{"contentTopic": "/waku/2/default-content/proto"}
],
{
"pageSize": 2,
"cursor": {
"digest": "abcdef",
"receivedTime": 1605887187000000000
},
"forward": false
}
]
}
```
#### Response
```jsonrpc
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": "id",
"result": {
"messages": [
{
"payload": dGVzdDE,
"contentTopic": "/waku/2/default-content/proto",
"version": 0
},
],
"pagingInfo": {
"pageSize": 2,
"cursor": {
"digest": "123abc",
"receivedTime": 1605866187000000000
},
"forward": false
}
},
"error": null
}
```
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
1. [JSON-RPC specification](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification)
1. [LibP2P Addressing](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/addressing/)
1. [LibP2P PubSub specification - topic descriptor](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/tree/master/pubsub#the-topic-descriptor)
1. [Waku v2 specification](../10/waku2.md)
1. [IETF RFC 4648 - The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4648)

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# Sequence diagram for RLN Relay protocol (publishing,routing, and slashing)
msc {
hscale="1",
wordwraparcs=true;
a [label=" "],
b [label=" "],
c [label=" "],
d [label=" "],
e [label=" "];
a rbox a [label="Relay Node: Publisher"],
b rbox b [label="Relay Node: Router"],
c rbox c [label="Relay Node"],
d rbox d [label="Relay Node"],
e note e [label="Membership Contract"];
|||;
b box b [label=" \n nullifierMap= [(nullifier, shareX, shareY)...] \n \n Initialize an empty map of the received nullifiers \n "],
c box c [label=" \n nullifierMap= [(nullifier, shareX, shareY)...] \n \n Initialize an empty map of the received nullifiers \n "],
d box d [label=" \n nullifierMap= [(nullifier, shareX, shareY)...] \n \n Initialize an empty map of the received nullifiers \n "];
|||;
...,
a -> a [label="Keep track of epoch"],
b -> b [label="Keep track of epoch"],
c -> c [label="Keep track of epoch"],
d -> d [label="Keep track of epoch"];
a box a [label=" \n Message: the intended message \n \n epoch: the current epoch \n "];
a box a [label=" \n A(x) = sk + H(sk, epoch)x \n \n shareX = H(message), shareY = A(shareX) \n \n nullifier = H(H(sk,epoch)) \n "];
a box a [label=" \n zkProof: generate the proof using zkSNARK \n "];
|||;
a => b [label="Message, epoch, proofBundle:(shareX, shareY, nullifier, zkProof) \n "];
b box b [label="1. If the received epoch is far from the current epoch"];
b -x c [label="Do not relay"];
b box b [label=" \n 2. If verification of zkProof failed \n "];
b -x c [label="Do not relay"];
b box b [label=" \n 3. If identical nullifier exists in the nullifierMap, \n \n extract the publisher sk \n "];
b -x c [label="Do not relay"];
b => e [label="Slash the publisher: Unlbock the deposit associated with sk"];
e => b [label="x ETH"];
b box b [label=" \n 4. If none of 1-3 happens, update the nullifierMap \n "];
b => c [label="Relay"];
b => d [label="Relay"];
}

BIN
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# Sequence diagram for RLN Relay protocol (registration)
msc {
hscale = "2";
d [label = " "], a [label = " "],b [label = " "];
a rbox a [label="Relay Node A"],
b note b [label="Membership Contract"],
d rbox d [label = "Relay Node B"];
b abox b [ label=" \n Listening to the membership contract \n "] ;
a box a [ label=" \n Generate sk,pk \n "] ;
a=>b [ label = " \n Register(pk, x ETH) \n " ] ;
a box a [ label=" \n Listening to the membership contract \n "] ;
b box b [label=" \n Insert pk as a leaf to the tree \n \n index: The index of the inserted leaf \n \n root: The updated tree root \n \n authPath: The authentication path \n "];
|||;
b=>a [ label = "index, root, authPath"];
|||;
..., ---;
... [ label = "Other relay nodes register and the membership tree gets updatetd" ];
..., ---;
a=>b [ label = "getRoot()" ] ;
b box b [label=" \n root: Get the current root\n "];
b=>a [ label = "root"];
..., --- [ label = " " ];
a=>b [ label = "getAuthPath(index)" ] ;
b box b [label=" \n authPath: Calculate the authentication path of the leaf with the given index and based on the current tree\n "];
b=>a [ label = "authPath"];
}

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# Sequence diagram for RLN Relay protocol (registration)
msc {
hscale = "1.3";
d [label = " "], a [label = " "],b [label = " "];
a rbox a [label="Relay Node A"],
b note b [label="Membership Contract"],
d rbox d [label = "Relay Node B"];
|||;
d abox d [ label=" \n Listening to the membership contract \n "] ;
a box a [ label=" \n Generate sk,pk \n "] ;
a=>b [ label = "Register(pk, x ETH)" ] ;
a abox a [ label=" \n Listening to the membership contract \n "] ;
b box b [label=" \n Insert pk to the list. \n Emit an event announcing the insertion of pk and its index in the list. \n "];
|||;
---;
b abox b [ label=" \n Block containing the insertion transaction is mined \n "] ;
b=>a [ label = "Insert(pk, index)"];
b=>d [ label = "Insert(pk, index)"];
}

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---
title: 17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY
name: Waku v2 RLN Relay
status: draft
editor: Sanaz Taheri \<sanaz@status.im\>
contributors:
- Oskar Thorén \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\>
- Aaryamann Challani \<aaryamann@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
The `17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY` protocol is an extension of `11/WAKU2-RELAY` which additionally provides spam protection using [Rate Limiting Nullifiers (RLN)](../../../../vac/32/rln-v1.md).
The security objective is to contain spam activity in a GossipSub network by enforcing a global messaging rate to all the peers.
Peers that violate the messaging rate are considered spammers and their message is considered spam.
Spammers are also financially punished and removed from the system.
\<!-- **Protocol identifier***: `/vac/waku/waku-rln-relay/2.0.0-alpha1` --\>
# Motivation
In open and anonymous p2p messaging networks, one big problem is spam resistance.
Existing solutions, such as Whisper’s proof of work are computationally expensive hence not suitable for resource-limited nodes.
Other reputation-based approaches might not be desirable, due to issues around arbitrary exclusion and privacy.
We augment the [`11/WAKU2-RELAY`](/spec/11) protocol with a novel construct of [RLN](/spec/32) to enable an efficient economic spam prevention mechanism that can be run in resource-constrained environments.
# Flow
The messaging rate is defined by the `period` which indicates how many messages can be sent in a given period.
We define an `epoch` as $\lceil$ `unix_time` / `period` $\rceil$. For example, if `unix_time` is `1644810116` and we set `period` to `30`, then `epoch` is $\lceil$`(unix_time/period)`$\rceil$ `= 54827003`.
Note that `epoch` refers to epoch in RLN and not Unix epoch. This means a message can only be sent every period, where period is up to the application.
See see section [Recommended System Parameters](#recommended-system-parameters) for some recommended ways to set a sensible `period` value depending on the application.
Peers subscribed to a spam-protected `pubsubTopic` are only allowed to send one message per `epoch`.
The higher-level layers adopting `17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY` MAY choose to enforce the messaging rate for `WakuMessages` with a specific `contentTopic` published on a `pubsubTopic`.
## Setup and Registration
Peers subscribed to a specific `pubsubTopic` form a [RLN group](/spec/32).
\<!-- link to the RLN group definition in the RLN RFC --\>
Peers MUST be registered to the RLN group to be able to publish messages.
Registration is moderated through a smart contract deployed on the Ethereum blockchain.
Each peer has an [RLN key pair](/spec/32) denoted by `sk` and `pk`.
The secret key `sk` is secret data and MUST be persisted securely by the peer.
The state of the membership contract contains the list of registered members' public identity keys i.e., `pk`s.
For the registration, a peer creates a transaction that invokes the registration function of the contract via which registers its `pk` in the group.
The transaction also transfers some amount of ether to the contract to be staked.
This amount is denoted by `staked_fund` and is a system parameter.
The peer who has the secret key `sk` associated with a registered `pk` would be able to withdraw a portion `reward_portion` of the staked fund by providing valid proof. \<!-- a secure way to prove the possession of a pk is yet under discussion, maybe via commit and reveal --\>
`reward_portion` is also a system parameter.
Note that `sk` is initially only known to its owning peer however, it may get exposed to other peers in case the owner attempts spamming the system i.e., sending more than one message per `epoch`.
An overview of registration is illustrated in Figure 1.
![Figure 1: Registration.](./images/rln-relay.png)
## Publishing
To publish at a given `epoch`, the publishing peer proceeds based on the regular [`11/WAKU2-RELAY`](/spec/11) protocol.
However, to protect against spamming, each `WakuMessage` (which is wrapped inside the `data` field of a PubSub message) MUST carry a [`RateLimitProof`](##RateLimitProof) with the following fields.
Section [Payload](#payloads) covers the details about the type and encoding of these fields.
The `merkle_root` contains the root of the Merkle tree.
The `epoch` represents the current epoch.
The `nullifier` is an internal nullifier acting as a fingerprint that allows specifying whether two messages are published by the same peer during the same `epoch`.
The `nullifier` is a deterministic value derived from `sk` and `epoch` therefore any two messages issued by the same peer (i.e., using the same `sk`) for the same `epoch` are guaranteed to have identical `nullifier`s.
The `share_x` and `share_y` can be seen as partial disclosure of peer's `sk` for the intended `epoch`.
They are derived deterministically from peer's `sk` and current `epoch` using [Shamir secret sharing scheme](/spec/32).
If a peer discloses more than one such pair (`share_x`, `share_y`) for the same `epoch`, it would allow full disclosure of its `sk` and hence get access to its staked fund in the membership contract.
The `proof` field is a zero-knowledge proof signifying that:
1. The message owner is the current member of the group i.e., her/his identity commitment key `pk` is part of the membership group Merkle tree with the root `merkle_root`.
2. `share_x` and `share_y` are correctly computed.
3. The `nullifier` is constructed correctly.
For more details about the proof generation check [RLN](/spec/32)
The proof generation relies on the knowledge of two pieces of private information i.e., `sk` and `authPath`.
The `authPath` is a subset of Merkle tree nodes by which a peer can prove the inclusion of its `pk` in the group. \<!-- TODO refer to RLN RFC for authPath def --\>
The proof generation also requires a set of public inputs which are: the Merkle tree root `merkle_root`, the current `epoch`, and the message for which the proof is going to be generated.
In `17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY`, the message is the concatenation of `WakuMessage`'s `payload` filed and its `contentTopic` i.e., `payload||contentTopic`.
## Group Synchronization
Proof generation relies on the knowledge of Merkle tree root `merkle_root` and `authPath` which both require access to the membership Merkle tree.
Getting access to the Merkle tree can be done in various ways.
One way is that all the peers construct the tree locally.
This can be done by listening to the registration and deletion events emitted by the membership contract.
Peers MUST update the local Merkle tree on a per-block basis.
This is discussed further in the [Merkle Root Validation](#merkle-root-validation) section.
Another approach for synchronizing the state of slashed `pk`s is to disseminate such information through a p2p GossipSub network to which all peers are subscribed.
This is in addition to sending the deletion transaction to the membership contract.
The benefit of an off-chain slashing is that it allows real-time removal of spammers as opposed to on-chain slashing in which peers get informed with a delay,
where the delay is due to mining the slashing transaction.
For the group synchronization, one important security consideration is that peers MUST make sure they always use the most recent Merkle tree root in their proof generation.
The reason is that using an old root can allow inference about the index of the user's `pk` in the membership tree hence compromising user privacy and breaking message unlinkability.
## Routing
Upon the receipt of a PubSub message via [`11/WAKU2-RELAY`](/spec/11) protocol, the routing peer parses the `data` field as a `WakuMessage` and gets access to the `RateLimitProof` field.
The peer then validates the `RateLimitProof` as explained next.
### Epoch Validation
If the `epoch` attached to the message is more than `max_epoch_gap` apart from the routing peer's current `epoch` then the message is discarded and considered invalid.
This is to prevent a newly registered peer from spamming the system by messaging for all the past epochs.
`max_epoch_gap` is a system parameter for which we provide some recommendations in section [Recommended System Parameters](#recommended-system-parameters).
### Merkle Root Validation
The routing peers MUST check whether the provided Merkle root in the `RateLimitProof` is valid.
It can do so by maintaining a local set of valid Merkle roots, which consist of `acceptable_root_window_size` past roots.
These roots refer to the final state of the Merkle tree after a whole block consisting of group changes is processed.
The Merkle roots are updated on a per-block basis instead of a per-event basis.
This is done because if Merkle roots are updated on a per-event basis, some peers could send messages with a root that refers to a Merkle tree state that might get invalidated while the message is still propagating in the network, due to many registrations happening during this time frame.
By updating roots on a per-block basis instead, we will have only one root update per-block processed, regardless on how many registrations happened in a block, and peers will be able to successfully propagate messages in a time frame corresponding to roughly the size of the roots window times the block mining time.
Atomic processing of the blocks are necessary so that even if the peer is unable to process one event, the previous roots remain valid, and can be used to generate valid RateLimitProof's.
This also allows peers which are not well connected to the network to be able to send messages, accounting for network delay.
This network delay is related to the nature of asynchronous network conditions, which means that peers see membership changes asynchronously, and therefore may have differing local Merkle trees.
See [Recommended System Parameters](#recommended-system-parameters) on choosing an appropriate `acceptable_root_window_size`.
### Proof Verification
The routing peers MUST check whether the zero-knowledge proof `proof` is valid.
It does so by running the zk verification algorithm as explained in [RLN](/spec/32).
If `proof` is invalid then the message is discarded.
### Spam detection
To enable local spam detection and slashing, routing peers MUST record the `nullifier`, `share_x`, and `share_y` of incoming messages which are not discarded i.e., not found spam or with invalid proof or epoch.
To spot spam messages, the peer checks whether a message with an identical `nullifier` has already been relayed.
1. If such a message exists and its `share_x` and `share_y` components are different from the incoming message, then slashing takes place.
That is, the peer uses the `share_x` and `share_y` of the new message and the `share'_x` and `share'_y` of the old record to reconstruct the `sk` of the message owner.
The `sk` then can be used to delete the spammer from the group and withdraw a portion `reward_portion` of its staked fund.
2. If the `share_x` and `share_y` fields of the previously relayed message are identical to the incoming message, then the message is a duplicate and shall be discarded.
3. If none is found, then the message gets relayed.
An overview of the routing procedure and slashing is provided in Figure 2.
\<!-- TODO: may consider [validator functions](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/tree/master/pubsub#topic-validation) or [extended validators](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md#extended-validators) for the spam detection --\>
![Figure 2: Publishing, Routing and Slashing workflow.](./images/rln-message-verification.png)
-------
# Payloads
Payloads are protobuf messages implemented using [protocol buffers v3](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/).
Nodes MAY extend the [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](/spec/14) with a `rate_limit_proof` field to indicate that their message is not spam.
```diff
syntax = "proto3";
message RateLimitProof {
bytes proof = 1;
bytes merkle_root = 2;
bytes epoch = 3;
bytes share_x = 4;
bytes share_y = 5;
bytes nullifier = 6;
}
message WakuMessage {
bytes payload = 1;
string content_topic = 2;
optional uint32 version = 3;
optional sint64 timestamp = 10;
optional bool ephemeral = 31;
+ optional bytes rate_limit_proof = 21;
}
```
## WakuMessage
`rate_limit_proof` holds the information required to prove that the message owner has not exceeded the message rate limit.
## RateLimitProof
Below is the description of the fields of `RateLimitProof` and their types.
| Parameter | Type | Description |
| ----: | ----------- | ----------- |
| `proof` | array of 256 bytes | the zkSNARK proof as explained in the [Publishing process](##Publishing) |
| `merkle_root` | array of 32 bytes in little-endian order | the root of membership group Merkle tree at the time of publishing the message |
| `share_x` and `share_y`| array of 32 bytes each | Shamir secret shares of the user's secret identity key `sk` . `share_x` is the Poseidon hash of the `WakuMessage`'s `payload` concatenated with its `contentTopic` . `share_y` is calculated using [Shamir secret sharing scheme](/spec/32) | \<!-- todo specify the poseidon hash setting --\>
| `nullifier` | array of 32 bytes | internal nullifier derived from `epoch` and peer's `sk` as explained in [RLN construct](/spec/32)|
# Recommended System Parameters
The system parameters are summarized in the following table, and the recommended values for a subset of them are presented next.
| Parameter | Description |
| ----: |----------- |
| `period` | the length of `epoch` in seconds |
| `staked_fund` | the amount of wei to be staked by peers at the registration |
| `reward_portion` | the percentage of `staked_fund` to be rewarded to the slashers |
| `max_epoch_gap` | the maximum allowed gap between the `epoch` of a routing peer and the incoming message |
| `acceptable_root_window_size` | The maximum number of past Merkle roots to store |
## Epoch Length
A sensible value for the `period` depends on the application for which the spam protection is going to be used.
For example, while the `period` of `1` second i.e., messaging rate of `1` per second, might be acceptable for a chat application, might be too low for communication among Ethereum network validators.
One should look at the desired throughput of the application to decide on a proper `period` value.
In the proof of concept implementation of `17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY` protocol which is available in [nim-waku](https://github.com/status-im/nim-waku), the `period` is set to `1` second.
Nevertheless, this value is also subject to change depending on user experience.
## Maximum Epoch Gap
We discussed in the [Routing](#routing) section that the gap between the epoch observed by the routing peer and the one attached to the incoming message should not exceed a threshold denoted by `max_epoch_gap` .
The value of `max_epoch_gap` can be measured based on the following factors.
- Network transmission delay `Network_Delay`: the maximum time that it takes for a message to be fully disseminated in the GossipSub network.
- Clock asynchrony `Clock_Asynchrony`: The maximum difference between the Unix epoch clocks perceived by network peers which can be due to clock drifts.
With a reasonable approximation of the preceding values, one can set `max_epoch_gap` as
`max_epoch_gap` $= \lceil \frac{\text{Network Delay} + \text{Clock Asynchrony}}{\text{Epoch Length}}\rceil$ where `period` is the length of the `epoch` in seconds.
`Network_Delay` and `Clock_Asynchrony` MUST have the same resolution as `period` .
By this formulation, `max_epoch_gap` indeed measures the maximum number of `epoch`s that can elapse since a message gets routed from its origin to all the other peers in the network.
`acceptable_root_window_size` depends upon the underlying chain's average blocktime, `block_time`
The lower bound for the `acceptable_root_window_size` SHOULD be set as $acceptable_root_window_size=(Network_Delay)/block_time$
`Network_Delay` MUST have the same resolution as `block_time`.
By this formulation, `acceptable_root_window_size` will provide a lower bound of how many roots can be acceptable by a routing peer.
The `acceptable_root_window_size` should indicate how many blocks may have been mined during the time it takes for a peer to receive a message.
This formula represents a lower bound of the number of acceptable roots.
# Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
# References
1. [RLN documentation](https://hackmd.io/tMTLMYmTR5eynw2lwK9n1w?view)
2. [Public inputs to the RLN circuit](https://hackmd.io/tMTLMYmTR5eynw2lwK9n1w?view#Public-Inputs)
3. [Shamir secret sharing scheme used in RLN](https://hackmd.io/tMTLMYmTR5eynw2lwK9n1w?view#Linear-Equation-amp-SSS)
4. [RLN internal nullifier](https://hackmd.io/tMTLMYmTR5eynw2lwK9n1w?view#Nullifiers)

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---
title: 19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH
name: Waku v2 Light Push
status: draft
editor: Oskar Thorén \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\>
contributors:
- Daniel Kaiser \<danielkaiser@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
**Protocol identifier**: `/vac/waku/lightpush/2.0.0-beta1`
## Motivation and Goals
Light nodes with short connection windows and limited bandwidth wish to publish messages into the Waku network.
Additionally, there is sometimes a need for confirmation that a message has been received "by the network"
(here, at least one node).
`19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH` is a request/response protocol for this.
## Payloads
```protobuf
syntax = "proto3";
message PushRequest {
string pubsub_topic = 1;
WakuMessage message = 2;
}
message PushResponse {
bool is_success = 1;
// Error messages, etc
string info = 2;
}
message PushRPC {
string request_id = 1;
PushRequest request = 2;
PushResponse response = 3;
}
```
### Message Relaying
Nodes that respond to `PushRequests` MUST either
relay the encapsulated message via [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md) protocol on the specified `pubsub_topic`,
or forward the `PushRequest` via 19/LIGHTPUSH on a [44/WAKU2-DANDELION](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/application/dandelion.md) stem.
If they are unable to do so for some reason, they SHOULD return an error code in `PushResponse`.
## Security Considerations
Since this can introduce an amplification factor, it is RECOMMENDED for the node relaying to the rest of the network to take extra precautions.
This can be done by rate limiting via [17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY](https://rfc.vac.dev/spec/17/).
Note that the above is currently not fully implemented.
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## References
* [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md)
* [44/WAKU2-DANDELION](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/application/dandelion.md)
* [17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY](../17/rln-relay.md)

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---
title: 33/WAKU2-DISCV5
name: Waku v2 Discv5 Ambient Peer Discovery
status: draft
editor: Daniel Kaiser \<danielkaiser@status.im\>
contributors:
sidebar_position: 1
---
## Abstract
`33/WAKU2-DISCV5` specifies a modified version of [Ethereum's Node Discovery Protocol v5](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv5/discv5.md) as a means for ambient node discovery.
[10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md) uses the `33/WAKU2-DISCV5` ambient node discovery network for establishing a decentralized network of interconnected Waku2 nodes.
In its current version, the `33/WAKU2-DISCV5` discovery network is isolated from the Ethereum Discovery v5 network.
Isolation improves discovery efficiency, which is especially significant with a low number of Waku nodes compared to the total number of Ethereum nodes.
## Disclaimer
This version of `33/WAKU2-DISCV5` has a focus on timely deployment of an efficient discovery method for [10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md).
Establishing a separate discovery network is in line with this focus.
However, we are aware of potential resilience problems (see section on security considerations) and are [discussing](https://forum.vac.dev/t/waku-v2-discv5-roadmap-discussion/121/8)
and researching hybrid approaches.
## Background and Rationale
[11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md) assumes the existence of a network of Waku2 nodes.
For establishing and growing this network, new nodes trying to join the Waku2 network need a means of discovering nodes within the network.
[10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md) supports the following discovery methods in order of increasing decentralization
* hard coded bootstrap nodes
* [`DNS discovery`](https://rfc.vac.dev/spec/10/#discovery-domain) (based on [EIP-1459](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459))
* `peer-exchange` (work in progress)
* `33/WAKU2-DISCV5` (specified in this document)
The purpose of ambient node discovery within [10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md) is discovering Waku2 nodes in a decentralized way.
The unique selling point of `33/WAKU2-DISCV5` is its holistic view of the network, which allows avoiding hotspots and allows merging the network after a split.
While the other methods provide either a fixed or local set of nodes, `33/WAKU2-DISCV5` can provide a random sample of Waku2 nodes.
Future iterations of this document will add the possibility of efficiently discovering Waku2 nodes that have certain capabilities, e.g. holding messages of a certain time frame during which the querying node was offline.
### Separate Discovery Network
#### w.r.t. Waku2 Relay Network
`33/WAKU2-DISCV5` spans an overlay network separate from the [GossipSub](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/README.md) network [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md) builds on.
Because it is a P2P network on its own, it also depends on bootstrap nodes.
Having a separate discovery network reduces load on the bootstrap nodes, because the actual work is done by randomly discovered nodes.
This also increases decentralization.
#### w.r.t. Ethereum Discovery v5
`33/WAKU2-DISCV5` spans a discovery network isolated from the Ethereum Discovery v5 network.
Another simple solution would be taking part in the Ethereum Discovery network, and filtering Waku nodes based on whether they support [31/WAKU2-ENR](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/enr.md).
This solution is more resilient towards eclipse attacks.
However, this discovery method is very inefficient for small percentages of Waku nodes (see [estimation](https://forum.vac.dev/t/waku-v2-discv5-roadmap-discussion/121/8)).
It boils down to random walk discovery and does not offer a O(log(n)) hop bound.
The rarer the requested property (in this case Waku), the longer a random walk will take until finding an appropriate node, which leads to a needle-in-the-haystack problem.
Using a dedicated Waku2 discovery network, nodes can query this discovery network for a random set of nodes
and all (well-behaving) returned nodes can serve as bootstrap nodes for other Waku2 protocols.
A more sophisticated solution would be using [Discv5 topic discovery](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv5/discv5-theory.md#topic-advertisement).
However, in its current state it also has efficiency problems for small percentages of Waku nodes and is still in the design phase ([see here](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/issues/199)).
Currently, the Ethereum discv5 network is very efficient in finding other discv5 nodes,
but it is not so efficient for finding discv5 nodes that have a specific property or offer specific services, e.g. Waku.
As part of our [discv5 roadmap](https://forum.vac.dev/t/waku-v2-discv5-roadmap-discussion/121), we consider two ideas for future versions of `33/WAKU2-DISCV5`
* [Discv5 topic discovery](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv5/discv5-theory.md#topic-advertisement) with adjustments (ideally upstream)
* a hybrid solution that uses both a separate discv5 network and a Waku-ENR-filtered Ethereum discv5 network
## Semantics
`33/WAKU2-DISCV5` fully inherits the [discv5 semantics](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv5/discv5-theory.md).
Before announcing their address via Waku2 discv5, nodes SHOULD check if this address is publicly reachable.
Nodes MAY use the [libp2p AutoNAT protocol](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/autonat/README.md) to perform that check.
Nodes SHOULD only announce publicly reachable addresses via Waku2 discv5,
to avoid cluttering peer lists with nodes that are not reachable.
## Wire Format Specification
`33/WAKU2-DISCV5` inherits the [discv5 wire protocol](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv5/discv5-wire.md) except for the following differences
## WAKU2-Specific `protocol-id`
Ethereum discv5:
\<pre\>
\<code\>
header = static-header || authdata
static-header = protocol-id || version || flag || nonce || authdata-size
protocol-id = \<b\>"discv5"\</b\>
version = 0x0001
authdata-size = uint16 -- byte length of authdata
flag = uint8 -- packet type identifier
nonce = uint96 -- nonce of message
\</code\>
\</pre\>
`33/WAKU2-DISCV5`:
\<pre\>
kcode\>
header = static-header || authdata
static-header = protocol-id || version || flag || nonce || authdata-size
protocol-id = \<b\>"d5waku"\</b\>
version = 0x0001
authdata-size = uint16 -- byte length of authdata
flag = uint8 -- packet type identifier
nonce = uint96 -- nonce of message
\</code\>
\</pre\>
## Suggestions for Implementations
Existing discv5 implementations
* can be augmented to make the `protocol-id` selectable using a compile-time flag as in [this feature branch](https://github.com/kaiserd/nim-eth/blob/add-selectable-protocol-id-static/eth/p2p/discoveryv5/encoding.nim#L34) of nim-eth/discv5.
* can be forked followed by changing the `protocol-id` string as in [go-waku](https://github.com/status-im/go-waku/blob/master/waku/v2/discv5/discover.go#L135-L137).
## Security Considerations
### Sybil attack
Implementations should limit the number of bucket entries that have the same network parameters (IP address / port) to mitigate Sybil attacks.
### Eclipse attack
Eclipse attacks aim to eclipse certain regions in a DHT.
Malicious nodes provide false routing information for certain target regions.
The larger the desired eclipsed region, the more resources (i.e. controlled nodes) the attacker needs.
This introduces an efficiency versus resilience tradeoff.
Discovery is more efficient if information about target objects (e.g. network parameters of nodes supporting Waku) are closer to a specific DHT address.
If nodes providing specific information are closer to each other, they cover a smaller range in the DHT and are easier to eclipse.
Sybil attacks greatly increase the power of eclipse attacks, because they significantly reduce resources necessary to mount a successful eclipse attack.
## Security Implications of a Separate Discovery Network
A dedicated Waku discovery network is more likely to be subject to successful eclipse attacks (and to DoS attacks in general).
This is because eclipsing in a smaller network requires less resources for the attacker.
DoS attacks render the whole network unusable if the percentage of attacker nodes is sufficient.
Using random walk discovery would mitigate eclipse attacks targeted at specific capabilities, e.g. Waku.
However, this is because eclipse attacks aim at the DHT overlay structure, which is not used by random walks.
So, this mitigation would come at the cost of giving up overlay routing efficiency.
The efficiency loss is especially severe with a relatively small number of Waku nodes.
Properly protecting against eclipse attacks is challenging and raises research questions that we will address in future stages of our discv5 roadmap.
## References
1. [10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md)
1. [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md)
1. [`31/WAKU2-ENR`](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/enr.md)
1. [Node Discovery Protocol v5 (`discv5`)](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv5/discv5.md)
1. [`discv5` semantics](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv5/discv5-theory.md).
1. [`discv5` wire protocol](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv5/discv5-wire.md)
1. [`discv5` topic discovery](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv5/discv5-theory.md#topic-advertisement)
1. [Waku DNS discovery](https://rfc.vac.dev/spec/10/#discovery-domain)
1. [libp2p AutoNAT protocol](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/autonat/README.md)
1. [`EIP-1459`](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459)
1. [`GossipSub`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/README.md)
1. [Waku discv5 roadmap discussion](https://forum.vac.dev/t/waku-v2-discv5-roadmap-discussion/121)
1. [discovery efficiency estimation](https://forum.vac.dev/t/waku-v2-discv5-roadmap-discussion/121/8)
1. [implementation: Nim](https://github.com/kaiserd/nim-eth/blob/add-selectable-protocol-id-static/eth/p2p/discoveryv5/encoding.nim)
1. [implementation: Go](https://github.com/status-im/go-waku/blob/master/waku/v2/discv5/discover.go)
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).

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---
title: 6/WAKU1
name: Waku v1
status: stable
editor: Oskar Thorén \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\>
contributors:
- Adam Babik \<adam@status.im\>
- Andrea Maria Piana \<andreap@status.im\>
- Dean Eigenmann \<dean@status.im\>
- Kim De Mey \<kimdemey@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
This specification describes the format of Waku packets within the ÐΞVp2p Wire Protocol. This spec substitutes [EIP-627](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-627). Waku is a fork of the original Whisper protocol that enables better usability for resource restricted devices, such as mostly-offline bandwidth-constrained smartphones. It does this through (a) light node support, (b) historic envelopes (with a mailserver) (c) expressing topic interest for better bandwidth usage and (d) basic rate limiting.
## Motivation
Waku was created to incrementally improve in areas that Whisper is lacking in, with special attention to resource restricted devices. We specify the standard for Waku packets in order to ensure forward compatibility of different Waku clients, backwards compatibility with Whisper clients, as well as to allow multiple implementations of Waku and its capabilities. We also modify the language to be more unambiguous, concise and consistent.
## Definitions
| Term | Definition |
| --------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Batch Ack** | An abbreviated term for Batch Acknowledgment |
| **Light node** | A Waku node that does not forward any envelopes through the Messages packet. |
| **Envelope** | Messages sent and received by Waku nodes. Described in [ABNF spec `waku-envelope`](#abnf-specification) |
| **Node** | Some process that is able to communicate for Waku. |
## Underlying Transports and Prerequisites
### Use of DevP2P
For nodes to communicate, they MUST implement devp2p and run RLPx. They MUST have some way of connecting to other nodes. Node discovery is largely out of scope for this spec, but see the appendix for some suggestions on how to do this.
This protocol needs to advertise the `waku/1` [capability](https://ethereum.gitbooks.io/frontier-guide/devp2p.html).
### Gossip based routing
In Whisper, envelopes are gossiped between peers. Whisper is a form of rumor-mongering protocol that works by flooding to its connected peers based on some factors. Envelopes are eligible for retransmission until their TTL expires. A node SHOULD relay envelopes to all connected nodes if an envelope matches their PoW and bloom filter settings. If a node works in light mode, it MAY choose not to forward envelopes. A node MUST NOT send expired envelopes, unless the envelopes are sent as a [8/WAKU-MAIL](../../application/8/mail.md) response. A node SHOULD NOT send an envelope to a peer that it has already sent before.
### Maximum Packet Size
Nodes SHOULD limit the maximum size of both packets and envelopes. If a packet or envelope exceeds its limit, it MUST be dropped.
- **RLPx Packet Size** - This size MUST be checked before a message is decoded.
- **Waku Envelope Size** - Each envelope contained in an RLPx packet MUST then separately be checked against the maximum envelope size.
Clients MAY use their own maximum packet and envelope sizes. The default values are `1.5mb` for the RLPx Packet and `1mb` for a Waku envelope.
## Wire Specification
### Use of RLPx transport protocol
All Waku packets are sent as devp2p RLPx transport protocol, version 5[^1] packets. These packets MUST be RLP-encoded arrays of data containing two objects: packet code followed by another object (whose type depends on the packet code). See [informal RLP spec](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/RLP) and the [Ethereum Yellow Paper, appendix B](https://ethereum.github.io/yellowpaper/paper.pdf) for more details on RLP.
Waku is a RLPx subprotocol called `waku` with version `0`. The version number corresponds to the major version in the header spec. Minor versions should not break compatibility of `waku`, this would result in a new major. (Some exceptions to this apply in the Draft stage of where client implementation is rapidly change).
### ABNF specification
Using [Augmented Backus-Naur form (ABNF)](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5234) we have the following format:
```abnf
; Packet codes 0 - 127 are reserved for Waku protocol
packet-code = 1*3DIGIT
; rate limits per packet
packet-limit-ip = 1*DIGIT
packet-limit-peerid = 1*DIGIT
packet-limit-topic = 1*DIGIT
; rate limits by size in bytes
bytes-limit-ip = 1*DIGIT
bytes-limit-peerid = 1*DIGIT
bytes-limit-topic = 1*DIGIT
packet-rate-limits = "[" packet-limit-ip packet-limit-peerid packet-limit-topic "]"
bytes-rate-limits = "[" bytes-limit-ip bytes-limit-peerid bytes-limit-topic "]"
pow-requirement-key = 0
bloom-filter-key = 1
light-node-key = 2
confirmations-enabled-key = 3
packet-rate-limits-key = 4
topic-interest-key = 5
bytes-rate-limits-key = 6
status-options = "["
[ pow-requirement-key pow-requirement ]
[ bloom-filter-key bloom-filter ]
[ light-node-key light-node ]
[ confirmations-enabled-key confirmations-enabled ]
[ packet-rate-limits-key packet-rate-limits ]
[ topic-interest-key topic-interest ]
[ bytes-limits-key bytes-rate-limits ]
"]"
status = status-options
status-update = status-options
confirmations-enabled = BIT
light-node = BIT
; pow is "a single floating point value of PoW.
; This value is the IEEE 754 binary representation
; of a 64-bit floating point number packed as a uint64.
; Values of qNAN, sNAN, INF and -INF are not allowed.
; Negative values are also not allowed."
pow = 1*DIGIT "." 1*DIGIT
pow-requirement = pow
; bloom filter is "a byte array"
bloom-filter = *OCTET
waku-envelope = "[" expiry ttl topic data nonce "]"
; List of topics interested in
topic-interest = "[" *10000topic "]"
; 4 bytes (UNIX time in seconds)
expiry = 4OCTET
; 4 bytes (time-to-live in seconds)
ttl = 4OCTET
; 4 bytes of arbitrary data
topic = 4OCTET
; byte array of arbitrary size
; (contains encrypted payload)
data = *OCTET
; 8 bytes of arbitrary data
; (used for PoW calculation)
nonce = 8OCTET
messages = 1*waku-envelope
; version of the confirmation packet
version = 1*DIGIT
; keccak256 hash of the envelopes batch data (raw bytes)
; for which the confirmation is sent
hash = *OCTET
hasherror = *OCTET
; error code
code = 1*DIGIT
; a descriptive error message
description = *ALPHA
error = "[" hasherror code description "]"
errors = *error
response = "[" hash errors "]"
confirmation = "[" version response "]"
; message confirmation packet types
batch-ack = confirmation
message-response = confirmation
; mail server / client specific
p2p-request = waku-envelope
p2p-message = 1*waku-envelope
p2p-request-complete = *OCTET
; packet-format needs to be paired with its
; corresponding packet-format
packet-format = "[" packet-code packet-format "]"
required-packet = 0 status /
1 messages /
22 status-update /
optional-packet = 11 batch-ack /
12 message-response /
126 p2p-request-complete /
126 p2p-request /
127 p2p-message
packet = "[" required-packet [ optional-packet ] "]"
```
All primitive types are RLP encoded. Note that, per RLP specification, integers are encoded starting from `0x00`.
### Packet Codes
The packet codes reserved for Waku protocol: 0 - 127.
Packets with unknown codes MUST be ignored without generating any error, for forward compatibility of future versions.
The Waku sub-protocol MUST support the following packet codes:
| Name | Int Value |
| -------------------------- | ------------- |
| Status | 0 |
| Messages | 1 |
| Status Update | 22 |
The following message codes are optional, but they are reserved for specific purpose.
| Name | Int Value | Comment |
|----------------------------|-----------|---------|
| Batch Ack | 11 | |
| Message Response | 12 | |
| P2P Request Complete | 125 | |
| P2P Request | 126 | |
| P2P Message | 127 | |
### Packet usage
#### Status
The Status packet serves as a Waku handshake and peers MUST exchange this
packet upon connection. It MUST be sent after the RLPx handshake and prior to
any other Waku packets.
A Waku node MUST await the Status packet from a peer before engaging in other Waku protocol activity with that peer.
When a node does not receive the Status packet from a peer, before a configurable timeout, it SHOULD disconnect from that peer.
Upon retrieval of the Status packet, the node SHOULD validate the packet
received and validated the Status packet. Note that its peer might not be in
the same state.
When a node is receiving other Waku packets from a peer before a Status
packet is received, the node MUST ignore these packets and SHOULD disconnect from that peer. Status packets received after the handshake is completed MUST also be ignored.
The Status packet MUST contain an association list containing various options. All options within this association list are OPTIONAL, ordering of the key-value pairs is not guaranteed and therefore MUST NOT be relied on. Unknown keys in the association list SHOULD be ignored.
#### Messages
This packet is used for sending the standard Waku envelopes.
#### Status Update
The Status Update packet is used to communicate an update of the settings of the node.
The format is the same as the Status packet, all fields are optional.
If none of the options are specified the packet MUST be ignored and considered a noop.
Fields that are omitted are considered unchanged, fields that haven't changed SHOULD not
be transmitted.
##### PoW Requirement Field
When PoW Requirement is updated, peers MUST NOT deliver envelopes with PoW lower than the PoW Requirement specified.
PoW is defined as average number of iterations, required to find the current BestBit (the number of leading zero bits in the hash), divided by envelope size and TTL:
PoW = (2**BestBit) / (size * TTL)
PoW calculation:
fn short_rlp(envelope) = rlp of envelope, excluding env_nonce field.
fn pow_hash(envelope, env_nonce) = sha3(short_rlp(envelope) ++ env_nonce)
fn pow(pow_hash, size, ttl) = 2**leading_zeros(pow_hash) / (size * ttl)
where size is the size of the RLP-encoded envelope, excluding `env_nonce` field (size of `short_rlp(envelope)`).
##### Bloom Filter Field
The bloom filter is used to identify a number of topics to a peer without compromising (too much) privacy over precisely what topics are of interest. Precise control over the information content (and thus efficiency of the filter) may be maintained through the addition of bits.
Blooms are formed by the bitwise OR operation on a number of bloomed topics. The bloom function takes the topic and projects them onto a 512-bit slice. At most, three bits are marked for each bloomed topic.
The projection function is defined as a mapping from a 4-byte slice S to a 512-bit slice D; for ease of explanation, S will dereference to bytes, whereas D will dereference to bits.
LET D[*] = 0
FOREACH i IN { 0, 1, 2 } DO
LET n = S[i]
IF S[3] & (2 ** i) THEN n += 256
D[n] = 1
END FOR
A full bloom filter (all the bits set to 1) means that the node is to be considered a `Full Node` and it will accept any topic.
If both topic interest and bloom filter are specified, topic interest always takes precedence and bloom filter MUST be ignored.
If only bloom filter is specified, the current topic interest MUST be discarded and only the updated bloom filter MUST be used when forwarding or posting envelopes.
A bloom filter with all bits set to 0 signals that the node is not currently interested in receiving any envelope.
##### Topic Interest Field
Topic interest is used to share a node's interest in envelopes with specific topics. It does this in a more bandwidth considerate way, at the expense of some metadata protection. Peers MUST only send envelopes with specified topics.
It is currently bounded to a maximum of 10000 topics. If you are interested in more topics than that, this is currently underspecified and likely requires updating it. The constant is subject to change.
If only topic interest is specified, the current bloom filter MUST be discarded and only the updated topic interest MUST be used when forwarding or posting envelopes.
An empty array signals that the node is not currently interested in receiving any envelope.
##### Rate Limits Field
Rate limits is used to inform other nodes of their self defined rate limits.
In order to provide basic Denial-of-Service attack protection, each node SHOULD define its own rate limits. The rate limits SHOULD be applied on IPs, peer IDs, and envelope topics.
Each node MAY decide to whitelist, i.e. do not rate limit, selected IPs or peer IDs.
If a peer exceeds node's rate limits, the connection between them MAY be dropped.
Each node SHOULD broadcast its rate limits to its peers using the `status-update` packet. The rate limits MAY also be sent as an optional parameter in the handshake.
Each node SHOULD respect rate limits advertised by its peers. The number of packets SHOULD be throttled in order not to exceed peer's rate limits. If the limit gets exceeded, the connection MAY be dropped by the peer.
Two rate limits strategies are applied:
1) Number of packets per second
2) Size of packets (in bytes) per second
Both strategies SHOULD be applied per IP address, peer id and topic.
The size limit SHOULD be greater or equal than the maximum packet size.
##### Light Node Field
When the node's `light-node` field is set to true, the node SHOULD NOT forward Envelopes from its peers.
A node connected to a peer with the `light-node` field set to true MUST NOT depend on the peer for forwarding Envelopes.
##### Confirmations Enabled Field
When the node's `confirmations-enabled` field is set to true, the node SHOULD send [message confirmations](#batch-ack-and-message-response) to its peers.
#### Batch Ack and Message Response
Message confirmations tell a node that an envelope originating from it has been received by its peers, allowing a node to know whether an envelope has or has not been received.
A node MAY send a message confirmation for any batch of envelopes received with a Messages packet (`0x01`).
A message confirmation is sent using Batch Ack packet (`0x0B`) or Message Response packet (`0x0C`). The message confirmation is specified in the [ABNF specification](#abnf-specification).
The current `version` in the `confirmation` is `1`.
The supported error codes:
- `1`: time sync error which happens when an envelope is too old or was created in the future (typically because of an unsynchronized clock of a node).
The drawback of sending message confirmations is that it increases the noise in the network because for each sent envelope, a corresponding confirmation is broadcast by one or more peers.
#### P2P Request
This packet is used for sending Dapp-level peer-to-peer requests, e.g. Waku Mail Client requesting historic (expired) envelopes from the [Waku Mail Server](../../application/8/mail.md).
#### P2P Message
This packet is used for sending the peer-to-peer envelopes, which are not supposed to be forwarded any further. E.g. it might be used by the Waku Mail Server for delivery of historic (expired) envelopes, which is otherwise not allowed.
#### P2P Request Complete
This packet is used to indicate that all envelopes, requested earlier with a P2P Request packet (`0x7E`), have been sent via one or more P2P Message packets (`0x7F`).
The content of the packet is explained in the [Waku Mail Server](../../application/8/mail.md) specification.
### Payload Encryption
Asymmetric encryption uses the standard Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme with SECP-256k1 public key.
Symmetric encryption uses AES GCM algorithm with random 96-bit nonce.
### Packet code Rationale
Packet codes `0x00` and `0x01` are already used in all Waku / Whisper versions. Packet code `0x02` and `0x03` were previously used in Whisper but are deprecated as of Waku v0.4
Packet code `0x22` is used to dynamically change the settings of a node.
Packet codes `0x7E` and `0x7F` may be used to implement Waku Mail Server and Client. Without the P2P Message packet it would be impossible to deliver the historic envelopes, since they will be recognized as expired, and the peer will be disconnected for violating the Waku protocol. They might be useful for other purposes when it is not possible to spend time on PoW, e.g. if a stock exchange will want to provide live feed about the latest trades.
## Additional capabilities
Waku supports multiple capabilities. These include light node, rate limiting and bridging of traffic. Here we list these capabilities, how they are identified, what properties they have and what invariants they must maintain.
Additionally there is the capability of a mailserver which is documented in its on [specification](../../application/8/mail.md).
### Light node
The rationale for light nodes is to allow for interaction with waku on resource restricted devices as bandwidth can often be an issue.
Light nodes MUST NOT forward any incoming envelopes, they MUST only send their own envelopes. When light nodes happen to connect to each other, they SHOULD disconnect. As this would result in envelopes being dropped between the two.
Light nodes are identified by the `light_node` value in the Status packet.
### Accounting for resources (experimental)
Nodes MAY implement accounting, keeping track of resource usage. It is heavily inspired by Swarm's [SWAP protocol](https://www.bokconsulting.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/tron-fischer-sw3.pdf), and works by doing pairwise accounting for resources.
Each node keeps track of resource usage with all other nodes. Whenever an envelope is received from a node that is expected (fits bloom filter or topic interest, is legal, etc) this is tracked.
Every epoch (say, every minute or every time an event happens) statistics SHOULD be aggregated and saved by the client:
| peer | sent | received |
|-------|------|----------|
| peer1 | 0 | 123 |
| peer2 | 10 | 40 |
In later versions this will be amended by nodes communication thresholds, settlements and disconnect logic.
## Upgradability and Compatibility
### General principles and policy
The currently advertised capability is `waku/1`. This needs to be advertised in the `hello` `ÐΞVp2p` [packet](https://ethereum.gitbooks.io/frontier-guide/devp2p.html).
If a node supports multiple versions of `waku`, those needs to be explicitly advertised. For example if both `waku/0` and `waku/1` are supported, both `waku/0` and `waku/1` MUST be advertised.
These are policies that guide how we make decisions when it comes to upgradability, compatibility, and extensibility:
1. Waku aims to be compatible with previous and future versions.
2. In cases where we want to break this compatibility, we do so gracefully and as a single decision point.
3. To achieve this, we employ the following two general strategies:
- a) Accretion (including protocol negotiation) over changing data
- b) When we want to change things, we give it a new name (for example, a version number).
Examples:
- We enable bridging between `shh/6` and `waku/1` until such a time as when we are ready to gracefully drop support for `shh/6` (1, 2, 3).
- When we add parameter fields, we (currently) do so by accreting them in a list, so old clients can ignore new fields (dynamic list) and new clients can use new capabilities (1, 3).
- To better support (2) and (3) in the future, we will likely release a new version that gives better support for open, growable maps (association lists or native map type) (3)
- When we we want to provide a new set of packets that have different requirements, we do so under a new protocol version and employ protocol versioning. This is a form of accretion at a level above - it ensures a client can support both protocols at once and drop support for legacy versions gracefully. (1,2,3)
### Backwards Compatibility
Waku is a different subprotocol from Whisper so it isn't directly compatible. However, the data format is the same, so compatibility can be achieved by the use of a bridging mode as described below. Any client which does not implement certain packet codes should gracefully ignore the packets with those codes. This will ensure the forward compatibility.
### Waku-Whisper bridging
`waku/1` and `shh/6` are different DevP2P subprotocols, however they share the same data format making their envelopes compatible. This means we can bridge the protocols naively, this works as follows.
**Roles:**
- Waku client A, only Waku capability
- Whisper client B, only Whisper capability
- WakuWhisper bridge C, both Waku and Whisper capability
**Flow:**
1. A posts envelope; B posts envelope.
2. C picks up envelope from A and B and relays them both to Waku and Whisper.
3. A receives envelope on Waku; B on Whisper.
**Note**: This flow means if another bridge C1 is active, we might get duplicate relaying for a envelope between C1 and C2. I.e. Whisper(\<\>Waku\<\>Whisper)\<\>Waku, A-C1-C2-B. Theoretically this bridging chain can get as long as TTL permits.
### Forward Compatibility
It is desirable to have a strategy for maintaining forward compatibility between `waku/1` and future version of waku. Here we outline some concerns and strategy for this.
- **Connecting to nodes with multiple versions:** The way this SHOULD be accomplished is by negotiating the versions of subprotocols, within the `hello` packet nodes transmit their capabilities along with a version. The highest common version should then be used.
- **Adding new packet codes:** New packet codes can be added easily due to the available packet codes. Unknown packet codes SHOULD be ignored. Upgrades that add new packet codes SHOULD implement some fallback mechanism if no response was received for nodes that do not yet understand this packet.
- **Adding new options in `status-options`:** New options can be added to the `status-options` association list in the `status` and `status-update` packet as options are OPTIONAL and unknown option keys SHOULD be ignored. A node SHOULD NOT disconnect from a peer when receiving `status-options` with unknown option keys.
## Appendix A: Security considerations
There are several security considerations to take into account when running Waku. Chief among them are: scalability, DDoS-resistance and privacy. These also vary depending on what capabilities are used. The security considerations for extra capabilities such as [mailservers](../../application/8/mail.md#security-considerations) can be found in their respective specifications.
### Scalability and UX
#### Bandwidth usage:
In version 0 of Waku, bandwidth usage is likely to be an issue. For more investigation into this, see the theoretical scaling model described [here](https://github.com/vacp2p/research/tree/dcc71f4779be832d3b5ece9c4e11f1f7ec24aac2/whisper_scalability).
#### Gossip-based routing:
Use of gossip-based routing doesn't necessarily scale. It means each node can see an envelope multiple times, and having too many light nodes can cause propagation probability that is too low. See [Whisper vs PSS](https://our.status.im/whisper-pss-comparison/) for more and a possible Kademlia based alternative.
#### Lack of incentives:
Waku currently lacks incentives to run nodes, which means node operators are more likely to create centralized choke points.
### Privacy
#### Light node privacy:
The main privacy concern with a light node is that it has to reveal its topic interests (in addition to its IP/ID) to its directed peers. This is because when a light node publishes an envelope, its directed peers will know that the light node owns that envelope (as light nodes do not relay other envelopes). Therefore, the directed peers of a light node can make assumptions about what envelopes (topics) the light node is interested in.
#### Mailserver client privacy:
A mailserver client fetches archival envelopes from a mailserver through a direct connection.
In this direct connection, the client discloses its IP/ID as well as the topics/ bloom filter it is interested in to the mailserver.
The collection of such information allows the mailserver to link clients' IP/IDs to their topic interests and build a profile for each client over time.
As such, the mailserver client has to trust the mailserver with this level of information.
#### Bloom filter privacy:
By having a bloom filter where only the topics you are interested in are set, you reveal which envelopes you are interested in. This is a fundamental tradeoff between bandwidth usage and privacy, though the tradeoff space is likely suboptimal in terms of the [Anonymity](https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/954.pdf) [trilemma](https://petsymposium.org/2019/files/hotpets/slides/coordination-helps-anonymity-slides.pdf).
#### Privacy guarantees not rigorous:
Privacy for Whisper / Waku haven't been studied rigorously for various threat models like global passive adversary, local active attacker, etc. This is unlike e.g. Tor and mixnets.
#### Topic hygiene:
Similar to bloom filter privacy, if you use a very specific topic you reveal more information. See scalability model linked above.
### Spam resistance
**PoW bad for heterogeneous devices:**
Proof of work is a poor spam prevention mechanism. A mobile device can only have a very low PoW in order not to use too much CPU / burn up its phone battery. This means someone can spin up a powerful node and overwhelm the network.
### Censorship resistance
**Devp2p TCP port blockable:**
By default Devp2p runs on port `30303`, which is not commonly used for any other service. This means it is easy to censor, e.g. airport WiFi. This can be mitigated somewhat by running on e.g. port `80` or `443`, but there are still outstanding issues. See libp2p and Tor's Pluggable Transport for how this can be improved.
## Appendix B: Implementation Notes
### Implementation Matrix
| Client | Spec supported | Details |
|--------|----------------|---------|
| **Status-go** | 0.5 | [details](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/develop/WAKU.md) |
| **Nim-waku** | 1.0 | [details](https://github.com/status-im/nim-waku/blob/master/README.md) |
### Recommendations for clients
Notes useful for implementing Waku mode.
1. Avoid duplicate envelopes
To avoid duplicate envelopes, only connect to one Waku node. Benign duplicate envelopes is an intrinsic property of Whisper which often leads to a N factor increase in traffic, where N is the number of peers you are connected to.
2. Topic specific recommendations
Consider partition topics based on some usage, to avoid too much traffic on a single topic.
### Node discovery
Resource restricted devices SHOULD use [EIP-1459](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459) to discover nodes.
Known static nodes MAY also be used.
## Changelog
### [Initial Release](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/bc7e75ebb2e45d2cbf6ab27352c113e666df37c8)
- Add section on P2P Request Complete packet and update packet code table.
- Correct the header hierarchy for the status-options fields.
- Consistent use of the words packet, message and envelope.
- Added section on max packet size
- Complete the ABNF specification and minor ABNF fixes.
### Version 1.1
Released [June 09, 2020](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/33b8d7304c9ebece90ea94e601f11080a8ac2c4d)
- Add rate limit per bytes
### Version 1.0
Released [April 21,2020](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/9e650995f24179844857520c68fa3e8f6018b125)
- Removed `version` from handshake
- Changed `RLP` keys from 48,49.. to 0,1..
- Upgraded to `waku/1`
### Version 0.6
Released [April 21,2020](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/9e650995f24179844857520c68fa3e8f6018b125)
- Mark spec as Deprecated mode in terms of its lifecycle.
### Version 0.5
Released [March 17,2020](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/7b9dc562bc50c6bb844ac575cb221ec9cda2530a)
- Clarify the preferred way of handling unknown keys in the `status-options` association list.
- Correct spec/implementation mismatch: Change RLP keys to be the their int values in order to reflect production behavior
### Version 0.4
Released [February 21, 2020](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/17bd066e317bbe33af07146b721d73f24de47e88).
- Simplify implementation matrix with latest state
- Introduces a new required packet code Status Code (`0x22`) for communicating option changes
- Deprecates the following packet codes: PoW Requirement (`0x02`), Bloom Filter (`0x03`), Rate limits (`0x20`), Topic interest (`0x21`) - all superseded by the new Status Code (`0x22`)
- Increased `topic-interest` capacity from 1000 to 10000
### Version 0.3
Released [February 13, 2020](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/73138d6ba954ab4c315e1b8d210ac7631b6d1428).
- Recommend DNS based node discovery over other Discovery methods.
- Mark spec as Draft mode in terms of its lifecycle.
- Simplify Changelog and misc formatting.
- Handshake/Status packet not compatible with shh/6 nodes; specifying options as association list.
- Include topic-interest in Status handshake.
- Upgradability policy.
- `topic-interest` packet code.
### Version 0.2
Released [December 10, 2019](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/blob/waku-0.2.0/waku.md).
- General style improvements.
- Fix ABNF grammar.
- Mailserver requesting/receiving.
- New packet codes: topic-interest (experimental), rate limits (experimental).
- More details on handshake modifications.
- Accounting for resources mode (experimental)
- Appendix with security considerations: scalability and UX, privacy, and spam resistance.
- Appendix with implementation notes and implementation matrix across various clients with breakdown per capability.
- More details on handshake and parameters.
- Describe rate limits in more detail.
- More details on mailserver and mail client API.
- Accounting for resources mode (very experimental).
- Clarify differences with Whisper.
### Version 0.1
Initial version. Released [November 21, 2019](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/blob/b59b9247f2ac1bf45c75bd3227a2e5dd87b6d7b0/waku.md).
### Differences between shh/6 and waku/1
Summary of main differences between this spec and Whisper v6, as described in [EIP-627](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-627):
- RLPx subprotocol is changed from `shh/6` to `waku/1`.
- Light node capability is added.
- Optional rate limiting is added.
- Status packet has following additional parameters: light-node,
confirmations-enabled and rate-limits
- Mail Server and Mail Client functionality is now part of the specification.
- P2P Message packet contains a list of envelopes instead of a single envelope.
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).
## Footnotes
[^1]: Felix Lange et al. [The RLPx Transport Protocol](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/rlpx.md). Ethereum.

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---
title: 7/WAKU-DATA
name: Waku Envelope data field
status: stable
editor: Oskar Thorén \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\>
contributors:
- Dean Eigenmann \<dean@status.im\>
- Kim De Mey \<kimdemey@status.im\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
This specification describes the encryption, decryption and signing of the content in the [data field used in Waku](../../standards/core/6/waku1.md/#abnf-specification).
## Specification
The `data` field is used within the `waku envelope`, the field MUST contain the encrypted payload of the envelope.
The fields that are concatenated and encrypted as part of the `data` field are:
- flags
- auxiliary field
- payload
- padding
- signature
In case of symmetric encryption, a `salt` (a.k.a. AES Nonce, 12 bytes) field MUST be appended.
### ABNF
Using [Augmented Backus-Naur form (ABNF)](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5234) we have the following format:
```abnf
; 1 byte; first two bits contain the size of auxiliary field,
; third bit indicates whether the signature is present.
flags = 1OCTET
; contains the size of payload.
auxiliary-field = 4*OCTET
; byte array of arbitrary size (may be zero)
payload = *OCTET
; byte array of arbitrary size (may be zero).
padding = *OCTET
; 65 bytes, if present.
signature = 65OCTET
; 2 bytes, if present (in case of symmetric encryption).
salt = 2OCTET
data = flags auxiliary-field payload padding [signature] [salt]
```
### Signature
Those unable to decrypt the envelope data are also unable to access the signature. The signature, if provided, is the ECDSA signature of the Keccak-256 hash of the unencrypted data using the secret key of the originator identity. The signature is serialized as the concatenation of the `R`, `S` and `V` parameters of the SECP-256k1 ECDSA signature, in that order. `R` and `S` MUST be big-endian encoded, fixed-width 256-bit unsigned. `V` MUST be an 8-bit big-endian encoded, non-normalized and should be either 27 or 28.
### Padding
The padding field is used to align data size, since data size alone might reveal important metainformation. Padding can be arbitrary size. However, it is recommended that the size of Data Field (excluding the Salt) before encryption (i.e. plain text) SHOULD be factor of 256 bytes.
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).

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---
title: 8/WAKU-MAIL
name: Waku Mailserver
status: stable
editor: Andrea Maria Piana \<andreap@status.im\>
contributors:
- Adam Babik \<adam@status.im\>
- Dean Eigenmann \<dean@status.im\>
- Oskar Thorén \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
## Abstract
In this specification, we describe Mailservers. These are nodes responsible for archiving envelopes and delivering them to peers on-demand.
## Specification
A node which wants to provide mailserver functionality MUST store envelopes from incoming Messages packets (Waku packet-code `0x01`). The envelopes can be stored in any format, however they MUST be serialized and deserialized to the Waku envelope format.
A mailserver SHOULD store envelopes for all topics to be generally useful for any peer, however for specific use cases it MAY store envelopes for a subset of topics.
### Requesting Historic Envelopes
In order to request historic envelopes, a node MUST send a packet P2P Request (`0x7e`) to a peer providing mailserver functionality. This packet requires one argument which MUST be a Waku envelope.
In the Waku envelope's payload section, there MUST be RLP-encoded information about the details of the request:
```abnf
; UNIX time in seconds; oldest requested envelope's creation time
lower = 4OCTET
; UNIX time in seconds; newest requested envelope's creation time
upper = 4OCTET
; array of Waku topics encoded in a bloom filter to filter envelopes
bloom = 64OCTET
; unsigned integer limiting the number of returned envelopes
limit = 4OCTET
; array of a cursor returned from the previous request (optional)
cursor = *OCTET
; List of topics interested in
topics = "[" *1000topic "]"
; 4 bytes of arbitrary data
topic = 4OCTET
payload-without-topic = "[" lower upper bloom limit [ cursor ] "]"
payload-with-topic = "[" lower upper bloom limit cursor [ topics ] "]"
payload = payload-with-topic | payload-without-topic
```
The `Cursor` field SHOULD be filled in if a number of envelopes between `Lower` and `Upper` is greater than `Limit` so that the requester can send another request using the obtained `Cursor` value. What exactly is in the `Cursor` is up to the implementation. The requester SHOULD NOT use a `Cursor` obtained from one mailserver in a request to another mailserver because the format or the result MAY be different.
The envelope MUST be encrypted with a symmetric key agreed between the requester and Mailserver.
If `Topics` is used the `Cursor` field MUST be specified for the argument order to be unambiguous. However, it MAY be set to `null`. `Topics` is used to specify which topics a node is interested in. If `Topics` is not empty, a mailserver MUST only send envelopes that belong to a topic from `Topics` list and `Bloom` value MUST be ignored.
### Receiving Historic Envelopes
Historic envelopes MUST be sent to a peer as a packet with a P2P Message code (`0x7f`) followed by an array of Waku envelopes. A Mailserver MUST limit the amount of messages sent, either by the `Limit` specified in the request or limited to the maximum [RLPx packet size](./waku#maximum-packet-size), whichever limit comes first.
In order to receive historic envelopes from a mailserver, a node MUST trust the selected mailserver, that is allow to receive expired packets with the P2P Message code. By default, such packets are discarded.
Received envelopes MUST be passed through the Whisper envelope pipelines so that they are picked up by registered filters and passed to subscribers.
For a requester, to know that all envelopes have been sent by mailserver, it SHOULD handle P2P Request Complete code (`0x7d`). This code is followed by a list with:
```abnf
; array with a Keccak-256 hash of the envelope containing the original request.
request-id = 32OCTET
; array with a Keccak-256 hash of the last sent envelope for the request.
last-envelope-hash = 32OCTET
; array of a cursor returned from the previous request (optional)
cursor = *OCTET
payload = "[" request-id last-envelope-hash [ cursor ] "]"
```
If `Cursor` is not empty, it means that not all envelopes were sent due to the set `Limit` in the request. One or more consecutive requests MAY be sent with `Cursor` field filled in in order to receive the rest of the envelopes.
### Security considerations
There are several security considerations to take into account when running or interacting with Mailservers. Chief among them are: scalability, DDoS-resistance and privacy.
**Mailserver High Availability requirement:**
A mailserver has to be online to receive envelopes for other nodes, this puts a high availability requirement on it.
**Mailserver client privacy:**
A mailserver client fetches archival envelopes from a mailserver through a direct connection.
In this direct connection, the client discloses its IP/ID as well as the topics/ bloom filter it is interested in to the mailserver.
The collection of such information allows the mailserver to link clients' IP/IDs to their topic interests and build a profile for each client over time.
As such, the mailserver client has to trust the mailserver with this level of information.
A similar concern exists for the light nodes and their direct peers which is discussed in the security considerations of [6/WAKU1](/spec/7).
**Mailserver trusted connection:**
A mailserver has a direct TCP connection, which means they are trusted to send traffic. This means a malicious or malfunctioning mailserver can overwhelm an individual node.
## Changelog
| Version | Comment |
| :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: | ------- |
| [1.0.0](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/bc7e75ebb2e45d2cbf6ab27352c113e666df37c8) | marked stable as it is in use. |
| 0.2.0 | Add topic interest to reduce bandwidth usage |
| [0.1.0](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/blob/06d4c736c920526472a507e5d842212843a112ed/wms.md) | Initial Release |
### Difference between wms 0.1 and wms 0.2
- `topics` option
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).

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---
title: 9/WAKU-RPC
name: Waku RPC API
status: stable
editor: Andrea Maria Piana \<andreap@status.im\>
contributors:
- Dean Eigenmann \<dean@status.im\>
- Oskar Thorén \<oskarth@titanproxy.com\>
sidebar_position: 1
---
This specification describes the RPC API that Waku nodes MAY adhere to. The unified API allows clients to easily
be able to connect to any node implementation. The API described is privileged as a node stores the keys of clients.
## Introduction
This API is based off the [Whisper V6 RPC API](https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/wiki/Whisper-v6-RPC-API).
## Wire Protocol
### Transport
Nodes SHOULD expose a [JSON RPC](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification) API that can be accessed. The JSON RPC version SHOULD be `2.0`. Below is an example request:
```json
{
"jsonrpc":"2.0",
"method":"waku_version",
"params":[],
"id":1
}
```
#### Fields
| Field | Description |
| --------- | --------------------------------------------------- |
| `jsonrpc` | Contains the used JSON RPC version (`Default: 2.0`) |
| `method` | Contains the JSON RPC method that is being called |
| `params` | An array of parameters for the request |
| `id` | The request ID |
### Objects
In this section you will find objects used throughout the JSON RPC API.
#### Message
The message object represents a Waku message. Below you will find the description of the attributes contained in the message object. A message is the decrypted payload and padding of an [envelope](/spec/7) along with all of its metadata and other extra information such as the hash.
| Field | Type | Description |
| ----: | :--: | ----------- |
| `sig` | string | Public Key that signed this message |
| `recipientPublicKey` | string | The recipients public key |
| `ttl` | number | Time-to-live in seconds |
| `timestamp` | number | Unix timestamp of the message generation |
| `topic` | string | 4 bytes, the message topic |
| `payload` | string | Decrypted payload |
| `padding` | string | Optional padding, byte array of arbitrary length |
| `pow` | number | The proof of work value |
| `hash` | string | Hash of the enveloped message |
#### Filter
The filter object represents filters that can be applied to retrieve messages. Below you will find the description of the attributes contained in the filter object.
| Field | Type | Description |
| ----: | :--: | ----------- |
| `symKeyID` | string | ID of the symmetric key for message decryption |
| `privateKeyID` | string | ID of private (asymmetric) key for message decryption |
| `sig` | string | Public key of the signature |
| `minPow` | number | Minimal PoW requirement for incoming messages |
| `topics` | array | Array of possible topics, this can also contain partial topics |
| `allowP2P` | boolean | Indicates if this filter allows processing of direct peer-to-peer messages |
All fields are optional, however `symKeyID` or `privateKeyID` must be present, it cannot be both. Additionally, the `topics` field is only optional when an asymmetric key is used.
### Methods
#### `waku_version`
The `waku_version` method returns the current version number.
##### Parameters
none
##### Response
- **string** - The version number.
#### `waku_info`
The `waku_info` method returns information about a Waku node.
##### Parameters
none
##### Response
The response is an `Object` containing the following fields:
- **`minPow` [number]** - The current PoW requirement.
- **`maxEnvelopeSize` [float]** - The current maximum envelope size in bytes.
- **`memory` [number]** - The memory size of the floating messages in bytes.
- **`envelopes` [number]** - The number of floating envelopes.
#### `waku_setMaxEnvelopeSize`
Sets the maximum envelope size allowed by this node. Any envelopes larger than this size both incoming and outgoing will be rejected. The envelope size can never exceed the underlying envelope size of `10mb`.
##### Parameters
- **number** - The message size in bytes.
##### Response
- **bool** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
#### `waku_setMinPoW`
Sets the minimal PoW required by this node.
##### Parameters
- **number** - The new PoW requirement.
##### Response
- **bool** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
#### `waku_markTrustedPeer`
Marks a specific peer as trusted allowing it to send expired messages.
##### Parameters
- **string** - `enode` of the peer.
##### Response
- **bool** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
#### `waku_newKeyPair`
Generates a keypair used for message encryption and decryption.
##### Parameters
none
##### Response
- **string** - Key ID on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
#### `waku_addPrivateKey`
Stores a key and returns its ID.
##### Parameters
- **string** - Private key as hex bytes.
##### Response
- **string** - Key ID on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
#### `waku_deleteKeyPair`
Deletes a specific key if it exists.
##### Parameters
- **string** - ID of the Key pair.
##### Response
- **bool** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
#### `waku_hasKeyPair`
Checks if the node has a private key of a key pair matching the given ID.
##### Parameters
- **string** - ID of the Key pair.
##### Response
- **bool** - `true` or `false` or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
#### `waku_getPublicKey`
Returns the public key for an ID.
##### Parameters
- **string** - ID of the Key.
##### Response
- **string** - The public key or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
#### `waku_getPrivateKey`
Returns the private key for an ID.
##### Parameters
- **string** - ID of the Key.
##### Response
- **string** - The private key or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
#### `waku_newSymKey`
Generates a random symmetric key and stores it under an ID. This key can be used to encrypt and decrypt messages where the key is known to both parties.
##### Parameters
none
##### Response
- **string** - The key ID or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
#### `waku_addSymKey`
Stores the key and returns its ID.
##### Parameters
- **string** - The raw key for symmetric encryption hex encoded.
##### Response
- **string** - The key ID or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
#### `waku_generateSymKeyFromPassword`
Generates the key from a password and stores it.
##### Parameters
- **string** - The password.
##### Response
- **string** - The key ID or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
#### `waku_hasSymKey`
Returns whether there is a key associated with the ID.
##### Parameters
- **string** - ID of the Key.
##### Response
- **bool** - `true` or `false` or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
#### `waku_getSymKey`
Returns the symmetric key associated with an ID.
##### Parameters
- **string** - ID of the Key.
##### Response
- **string** - Raw key on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) of failure.
#### `waku_deleteSymKey`
Deletes the key associated with an ID.
##### Parameters
- **string** - ID of the Key.
##### Response
- **bool** - `true` or `false` or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
#### `waku_subscribe`
Creates and registers a new subscription to receive notifications for inbound Waku messages.
##### Parameters
The parameters for this request is an array containing the following fields:
1. **string** - The ID of the function call, in case of Waku this must contain the value "messages".
2. **object** - The [message filter](#filter).
##### Response
- **string** - ID of the subscription or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
###### Notifications
Notifications received by the client contain a [message](#message) matching the filter. Below is an example notification:
```json
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"method": "waku_subscription",
"params": {
"subscription": "02c1f5c953804acee3b68eda6c0afe3f1b4e0bec73c7445e10d45da333616412",
"result": {
"sig": "0x0498ac1951b9078a0549c93c3f6088ec7c790032b17580dc3c0c9e900899a48d89eaa27471e3071d2de6a1f48716ecad8b88ee022f4321a7c29b6ffcbee65624ff",
"recipientPublicKey": null,
"ttl": 10,
"timestamp": 1498577270,
"topic": "0xffaadd11",
"payload": "0xffffffdddddd1122",
"padding": "0x35d017b66b124dd4c67623ed0e3f23ba68e3428aa500f77aceb0dbf4b63f69ccfc7ae11e39671d7c94f1ed170193aa3e327158dffdd7abb888b3a3cc48f718773dc0a9dcf1a3680d00fe17ecd4e8d5db31eb9a3c8e6e329d181ecb6ab29eb7a2d9889b49201d9923e6fd99f03807b730780a58924870f541a8a97c87533b1362646e5f573dc48382ef1e70fa19788613c9d2334df3b613f6e024cd7aadc67f681fda6b7a84efdea40cb907371cd3735f9326d02854",
"pow": 0.6714754098360656,
"hash": "0x17f8066f0540210cf67ef400a8a55bcb32a494a47f91a0d26611c5c1d66f8c57"
}
}
}
```
#### `waku_unsubscribe`
Cancels and removes an existing subscription. The node MUST stop sending the client notifications.
##### Parameters
- **string** - The subscription ID.
##### Response
- **bool** - `true` or `false`
#### `waku_newMessageFilter`
Creates a new message filter within the node. This filter can be used to poll for new messages that match the criteria.
##### Parameters
The request must contain a [message filter](#filter) as its parameter.
##### Response
- **string** - The ID of the filter.
#### `waku_deleteMessageFilter`
Removes a message filter from the node.
##### Parameters
- **string** - ID of the filter created with [`waku_newMessageFilter`](#waku_newMessageFilter).
##### Response
- **bool** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
#### `waku_getFilterMessages`
Retrieves messages that match a filter criteria and were received after the last time this function was called.
##### Parameters
- **string** - ID of the filter created with [`waku_newMessageFilter`](#waku_newMessageFilter).
##### Response
The response contains an array of [messages](#messages) or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
#### `waku_post`
The `waku_post` method creates a waku envelope and propagates it to the network.
##### Parameters
The parameters is an `Object` containing the following fields:
- **`symKeyID` [string]** `optional` - The ID of the symmetric key used for encryption
- **`pubKey` [string]** `optional` - The public key for message encryption.
- **`sig` [string]** `optional` - The ID of the signing key.
- **`ttl` [number]** - The time-to-live in seconds.
- **`topic` [string]** - 4 bytes message topic.
- **`payload` [string]** - The payload to be encrypted.
- **`padding` [string]** `optional` - The padding, a byte array of arbitrary length.
- **`powTime` [number]** - Maximum time in seconds to be spent on the proof of work.
- **`powTarget` [number]** - Minimal PoW target required for this message.
- **`targetPeer` [string]** `optional` - The optional peer ID for peer-to-peer messages.
*Either the **`symKeyID`** or the **`pubKey`** need to be present. It can not be both.*
#### Response
- **bool** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure.
## Changelog
| Version | Comment |
| :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------:| ---------------- |
| [1.0.0](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/bc7e75ebb2e45d2cbf6ab27352c113e666df37c8)| Initial release. |
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).